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Moroccan Society’s Educational and Cultural Losses during the Years of Lead (1956-1999)

Brahim El Guabli

Abstract
In this article, I argue that political repression during the Moroccan Years of Lead (1956-1999) engendered myriad losses in the fields of education and culture. However, the scholarly focus on the embodied effects of state violence on former prisoners and forcibly disappeared individuals has overlooked the intangible damages both education and culture sustained during this period. In investigating the imbrication of political conservatism, educational reform and censorship, the article opens a more critical space for the conceptualization of the broader implications of the Years of Lead for education and culture. Drawing on several primary sources in Arabic and French, including documents of the Moroccan Student Union (UNEM), Lamalif issues, and ERC’s final report, I examine how educational and cultural loss was constitutive of the experience of Years of Lead. Combining close readings with historical analysis, this article is an invitation to broaden the scope of scholarly investigation of the multilayered ramifications of statal political violence on socio-economic and cultural fields in Morocco.

Keywords: Years of Lead, culture, education, loss, potential, retraditionalization, authoritarianism, Lamalif, Souffles/Anfas

We don’t know yet the extent to which repression impacted the production and creativity of academics, music, theater, cinema, visual arts, literature, [and] the press, both written and audiovisual (Fakihani, 2005, p.163).

The Moroccan “Years of Lead” (1956-1999), also known as sanawāt al-jamr wal-raṣāṣaṣ, al-sanawāt al-sawdā’, les années de plomb, les années de la braise, and les années noires were decades of multilayered losses due to state violence. Describing the decades between Morrocco’s independence in 1956 and the passing of King Hassan II in 1999, the Years of Lead were half a century of systematic violence against dissidents in the midst of the power struggle that pitted the monarchy against its opposition (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-53). Although much work has focused on the embodied violence victims experienced during this period (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, pp. 51-117), less tangible losses the state inflicted on
Moroccan society during the Years of Lead have yet to be examined in theoretical terms. For example, there was loss of socioeconomic and cultural potential due to the isolation imposed on the regions that housed former detention centers (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006b, pp. 37-38). Additionally, not only did the Years of Lead leave their scars on their direct victims, but they also exacerbated the fear of institutions and undermined the democratic, economic, and artistic prospects of Moroccan society (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 68-72; Fakihani, 2005, p. 163). Since preventing a people from achieving their full potential in any field is a form of loss, this article aims to reveal the processes that led to the intangible and difficult-to-quantify losses that authoritarianism inflicted on Moroccans through the examination of the impact the Years of Lead had on education and culture.

I argue that education and culture were areas in which the Years of Lead had a significant, albeit understudied, damage. In this regard, Rachid Benmokhtar, a former minister of education, has declared that “[t]he opposition between the monarchy on the one hand and the political parties on the other hand made Morocco lose forty years of development.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). According to Belmokhtar, “[i]nstead of taking care of development, much time was spent on power struggles.” (Akalay, 2017, para. 10). The striking absence of academic studies that ground their analysis of the present state of Moroccan education and culture in the repressive Years of Lead requires that I craft this analysis based on written sources. Consequently, I draw on original documents of Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc (National Union of Moroccan Students, UNEM) collected by Claude Palazzoli in his book Le Maroc politique (1974), some issues of the monthly journal Lamalif, and the Equity and Reconciliation Commission’s (ERC) final report to theorize how political retraditionalization, cultural attrition, and educational losses are interconnected during the Moroccan Years of Lead. In investigating loss in education and culture as a fundamental aspect of this violent period in Moroccan history, this article paves the path toward a broader scholarly engagement with the intangible effects of authoritarianism. The article also provides a retrospective understanding of the chronic ills that continue to haunt Moroccan educational and cultural fields today.

Retraditionalization of Education during the Years of Lead

Education and culture were ideal candidates for political repression during the formative years following Morocco’s post-independence in 1956. Clifford Geertz (1973) has defined culture as a “system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life” (p. 89). In Morocco’s post-independence context in which both the monarchy and the nationalist movement were negotiating the configuration of power, both contenders understood that monopolizing educational and cultural outlets was key to establish control over society and the political system that would define the new nation-state. In fact, even before Morocco’s independence, Moroccan nationalist leaders made access to a modern education a crucial stepping-stone toward liberation (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 199; Monjib, 2013, p. 7). In the post-colonial period, however, education and culture were one of the terrains in which the conflict between the monarchy and its
opposition played out. This very fact turned education into a battlefield in which were fought out political disagreements over the future of Morocco. Culture and education were corner stones of the monarchy’s strategy to retraditionalize the political system by reviving pre-colonial mechanisms of authority despite the opposition of the progressives who advocated the establishment of a democratic state. However, the victory of retraditionalization by the enthronement of Hassan II in 1961 dealt, as an academic would later write, a strong blow to the “modernist flow in Moroccan culture,” which “was subjected to a real operation of political abortion whose harbingers appeared in the aftermath of March 23 [1965] [education-related] events in Casablanca” (al-Naḥḥāl, 2013, para. 5). Noureddine Afaya, the philosopher who made this statement, has thus attributed Morocco’s failed modernity to repression in the fields of culture and education.

