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Introduction to the Special Issue: Examining Complex Relationships in the Portuguese Speaking World

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Marking the 32nd anniversary of Kennesaw State University’s (KSU) award-winning Annual Country Study Program, the Year of the Portuguese Speaking World (YPSW), has been a truly unique and rewarding undertaking. We owe such an indelible experience to the tremendous diversity represented in the constellation of countries within this community, as well as to the myriad of views and perspectives to which our guest speakers espoused, and which they also shared, throughout the project. The Portuguese-speaking world includes the following countries and various cultural enclaves spread throughout four continents: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Equatorial Guinea, Goa, Guinea-Bissau, Macau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe, among others. Our program of study has focused especially on the relationships which have developed among these countries over the past 500 years, as well as with other Portuguese-speaking communities in their role in the wider world.

One of many overarching goals of the program has been to understand the complex histories and dynamics of this relatively undiscovered world at KSU. Such a project is borne from the growth and collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the ever-changing post/neo-colonial conditions that continues to shape the national and cultural identities, worldviews, and relationships of these countries and their people. Portugal, the first modern nation-state in Europe, took advantage of advanced seafaring techniques learned from its earlier Arab conquerors to become a nation of global traders and explorers. They first established colonies in the Atlantic Islands of Madeira, the Azores, and Cape Verde archipelago, then developed a network of factories/fortifications along the Atlantic coast of Africa (for example, to trade for gold at the Elmina castle in Ghana) and then along the Indian Ocean. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas fixed a boundary among the competing Portuguese and Spanish empires, incorporating Brazil and much of Africa into Portugal’s domain. Three years later, Vasco da Gama led the first
European seaborne expedition to make landfall in Asia, at Calicut in India, returning with precious cargoes of spices. Notably, upon arrival, da Gama encountered Christian communities already present in India (Fernández-Armesto, 2006, p. 178). The first essay in this volume describes the iconography of royal portraiture that transposes Christian motifs onto local scenes; while the second article further articulates the motivations and myths surrounding de Gama’s voyages of discovery. It emphasizes, in particular, the messianic zeal in carrying out a so-called civilizing mission. After the establishment of trading ports in India, Portuguese expansion developed in entrepôts in places such as Macau, China, and Nagasaki, Japan. This allowed Portugal, essentially, to monopolize the sea routes from Europe to Asia for 100 years. Indeed, the Portuguese were instrumental to the development of highly decentralized, social networks of global trade, beyond that which already existed in the Indian Ocean and other long-distance routes, which have endured and continue to shape such relationships today. David Hancock, in Oceans of Wine (2009), traced these extensive networks related to the Madeira wine trade especially in North America. In the United States, today, large communities of Portuguese speakers live in the Boston area. For example, New Bedford’s Feast of the Blessed Sacrament attracts over 100,000 people and claims to be the largest Portuguese feast in the world. The final article in this special issue reviews Macau’s trade relationships with the Portuguese-speaking world revealing serious weaknesses but also opportunities for growth.

Understanding differences in concepts of hybridity, creolization, and gender and race relations in the Portuguese -speaking world have been critical recurring themes in this year’s study. Race, especially, was used to identify, mark, and separate groups of people, to place them within a hierarchy ranging from civilization to barbarity, and to explain and justify the rule and domination of Europeans over others (Williamson, 2016). One of the distinguishing characteristics of Portuguese colonialism was its reliance on marriage and miscegenation to expand its influence and deny claims of racism. Owen and Klubocka (2014) write, “Linking expansionist impulse to sexual desire,” we have come to know this as “Lusotropicalism,” a term that encompasses many other aspects of colonial cultural re-shaping (p. 1). This includes the rampant justification of cultural, linguistic, and social submission of colonial peoples via the above-mentioned discourse. Encouraged by government and church in part due to Portugal’s small population and increasing European competition for global conquests, such unions–ranging from genuine voluntary companionship to coercive rape and abuse and resulting in both wanted and unwanted children–had significant consequences for both colonizer and colonized (Reid, 2014, p. 31).

Noting that “identities are always relational but seldom reciprocal,” for de Sousa Santos (2002, p. 20) post-colonial hybridity and alterity rest along a continuum between Prospero and Caliban, between colonizer and colonized. The theory of the “calibanized Prospero” face-to-face with the “prosperized Caliban,” although rife with Lusotropicalist possibilities, attempts to build an image of Portuguese colonialism as one in which the former would become unthinkable without the latter, and where reciprocity and mutual respect is the best possible outcome. Historically, it means “those who would render the Portuguese as a
proper and prosperous Prospero ascribed to them a Lusitanian, Roman and Germanic ancestry. . . [and] those that viewed the Portuguese as a reluctant, inconsequent, and cannibalized Prospero ascribed to them Jewish, Moorish, and African ancestry” (de Sousa Santos, 2002, p. 28). In more recent critical work the issue of an unstable, centralized cultural framework coming face-to-face with the cultural diversity that the Lusophone World’s various countries and territories encompasses has also taken center stage (Matta Matta, 2001, pp. 31-32). Within most of the articles present in this volume these and related notions of class, ethnicity, race, and sociopolitical (in)stabilities make themselves apparent.

In terms of gender continuity within such a theoretical system this means that “. . . Portuguese post-colonialism calls for a strong articulation with the question of sexual discrimination and feminism . . .” (de Sousa Santos, 2002, p. 17). The article “The Integrity of Women in Re-making a Nation: The Case of Guinea-Bissau” specifically looks at gender relations and the roles of women as agents of change, moving beyond the dichotomies rampant in earlier critical frameworks. Perhaps in contrast to the views of de Sousa Santos, yet well within the ideal of “lusofonia,” the article on “The Universality of Traditional Folktales” considers similarities in values across cultures that in some ways may transcend issues of power. Also in this volume, the short story, “A Lagoa do Cacimbo,” further contributes to the literary perspective on issues of tradition and modernity in contrast both with one another and with the theories which attempt to bind them.

