Document Type
Article
Publication Date
1-2014
Abstract
We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competitions, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in choosing the type of the licensing contract.
Comments
NOTICE: this is the author’s pre-print version of a work that was accepted for publication in International Review of Economics & Finance. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in International Review of Economics & Finance , [VOL#29, ISSUE#, (January 2014)] DOI# http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2013.07.005