The strive to quell dissidence in 1960s and 1970s shaped the Moroccan state’s attitude vis-à-vis education. In a much-referred-to interview with Jean Daniel, the director of the French newspaper Le Nouvel Observateur, King Hassan II was reported to have connected education to dissidence. In Hassan II’s opinion, educated Moroccan youth either turned to Marxism or joined the ranks of the opposition (El Kaidi, 2018, para. 7). This royal skepticism vis-à-vis education was translated into an active endeavor “to convince the ruling class that the massification of education represented a mortal threat to the socio-economic equilibrium and the worldview on which the regime is [sic] founded” (Monjib, 2013, p. 7). Also, this desire to halt universal education in the 1960s coincided with the firing of Abdallah Ibrahim’s government, which undertook fundamental socio-economic reforms in all fields and strove to preserve the autonomy of the prime minister’s office (Daoud, 2019, pp. 159-160; Kably, 2011, pp. 660-661). UNEM, which was created to represent all Moroccan students in 1956, blamed the recantation of the “generalization, unification, Arabization, and Moroccanization of cadres” on the royal decision to sack Ibrahim’s government to prevent modernization (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 422-423). Even the ERC has recorded a historian’s assessment of the Years of Lead as “a transitional period during which the educational system [witnessed] the assassination of critical thinking and the replacement of the younger generations’ learning of love of the homeland and its territory […] with a superficial education that relied on an artificial history” (Hay’at al-insāf, 2006c, p. 72). The assumption underlying this statement is that critical thinking bred dissidence and “real” history infused people with a spirit of resistance, both of which were not encouraged during this period.

A progressive school was antithetical to the monarchy’s retraditionalizing project. Morocco’s independence created a clash of visions of the nascent nation-state between a traditionalist camp that rallied behind the monarchy and a more progressive camp that wanted to establish a democratic polity (Kably, 2011, p. 658, 661). While the monarchy was surrounded by former French Protectorate administrators, caïds, rural notables, and officers, the progressive camp brought together different factions on the left of Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl (Independence Party) as well as members of the newly formed Armée de libération nationale (National Liberation Army). The two principles that cemented this camp together was the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy in which the king reigned without ruling and continuing the struggle for the complete liberation of all Moroccan territories (Hay’at al-insāf, 2006b, p. 51; Kably, 2011, pp. 655-656). Retraditionalization resulted in royal absolutism, which ended 44 years of colonial modernity by 1960. Reflecting on retraditionalization, Laroui (2005) underlined the fact that instead of the anticipated modernity, the monarchy “erased [the colonial reforms] one after the other” (Laroui, 2005, p. 23). Concepts, such as bay’a (allegiance) were reinvented and constitutionalized to further legitimize the royal power (Hammoudi, 1997, p. 13). Moreover, political retraditionalization was accompanied by a return of annual religious festivals to entrench the “dynastic, territorial and cultural” continuity of the Alawite monarchy despite the Salafis’ protests (Valensi, 1990, p. 280). Not only that, conservative values as well as mosque education were promoted in the media and state institutions (Kably, 2011, p. 665). In both school and politics, the triumph of retraditionalization terminated “an experience in which a Moroccan humanism could have been born” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174). Therefore, conservative politics deprived Morocco of the myriad possibilities that could have emerged from “a synthesis between Moroccan traditional, religious culture and modernity” (Daoud, 2019, p. 174).

The revival of religious education undergirded political and societal retraditionalization during the Years of Lead (Kably, 2011, p. 665). Mohammed Chafik, a pedagogical inspector and former director of the prestigious College Royal, where princes and princesses still receive their education, was recruited in the context of May 1968 events in France to prepare “a more technical report on the pedagogical value of Quranic education that was dispensed in the mosques” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 46). Chafik recommended dismantling the religious education system because, in his very unreserved words, “education in the msids [mosques] is one of the main causes of our civilization lag” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 46). Against Chafik’s conclusion, the king instructed his minister of education to generalize this education; a decision that Chafik would later explain by the fact that msid education has historically furnished the Moroccan state with its best servants because, always in his controversial phrasing, it teaches a “culture of submission” (Aït Mous & Ksikes, 2014, p. 47). Chafik’s highly disputable statement about Islamic education shows how deep the cleavage was between the conservative monarchy and the modernist current in society. Speaking to the consequences of this system, Khadija Merouazi, a human rights activist, declared that the state’s education strategy “contributed to the creation of the […] submissive Moroccan citizen” (Hay’at al-insāf, 2005, para. 13). Princeton-trained sociologist Mohamed Guessous also accused the state of using schools to “create generations of hyenas” (Guessous, 2016, n.p.). The distrust of education by the authorities was reflected in Guessous’s (2016) assertion that “considered school a threat and education a tool for the training of agitators” who become “opponents of the dominating economic, social and political regime” (para. 3). Guessous’s analysis of the demonization of education was twofold: first, he showed that the dominant discourse attempted to delegitimize the importance of the modern school; second, in using the dabu’ or hyena metaphor to describe the new generations of Moroccan students, Guessous referred to the fact that school curricula did not teach critical
thinking skills. Paradoxically, as Monjib (2013) has revealed, in the midst of the generalization of religious education, the royal palace requested the assistance of the French embassy to order French first grade curricula for the crown prince (p. 10). This means that retraditionalization in education was not designed for all Moroccan children.