The advent of Early Modern slavery and the Atlantic slave trade also corresponded with the Portuguese colonial legacy and, ironically, a system we may now characterize as an early variant of globalization. One of the most devastating impacts of the contact between Europeans and Native Americans was that of diseases such as smallpox which caused widespread epidemics and loss of life. In the Brazilian colonies, because of these decimating illnesses, and the desire to exploit labor for economic gain, the loss of native populations lead the Portuguese to begin importing enslaved Africans from the regions around the Angolan colony to work on sugarcane plantations. Slavery was the key institution to the development of the sugar industry as well as other commodities (gold, tobacco, coffee, cotton, indigo, rubber, brasilwood, etc.). Because of these lucrative industries, Brazil became the jewel in the crown of the Portuguese empire. The trade saw more enslaved Africans forced to Brazil (4 million) and over a longer period of time than any other country. As a result, the impact of African cultures on Brazil is ever-present. Beyond influences on the Portuguese language itself, it is most obviously evidenced through traditions that involve a level of religious syncretism and cultural expression in resistance to slavery’s oppression such as Capoeira, Candomblé, and certain Carnival performances. Yet, it also permeates numerous aspects of daily life especially in the northern states of Bahia and Pernambuco. Due to the shorter distance between Africa and Brazil, it was also the only territory in the Americas that regularly exported goods directly back to Africa. Direct trade between Brazil and Southern Africa remains a vital economic and social driver of change in the Portuguese-speaking world. These ongoing “South-South” relationships have begun to take on new meaning to embrace alternative views of social justice and the solidarity economy.
Among the most interesting episodes in all of world history is the unprecedented move in 1808 of the Portuguese Royal Court and Capital from Lisbon to Brazil with the help of the British Navy in order to escape Napoleon’s forces. Moving the Royal capital from Lisbon to Salvador was done to protect the most lucrative trade holdings of the empire. A similar move occurred later when the Sultan of Oman moved his capital from Muscat to the spice island of Zanzibar. The Napoleonic Wars were accompanied by rising European nationalism with British sea power confining French imperialism to mainland Europe. The Portuguese monarchy escorted to Brazil subsequently opened the entire Portuguese Empire to British trade, indicating the importance of collaborative alliances to compete globally, although some observers have cast Portugal in the relationship of being an informal colony of Great Britain (de Sousa Santos, 2002, p. 11). After King João VI returned to Portugal in 1821, his son Pedro remained in Brazil claiming Brazil’s independence from Portugal in 1822. Unfortunately, most of the countries in the Portuguese-speaking world only gained their independence from Portugal 150 years later in 1974-75 following the overthrow of authoritarian rule in Portugal (15 years after most African countries gained independence from British and French colonial powers). This makes this Year of the Portuguese Speaking World also the year of the 40th anniversary of these countries’ independence. For Angola, Cape Verde, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, independence was only achieved after years of guerilla warfare and armed struggle. The decolonization of these Portuguese territories also went hand-in-hand with nationalist movements committed to socialism; yet, many of the colonial period legacies, such as centralizing linguistic practices, were still part of the “national project” of many countries, including Angola (Arenas, 2011, p. 160). African decolonization in the Portuguese-speaking world occurred against the background of supposedly having learned lessons from the previous British and French colonies, involved extensive military conflict and traumatic violence, was seen as “the last great hope of Third World socialism,” and occurred simultaneously with the Carnation Revolution’s overthrow of the Salazar-Caetano regime inextricably linking change in Portugal with change in Africa (Chabal, 2002, pp. 18-19). In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution, over a million Portuguese citizens fled the African territories. Portuguese emigration and the sending of remittances back to Portugal have been important aspects of economic development for Portugal before, during, and after the colonial period.

A notable consequence of this colonial legacy and the circumstances of its final moments has been that the so-called periphery (i.e., Portugal’s former colonies in Africa and Asia) was now influencing the center (i.e., Portugal). As sites of value, today, Portuguese Africa is being examined as emergent leaders in cultural, social, aesthetic, and economic initiatives that impact the greater Portuguese-speaking world (Lundy, 2016). Interestingly, many Portuguese are now moving to Angola, Brazil, and Mozambique in search of work; more so, such a movement “back” to the former colonies has been by invitation and with the support of the Portuguese government (Pinto, 2011, p3). At the same time, Portugal has become an important link for the Portuguese-speaking world within the European Union as well as a highly regarded global center of diverse artistic,
musical, and literary culture (“Portugal,” para. 1). In this sense, while Portugal has represented this world’s rich and complex past, and Brazil symbolizes the challenges and opportunities of the present, Lusophone Africa is viewed as a vital place for the Portuguese-speaking world’s future potential. Moreover, today, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP, or “Comunidade de Países de Língua Portuguesa) is working to support each other’s progress in mutually beneficial ways. The article “The Portuguesinhos: Return and Reintegration of Angolan Police Officers who Trained Abroad” focuses on assessing the impact of a specific collaborative training project between two countries in the Portuguese-speaking world whose relationship has spanned colony, political revolution, social evolution, and a nascent and somewhat fractured collaborative “reencontro,” or finding of each other again.

The specific and varied circumstances of the colonial pasts, independence movements, and post-colonial developments represent another important theme in our year-long program of study of the Portuguese-speaking world. In Angola and Mozambique, especially, independence did not result in an immediate end to the manipulation of structures of power and privilege or the establishment of stable democracies. For example, Angola’s most important export crop, coffee, and the political fights for its control “affected the wars of liberation in the 1970’s, the wars of intervention in the 1980’s, and even the civil wars in the 1990’s” (Birmingham, 2002, p. 140). As emphasized by KSU visiting Fulbright scholar Raul Fernandes (2016) during his talk in the YPSW series, the struggle for independence represented not only a rejection of colonial order but was also a time-consuming process of cultural emancipation and political consciousness aimed at building alternative forms of livelihood and prosperity. In discussing the development of a large dam in Mozambique, Allen and Barbara Isaacman (2013) have observed that,

> despite their very different economic agendas and ideological orientations, the Portuguese colonial regime, the postindependence socialist state, and its free-market successor all heralded the development promise of Cahora Bassa. Whether Portuguese or Africans held the reins of state power, the dam symbolized the ability of science and technology to master nature and ensure human progress . . . [yet], Cahora Bassa has caused very real ecological, economic, and social trauma for Zambezi valley residents. (p. 4)

Unfortunately, fifty years after its completion, the Cahora Bassa Dam today continues to impoverish the more than half a million residents of the lower Zambezi river valley and to devastate the region’s local ecosystems and wildlife. The challenges of balancing economic development with environmental sustainability are among the most critical issues for the Portuguese-speaking world.

