Publication Date
11-15-2025
Abstract
For many African leaders, the most serious threat to their rule does not come from elections or public protests but from the people closest to them—the military and ruling elites. This paper examines how Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Paul Biya of Cameroon have remained in power for more than four decades by carefully reshaping their security institutions in ways that minimize coup risks. Drawing on established theories of authoritarian survival and a comparative analysis of both regimes, the research shows that they rely on a deliberate set of coup-proofing tactics, including the placement of trusted allies in command roles, the fragmentation of security services, and the use of state resources to reward loyal officers. While Obiang employs a highly personalized, family-centered approach, Biya blends ethnic favoritism with a more institutionalized framework of military governance. The findings demonstrate that these strategies have been essential to the longevity of both regimes, even as they have contributed to corruption, institutional weakness, and entrenched ethnic divisions. Overall, the paper highlights how coup-proofing shapes not only the durability of authoritarian rule but also the political environments these leaders leave behind.
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