Connections and Disconnections: The Making of Bombay/Mumbai as India’s “Global City”

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Cover Page Footnote
A preliminary draft of the paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Georgia Sociological Association at Savannah, Georgia in October 2016. I thank the participants at the conference for their comments on the paper. I also thank the anonymous referees for their encouragement and feedback.

This article is available in Journal of Global Initiatives: Policy, Pedagogy, Perspective: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jgi/vol13/iss1/5
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Abstract
Scholarly literature on “global cities” has been criticized for ignoring the long-term historical context within which cities articulate the relationship between the global and the local. Employing a longue durée globalization perspective, this paper historicizes the unequal and uneven nature of contemporary urban development in Mumbai, India’s “global city.” The paper uses two analytical frames: the “port city” and the “colonial city” to highlight two essential dimensions of Mumbai’s contemporary transformation of interconnectedness and segmentation based on unequal power.

“I will not claim to possess the prophetic insight to foresee what is in store for Bombay. But as it has adopted the happy motto of Urbs prima in Indis, it may be hoped that this will prove of good augury, and that among other privileges Bombay will own that of priority among the Indian cities for longevity in undecaying prosperity” (da Cunha, [1900] 2004, p. 6).

“Urban landscapes come to refract various layers of sedimentation—of past uses and organization—as well as to embody a range of possible meanings and actions falling outside the shifting levels of specification brought to bear on these landscapes by the prevailing and…. often fragmentary apparatuses of control” (Simone, 2004, p. 14).

Introduction
Contemporary globalization is marked by an “urban turn” with the city becoming important both as a place and a site of discourse in the social sciences and policy-making (Prakash, 2002; Sassen, 1991, 2001). Moreover, with the shift of global trade toward Asia, there is a renewed interest in urban development in this region (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Roy, 2009). Asian states are systematically orchestrating national growth by “reinventing” their cities through extensive centralized political and economic investment (Ong, 2011, p. 2). In the post-reform years, India too has adopted a dominant city-centric growth strategy (Kennedy &
The city of Mumbai (India’s “global city”) is of particular importance to the political and business elite in India who view it as the driving force of India’s economic integration in the world economy.

Mumbai is hailed as India’s most modern (Patel, 2004) and global city (Nijman, 2011). The modern view of Bombay/Mumbai is based on its economic vitality and its cultural appeal as India’s most cosmopolitan city that nurtures diverse arts, theater, literature, music, and films. Bombay/Mumbai has been the birthplace of modern Indian painting and progressive modern theater in both English and native languages. It is home to the radical Dalit literature, produced primarily by the historically most oppressed castes. It also houses Bollywood, India’s premier film industry. However, the city is also notorious for its seamy underbelly of crime and the underworld as well as a regressive anti-migrant and anti-Muslim urban movement since the 1960s in the form of the Shiv Sena. Mumbai is also India’s “global city” as it is the most globally connected city in India having the largest share of international trade and foreign direct investment in India (Nijman, 2007, p. 239). Given its unique status, one project has taken center stage and captured the hearts and minds of the middle classes and the elite in the city since the mid-1990s. Urban planners are obsessed with entrepreneurial and technocratic visions of transforming Mumbai into a “world-class city” modeled on cities such as Shanghai.

Mumbai’s post-reform urban transformation since the early 1990s has been a focus of considerable research in recent years (Anjaria, 2009; Banerjee-Guha, 2002; Gandy, 2008; Ghadge, 2010; Harris, 2008; Nijman, 2008; Zérah, 2007). However, there is a relatively less nuanced historical discussion on long-term global processes impacting the city and its emergence as a privileged site of concentrated economic activity and investment in India (Nijman, 2011, p. 450).

New urban experiments are not introduced tabula rasa in the city but jostle with inherited institutional frameworks, patterns of socio-spatial development, and power geometries. In the context of cities and globalization, scholars employing path-dependent analysis have demonstrated how the global reach and the internal social and spatial polarization of world cities are based on their particular histories of hegemony (Chakravorty, 2000; Nijman, 2011). In Nijman’s (2011) words, “each phase [of historical development] produces an urban space on top of that which is left behind by history” (p. 451). For example, Grant and Nijman’s (2002) study demonstrates a correspondence between the new corporate geography of Mumbai post-1990s and the earlier colonial period. The study shows that there is a high concentration of business activity with sizeable Indian and foreign-owned companies in South Mumbai where the old European town existed. On the other hand, the old Native town of the colonial period retains a bazaar atmosphere (Grant & Nijman, 2002, p. 330). Thus, contemporary efforts at urban redevelopment of Mumbai confront grave challenges posed by the historical, social inequities and built environment in the city.

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1 Bombay was officially renamed as Mumbai in 1995 by the Hindu fundamentalist Shiv Sena-led state government. In the paper, the region is referred to Bombay or Mumbai alternatively depending on the historical period.
Therefore, to achieve a deeper understanding of contemporary urban transformation in Mumbai, we need to examine the long-term historical factors that shaped the city employing a *longue durée* globalization perspective. The paper does this through the use of two analytic frames to highlight two essential dimensions of Mumbai’s contemporary transformation of interconnectedness and segmentation based on unequal power. The first emphasizes Bombay/Mumbai as a “port city” where human interconnectivity is based on trade and how port cities evolved as key nodes in various trade networks (Rennstich, 2006). The second emphasizes Bombay/Mumbai as a “colonial city” where the dimension of inequality based on the unequal nature of colonial power in which colonial urban development primarily served the interests of the colonial elite (King, 1976).