Brazil, a unique example of a long-term post-colonial nation in the Portuguese-speaking world, holds an important place within it as well as globally. Born out of Portugal’s economic colonial empire and now almost 190 years post-independence, it is a vital trading partner of the United States and therefore of particular interest to many of our faculty, staff, students, and local community.
Georgia’s governor recently led a trade delegation to Brazil. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Brazil was the sixth largest destination for global Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2013. The country typically receives close to half of South America’s total incoming foreign investment. U.S. trade with Brazil exceeds $100 billion annually. However, not all of the news from Brazil is so positive. The nation also boasts the second most expansive market for cocaine and the second largest small arms industry in the world, a murder rate higher than that of Mexico, and the fourth largest incarceration rate in the world (Reid, 2014, pp. 189-191). To be fair, it should be noted that the United States has the dubious distinction of surpassing Brazil in most of these categories. Nonetheless, and despite the recent downturn and corruption scandals, overall long-term economic prospects in Brazil remain relatively good due to growing domestic demand, global demand for commodity exports, a growing middle class, increased investments in infrastructure and development of offshore oil reserves, and prudent macroeconomic policies.

In the face of the dramatic economic and political swings that define Brazil’s contemporary evolution, a strong desire to learn about what makes Brazil so unique in the Americas has brought many Portuguese language students into the classroom. The article in this volume on “Critical Pedagogy and Language Acquisition” examines how studying Brazil’s current economic and political crises presents an engaging and meaningful method for enhancing language learning through problem-solving practices.

It has been the goal of the YPSW to foster a critical understanding of this diverse region. In this vein, the intellectual community at KSU has looked to contribute to the development of more nuanced approaches in solving the complex global issues and challenges that our students face. This will strengthen them as critical and thoughtful members of society, as global citizens, as they attempt to interact constructively, responsibly and appropriately, across cultures. The YPSW Program has aimed to provide participants with a wide range of perspectives on different aspects of the artistic, economic, social, scientific, literary, musical, and cultural life of the Lusophone, or Portuguese-speaking, world. This has been possible via a weekly series of lectures and round tables, our many cultural events, the student symposium and conference, the two-week seminar abroad, and this special issue of the *Journal of Global Initiatives*. The project has also offered opportunities to engage with people from various countries, regions, and cultures in meaningful dialogue. In sum, we hope that readers will find this volume informative and thought-provoking as a means for better understanding and engaging the Portuguese-speaking world in all of the vast diversity it represents.

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Blending Myth and Reality: Maritime Portugal and Renaissance Portraits of the Royal Court

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Abstract

An incalculable loss of art was suffered by Portugal on November 1, 1755, when Lisbon was essentially leveled by a 9.0 earthquake that lasted six minutes and was followed by an immense tsunami. All the churches in Lisbon were destroyed either by the massive tremor or subsequent fires. All the courtly castles of the city were obliterated too, including the lofty medieval fortress-citadel of St. George, the late-Gothic princely Palace of St. Martin, the Renaissance Bragança Palace, the Manueline Riverbank Palace, and the Estaus Palace on the north side of the Rossio municipal square, which had been frequented by visiting diplomats and dignitaries since the mid-15th century (Smith, 1968; Fonseca, 2004; Kendrick, 1957; Paice, 2008). The 1755 devastation of Lisbon’s cultural monuments has resulted in an incomplete picture of the country’s art history—imagine a catastrophic loss of art from a comparable cataclysm in Paris, Rome, or London. So then, this essay concentrates upon select examples of Portuguese Renaissance art which either survived the Lisbon earthquake or remained protected in other courtly centers of Europe. Unless otherwise noted, the concepts are original observations presented by the author. Recommended readings are provided in text citations, and select books about the history of Portugal are included in the references. These scholarly publications contain excellent bibliographies for further study.

Afonso Henriques I, a Nation’s First King, and the Persistence of Memory: The Crimson Cross and Manueline Caravels

The mariners of Portugal charted unfamiliar waters and their voyages are the essence of myth—Vasco da Gama, who traveled to India in 1497; Pedro Álvares Cabral who steered the same course to South Asia in 1500, but deviated on his return to set anchor in Brazil; Fernão Magalhães, who sailed around the globe
between 1519 and 1521 (Livermore, 1966; Boxer, 1969, 1991; Castanheda, 1979; Diffie, 1960; Diffie & Winius 1977; Dos Passos, 2011; Lach & Van Kley, 1965; Newitt, 2004; Russell-Wood, 1992; Studnicki-Gizbert, 2007; Disney, 2009). Portugal’s cultural heritage equally is the substance of legend and lore. In the case of courtly portraiture, the chemistry of art and history is quite distinctive. The veristic royal likeness often blends with epical saga to produce a highly refined allegorical compound. This essay will address the Lusitanian portrait amalgamation, beginning with the origin of the kingdom of Portugal in the 12th century and concluding with the extraordinary Renaissance age of global encounters.

The kingdom of Portugal was founded in 1139 by Afonso Henriques I (1109: r. 1139-1185). The son of a Burgundian Count who fought in the First Crusade, he achieved a unification of regions from his family stronghold in Guimarães in the north to the vast area south of the Tagus River known as the Alentajo (Mattoso, 2014; Anderson, 2000; Mattoso & Sousa, 1997, Oliveira Marques, 1971). Afonso Henriques’s life and deeds were celebrated by later royals, most notably in a manuscript of the Genealogy of the Portuguese Kings (Figure 1: a) begun in 1530 for the son of Manuel I (1469: r. 1495-1521), the monarch most associated with Portugal’s Age of Discoveries. Simon Bening of Bruges and Antonio de Holanda of Lisbon collaborated to provide colorful illuminations. While only 13 detached pages survive, most contain a royal ancestral tree populated by diverse historical figures (Aguiar, 1962; Albuquerque & Abreu e Lima, 1984; McKendrick, 2003). The portraits belonging to the genealogy of King Afonso Henriques I are generic, but the border encasing the grouped figures provides a fairly accurate topographical view of the seacoast from the town of Sintra to Lisbon. More than mere picturesque landscape, however, two upper marginal vignettes extol Afonso Henriques’s achievement of the Christian Reconquest against the Almoravids of Morocco (Figure 1: b).