**Colonial Precursors: A Protracted Legacy**

The Moroccan state had a model to follow in its revival of religious education in parallel to a modern school. Acting as France’s first resident general in Morocco between 1912 and 1925, Lyautey bequeathed Moroccans a dual educational system. This system included pre-Protectorate, religious schools as well as the modern school system that was established in 1912. While the former was accessible to all children through mosques and Sufi orders, the latter was only available to the lucky few Moroccans who joined the écoles des fils de notables. This colonial educational system was governed by multiple discriminatory and intelligence-based considerations, which all aimed to educate some Moroccans just enough to serve the state without endangering the indigenous way of life (Knibiehler, 1994, p. 490). In accordance with Lyautey’s vision to spare Moroccans colonial modernity, he instituted a policy that continued to prevent Moroccan students from attending French universities until 1930 (Vermeren, 2011, p. 56). Colonial education was also hierarchized and organized according to class (poor/notables), location (rural/urban), professions (agricultural and industrial schools), religion (Jewish/Muslim), and languages (Berber/Arabic) (Chafiqi & Alagui, 2011, pp. 29-30). By the end of its 44 years of direct rule in Morocco, France’s most impactful achievement was the establishment of an elitist system that served a very small number of Moroccans (al-Jābiṛī, 1972, p. 18). This same system has been reinvented to be the key to the future and a passport to education in engineering, medical, and business schools abroad in contemporary North Africa (Vermeren, 2005, para. 5).

This Lyauteyan model was there for the Moroccan government to guide the reforms it undertook in education in the heated political climate of the 1960s. In response to students’ increasing political commitment, education was reformed to stave off the revolution of the educated generations. Controlling foreign languages became central to the state’s strive to prevent political commitment among students. For example, Moroccan students in the 1960s acquired solid linguistic skills, allowing them to read Marx, Engles, Gramsci, Lenin, and Mao Zedong, when they joined the university. This fact turned French into a revolutionary tool that the ruling class attempted to withdraw from ordinary Moroccans. Vermeren (2011) has written that Hassan II “limit[ed] students’ access to primary school, then secondary school, [then] he start[ed] the Arabization, cancel[led] the teaching of ‘subversive’ topics (European history, philosophy, sociology), and then put[s] an end to educational cooperation [with France]” (p. 57). In this context, depoliticizing the youth was Arabization’s main function in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the king, at least in his public statements, was in favor of bilingualism (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 201), he did not hesitate to Arabize education when the class interests of his opponents converged with his conservative politics (El Ayadi, 2009, p. 196).
Therefore, there is reason to think, however, that Arabization, albeit a demand of Moroccan nationalists, was used to prevent future generations of Moroccan students from accessing revolutionary ideas.

**Student Protests and Security-Driven Reforms in Education**

UNEM, the national student union, opposed the conservative monarchy and became the incubator of the Moroccan student-led revolutionary thought. Although Moroccan students played an active role in the construction of Moroccan nationalism during the colonial period, their activism after independence was mistrusted by the monarchy. A depoliticized organization when it was established in 1956 to represent all Moroccan students, UNEM’s first four years were uneventful (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). However, the student union took a radical turn in the aftermath of the split within the Independence Party in 1959 and the sacking of Ibrahim’s government in 1960 (Palazzoli, 1974, pp. 400-401). Its 1963 Azrou Manifest called for “the abolition of the regime [as] condition sine qua non to extricate[ing] the country from the open or latent crisis with which it has not ceased to wrestle since independence” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 419). In the face of the all-out political repression of political parties and student activism at the peak of the Years of Lead, UNEM stressed that its historical responsibility required that Moroccan students work toward “overthrowing the current regime and seiz[ing] of power by popular, revolutionary, democratic and legitimate organizations that represent the people” (Palazzoli, 1974, p. 421). These radical positions of the body representing Moroccan students, high school students included, induced security-driven reforms that aimed to reduce the number of students admitted into the educational system.

These security-driven, rather than pedagogically-oriented, reforms triggered the explosion of post-independence frustrations in Casablanca on March 23, 1965. Minister of Education Youssef Belabès had proposed a bill in February 1965 to institute an age cap on students’ access to high school (Brouksy, 2005, para. 2). By proposing to prevent students who were aged 16 or more from passing final middle school exams, the minister intended to decrease the number of students in increasingly politicized high schools (Daure-Serfaty, 1993, p. 29). Moreover, these proposed measures were disadvantageous to working class families at a moment when the lucrative jobs left behind by former French employees as well as thousands of qualified Moroccan Jews would be available for educated Moroccans (Miskīn, 2019, para. 3). As a result of the announcement of this reform, Morocco witnessed the first post-independence urban rebellion on March 23, 1965. Instigated by UNEM, which became the de facto “spearhead of the opposition” (Kably, 2011, p. 665), thousands of students protested peaceably in Casablanca on March 22. These student protests ended in a bloodbath on March 23 (Brouksy, 2005, paras. 7 & 8). When parents and the unemployed joined the protests, the army intervened, turning the peaceful protests into a carnage; leaving 500 to 1,000 dead according to social memory (al-Sanūsī, 2009; Laffort, 2009, p. 43).

Up until the establishment of the ERC, this rebellion was relegated to oblivion. However, ERC’s final report unsilenced the history of this educational revolt and established some important facts about it. In addition to refuting the official version
of the events, which “put the [death] toll at seven dead,” ERC confirmed the death of 50 protesters (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 91). ERC’s report has also specified that “a large number of the 31 victims died of gunshot wounds in the skull and rib cage,” including three children under the age of 10 (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006a, p. 75). Not only did the ERC officialize the existence of higher numbers of dead, but its investigative work brought more journalistic and scholarly attention to this foundational urban uprising.