**Cities and Longue Durée Globalization**

One of the critical features of the contemporary phase of globalization is the re-emergence of cities as central nodes in the world economy.² It is recognized that urbanization can no longer be understood solely by the political economy of regions or within the boundaries of nation-states and that there is a need for an “analytic disarticulation of cities and nations” (Davis, 2005, p. 97). The world systems theory provides a framework to understand how processes of urbanization connect with structural changes in the world economy (Braudel, 1986; Wallerstein, 1994, 2004). Influenced by this approach, the “world city” (Friedmann, 1995) and the “global city” (Sassen, 1991, 2001) have emerged as critical theoretical constructs informing the discussion of cities and contemporary globalization. However, the world/global city paradigm has ignored the long-term historical context within which cities articulated the relationship between the global and the local and therefore exaggerate the historical uniqueness of contemporary urban transformations.

Scholars advocating a *longue durée* globalization approach have shown that cities, as key “nodes,” were engaged in wider circuits of production, exchange, and culture throughout history (Abu-Lughod, 1989; Arrighi, 1994; Braudel, 1986; Brenner, 2001; Gills & Thompson, 2006; King, 1990). According to Brenner (2001), the *longue durée* historical analysis places “standard interpretations of contemporary urban restructuring in the broad geohistorical context of earlier rounds of globally induced transformations within each city” (p. 127). This enables us to understand how certain locally specific factors, processes, and developments have enabled cities to acquire specific world city functions in the contemporary context. Therefore, rather than understanding global forces as macrostructural background conditions, the long-term historical perspective incorporates a “path dependent” analysis where earlier historical events provide a causal context for subsequent development (Brenner, 2001, pp. 127-128).

² The emphasis on the term “re-emergence” is to highlight the fact that if one takes into account a longer historical approach of understanding globalization, cities have remained critical sites of cross-cultural exchanges.
Network Systems, Maritime Trade, and Port Cities

Rennstich’s (2006) *longue durée* approach understands globalization as an “evolutionary process in the making for an extended period of human history rather than a unique occurrence that started in the latter part of the twentieth century” (p. 185). According to Rennstich’s path dependent approach, each new long wave of global change builds upon past patterns of change and is carried forward through an “evolutionary logic” driven by the human agency through the innovative use of resources, thereby “strengthening the global layers of interactions” (Rennstich, 2006, p. 185). According to Rennstich (2006), in the evolution of the global system, world cities have constituted the major nodes of connection. However, this evolutionary logic of change does not have a linear dynamic of an ever-increasing level of global interaction. This historical evolution is marked by periods of “punctuation” brought about by political and military “blockages” of trade forcing agents to adapt either by developing new connections, or reconstituting existing nodes, or even develop new nodes and consequently a new system. As a result, within this evolutionary dynamic, the system can alternate between inward and external-oriented phases (Rennstich, 2006, p. 188).

Rennstich (2006) finds that broadly there have been three distinct network systems in the modern global system: the commercial maritime system, the industrial production system, and the emerging new digital commercial system. Both the commercial maritime and digital system displayed external network relations, whereas the industrial phase was more internally-oriented (p. 190). In terms of the path-dependent analysis of the development of the modern global system, Rennstich (2006) describes a “three-step” path-dependent evolution of the global system in which the Phoenician maritime commercial system contributed to the growth of a global maritime external commercial system that is currently transforming into an external network system based on digital communication. According to Rennstich (2006), the Phoenician network system (1100 BCE-850 BCE) centered on current regions of Lebanon and Syria was the first truly transcontinental system based on maritime nodes of world cities in three different continents. This system led to the emergence of cities such as Byblos, Tyre, and Arward with the larger Assyrian Empire. However, it was around 900 CE that the modern era of globalization began, driven by the expansion of maritime trade by Sung China. In the Indian Ocean, harnessing seasonal monsoon (in Arabic mawsim) winds, Arabian sailors and traders established extensive patterns of migration and social relationships further intensifying linkages between diverse civilizations including Abyssinian, Arab, Egyptian, Harappan, Persian, Somali, Swahili, Indian, Malay, and Chinese (Paracka, 2015, p. 3). Later these maritime links were widened by maritime powers of Portugal, the Netherlands, and England. Through the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1497-1499, the Portuguese were able to link the Asian maritime trade with the Atlantic. During the 17th century the Dutch, along with the trade with the East, were engaged in an Atlantic triangular trade between Europe, Africa, and the Americas, which was later contested and extended by England after 1650 through trade in mass-consumed goods, resulting in London becoming a major financial node in the world economy (Rennstich, 2006, pp. 193-194).
The externalizing tendency was punctuated at around 1850 with the introduction of a relatively internal-oriented industrial system. With the growth of digital technologies in recent years, there is a re-emergence of an external-oriented global system, the momentum for which was set in the late 20th century through a transformation in the communication technologies through the invention of the telephone, typewriters, and the electrical telegraph (Rennstich, 2006, p. 197).

The emerging digital system marks a return to an external-network system replacing the internal-oriented industrial system in place since the mid-19th century (Rennstich, 2006, p. 197). It is precisely its digital nature and the possibilities it opens up that differentiate it from the previous external network system. This new system, based on the use of digital technologies powered by the internet, enables much deeper integration and a broader organizational and institutional change. The United States due to its wider reach of digital infrastructure is a central node in this new information system with other countries linked to the United States. It is in this context that we need to understand the current re-emergence of cities (“global cities”) as essential nodes that articulate transnational flows of goods, capital, and people.