The historiated narrations illustrate the decisive battle fought at Ourique in the Alentejo, on July 25, 1139, against King Ali ibn Yusef. The Portuguese victory was indelibly linked with a vision of the Holy Cross which Afonso Henriques purportedly experienced on the eve of his conflict—the legendary event was quite analogous to Constantine’s apparition of a labrarum. The pious legend of Ourique was in fact shaped by Augustinian monks at the Monastery of the Holy Cross in Coimbra, an ancient Roman commercial center Afonso Henriques had selected as his capital in 1131.

After his death in 1185, Afonso Henriques was buried in a simple sarcophagus in the Coimbra church of Santa Cruz. In 1520, Nicolau Chanterene installed a more lavish wall tomb by order of King Manuel I, whose brother had commissioned the Portuguese Genealogy (Dias, 1987; Grilo, 2000). Portrayed in full armor with hands joined in perpetual prayer, the king’s realist gisant rests beneath carvings of the Immaculate Virgin Mary, the Evangelists, and other sacred personalities. This sculpted disposition of figures visually recollects a Tree of Jesse. In the Franciscan Church at Porto, the interior of which was entirely gilded with gold from Brazil, Jesse of Bethlehem, the father of the biblical King
David, reclines to form the base of Christ’s genealogical tree. Only a portion of a Jesse carving has survived from a Tree of Jesse sculpted about 1387-93 by João Garcia de Toledo, and the image actually is housed in Afonso Henrique’s natal town of Guimarães. Subsequent generations revived the “mythical” portrait of Afonso Henrique as a Portuguese Jesse, always with the armor of Ourique updated as if to insinuate the continued transcendent presence of the nation’s founder.

**Figure 1 (a)**

**Figure 1 (b)**

![Figure 1](image_url)

**Figure 1**: (a) Antonio de Holanda (Lisbon) and Simon Bening (Bruges), *Battle of Ourique*, middle side vignette from the (b) *Dynastic Tree of King Afonso Henriques I, Portuguese Genealogy of the Royal Houses* 1530-1534, London, British Library, Add MS. 12531, f. 7.

Afonso Henrique’s unification of Portugal and concurrent attainment of the Christian Reconquest was accomplished in large measure by the buttressing force of the Templar Knights, fearless commanders who defended around 30 major fortress-castles taken from the Almoravids of Morocco (Gandra, 2000). From these rural outposts, they reported directly to Tomar, the Templar headquarters established between 1157 and 1162 (Rosa, 1960; Rosa, 1965/1988; Santos Graça, 1991), Silva, 2011). Tomar’s walled site still retains its spectacular rotunda known as the Charola, built in 1160 to evoke Jerusalem’s Holy Sepulchre (Figure 2: a). Its interior is Renaissance. The 14th century witnessed the demise of the Knights...
Templar in Europe as they were suppressed in 1312 by Pope Clement V and their extensive preserves and treasures were seized by the French King Philippe IV. Insofar as the Templars in Portugal, King Dinis (1261-1325) established a new chivalric institution in 1319, the Order of Christ, which assumed direct control of all former Templar holdings including Tomar (Guimarães, 1936; Pero-Sanz, 2011). Known by his sobriquet, Rei Lavrador or Farmer king, King Dinis was one of the first conservationists (Ackerlind, 1990; Gomes, 2003; Sotto Mayor Pizarro, 2008). Although the huge forest near Leiria was planted to prevent soil erosion, abundant pinewood from the preserve later was used to construct Portugal’s impressive fleets of commercial ships (Castro, Fonseca, Vacas, & Ciciliot, 2008).

The insignia chosen for the new Order of Christ was a red cross, and this emblem adorned the sails of the Portuguese caravels during the Renaissance age of navigation (Figure 2). Duarte Galvão’s manuscript Crónica de Dom Afonso Henriques contains a folio that shows the Lisbon Ribeira (riverbank) with the Terreiro do Paço. This “Palace Square” received its name from the adjacent royal residence on the Tagus estuary built by King Manuel I in the early 1500s and furnished with European tapestries and paintings, as well as luxury goods from Africa, East Asia, and Brazil (Jordan, 1985, 1994). The 1755 earthquake of Lisbon decimated not only the Manueline Paço da Ribeira with its enclosed jardim de laranjal (garden of orange trees), but also the entire area of the Ribeira that encompassed ship building and the center which regulated trade known as the Casa da Índia (Moita, 1994; Moita, Baptista Pereira, Pereira, & Leite, 1983). The View of Manueline Lisbon from Duarte Galvão’s Chronicle creates the illusion of movement as numerous caravels and smaller vessels populate the waters of the Tagus in front of the Paço da Ribeira and its commercial yard. Many masted ships as well as smaller open boats with oarsmen, proudly display banners with the distinctive red cross of the Order of Christ and Jerusalem. Afonso Henriques I’s reconquest of Lisbon from Moorish occupation (July 1-October 25, 1147) was largely achieved by warrior-knights en route to the Holy Land on the Second Crusade. The folio of Lisbon from Galvão’s historical account Crónica de El-Rei D. Afonso Henriques (Galvão, 1995) shows medieval battle tents occupying both sides of the open terrain with groups of men engaged in conflict (Bragança, 1950). If indeed intended by the manuscript’s illuminator, the notion of a time sequence in the landscape is most original. The Manueline artist insinuates that commercial caravels dispatched from Portugal must have been perceived by the royal court as divinely propelled “ships of faith.”

Afonso V - “O Africano”: Extolling the Heroic Epic of Morocco

Portugal’s first forays of nautical exploration beyond Europe began soon after the rise to power in 1385 of King João I (1357-1433), founder of the Aviz dynasty. In 1415 the monarch, his able commander, the Santo Condestável Nuno Álvares Pereira (1360-1431), and his natural son Afonso, Count of Barcelos, led a naval expedition to vanquish the Moroccan port-citadel of Ceuta. In the aftermath of the victory, three royal princes - Duarte, Pedro, and Henrique “the Navigator”—were
Knighted within the church of São Francisco that had been hastily constructed over a mosque (Oliveira Martins, 1891; Russell, 2000). In 1428 Northern Renaissance’s most celebrated artist, Jan van Eyck traveled by sea from Bruges to Lisbon (Von Barghahn, 2013-2014). He was a member of a diplomatic delegation sent by Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, to negotiate a royal marriage with Isabella of Portugal, the only daughter of João I and Philippa of Lancaster. Upon his return to Belgium, Van Eyck in 1432 painted his famous Ghent Altarpiece (Sint-Baafskathedral, Ghent), a polyptych which contains credible portraits of João I’s family, and moreover, acknowledges the triumph at Ceuta in the lateral panel of Holy Knights.