Security concerns also impacted humanistic disciplines, specifically sociology and philosophy during the Years of Lead. For instance, the Institut de sociologie, which played a crucial role in the effort to decolonize social sciences, practice sociology as an “activist-oriented” discipline, rather than a “sociology on demand,” and subsequently train generations of Moroccan sociologists, was closed in 1970 (El Idrissi, 2017, p. 193). May 1968, the rise of the Moroccan Marxist-Leninist Movement (MMLM), and the state’s wariness of contact between researchers and populations created an adverse climate to sociological work. Evoking the events of this period, Zakya Daoud (2007) has observed that,

The authority suspected the institute of training evil spirits [italics in the original]. Morocco has no need (for) these birds of bad omen that sociologists are. Once the institute was shut down, sociology was replaced by theology, and [the country] plunged into tradition and social archaisms were encouraged. (p. 141)

Abdelkébir Khatibi, the then director of the institute, downplayed Daoud’s observations. In his response to Daoud’s assertions, Khatibi refuted the institute’s political role and foregrounded its academic mission and the diligence of its students (Khatibi, 2008, p. 35). While expressing his consternation at the government’s decision to shutter the institute, Khatibi attributed it to the prevalence of resistance to critical and analytical inquiry among politicians (Khatibi, 2008, p. 35).

Philosophy did not fare any better. The Arabization of the discipline put an end to 40 years of francophone philosophical practice in Morocco. When philosophy was Arabized in 1971, Tahar Ben Jelloun, a then unknown philosophy teacher in high school in Casablanca, left Morocco to live in France. Years later, Ben Jelloun would say that the “Ministry of Interior decide[d] to Arabize philosophy in order to prevent Moroccans from learning how to think, to doubt, and to reflect. So, we [would] Arabize and teach Islamic thought [instead]” (Sorel-Sutter, 2015, p. 160). Indeed, in tandem with the Arabization of philosophy and the onslaught on sociology, Islamic studies were introduced in order to Islamize the Marxist youth (El Ayadi, 2004, p. 114). El Ayadi (2004) has argued that by the time Islamic Studies became a department during the academic year 1979-1980, philosophy, which they replaced, became “the victim of the state’s new religious doctrine” (p. 118). Consequently, Islamization and Arabization of academic disciplines were entrenched even as the Moroccan monarchy consolidated its authoritarian grip on the country.
Intellectual work was also denigrated in these disadvantageous circumstances for education and culture. Intellectuals, especially the ones endowed with “advanced theoretical training,” in the humanities were met with disregard and suspicion (Monjib, 2013, p. 7). Analyzing Hassan II’s attitudes toward intellectuals, including himself, Abdallah Laroui (2005), Morocco’s prominent historian and philosopher, has written that “[f]or a long time, Hassan II ignored me as he ignored tens of other intellectuals who prefer to write in Arabic” before adding that,

Hassan II did not like those of his subjects who lived abroad for a very long time or pretended to have original ideas. [...] [Hassan II] was only at ease among technicians, who are content with finding solutions to the problems that he brought to their attention (engineers, jurists, physicians, littérateurs, etc.). He also got along very well with the traditional “ulamā” who were also, in their own way, technicians of speech and psychological manipulation. (p. ix)

Adil Hajji, a Moroccan intellectual, has explained Hassan II’s attitude toward intellectuals by his traditional training (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Accordingly, Hassan II understood the intellectual as a learned person who “knew the texts, the scriptural sources, the Quran, history, and language.” (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). Thus, the critical intellectual had no place in this traditional understanding of intellectual work (Dalle, 2011, p. 625). This royal disregard of highly educated citizens was true across the board, even vis-à-vis educated Moroccan Jewish Communists (Benbaruk, 1990, p. 51). Hassan II’s preference for technicians and technocrats was probably due to the wrong assumption that their work is not premised on the existence of freedom compared to their humanistic counterparts. Whereas authoritarianism can cohabit with technical modernity, as is the case in places like China today, freedom and free thought are more challenging to accommodate. Therefore, this disregard for intellectuals was merely a reflection of an official view of educated people and education’s place in society.

However, instead of placing all agency with King Hassan II, it is important to underline that Moroccan political parties also facilitated the constraints imposed on education. For instance, immediately after March 23, 1965, Mohammed Benhima, the new Minister of Education, charted a detailed reform program. This reform plan included pursuing the generalization of primary education, introducing a selection process in high school to orient students to specialties that better suited their abilities, instituting bilingualism as a policy, continuing educational cooperation with France, and improving the quality of education (Adam, 1966, pp. 223-224). However, the Independence party accused the minister’s plan of “undermin[ing] the foundations of [the nation’s] personality as well as the unity of the country by destroying the mother tongue; [and] its cultural unity, which is based on the national language, the language of the Quran” (Adam, 1966, pp. 224-225). King Hassan II snatched the initiative from the Independence party and, according to former minister Mahjoubi Aherdan,
ordered the institution of the five obligatory prayers in all universities and schools, [and] the addition of a course of religious education, which will be taken into consideration to sanction a student’s success regardless of their grades or language of education. (Aourid, 2019, para. 1)

As El Ayadi rightly has noted, the convergence between “religious reformism of the Istiqlāl party” and the “monarchy’s religious fundamentalism” accelerated the implementation of the “Arabization-Islamization of education” (El Ayadi, 2004, p. 117). Therefore, political parties cannot be entirely absolved of their share of responsibility for the lost potential of the Moroccan education system.