The Colonial City and Unequal Urban Development

The above discussion on nodes and networks helps us in understanding the historical evolution of contemporary “global cities,” thereby problematizing the supposed novelty of some of the discussion on contemporary urbanization. However, this network-based analysis does not adequately address the role of power and ideology in shaping global change. Even though Rennstich (2006) acknowledges the role of human agency in driving global systemic change, the agency is assumed to be power-neutral. In this context, the analytic frame of the “colonial city” is more suitable for understanding the historical role of power in shaping contemporary inequalities in postcolonial cities such as Bombay/Mumbai.

According to (King, 1976), a “colonial city” is “that urban area in the colonial society most typically characterized by the physical segregation of its ethnic, social, and cultural component groups, which resulted from the processes of colonialism” (p. 7). King (1976) prefers to use the term urban “development” as opposed to urban growth while discussing urban change. For King, urban growth presupposes a non-agential, evolutionary nature of urban change that does not take into account the role of power in shaping urban processes. On the other hand, urban development refers to urban change as a conscious, planned, and directed process circumscribed by the uneven power of human agency. As discussed later in the context of Bombay/Mumbai this is evident by the role played by the state (colonial and post-colonial) and the elite in transforming the city.

The period between the 18th and 20th century was particularly crucial in the Indian context, as it is the introduction of the “modern,” industrial phase of colonial urbanization. This period led to the disruption of traditional market structures and the colonial city, segregated from its hinterland, and employed in the service of the metropolitan economy. Castells (1977) uses the term “dependent urbanization” to
characterize the relationship between the colonial city and the metropolitan economy. The urbanization of the colonial society was dependent upon the industrialization of the metropolitan society, or as Simone (2004) puts it, it was in the context of an “enforced engagement with the European world” (p. 139). This dominance-dependence relationship is visible at the city level in the separation between the native and the European areas of the city where the European quarter was dependent on the labor of the native quarter. This segregation between the two areas is visible even today in the architectural landscapes of post-colonial cities. Even the provision of services, amenities such as roads, recreational space, water, electricity lines, sewers, housing, shopping, and hotels were concentrated in the European sector. In contrast, there was severe neglect and underinvestment in the native quarters of the colonial city (King, 1976, p. 282). Scholars have used the term the “dual city” (Abu-Lughod, 1965) or the “unintended city” (Nandy, 1998, p. 2) to describe this uneven legacy of the interdependence between the urban elites and the urban poor.3

Simone (2004) argues that the historical legacy of dependence is also visible in the relationship between the colonial state and the urban elite, reproduced in the post-colonial contexts. Simone (2004) further argues that in the contemporary context, this transfer of metropolitan values continues through various “development models,” whereby, “cultural categories are assumed to be universal,” giving rise to “new modes of dependence” (p. 280).

Colonialism not only shaped a particular nature of urban development, but also led to considerable structural and organizational changes in the systems of production, governance, and knowledge creation. As Simone (2004) observes in the case of Africa, the colonial project of urbanization involved a kind of “remaking” of pre-colonial cultures in a mostly rural continent and “cities would act instrumentally on African bodies and social formations” (p. 18). Simone further argues that this urbanization set the framework within which Africans began to relate to each other within cities, as well as how they interacted with the outside world. He states,

… the present emphases on decentralization, local management, the exigencies of poverty alleviation, and regionally articulated local economic development are all in significant ways a reformulation of instruments used to evolve urban life according to the conditions that would ensure a very specific engagement with nonlocal worlds. (Simone, 2004, p. 19)

Post-colonial cities in the Global South are a product of colonial economies and the constant migration of people to cities. Cities become “places of refuge” to the multitude of people displaced from rural areas as a result of the colonial economy (Simone, 2004, p. 20).

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3 The term “unintended city,” originally used by Jai Sen (1976), has been used by Ashis Nandy (1998) to describe the world of the urban poor as a city “that was never a part of the formal ‘master plan’ but always implicit in it” (p. 2).
Drawing upon insights from the two analytical frames emphasizing both interconnection and segmentation, the following section presents a historical account of the evolution of Bombay/Mumbai from a small fishing hamlet in the mid-16th century under European dominance to India’s post-colonial global city in the 20th century. Scholars have pointed before in the context of Bombay/Mumbai that the city does not demonstrate a linear global dynamic, rather a cyclical evolutionary history marked by periods of internal and external (global) orientation shaped by broader world-historical processes (Nijman, 2011).

The Making of Bombay/Mumbai as India’s “Global City”

Based on the insights of Rennstich (2006), this section traces Bombay/Mumbai’s historical trajectory becoming India’s “global city” through several stages where each new stage adds layers of global interaction marked by periods of “punctuation” or “blockages” that either offered an opportunity for the city to extend outward or become inward-oriented. Table 1 summarizes this discussion.