Figure 2: Portuguese School, View of Manuoline Lisbon from Duarte Galvão, Crónica de El Rey Dom Afonso Henrique, (Ships display the Templar red cross adopted as the insignia of the Order of Christ in 1319), 1500-1510, Cascais, Museu-Biblioteca Conde Castro Guimarães.

After several unsuccessful Portuguese attempts to conquer Morocco, the Marinid kingdom ultimately was conquered in 1471 by Afonso V, the grandson of João I. His taking of the jewel cities of Asilah and Tangier was commemorated in two monumental commissions given by the monarch to the painter Nuno Gonçalves. Appointed court artist in Lisbon on July 20, 1450, Gonçalves likely was trained in the Brussels workshop of Rogier van der Weyden, a Flemish
specialist in sacred art, and a portraitist of extraordinary talent second only to his predecessor Jan van Eyck (Everaert & Stols, 1991).

The *St. Vincent Altarpiece* (Figure 3: Lisbon, Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga) by Nuno Gonçalves today comprises six paintings on wood, but originally they formed part of a much larger retable that had a statue of the famed martyr of Saragossa placed above a centerpiece silver reliquary casket upheld by angels (Azevedo & Brummel, 1985; Carvalho et al., 1994; Francis, 1979). St. Vincent’s relics purportedly had been discovered at the Capo São Vicente during the reign of the Afonso Henriques I and transported mystically to Lisbon in a ship guarded by ravens. Gonçalves installed his huge altarpiece in a chapel honoring St. Vincent which architecturally was encapsulated by the old Romanesque bell tower of the Cathedral of Lisbon. The extant panels provide an impressive array of historical figures, 60 in total, including men who had fought valorously in North African campaigns from the 1415 conquest of Ceuta to the 1471 taking of Tangier. The *St. Vincent Altarpiece* commemorates a maritime realm's continued defense of Christianity, and the deliberate genealogical alignment of royals, aristocrats, and clergy combined to magnify Lusitania’s celebrated past, present, and future. Despite an undeniable veneer of Flemish realism to the figures and faces, the tableau vivant of society presents an extraordinary Pentecostal “Holy Grail procession” in the tradition of fables enshrouding Camelot. Romances about King Arthur and his knights of the Round Table were ever popular and constantly recalled during the reign of João I and his English queen, Philippa of Lancaster (Hook, 2015; Campos Brunetti, 1974; Souza Zierer, 2007, 2010). Yet even earlier, medieval Portugal had celebrated Arthurian chivalry, as Isabel of Aragon (1282-1325), sainted wife of King Dinis, presided over Pentecostal processions held at Sintra, a rural estate traditionally frequented by the royal court during the summer (Pero-Sanz, 2011).

Far eclipsing the *St. Vincent Altarpiece* in quantity of figures, however, is a set of six large tapestries that pertain to the final stages of the Moroccan campaign and are housed in Pastrana, Spain. Unquestionably designed by Nuno Gonçalves, the cycle was woven in Tournai (Belgium), by the Pasquier Granier workshop. Four panels have been recently restored and exhibited internationally (Figure 4). The quartet of subjects aptly has been described by the National Gallery of Art as marking “The Invention of Glory” (Bunes Ibarra, Angel, La Rocca, Rodrigues, De Wit, 2012; Santos, 1925, 1953); Von Barghahn, 2012). The huge tapestries are without parallel because they illustrate a contemporary epic rather than a biblical or mythological theme. They are an historical chronicle of events, having the aspect of a woven journal. Numerous “portraits” of chivalric knights define the detailed compositions making the story difficult to read.

The *Landing of Asilah* shows Afonso V’s flagship *Santo António*, with the ruler’s emblematic water wheel banner, a herald that surfaces as a leitmotif, and occasionally with the motto “jamais” (French: never). Realistic portraits of Afonso V and his teenage son, João [II], appear twice in this panel. They are portrayed in the foreground among the knights seated in transport skiffs (*naus*) that move on choppy waters along the rocky shoreline—a perilous endeavor - as
both father and son are portrayed wearing heavy steel armor. About 200 men drowned in the landing at Asilah, weighted down by their arms, chain mail, and heraldic tunics laden over *cuir bouilli*, or hardened leather. Afonso V and his son again appear in the distance with their army situated before the looming walls of the Merinid citadel.

**Figure 3:** Nuno Gonçalves/João Eanes, *St. Vincent Altarpiece with Effigy Saints Thekla and Vincent*, 1470-1472, Lisbon, Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga; DETAIL: Panel of St. Vincent, King Afonso V and his son João II (when Prince)

**Figure 4:** Nuno Gonçalves (designer), *Landing at Asilah* (August 20, 1471), woven under Pasquier Grenier (Tournai), 1470s, wool and silk (144-7/8 x 436-1/4"), Pastrana, Diocese of Sigüenza-Guadalajara/Church of Our Lady of the Assumption, Fundación Carlos de Amberes (Photo: Paul M.R. Maeyaert)

The *Siege of Asilah* shows João II and Afonso V within a wooden palisade constructed by the Portuguese to cut off the town by land as their masted ships prevent any escape from sea. Afonso V, seated on a richly caparisoned horse and readily identifiable by his water wheel pennon, tenders his baton of command in the direction of his son. Prince João, who rides in equal splendor, extends his hand to receive the rod for directing the military. Heraldry appears on the palisade: the
Portuguese royal arms; the red cross of the Order of Christ; the ubiquitous water wheel. The panel of the *Assault on Asilah* truly captures the chaos of hand-to-hand combat. Equestrian portraits of the monarch and his son again appear in the mêlée of fighting men and battle standards. Prince João now wields the command baton while King Afonso brandishes his sword as if he were the legendary Arthur hefting the mighty Excalibur. Due to the resounding victory at Asilah, the taking of Tangier was a relatively tame affair. In the last tapestry of the *Fall of Tangier*, the royals are absent, having relinquished the final routing to their commanders. The Tangerines flee their city. By contrast to the implied cacophony of the other panels, the sounds of silence are apparent in this final episode.