Today’s discussions of the pathetic state of Moroccan education lack the historical depth. A better contextualization of education and culture within the politics of the Years of Lead could explain how repression thwarted the establishment of a progressive and egalitarian school system. It is true that international bodies’ reports rank Morocco very low in terms of the quality of education (for instance, UNESCO), but these reports do not ground these rankings in historical contexts to illuminate the political origins of the failure. A systematic study of the impact of the establishment of an authoritarian regime on the country’s move toward educational modernity could elucidate the various ways in which the rupture it instituted in both politics and society forestalled the potential of Moroccan education. Moroccan’s rush toward private schools and foreign-language-based education today does not emanate from society’s natural evolution but is rather a consequence of the country’s failure to reverse the nefarious effects authoritarianism-dictated policies had on education. It’s both state and society that are paying the price for the sabotage of any progressive educational reform since independence. The social and human cost of Morocco’s lagging behind in education is now threatening to the state because of “civic disengagement, social delinquency and political deviance” (Berrada & El Aoufi, 2007, p. 4). Confirming these scholarly conclusions, none other than the official Haut Commissariat au Plan (2007) has warned that “it is highly probable that any development strategy is doomed to fail” if Moroccan human capital is not rehabilitated (p. 66); a belated realization that, for sure, emerged from the exigencies of neoliberalism and economic globalization, but which fails to contextualize the attrition in Morocco’s educational system in the legacy of the Years of Lead.

**Cultural Attrition during the Years of Lead:**

**Banned Cultural Journals**

Cultural production, writ large, sustained multiple losses during the Years of Lead. Sociologist Abdellatif Ezzine (n.d.) has rightly suggested that it is critical to investigate “censorship and the different restrictions that targeted thought and culture in their critical dimension” during the multidecade Years of Lead (para. 1). Ezzine (n.d.) even suggested that culture lived its own Years of Lead. Following on Ezzine’s proposition, I foreground the significance of cultural losses the Moroccan cultural scene registered due to state violence. A combination of censorship and weakening of the legal guarantees for publishers silenced cultural outlets that
challenged the state or provided a critical approach to Moroccan affairs (Hay’āt al-
insāf, 2006, p. 38). Over the years, many important newspapers, such as al-
Muharrir, and cultural journals Lamalīf (1966-1988), Aqlām (1964-1982), al-
(1981-1984), and al-Badīl (1981-1984) were banned or pushed to bankruptcy
4), thus depriving Moroccan society of their valuable contributions to public
debates. The mere absence of these publications from the public arena and the
suppression of the voices for which they served as a platform was a consequential
loss that scholarship has yet to account for.

Souffles/Anfas (1966-1973) is the cultural and political journal whose loss has
been studied the most (Fondation Laâbi, 2016; Harrison & Villa-Ignacio, 2015;
Sefrioui, 2013,). Souffles/Anfas was MMLM’s cultural outlet and the publication
that set the tone for the radicalization of the Moroccan youth after March 23, 1965.
The termination of Souffles/Anfas’s publication in 1972 dealt a huge blow to
Moroccan leftist thought. Indeed, Souffles/Anfas played a crucial role in creating a
new language and disseminating a leftist consciousness among both francophone
and Arabic-speaking readers. However, the tendency of francophone scholars to
present it as the main driver of intellectual transformation in Morocco is a risky
project. It has had the reverse effect of overshadowing the foundational work of
other cultural magazines during the same period. For instance, while Souffles/Anfas
adopted a rejectionist attitude vis-à-vis political parties, which was in line with
MMLM’s accusation of legal political parties of reformism (al-Shawi, 2015, p.
112), other publications, such as Lamalīf and Aqlām, treaded more tactically to
survive. Unlike Souffles/Anfas’s short-lived experience, these journals managed to
sustain their existence for decades, neither compromising their editorial convictions
nor betraying their critical positions, thus making a long-term impact on both
society and politics. Yet the long-term impact Arabic and francophone Moroccan
journals had on culture and politics still demands a comprehensive study.

In terms of numbers, Arabic journals suffered the most from the Years of Lead.
Because of their larger readership, Arabic cultural outlets also played a crucial role
in creating a critical cultural scene in Morocco. Not only did Arabic journals
contribute to the emergence of a Moroccan school of thought, but they also put this
local thought in dialogue with other intellectual traditions from both the East and
the West. For instance, journal Bayt al-Ḥikma translated articles by Michel
Foucault, François Ewald, Jacques Derrida, Claude Lévy-Strauss, and Julia
Kristeva, among others (1985, issue 1, April 1). Al-Jusur’s articles also included
translations of Aleksei Tikhonov’s work on Soviet planning and Jacques Attali’s
work Sovietism (1981, issue 2, June 1). Nonetheless, authoritarian Morocco could
not cohabit with the analyses Moroccan and foreign intellectuals disseminated
through these cultural platforms. As a result, the journals al-Thaqāfa al-jadīda, al-
Zaman al-Maghribī, al-Jusūr, and al-Badīl were banned at once in 1984 (Anoual,
1984, p. 4). Commenting on the administrative decision to close these cultural
journals, Annual (1984), the daily newspaper, interpreted this act as an “abortion of
innovative activities” in the cultural field (p. 4). Anoual also saw in banning these
journals an act of silencing that aimed to isolate serious intellectual work from
Morocco’s “Arab and global environment” (Anoual, 1984, p. 4). In Anoual’s analysis, the ban of the four journals “reflected repression’s sensitivity toward the progressive cultural action” and signaled that this decision was bad news for the rest of the cultural institutions that they might be targeted as well (Anoual, 1984, p. 4). The shutting down of several media outlets at the same time was meant to shock and terrorize cultural actors that the state had limitless power over their existence.

