Hunger and Anger in Autocracies and Democracies
Department
Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis
Additional Department
School of Conflict Management, Peacebuilding and Development
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-2019
Embargo Period
6-25-2019
Abstract
How do democracies and autocracies respond to rising food prices? Authoritarian regimes, we argue, must match the redistribution that the poor would obtain in a democracy to prevent an uprising. Interpreting authoritarian regimes as the rule of a faction of the rich, we develop a model that suggests that (1) food price inflation is both a threat to democracies and autocracies, (2) food price inflation is more of a threat to autocracies than to democracies, and (3) food price inflation is more of a threat to autocracies that are more factionalized. We provide empirical evidence for these hypotheses.
Journal Title
International Journal of Development and Conflict
Journal ISSN
2010-2704
Volume
9
Issue
1
First Page
1
Last Page
18
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
n/a