**João II (1455: r. 1481-1495) The Chivalric “Perfect Prince”: On the Threshold of a Global Empire**

When King Afonso died in 1481, his son João succeeded him to the throne of Portugal, a monarch known to posterity as *o Príncipe Perfeito* - the “Perfect Prince” (Sanceau, 1959). Although his reign was characterized by political unrest, João II’s rule witnessed the Portuguese penetration of West Africa and the establishment in Ghana of the important coastal citadel of São Jorge da Mina (Elmina) in 1482 and the subsequent exploration of the Congo River by Diogo Cão in 1484. The navigator Bartolomeu Dias in 1488 rounded the Cape of Good Hope, establishing a critical sea route to India.

In 1473, soon after he was knighted for his valor at Tangiers, João II wed his first cousin - Leonor of Viseu—the beautiful daughter of Afonso V’s brother Fernando, who had fought in campaigns to North Africa. This marriage occurred on January 22, 1470 - the feast day of St. Vincent. Prince João then was 18 and his bride Leonor was only 15. The well-known “Virgin of the Catholic Monarchs” in Madrid’s Prado Museum should be retitled the “Virgin of the Portuguese Monarchs” because, based upon a careful study of extant portraits, the sovereigns portrayed before the seated Madonna and Child actually are João II and Queen Leonor, not Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon (Figure 5).

Leonor was the first cousin of Isabel of Castile—their mothers were sisters—and so, the women shared an undeniable physical resemblance. The ruler in the Prado painting has a rather pointed nose, closer to that of João II than Ferdinand of Aragon. There too is the knotty issue of the painter’s identity. The Prado work has remained anonymous, because stylistically it cannot be related to the hand of any Spanish master. However, the work accords in sensuosity with figures painted by Jorge Afonso (1470-1540) as well as his disciple and son-in-law, Gregório Lopes (1490-1550) (Carvalho, 1999; Seruya, Alves, & Serrão, 1999). Jorge Afonso, a documented court artist of Manuel I in 1508, lived in Lisbon and maintained a workshop near the Church of São Domingos (Luz Afonso, de Brito, & Amado, 1992; Pereira, 1995; Porfírio, 1991). The Prado *Virgin of the Monarchs* includes the figures of four major mendicant saints of the Dominican Order: St. Thomas Aquinas with a Church Maquette with St. Raymond of Pennafort; and opposite, Sts. Dominic de Guzmán with a Lily and St. Peter Martyr of Verona).
Especially relevant for the Prado *Virgin of the Monarchs*, is the fact that Jorge Afonso received robust patronage from Queen Leonor of Viseu, Manuel I’s sister. Among projects she commissioned were main altarpieces for the Lisbon Madre de Deus Convent she founded (1515: Lisbon, Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga) and the Monastery of Jesus in Setúbal. Jorge Afonso and Gregório Lopes collaborated to decorate the interior of Tomar’s *Charola* (ca. 1536-40).

In 1490, when the Prado *Virgin of the Monarchs* was painted, a wedding was celebrated between the dynastic houses of Portugal and Spain (Cordeiro de Sousa, 1954; Sanceau, 1959, pp. 323-332; Oliviera Marques, 1971, pp. 31-35). The only son of João II and Leonor—a 15-year-old Prince Afonso—married the 20-year-old eldest daughter of the Spanish sovereigns Isabel and Ferdinand. Princess Isabella of Asturias, is seen *de dos*, that is, from the back, and her face is in profile.

![Figure 5: Attributed to Jorge Afonso (School of Lisbon), Virgin of the Portuguese Monarchs, mixed media on panel (123 x 112 cm), ca. 1490, Madrid, Museo del Prado](image)
This abbreviated manner of representation suggests the artist did not yet have personal contact with the Spanish Infanta. According to Garcia de Resende’s Chronicle of João II (Ch. XIV), after approval of the marriage in March of 1490, a Portuguese delegation traveled to Seville. Fernão Silveira, Juan Teixeira, and Ruy de Sande were received at the Alcázar by the Catholic Monarchs Isabel and Ferdinand. At that time, the ambassadors presented their daughter with several gifts, including a “handsome likeness” of Prince Afonso (Resende, 1545/1973, Ch. CXII). The Prado panel plausibly was the betrothal gift which greatly pleased his intended bride. The painting has a provenance in the Dominican Real Monasterio de Santo Tomás in Ávila, the burial place of Juan of Asturias, the younger brother of Princess Isabella and only son of the Catholic Monarchs. X-rays of the Prado panel reveal the original frontal portrait of the prince was later overpainted, perhaps to accord with the features of Juan of Asturias, who died prematurely in 1497 soon after his marriage to Maximilian I’s daughter, Margaret of Austria.

Prince Afonso’s marriage ceremony had occurred in the Cathedral of Seville on the first Sunday after Easter, April 18, 1490, with the diplomat Fernão Silveira served as proxy for his bride. However, the wedding festivities were not celebrated in Portugal until late November of that year when Infanta Isabella arrived to Évora, the favorite seat of King João II. The monarch spent months planning and organizing the nuptial events, and they were celebrated with great protocol, pomp, and ceremony (Resende, 1545, Ch. CXIV). Queen Leonor’s brother - Manuel I, who then was Duke of Beja, had served as escort to the Spanish princess from the frontier border of Spain. On November 25, 1490, the feast day of St. Catherine of Alexandria, Infanta Isabella and Manuel rode on horseback to Évora’s main town gate, where they were met by the groom, Prince Afonso. Mounted on a spirited steed and attired in fine silk velvet and wool, he rode beside his father. João II was outfitted entirely in the French fashion, with a slashed brocaded doublet lined with marten fur and embroidered with pearls and rare gems. The king wore the English Order of the Garter and his trailing cloak was lined with ermine and complimented by a white plumed hat (Resende, 1545/1973, Ch. CXXIII).