The early cultural outlets of Amazigh cultural expressions were also repressed. Neither Amazigh activists nor their cultural production were spared the generalized experience of loss during the Years of Lead. Upon Morocco’s independence, Arab nationalism’s irredentism combined with the Jacobin state model erased Amazigh identity from the public sphere. The persistence of the legacy of the so-called Berber Dahir, which was supposedly passed by the French Protectorate in 1930 to divide Arabs and Berbers in Morocco through French-Berber schools and the application of customary law to Berber areas, contributed to the negative attitude toward Amazigh cultural expression. Even worse than the Berber Dahir was the fact that the leaders of the coups d’états against Hassan II in 1971 and 1972 were Amazigh. However, the cultural field was the area in which repression of Amazigh rights was most manifested in the 1980s. For example, Ali Sidqi Azayku, an Amazigh activist, historian, and littérateur, was accused of posing a threat to the safety of the state because of an article he published in the first issue of journal Amazigh: revue marocaine d’histoire et de civilisation in 1981. Entitled “Fī sabīl mafhūm ḥaqīqī līthqāfatina al-ṭaniyya” [toward a real conceptualization of our national culture], the article was a revisionist attempt to question the connections between language, Islam, and national culture in Morocco. In driving a wedge between Islam and Arabic, Azaykou refuted the argument whereby Arabic as the language of Quran was used to eliminate Amazigh. Azaykou showed that the Quran did not invent a new Arabic with the advent of Islam in order to demonstrate that claiming Amazigh culture and being Muslim were not mutually exclusive (Azaykou, 1981, p. 41). Azaykou’s article constituted a frontal attack against the advocates of Arabization, who falsely linked the primacy of Arabic to Islam and preached incessantly the need to replace foreign languages with Arabic in order to promote a national culture while acting in an entirely contrary manner in their own lives. (Maddy-Weitzman, 2011, p. 99)

However, the price was a year in jail for Azaykou and the prohibition of the journal. With the ban of Amazigh: revue marocaine d’histoire et de civilisation, “Amazigh cultural movement was deprived of any activity” until the early 1990s (Rollinde, 1999, para. 11).

The end of Lamalif’s journey in 1988 was probably the most significant loss of a cultural platform during the Years of Lead. Lamalif (لا), which means NO in Arabic, was one of the most important journalistic experiences in Moroccan
history. Started by Jacqueline David (Zakya Daoud) and Mohammed Loghlam in 1966, *Lamalif: Revue Mensuelle, Culturelle, Economique et Sociale* initiated a different kind of journalism in Morocco. Combining coverage of culture, economy, society, and in-depth analyses of specific issues in a monthly journal, *Lamalif* targeted readers from across the social and political spectrum (*Lamalif*, 1966, p. 5). The conspicuous NO gracing its third page could not be more explicit in terms of the journal’s position vis-à-vis the Moroccan state throughout the period of its publication. Established in the tumultuous context of the state of exception (1965-1970) and the brutal attack on opposition political parties, *Lamalif* incarnated the mission of the “fragmented” Moroccan left without being a political party (Rollinde, 2002, p. 149). However, *Lamalif*’s editors’ success at striking a balance between their role as journalists/intellectuals and critics of the socio-political and cultural conditions in Morocco granted the journal longevity and allowed it to reach 200 issues that shed critical light on a host of issues of interest to Moroccan society. *Lamalif* rehabilitated intellectual reflection through a journalistic practice that has both the “critical gaze and the necessary autonomy to analyze, comprehend, and react to society in which [the journalist] lives.” (Rollinde, 2002, p. 150). By 1988, Lamalif was “a reference for a whole democratic current,” thus posing a threat to the state (Rollinde, 2002, p. 151). Just as *Lamalif* reached the pinnacle of its success by the publication of its 200th issue, Daoud and Loghlam shut down the magazine in a last activist act against authoritarianism. Rather than accepting a humiliating compromise with the authorities to publish articles by the powerful Minister of Interior and confining *Lamalif*’s distribution to university campuses (Daoud, 2007, p. 323), Daoud and Loghlam terminated the existence of their journal. The disappearance of *Lamalif* from Moroccan newsstands in 1988 was synonymous with the end of a most elegant and subversive way of saying NO to power. It also meant the loss of the longest existing and one of the most successful cultural journals in Moroccan history.

Even today, it is difficult to compare *Lamalif* to other journals. The balance between political independence, intellectual integrity, and critical engagement with societal questions was *Lamalif*’s mission statement from the start. In its first editorial entitled “Ce que nous voulons,” (this is what we want) *Lamalif* announced its identity and explained the three axes that defined its mission. In displaying ﾂ on its covers, *Lamalif* (1966) rejected the prevalent feelings of negativity in Moroccan society and presented itself as “an optimistic journal […] driven by hope, confidence, and certainty” (p. 5). Representing a project of hope in the morose Years of Lead required *Lamalif* to be a “journal that is resolutely open, open to all, to all professions, all intellectual tendencies, from all sides” (*Lamalif*, 1966, p. 5). *Lamalif* presented itself as part of most Moroccan people’s shared vision to “create a new state of mind, lift taboos and walk steadfastly toward the future” (*Lamalif*, 1966, p. 5). In delineating its cultural, economic, and social nature, *Lamalif* used a

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1 I had incorporated some ideas from this section into the proposal of the *Lamalif* anthology I am co-editing with Professor Ali Alalou. Although my work on *Lamalif* predated my partnership with Professor Alalou on the anthology, I would like to acknowledge the discussions I have had with him about the journal in the last two years.
very subversive definition of culture as “contestation, questioning, so renovation, because it is the profound expression of a people, its problems, aspirations, and its own reality” (Lamalif, 1966, p. 6). Finally, Lamalif’s self-chosen mission to provide analyses and studies of socio-economic and cultural questions did not prevent it from interest in literature and art, which it served immensely over 22 years of its existence.

