Title

HUNGER AND ANGER IN AUTOCRACIES AND DEMOCRACIES

Department

Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis

Additional Department

School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

6-2019

Embargo Period

6-25-2019

Abstract

How do democracies and autocracies respond to rising food prices? Authoritarian regimes, we argue, must match the redistribution that the poor would obtain in a democracy to prevent an uprising. Interpreting authoritarian regimes as the rule of a faction of the rich, we develop a model that suggests that (1) food price inflation is both a threat to democracies and autocracies, (2) food price inflation is more of a threat to autocracies than to democracies, and (3) food price inflation is more of a threat to autocracies that are more factionalized. We provide empirical evidence for these hypotheses.

Journal

International Journal of Development and Conflict

Journal ISSN

2010-2704

Volume

9

Issue

1

First Page

1

Last Page

18

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