Table 1: Historical Evolution of Bombay/Mumbai

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Network System</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Global Orientation</th>
<th>Punctuations/ Blockages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Maritime System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-colonial Maritime Trade</td>
<td>3rd century BCE-16th century CE</td>
<td>Magadha empire, Silharas, Delhi Sultanate, Mughals</td>
<td>European powers in the subcontinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early European Maritime Expansion</td>
<td>1550s-1750s</td>
<td>Portuguese, Dutch, British</td>
<td>Decline of Surat-reconfiguration of western India trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of Opium and Cotton</td>
<td>1750s-1880s</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Opium Wars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Production System</td>
<td>1857-1984</td>
<td>External and Internal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Textiles</td>
<td>1850s-1947</td>
<td>British/External</td>
<td>Indian Independence, Import-substitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial</td>
<td>1947-1984</td>
<td>Indian/Internal</td>
<td>De-industrialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital/Global Commercial System</td>
<td>1990-</td>
<td>External</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commercial Maritime System

Precolonial maritime trade. Bombay, unlike some of the other cities of India such as Delhi, Agra, Lahore, Varanasi, Hyderabad, or Ahmedabad, has a relatively
short history of urban settlement (Patel, 2004, p. 333). The word Bombay itself was a corrupted Portuguese usage of the island’s indigenous name derived from Mumbadevi, a patron goddess of the Kolis (the indigenous people of the region). However, to appreciate Bombay’s growth as a port city during the British expansion in the 19th century, one has to take into account a much earlier history of adaptation and expansion of maritime networks of trade and cultural exchange in the Indian Ocean region. The earliest archaeological evidence suggests that the region around Bombay had pre-colonial trade connections with Persia and Rome. It is speculated that Ptolemaeus’s Heptanesia (Seven Islands) were the seven islands of Bombay (Kooiman, 1985, p. 207). The original seven islands that became present-day Mumbai had been a part of the Magadha Empire ruled by Ashoka in the 3rd century BCE. The seven islands were later under the control of the Hindu Silhara dynasty until 1343 until the Islamic sultanate of Gujarat annexed them (Pacione, 2006, p. 231). However, some scholars attribute the 13th-century pre-colonial maritime networks in the region extending from the Red Sea to the South China Sea for the dominance of Asian trade connections in the world economy (Duara, 2010; Sen, 2010). The later European colonial trade and power expanded and built upon these older pre-colonial networks of mobile merchant communities of Asia constituted by the Arab, Chinese, Indian, and (Baghdadi) Jews, involved in long-distance credit networks. Chaudhuri (1990) argues, “India” in the pre-colonial period provided a vital junction point to three different networks of trade and civilization: the first linking its West coast to Arabia, East Africa, and the Levant; the second its North-West to Central Asia and Iran; and the third its South-East to South-East Asia. Washbrook (1997) argues that until the 16th century, Europeans played a marginal role in this Asian world dominated by the Arabs, Ottomans, Mughals, the Ming and the Ch’ing (p. 426).

Early European maritime expansion. As explained by Rennstich (2006), from the 16th century, beginning with the voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1497-1499 and the subsequent linking of the Asian maritime trade with the Atlantic by the Portuguese (later expanded by the British through trade in mass-consumed goods), the European powers began to dominate these pre-colonial trade networks through imperialism by expanding and building upon these older pre-colonial networks. Duara (2010) argues that the British Empire in the 19th century “had the effect of intensifying some of the old relationships and generating new linkages between cities (and hinterlands) of Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai as entrepôts and financial centers for Asian trade” (p. 964).

Bombay was one of the 25 islands along the Konkan coast of western India (da Cunha, 2004). Six other islands were united together with the island of Bombay through land reclamation to form a larger entity called Bombay. The Portuguese

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4 For more on pre-colonial Asian networks refer to the seminal study on the subject by K. N. Chaudhuri (1990).

transferred Bombay to the British in 1661 as part of a dowry of Princess Katherine.\(^6\) Even during the late 18th century, Bombay was primarily a marine post with very few linkages with its hinterland. However, Bombay possessed several promising geographical advantages that led to its emergence as India’s leading port city in the 19th century. It possessed a safe, natural harbor that suited the maritime interests of the British East India Company (EIC) (Kooiman, 1985, p. 209). It was predominantly under the British Empire that Bombay emerged as an urban center.

As discussed earlier, King (1976) understands colonial urbanism as urban development as opposed to urban growth. This fact is especially relevant in the case of Bombay. Even though it possessed a natural geographical advantage as a port, Bombay’s rise to prominence as a port city was not inevitable, but a result of conscious planning. Apart from harsh living conditions on the island itself, Bombay was also inaccessible to its hinterland as it was surrounded by the mountainous topography of the Western Ghats, preventing the formation of land-routes. Thus Bombay’s late emergence as a vibrant port city has not only to do with its global linkages in the world economy but also with its local linkages (or lack thereof) with its hinterland. In this context, Kooiman (1985, p. 212) argues, that Bombay’s history confirmed the general trend that port cities only grew after their surrounding countryside was commercialized. As a result of Bombay’s inaccessibility, much of the trade along the western coast was restricted in the Gulf of Khambat, north of Bombay, in places such as Khambat, Bharuch, Daman, and Diu, and more importantly Surat, which was the principal port along the western coast in the 17th and early 18th century. Surat had been a significant trading site of the Mughal Empire connecting the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and regions beyond Cape Comorin. In the 17th century, Surat possessed the largest merchant fleet in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Surat was also an important connection point for pilgrims going to Mecca. The Mughal Emperor allowed certain European companies to set up their factories. The British EIC set up a factory in Surat in 1612 after obtaining a license from the Mughal Emperor and since then much of its trade in the 17th century was centered in Surat. The Dutch and the French Companies too followed later (Kosambi, 1993, p. 211-212).

However, toward the middle of the 18th century, Surat’s importance as a port had declined, and Bombay later replaced it as the leading port along the west coast. However, historians argue that Bombay’s rise as a port city after Surat’s decline was not inevitable, considering its inaccessibility with its hinterland. Although the shift from Surat to Bombay occurred in 1687, it was not until the mid-18th century that Bombay became commercially bigger than Surat (Kosambi, 1993, p. 212). Surat’s decline and Bombay’s subsequent rise has to be understood in the context of the broader world-historical changes at that time marked by a period of “punctuation” leading to the reorientation of trading networks in the region.