The special dossiers, which Lamalif promised to publish on a monthly basis, were the location in which its 200 issues made a breakthrough in Moroccan thought and social debates. Opening up new breaches in the walls of social and political taboos, Lamalif published issues entitled “Yesterday and today’s crazies” (issue 81, 1976), “The war on cannabis” (issue 4, 1966), “ELECTIONS, TOMORROW?” (issue 10, 1967), “Che Guevara” (issue 16, 1967), and “Is there a Jewish question in Morocco” (issue 21, 1968), among others. The cover of its penultimate issue was dedicated to the “Language debate” in Morocco (issue 199, 1988). From women’s rights to religiosity in the French banlieues and Morocco’s multilayered belonging to the Maghreb, Africa, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, Lamalif brought significant depth to the journalistic practice in Morocco. The combination of information, analysis, and reflection on the deeper implications of the topics discussed in its pages made Lamalif a true forum for cutting-edge analyses about and theorization of a different Morocco. The premature termination of Lamalif’s publication in 1988 has since deprived generations of Moroccans of the benefits of these theorizations.

Lamalif’s survival under repression should not, however, be interpreted as a sign of democracy. In fact, Lamalif survived for 20 because its editors succeeded at navigating Morocco’s uncertain political situation. Loghlam and Daoud’s knowledge of when their work would be tolerated and when it would invite a backlash allowed them to practice their profession carefully. For instance, Lamalif did not cover MMLM members’ trials nor those of the soldiers involved in the coups d’états in 1970s. Additionally, unlike Souffles/Anfas’ support of independence in Western Sahara, Lamalif’s positions vis-à-vis this issue was closer to the authorities’. This aptitude to be critical and also careful when criticism is a risky endeavor helped Lamalif to stay a critical voice in an authoritarian climate for two decades. Nevertheless, a financially successful and intellectually autonomous journal could not be tolerated by the authorities. It only took one sentence about the Moroccan state officials’ habit of making people wait in its 200th volume for the journal to come under fire. This would ultimately lead to the termination of its existence.

In 1994, six years after the publication of Lamalif was stopped, Zakya Daoud provided an insightful reflection on the journal’s experience. Daoud remembered an independent, successful, and conscientious journal that should not have disappeared from the Moroccan cultural landscape. According to Daoud (1994),

all our collaborators in the beginning were part-time workers and volunteers. However, they slowly became permanent in their jobs and received remuneration. Our commercial means had also been developed.
By 1988, *Lamalif* was 90 pages-long and used full color (*quadrichronmie*), especially in its covers which were reserved for Moroccan paintings, in an [an effort that reflected] a nationalist aesthetic will. Also, our independence has always been preserved, and *Lamalif* had never any money issue, which was very rare [in the press sector]. It would have continued to exist indefinitely by its own means. (p. 162)

However, what Daoud did not say was that this very success was the reason *Lamalif* had to cease existing. Since the journal was not struggling enough financially, the authorities must have known that a compromise with the editors was impossible. Daoud (2007) would later reveal that the Minister of Interior complained of the “enormous” nature *Lamalif*’s sales, which reached 12,000 copies a month (p. 322). This number might sound insignificant in 2019, but it was quite momentous for a mostly illiterate society in 1988. Even *Souffles/Anfas* did not reach such numbers in its heyday in 1960s. For the Minister of Interior, these high sales indicated that *Lamalif* was not just read by the francophone elites, but also by ordinary Moroccans. To prevent *Lamalif*’s critical voice from seeping even deeper into society, the minister offered the publishers the possibility to sell it on university campuses only (Daoud, 2007, p. 322), a solution Loghlam and Daoud rejected, and, instead, closed the journal out of their own volition. The pressure to put an end to *Lamalif*’s publication in 1988 cannot but evoke the continuity of the same mistrust of education and culture that reigned over Morocco since independence.

**The ERC and the Immaterial Losses in Education and Culture**

**During the Years of Lead**

Upon the recommendation of the *Conseil consultatif des droits de l’Homme*, King Mohammed VI put in place Morocco’s ERC on January 7, 2004 (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006, p. 16). Its founding decree tasked the ERC with “nonjudicial” prerogatives that “include[d] the inquiry, the investigation, the assessment, the arbitration, and the recommendation” about the past arbitrary detention and forced disappearance (USIP, 2009, Article 6). The same decree limited ERC’s mandate to finding the truth about past violations of human rights without determining individual responsibility for them (USIP, 2009, Article 6). Specifying ERC’s temporal prerogatives, Article 8 of the decree stated that the ERC was created “to deal with the violations committed during the period from the independence to the date of the royal approval creating the Independent Commission of Arbitration in charge of compensation of the victims of forced disappearance and arbitrary detention” (USIP, 2009, Article 8). This period roughly covered Morocco’s independence in 1956 through the passing of King Hassan II in 1999. Compared to other transitional justice experiences, ERC had one of the longest temporal periods in the world (Groupe de travail, 2009, p. 8).