A contingent of 60 knights accompanied the monarch who was hailed by the Sicilian humanist Cataldo Siculo (1455-1517) as another Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar (Caetano de Sousa, 1735-1749). The joyful cavalcade rode through Évora’s narrow streets, all bedecked for the occasion with banners and laurel branches and perfumed with the scent of orange blossoms. Infanta Isabella and Prince Afonso were formally united in marriage at the old Cathedral before the wedding party moved to João II’s residence in the southern sector of Évora, the Paço Real de San Francisco (Baptista Pereira, 1998; Espanca, 1993). Located in the hortas, or gardens, of the town’s Franciscan Monastery of Espiñeiro, the royal palace was destroyed in 1619 and replaced with a municipal market place. A satellite view shows the parking lot and cavity area where the palace once stood. Only the Romanesque church of São Francisco (1226) remains, rebuilt as the palace chapel by João II in 1475, and completed under his cousin and successor, Manuel I. The emblems of both monarchs—João’s pelican and Manuel’s
armillary sphere—mark the entrance. So then, it was this area of Évora which witnessed the lavish marriage entertainments of 1490.

The São Francisco Palace of was a huge residence with many salas for audience and conversation, as well as a library with a studiolo, and generous apartments. Only a wing of the royal residence survives today. However, it is much altered, having been ravaged by fire in 1916 and summarily restored in 1943. The Manueline Galeria de Damas is a double-storied structure comprising two equal-sized galleries that are separated by a center vestibule. Built about 1504-1510, this “Gallery for Women,” about 190 feet in length, was a stone replacement for a huge Sala de Madeira, or Wooden Hall, that João II raised in the gardens of São Francisco Palace for his son’s wedding. The roof of the king’s grand gallery, which resembled an inverted ship’s hull, actually has been reconstructed in California. By contrast with San Diego’s famed Hotel del Coronado, João II’s banqueting hall was supported by tall ship masts transported from the Atlantic coast. Furthermore, the wooden nailed planks of its side walls were tarred and caulked like the decks of a caravela to prevent water leakage (Resende, 1545/1973, CXVIII). The wooden gallery measured about 220 feet in length by 60 feet in width and 52 feet in height (67 x 18 x 16 meters). Rafael Moreira, an architectural historian from the Universidade Nova de Lisboa, made the relevant observation in our correspondence of 2012 that this size was equivalent in proportion and scale to Noah’s Ark. He cited the measurements given by the 14th-century Franciscan Nicholas of Lyra in his Commentaries (Postillae perpetuae in universam S. Scripturam: 1471). Moreira believes the biblical analogy of the wooden hall to Noah’s Ark was deliberate in view of the international social aura of Évora during the reign of João II. The town functioned as a magnet for peoples of many cultures within the parameters of the known world. An oblique comparison of Évora with the biblical ship would have been understood by the wealthy Jews of the Aviz court who generously covered the costs of the 1490 wedding entertainments and decorations (Soyer, 2007).

The chronicle of Garcia de Resende informs that João II’s wooden hall had two arched galleries for musicians, and was illuminated by 30 very large gilded cross-shaped candlesticks so that “during night it looked as if it was daytime.” Moreover, the gallery was covered from “above to the ground by rich and beautiful tissues.” Resende used the term lambeis, a lambel being a Moroccan cloth in boldly colored strips. And he adds that this was a “new thing, that looked very well by the difference it had to the brocades and tapestry.” João II clearly wanted to accent his singular role in the Moroccan campaign of 1471 and he was the only European monarch who could claim this distinction. His hall contained dressoirs laden with gold and silver objects. At one end was the royal dais beneath a canopy of honor and along each side of the chamber were seven huge tables that were raised on carpeted platforms—14 tables in all. The middle space was left vacant for serving food and evening performances.

Among the roster of events in 1490 was an evening banquet held on December 5 to coincide with the feast day of St. Barbara, patron of the military and mariners (Resende, 1545/1973, Chap. CXXV). The wooden gallery was
decorated with 30 tents, each about three feet tall, adorned with gold streamers and fashioned with striped damask fabrics of purple and white, the colors of the Spanish Infanta. Upon the tables rested 14 large castles made of chestnut wood and golden taffeta, which were later given as favors to the guests. The concluding banquet on December 7, the eve of the feast of the Immaculate Virgin Mary, was even more spectacular because its entertainments were evocative of João II’s successful naval expedition in 1471 to Asilah and Tangier (Resende, 1545, Ch. CXXVII; Pena, 1504, Ch. XLVII). Nine Portuguese ships and a huge triple-masted carrack on wheels glided down the center of the hall to the fanfare of trumpets, drums, and artillery. The quarterdecks of the caravelas were fashioned of brocade, the sails of white and purple taffeta, and the riggings were of gold and silk. The masts bore the arms of Portugal, Castile, and Aragon. The colorful ships rested upon fabric bolts of rigid canvas painted to simulate the stormy waves of the ocean, and they were lighted by torches and manned by pilots and seamen dressed in brocades and silks. The lead ship in the flotilla was decorated as a white swan with gold and silver wings, and it was commanded by King João II “fully armed” who stood at the prow as the “Swan Knight.” The monarch issued a challenge to all who would join him and his eight companions in a four-day joust to defend a castle. João II then inaugurated a dance with Princess Isabella and a masque followed.

Without question, the guests were supposed to associate João II and his eight knights with the “Nine Worthies” of Fame. These Worthies have been identified as: the pagan Hector, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar - the biblical David, Joshua and Judas Maccabeus - and the Christian Arthur, Charlemagne, and Godfrey of Bouillon, the leader of the first Crusade in Jerusalem, with whom monarchs most often were compared. Illuminated in the famed scriptorium of Évora by João do Cró, a set of “Nine Worthies” was included in a manuscript on heraldry João II commissioned after 1490 (Figure 6: a-b). Because the Great Book was completed in 1509, the face of Godfrey de Bouillon presents a viable portrait of the king’s cousin and successor, Manuel I. Cró’s Hector most resembles proposed portraits of João II, and the selection was appropriate as in Homer’s Iliad, the Prince of Troy is upheld as an ideal warrior.