\(^6\) During the transfer, Bombay was considered to be of minor importance and “notoriously unhealthy” and thinly populated. Charles II was more "embarrassed than pleased by this part of the dowry" and later rented it to the East India Company at an annual rent of £ 10 in gold (Kooiman, 1985, p. 209).
Das Gupta (1979) argues that the decline of Surat was affected by the declining influence of three empires: the Mughal Empire in India, the Safavid Empire in Iran, and the Ottoman Empire in West Asia. This historical juncture acted as a key “blockage” (to use Rennstich's [2006] term) that led to the decline of Surat and reconfiguration of the trading networks in the region. The weakening of the Safavid and Ottoman empires disrupted Surat’s trade with West Asia, and the decline of the Mughal Empire affected Surat’s long-distance trade with Agra, Lahore, and Banaras. Thus, as argued by Farooqui (2006), the decline of Surat was a “part of a general crisis in the western Indian trade” (p. 5), contributing to Surat’s declining trade relations with Europe. In addition to these changes, there were also local strategic reasons for the British EIC to consider a move away from Surat to an alternative site along the western coast. The company was becoming weary of competition from rival European mercantile companies. Moreover, it was also looking for a more secure location, especially after its wars with the Dutch in the 1650s; in this context, Bombay’s inaccessibility proved to be a significant advantage (Kosambi, 1993, p. 212).

It was only after 1784 that Bombay began to grow significantly due to the export of cotton to China in exchange for Chinese tea. However, cotton exports could not keep up with the increasing import of Chinese tea. This difference was compensated with trade in a product that paved the way for Bombay’s makeover—opium. The opium trade operated within the triangular relationship between India, Britain, and China since the 18th century. While the role of cotton in Bombay’s transformation is well documented, the role of opium in capital accumulation in Bombay is relatively under-researched.

The opium trade and the emergence of the indigenous capitalist class. Opium was of immense importance for the Indian economy, the Indian Empire and, ultimately, for the global economy of the 19th century. Because of its high-profit margins, opium was one of the primary export products of colonial India until the end of the 19th century. This trade was sustained by increasing consumption of Opium by China and other parts of Southeast Asia (Richards, 2002). We can gauge the importance of opium for the colonial economy from the fact that from the early period of the EIC until the end of the British Empire, opium earned one of the highest revenues along with revenues from land and salt monopoly (Richards, 2002, p. 153). The income from opium steadily increased from about ₹ 17.2 million per year in the 1830s to ₹ 50.3 million in the 1850s and was the highest at about ₹ 93.5 million in the 1880s (Richards 2002, p. 155).

It is argued that it was the opium trade that led to the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class in India engaged in the opium enterprise around the port (Farooqui, 2006). The opium trade not only linked Bombay to the world economy, especially China, but also to other regions along the west coast of India, including Rajasthan, Sind, and Malwa. The British government had a monopoly over the opium trade which was mainly concentrated in Bengal ever since they gained control of Bihar and Bengal in the 1750s. Opium was grown in the eastern Gangetic

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7 For more on the opium trade, see Farooqui (2006), Richards (2002), and Siddiqi (1982).
plain, processed in Bihar and Bengal and auctioned and exported from Bengal. However, the control of the British EIC in western India was relatively weak throughout the 18th century, partly due to the dominance of the Maratha power in the western region which did not relinquish complete control of the region to the British EIC until the early 19th century. This lack of control of the British EIC in the western region enabled Indo-Portuguese traders to expand illegal trade of opium produced in western and central India from Bombay. Through the patronage of local rulers, these traders thwarted the monopolistic control of the British EIC over the opium in western and central India (Farooqui, 2006). Thus, Farooqui (2006) argues that “modern Bombay has its genesis in the poppy fields in Bihar” (p. 18).

Realizing its inability to control the illegal opium trade in the western and central regions, the British EIC allowed private and mainly Indian enterprise (mostly Marwari and Parsi merchants) in opium along the west coast in 1846. Thus, along with the Gangetic opium, opium from Malwa in central India was directed to be shipped to the world market from Bombay. In the mid-19th century, syndicates consisting of wealthy native merchants (especially the Parsis) operating in the Opium trade purchased Opium auctioned by the government and transported them through ships to Canton China (Richards, 2002; Siddiqi, 1982). These entrepreneurial communities later reinvested their profits from opium trade in the emerging textile industry in Bombay from the mid-19th century after the trade in opium became unfeasible after the Chinese ban of Opium trade and its suppression in the early 20th century.

The Industrial Production System

Cotton textiles. Previously, Bombay’s economy was centered on the export of cotton to China to settle EIC’s unfavorable balance of trade with China. However, in the middle of the 19th century, indigenous entrepreneurs started manufacturing cotton textiles in Bombay, aided by road and rail development projects between 1830 and 1860 that linked Bombay to its hinterland. Some scholars have argued that Bombay’s commercial and industrial development was also shaped in significant ways by its internal economy (Chandavarkar, 1994). The commodity markets in this internal economy were linked to more extensive relations of production and exchange in the hinterland through the newly established road and railroad infrastructure. The textile mills of Bombay relied increasingly on its domestic market. Thus, as argued by several scholars in the context of other India cities, the growth of Bombay is not solely due to colonialism, but due to a combination of global and regional/local processes (King, 2004).