The royal decree establishing the ERC also engaged in a crucial terminological exercise. The decree defined what was meant by “Gross human rights abuses,” “Forced disappearance,” “Arbitrary detention,” and “victim” (USIP, 2009, Article 5). Closely connected to these definitions and based on the signification given to
them, reparation, which is the corollary result of a claimant’s established victimhood, is also defined by the decree as,

> all measures taken for the victims because of the material and moral damage sustained by them or by their legal successors as a result of forced disappearance or arbitrary detention, as well as the general and collective measures. The reparation of damage may take different shapes and be put into practice through various measures such as compensation, readjustment, reintegration, rehabilitation, the preservation of memory and guarantees against the repetition of the violations. In case the victim died or her fate could not be determined, the reparation of the damage will be affected in favor of his/her heirs or legal successors. (USIP, 2009, Article 5)

It’s all too clear from the stipulations of the decree that ERC’s investigations and reparation work were tailored to focus on the tangible damage arbitrary detention and forcible disappearance inflicted on individual victims. Indeed, ERC’s priority was to resolve individual suffering and addressing the needs of the direct and indirect victims of the Years of Lead. After all, it was thanks to the mobilization of these victims and their families that the state was forced to undertake the ERC process. Moreover, the violence done to the educational system and cultural production platforms lacked the brutal tangibility of political disappearance and its consequences, which explains it not being a priority. Despite the constraints of its mandate, ERC was able to chart a path for a future examination of losses in education and culture.

ERC was able to transcend the limitations of its founding decree’s focus on individual victims. Not only did ERC succeed at assessing how state violence sabotaged Moroccan society’s potential beyond the direct victims, but it also elucidated “[t]he relationship between violations and socio-economic issues,” which it made recommendations to redress (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 66). ERC’s final report contains an important analysis of the impact of “violations on the fields of education and culture” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). In a summary of the discussions during a workshop dedicated to “educational and cultural reforms” organized on March 8, 2005, the panelists’ comments included in this section shed light on the imbrication of state violence and attrition in education and culture. According to the participants, violations in the field of education and culture “stifled creativity” and led to the “beginning of the end of the individual and the citizen” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). The panelists also argued that the violations in the “cultural field impacted creativity, including poetry, the novel, [and] music” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Because associations working in the fields of education and culture were targeted, the country’s creative potential was repressed (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). Always according to ERC’s final report, the reforms undertaken in education “were insufficient, and the educational system remained as it was in the past.” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This assessment paints a bleak picture of a society in which 48% of the population was illiterate (Hay’at al-inṣāf,
and which missed its rendezvous with the open horizons of modernity in 1960s (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71).

Delving into the contradictions of the educational system, ERC emphasized the unevenness between languages in Morocco. Arabic and Amazigh languages were disadvantaged by French’s predominance in business, administration, and higher education (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). This confirmed the suspicion that Arabization in the 1960s sought to limit working classes’ access to foreign languages to protect the interests of the elites. Amazigh language was specifically presented as having been sacrificed by both the state and media. The identity-related ramifications of this sacrifice of Amazigh language was a symbolic rejection of the marginalized Morocco (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71), the one inhabited by the Amazigh speakers. In addition to a lack of linguistic justice, the report asserted that Morocco’s linguistic policy was designed to serve the goals of the regime, which produced “generations that mastered no language” (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 71). ERC’s claims about languages during the Years of Lead open up a capacious space for inquiry into educational and cultural loss that future ethnographic work could quantify.

The ERC made multiple recommendations to redress the effects of political violence on Morocco. In order to reconcile the Moroccan state with its people and prevent the repetition of the same violations in the future, ERC’s recommendations focused on creating strong legal and institutional safeguards for human rights. For instance, under the heading “constitutional protection of human rights,” Hay’at al-inṣāf wal-muṣālaḥa (2006c) called for the constitutionalization of human rights and equality between genders as well as strengthening the “constitutional monitoring” of executive laws (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, p. 84). These changes targeted the transformation of the legal, security, and human rights culture in the country through governance-focused reforms in these areas (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 84-91). However, there is a mismatch between ERC’s diagnosis of the educational and cultural losses during the Years of Lead, and its proposed rehabilitation measures, which focused merely on a general protection of human rights. Except for recommendations about the recognition of Amazigh language and culture, the organization of the national archives and the revision of history curricula (Hay’at al-inṣāf, 2006c, pp. 92-93), ERC seems to be more invested in a forward-looking education and sensitization about human rights. Nonetheless, ERC placed education and culture at the heart of the areas in which the Moroccan state needed to reckon with the violence of the Years of Lead.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this article I have demonstrated that education and culture suffered from state violence during the Years of Lead. Locating the beginning of educational and cultural attrition in the early years of independence, I have revealed how much of the power struggle between the monarchy and the opposition played out to the detriment of education policies. Moreover, I have shown that the skepticism that governed the state’s attitudes vis-à-vis education also translated in the form of disdain and disregard for intellectuals and intellectual work. The ban of cultural journals deprived Moroccans of open spaces for critical engagement with new
ideas. Reflecting the linguistic and cultural diversity that was lost with the shutting of journals, I listed some of the main Arabic, Amazigh, and francophone journals that were closed by administrative decisions. The sheer number of these journals proves that Moroccan thought and societal development were impacted by these decisions.

Articulating educational and cultural loss can be elusive and at times difficult to quantify. Evidence, however, can be found in the most unlikely places. The official report “50 years of Human Development in Morocco” has concluded that the failure of the Moroccan school has “revealed itself in its inability to transmit values of citizenship, openness and progress, freedom of thought and learning of critical thought” (Mouline & Lazrak, 2005, p. 15). The results are there for us to understand the impact of authoritarianism on education and intellectual production.

Finally, this examination of the impact of the Years of Lead on education and culture is only a step toward a more critical investigation of cultural and educational losses that society incurred during the five decades of mistrust between state and society in Morocco.

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