Due to specific colonial economic, military, strategic, and political considerations, the involvement of the colonial state in matters of Bombay’s urban development was often artificial and uneven (Farooqui, 2006). This unevenness is most visible in the built environment of Bombay, ever since its emergence as an industrial city in the mid-19th century. Reflecting the growing importance of Bombay as a port, the southernmost tip of the island facing the harbor—the Fort area—became the nucleus of European settlement in the city. Just north of the Fort,
Journal of Global Initiatives

separated by an esplanade, was the native settlement. The Fort area itself was segregated, with the native Indians concentrated in the northern sections and the European population concentrated in the south. The Europeans and the natives were separated not only physically, but also socio-economically. The Fort with the Central Business District, symbolized the sphere of western capitalism, whereas the native quarter with the domestic bazaar economy reflected the caste-based residential patterns (Dossal, 1991; Kidambi, 2007). However, as the Fort area became overcrowded, the colonial elite began to move to the southwestern tip of the island which over a period became the upscale neighborhood of Malabar Hill, an exclusive conclave of the Europeans. However, several wealthy Parsi families too settled in that area (Farooqui, 2006).

Colonial urban planning primarily benefitted an elite minority in the city. There were massive investments in grand architectural projects at the expense of critical issues such as housing, transportation, health, and public services that concerned the majority of the city residents (Hazareesingh, 2001). Therefore, as Hazareesingh (2001) puts it, “the economy of Bombay was reasonably affluent in the early twentieth century: only its people remained poor” (p. 255). The systematic anti-poor bias of the colonial officials was especially evident at the time of the bubonic plague that hit the city in 1896. With inadequate knowledge about the etiology of the disease, the colonial plague policy was driven by class and race-based assumptions about the disease related to sanitation and hygiene. This lead to draconian acts that regularized forced eviction and demolition of overcrowded tenements of poor people in the city. The plague also provided an opportunity for the colonial state to pursue larger urban renewal strategies in the early 20th century under the City of Bombay Improvement Trust formed in 1898. Rather than carrying our necessary sanitary improvements, the Trust was responsible for creating an “orderly city” and to improve the image of Bombay as a center of imperial and commercial power (Kidambi, 2007, p. 71). By 1909, the Trust had evicted over 50,000 people from their demolished one-room tenements; however, only 2,844 new “sanitary” tenements were constructed (Hazareesingh, 2001, p. 240).

The uneven urban development was also reflected in access to essential services in the city. Despite the mid-19th century population boom, there was no proportionate rise in the public facilities provided by the colonial state. The city constantly grappled with appalling sanitation, high mortality rates, poor roads and transport infrastructure, and inadequate and over-crowded housing (Dossal, 1991, p. 30).

The development of spinning and weaving mills facilitated the migration of mill workers, from the southern coastal areas of Konkan. In 1856, the first textile mill was established and by the end of 1875, Bombay had 27 mills, and by 1900 this number grew to 82. By the end of the 19th century, Bombay had established itself as an important commercial center in India. The growth of cotton mills also led to growth in various ancillary small-scale industries that led to the emergence of Bombay as a major financial center in India by the end of the 19th century (Kidambi, 2007, p. 20).

All this economic activity attracted many people to the city, and Bombay’s population grew dramatically. The city’s population more than doubled from
232,032 in 1833 to more than half a million in 1849. Bombay’s population continued to increase in the latter part of the 19th century due to an increase in migration caused by the speculative boom in cotton triggered by the American Civil War in the early 1860s (Kidambi, 2007, p. 22). In 1891, Bombay’s population was about 800,000 out of which only a quarter was born in the city (Kidambi, 2007, p. 22). The interwar period is a critical period for the growth of the city. The relaxing of the colonial tie during the interwar period led to increased profits within the textile industry and extended its reach in its domestic market (Patel, 2003). The textile industry became the largest employer in the city as its employment grew from 136,000 in 1921 to 147,000 in 1931 (Kooiman, 1985, p. 215).

The textile mills of Bombay relied increasingly on the domestic market. Migrants from different regions were recruited as labor for these mills. However, interestingly, these migrants maintained close ties with their villages and contributed to the rural economy through their remittances (Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 29). These continued links with their host villages played a crucial role in sustaining the workers in the city and their labor struggles (Ghadge, 2016). Gradually, there emerged a unique working-class culture and the area where the mills existed came to be known as Girangaon, or the “village of mills.” The people who came to work in the textile mills were mostly rural migrants who migrated from the hinterland of Maharashtra, mainly the Konkan region on the west coast (especially Ratnagiri) and the Deccan Ghat or plateau region in central India (mainly Pune, Satara, Sangli, and Nashik). All those who migrated were essentially small land-owners and not landless rural poor. Thus migration and the possibility of earning quick money further strengthened their rural power base (Chandavarkar, 1994). To sustain themselves in the city and to meet their material needs like employment, credit, and housing they had to rely on social networks based on ties of caste, region, and kinship. Thus, it was essential for the rural migrants to maintain their rural links and they did not assimilate in the city by completely losing their rural identity. These rural links forged various working-class institutions in the city such as tamasha (working class theater), krida mandals (sports clubs), vyayam shalas (gymnasiums), gramastha mandals (village organizations), khanavalis (dining houses), and path pedis (credit societies) that not only catered to their cultural needs, but also existential needs such as housing, food, and finance.

Post-colonial Bombay/Mumbai. Several factors had a profound impact on Bombay/Mumbai’s post-colonial development—post-independence demographic change, deindustrialization and informalization, and a shift from manufacturing to finance and producer services—leading to increasing social and spatial polarization in the city.

From 1941-1951 the population of Greater Bombay grew more than 5% due to a growing influx of refugees from Pakistan and migration from other parts of India post-independence and partition. Furthermore, from the 1960s, Bombay experienced significant industrial restructuring constituted by growth in decentralized state-supported small-scale power loom sector. This profoundly impacted the textile industry. The spurt in the growth of capital-intensive power
looms resulted in a loss of market share of the labor-intensive mills (van Wersch, 1992). Along with declining share of production, the technological backwardness of textile mills further aggravated the situation. The obsolescence of machinery used in spinning, weaving, and processing has been identified as one of the main causes of “sickness” in the industry. However, this technological backwardness is not new. The mill owners’ refusal to modernize the mills facilitated their eventual closure. Thus, frequent textile strikes proved to be a blessing in disguise for the mill owners enabling them to shut down the mills and reinvest the profits in more lucrative sectors of the new economy.

The Bombay Textile Strike of 1982-1983 accelerated the decline of the textile industry. At the end of the strike, almost 100,000 workers were retrenched, and a considerable amount of units were shut down. In 1976, 27% of the city’s organized workforce was employed in the textile industry. This figure dropped to 12.5% by 1991 (Patel, 2004, p. 335). Most workers who lost their jobs have joined the informal economy. Employment in the informal sector of the urban economy grew from 49% in 1971 to 66% in 1991 (Pacione, 2006, p. 234).

Some scholars argue that what happened in Bombay cannot be called deindustrialization, but spatial reorganization combined with an increasing expansion of the boundaries of the city (Patel, 2003, p. 11). Due to this process of spatial reorganization, the central parts of the city ceased to be the dominant regions of manufacturing as production was dispersed to the suburbs and other satellite centers (outside Greater Mumbai, but within the Mumbai Metropolitan Region) such as Thane, Kalyan, and Navi Mumbai. Because of this, the central parts of the city (including the mill district in Mumbai) have now become the epicenter of the new economy in Mumbai based on service industries including finance, tourism, retailing, and entertainment.

By early 1990s, this shift in the Mumbai’s economy toward jobs related to producer services becomes more visible as seen in the following quote from Patel (2003):

By 1994, Bombay accounted for 61 per cent jobs in India’s oil sector, 41 per cent in domestic air traffic. Its airport handled 75 per cent of the country’s imports and 64 per cent of exports. Employment in financial and business services had increased by 43 per cent between the 1970s and 1980s. Bombay collected 25 per cent of India’s income tax revenues and 60 per cent of custom revenues. Its banks controlled 12 percent of national deposits and a quarter of the country’s outstanding credits. The number of issues listed on the Bombay’s stock exchange grew from 203 in 1991-2 to 694 in 1993-4, and the amount of fresh capital in old and

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8 In this context Patel (2003, p.11) argues that even though much of formal sector production shifted to informal and small-scale sector, older capital-intensive high-value production through subsidiaries of multinational companies continued due to a demand from domestic consumption in Mumbai. This was largely achieved due to large resources of skilled labor in the city.
new companies increased from Rs 54 billion to 213 billion between these years (p.17).

The decline of manufacturing witnessed a rise in finance and producer services in Bombay aided by the significant economic reforms in India by the mid-1980s. In Greater Mumbai, the employment in finance and services increased from 52.1% in 1980 to 64.3% in 1990, whereas employment in manufacturing decreased from 36% to 28.5% during the same period (MMRDA, 1995). The formal introduction of the structural adjustment policy in 1991 (popularly referred to as liberalization) further accelerated the process of urban restructuring in the city.

Digital/Global Mumbai

India announced official reforms of economic liberalization and deregulation in 1991. Further, in 1992, as part of the structural adjustment program to facilitate economic liberalization, the central government announced a policy of political devolution of authority through the 74th Amendment Act to enlarge the scope of municipal institutions. These reforms have transformed the institutional framework of urban governance in India and have created the conditions for the growth of finance and producer services and increasing private sector involvement in policy-making and implementation. Reforms have also prompted the entry of foreign-owned companies in Mumbai leading to a speculative increase in real estate values (Nijman, 2000). Most of these new foreign companies were finance and producer services (Nijman, 2007).

Post-reform, urban planning in Mumbai is self-consciously geared toward reorganizing city space to render it a “global” or “world class” status and to convert the city into a significant financial and service center (Banerjee-Guha, 2002). Informally, this is referred to as the “Shanghaization” of Mumbai, alluding to Shanghai as the preferred model of development for Mumbai (Ghadge, 2010; Mahadevia & Narayan, 2005). One of the central components of “Shanghaization” is to increase the supply of land for commercial and high-end residential purposes through deregulation. The logic behind deregulation is that it will lead to convergence of the real-estate market in Mumbai with other global cities. The Draft Regional Plan for the Mumbai Metropolitan Region 1996-2011 envisaged Mumbai's role as an international city driven by financial and business services which would facilitate the integration of India's economy with the rest of the world (D’monte, 2002; MMRDA, 1995). In order to do this, the plan recommends increasing the role of the private sector in infrastructure and deregulating land. This plan marked a severe departure from earlier 1973 plan that emphasized dispersal and decentralization of industry and provision of broader employment to large sections of the city (Ghadge, 2010, p. 65).

In 2003, the international consultancy firm McKinsey & Company drew up a comprehensive plan to transform Mumbai into a “world-class city.” Some of its recommendations include increasing land availability by 50-70%, creating islands of excellence (upscale residential and commercial spaces), and redevelopment the
city block-by-block (Bombay First, 2003, p. vii). These visions of the *Bombay First* report were later endorsed in 2004 by the Government of Maharashtra its report (D’monte, 2002). Following these reports, in 2004-2005, the state government violently demolished 94,000 homes to “free-up” 288.8 acres of land for development. This demolition drive was described as “Operation Shanghai” in the newspapers (Mahadevia & Narayan, 2005).

The impetus of post-reform urban planning on increasing land availability for upscale residential and commercial spaces brings into focus the question of the redevelopment of the older built environment in central parts of the city constituted by the textile mills district. Today there are 58 functional mills—33 privately owned, 25 managed by the central government, and one owned by the state government. The “vacant” mill lands were keenly sought for redevelopment after the boom of real estate prices from the late 1980s to early 1990s. The total value of the 600 acres of the mill lands in the 1990s was estimated to be around ₹ 50 billion (Paul, Shetty, & Krishnan, 2005, p. 399). The Development Control (DC) Rules of 1991 were amended to facilitate modernization of the mill lands. As per the new rules, a part of the excess mill lands could be redeveloped. One part of the profits from redevelopment was to be invested in the revival of the mill, and another part was to be used to generate employment for the workers. The unviable undeveloped parts of the mill were to be distributed in three parts: one-third for low-income housing, one-third civic amenities, and one-third for development by the mill owner. However, in practice, the mill owners exploited loopholes in the law to entirely redevelop or sell the mill lands (Fernandes & Pinto, 1997). Some of the mills were converted to upscale malls such as the Phoenix Mall in Lower Parel (see Figure 1). In addition to the DC Rules, the sale of mill land was also subject to guidelines of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act (ULCRA) which set limits on the development of surplus mill land. However, in 2011, as a result of a sustained campaign of developers, ULCRA was scrapped. The developers argued that scrapping of ULCRA would free up 25,000 hectares of land needed to attract foreign investors.

I have used the term “globalizing marginality” elsewhere to describe this Janus-faced nature of contemporary urban transformation in Mumbai, whereby, “on the one hand, the globalizing impulse of the new world economy has subjected the city to new strategies of urban development and regulations; while on the other hand, this very process of globalizing caters exclusively to certain key economic sectors and elites, marginalizing most of the population” (Ghadge, 2010, p. 72). However, these new global visions have engendered a new form of local politics in the form of poor people’s movements in the city involving slum dwellers, erstwhile textile mill workers and street vendors who lay claim to alternative visions of the city that draw on the earlier inclusive histories of urban experience.
Figure 1. Mills to Malls: High Street Phoenix Mall. A former textile mill converted into a mall. It is consistently listed as one of the top three malls in Mumbai. Source: Thirani (2011).

Figure 2. Rehearsing for the Ganesh festival in Girangaon, the mill-district of Mumbai. Source: Author (2009).
Conclusion

In contemporary globalization, cities have (re)-emerged as critical entities in the organization of the world economy. However, dominant urban theories such as the “world city” or “global city” have ignored the long-term historical context, thereby exaggerating the global context of today’s urban transformation. A longue durée perspective has shown that cities, as key “nodes,” were embedded in broader circuits of production, exchange, and culture throughout history. Based on a longue durée perspective, this paper maps a long-term historical development of Bombay/Mumbai, taking into account the global and local dynamics of the region. The paper used two analytic frames of the “port city” and the “colonial city” to facilitate our understanding of the connections and disconnections in the making of Bombay/Mumbai that has a profound bearing on the nature of contemporary urban transformation.

Bombay’s emergence as a port city is the result of both its global linkages in the world economy as well as its local linkages with its hinterland. Although Bombay’s growth as a port city took place during the British expansion in the 19th century, one needs to take into account a much earlier history of adaptation and expansion of maritime networks of trade and cultural exchange in the Indian Ocean region. Before Bombay, Surat was the preeminent port city within a 13th-century pre-colonial Asian maritime network that was later expanded by European colonial trade. It was only with the decline of Surat due to a decline of various Islamic
trading empires in the world that Bombay’s rise as an essential port city along the west coast of India was made possible. The opium trade led to the emergence of an indigenous capitalist class, who later reinvested their profits from opium trade in the emerging textile industry in Bombay from the mid-19th century. With the introduction of the textile mills and the railroad infrastructure, there was a systematic linking of Bombay to its hinterland as migrants from different regions were increasingly recruited in the mills. The post-independence period saw much of the profits from the textile industry reinvested in new industries including chemicals, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, engineering, and automobile production, further consolidating Bombay/Mumbai’s role as India’s commercial capital.

Since 1980s, deindustrialization and policies of liberalization and deregulation have transformed the economic landscape of Bombay/Mumbai enabling its integration into the global economy. This is evident in the growth of foreign corporate presence in the city (Nijman, 2007), as well the growth of information technology led industries comprising of finance and producer services, mass media and entertainment, and communications. But at the same time, the city continues to rely on the ever-increasing informal labor of poor migrants in the small-scale workshops of electronics, garments, plastics, and consumer goods (Pacione, 2006, p. 234). The existence of this dual economic world is also reflected in the polarized visions of the city’s future. The elite and the middle classes in the city are enamored by emerging global visions of prosperity and connectivity, while the poor majority cling onto the historical promise of Bombay/Mumbai as the city of the working classes.

The process of Bombay/Mumbai’s integration into the world economy has been and remains far from even. Historically, it was a “colonial city” whose development catered to metropolitan interests in Britain and the elite minority in the city. Colonial urban planning starkly reflected elite interests that produced inequities resulting from an uneven built environment and unequal access to essential services among its residents—problems that are at the heart of Mumbai’s contemporary global transformation.

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