The chief knights of the royal court partook in the outdoor festivities that were held the next day and wooden stands assigned to the Portuguese and Spanish onlookers were shaded by awnings. Draped in Avis green and cloths of gold, João II’s platform for the tourneys was festooned with his kingdom’s arms and heraldic pelican (Resende, 1545, Ch. CXXVIII; Pina, 1504, Ch. XLVII). The open air winter entertainments were staged in the gardens not far from the Manueline Galeria de Damas. At one end of the teia, or flat competition space, a square wooden castle had been built, replete with fanciful turrets and projecting pennons. Nuno Gonçalves’s tapestries of the 1471 Moroccan campaign likely were selected from the Palace of São Francisco to decorate and insulate the interior opulent apartments created for King João II and his eight companions. The main sportive event appears to have been a reenactment of the taking of Asilah and Tangier, with two equestrian groups of men competing in the battle, one contingent led by
João II and his “Worthies.” The challengers - *adventureiros* - were directed by the ruler’s cousin, Manuel I. The men fought with *canas*, or pointed reeds, in the Moroccan tradition. Dueling tilts and jousts followed the mock siege of a fortress, prizes for the contests being golden chains with white enamel medallions. The highest award was a diamond ring, which João II won but relinquished to an outstanding participant.

Mere months after these joyful celebrations, on July 13, 1491, Prince Afonso died at the Aviz summer palace in Santarém (Resende, 1545, Ch. CXXXII). Racing at a great speed on the shores of the Tagus River while his father was swimming, Afonso and a mounted companion executed the *parelho*, holding hands while riding, but the Prince’s horse fell, dragging him beneath (Prestage, 1928, p. 162). Afonso’s crushed body was wrapped in fishing nets and he was taken to a nearby shed to await the arrival of his mother Queen Leonor and young Spanish wife, Isabella of Asturias. After Afonso’s death, the grieving *Infanta* returned to Spain. Lacking an heir, João II attempted to have Jorge, his illegitimate ten-year-old son by Dona Ana de Mendoça, ascend to the throne. Leonor opposed this stratagem, perhaps out of loyalty to her brother Manuel I. Succeeding João II on October 25, 1495, Manuel appointed Jorge “Duke of Coimbra” and included him in his household (Sanceau, 1959: pp. 289-291).

*Figure 6:* (a) João do Cró (Frenchman: Jeanne de Jeu de Cartes), João II as Hector of the Trojan War and Manuel I as Godefroy de Bouillon of the First Crusade (b), from the *Nine Worthies of Fame* (Pagan; Hebrew; Christian) illustrated in *O Livro Grande do Armeiro-Mor* (*The Great Book of the Master Armorer*), commissioned by João II and completed in 1509 under Manuel I, Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo
Until her death in 1525, the widowed Queen Leonor lived in Lisbon, first at the coastal Xabregas Palace and then at the Madre de Deus Convent of Poor Clares that she founded in 1509. A Franciscan tertiary, she supported charitable institutions and hospitals. Like St. Helen, for whom she was named, Leonor acquired sacred art and relics which glorified the Holy Cross and an evangelical Church (Lowe, 2000).

A set of five narrative paintings in Lisbon’s Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga once belonged to a Reliquary Altarpiece of St. Auta (Figure 7). The panels have remained anonymous, although the sumptuous portrait-like figures recollect personae in the Prado Madonna of the Monarchs and paintings by Jorge Afonso and Gregório Lopes. Commissioned about 1517-1522 by Dowager Queen Leonor of Viseu, the paintings focus upon the legend of St. Ursula, daughter of Deonutus, a Christian ruler of Brittany, the promised bride of Prince Etherius, son of a pagan king of Anglia, their three-year pilgrimage from England to Rome in eleven ships with 11,000 virgins, and their eventual martyrdom in Cologne on their return journey. Purportedly St. Auta, Ursula’s Sicilian first cousin, was among the holy women in her retinue killed by the arrows of Huns (Alemparte, 1991; Osswald, 2005).

The St. Auta Altarpiece was ordered soon after the arrival to Portugal in 1517 of relics gifted by Maximilian I (r. 1493-1519). The Holy Roman Emperor must have been aware of the historical fact that Afonso Henrique I’s Reconquest of Lisbon in 1147 had occurred on the October 21 feast day of St. Ursula. Maximilian I’s mother, Leonora (1452-1467), the wife of Frederick III (1415-1493), was a Portuguese Infanta and the sister of King Afonso V. The primary panels of the dismantled Reliquary Altarpiece of St. Auta illustrate: The Departure...
of St. Auta’s Relics from Cologne and The Arrival of St. Auta’s Relics to the Franciscan Poor Clare Convent of Madre de Deus. The former is backed by the subject of The Meeting of St. Ursula and Prince Etherius and the latter’s reverse illustrates The Blessing of Pope Cyriacus. The uppermost section of the altarpiece was a lunette containing two historical subjects: The Boarding of St. Ursula, Prince Etherius and St. Auta at Basilea (Basel), and The Martyrdom in Cologne of St. Ursula and her Virginalis Militzia of 11,000 Companions by Julius, King of the Huns.

Three panels of the Reliquary Altarpiece of St. Auta have a landscape component with seafaring vessels: the paintings that concern the journey of St. Auta’s relics, and the lunette narratives which equally underscore the notion of travel with its variety of Portuguese carracks and smaller skiffs. These ships display João II’s heraldic arms and pelican motif, a Messianic symbol of self-sacrifice. They additionally show the “shrimp net” device adopted by Leonor of Viseu following the death of Prince Afonso. Consider that the female saints in panels of the Reliquary Altarpiece of St. Auta wear 16th-century attire—mantles with ermine collars, robes of brocade or velvet lined with vibrant silk, and with open sleeves variously gathered (Figure 8). The ensemble of holy martyrs wear crowns and pendants of gold inset with cabochon stones and pearls, all costly items of adornment and status that obviously are based directly upon jewels of the Portuguese Crown. To Dowager Queen Leonor, The Meeting of St. Ursula and Prince Etherius must have summoned poignant memories of the wedding festivities of Évora, where Africans from the Gold Coast played music in the balconied areas of Joao II’s huge Sala de Madeira with its spectacular inverted hull ceiling supported by the masts of Lisbon’s ships.

Manuel I—“The Fortunate King” as Dominus Mundi
Changing the Medieval World Picture

Queen Leonor of Viseu was the ever constant support of her brother, Manuel I, who on October 25, 1495, ascended to the throne of Portugal as the closest in the dynastic line to rule following the death of Prince Afonso (Atanázio, 1984; Góis, 1619/1970; Levenson, 1991; Lopes & Dias, 2002; Sanceau, 1969). On September 30, 1497, Manuel I wed Afonso’s widowed Spanish bride, Isabella of Asturias, though unfortunately she died in childbirth a year later (Anonymous, 1497, MS. 1751). To continue and solidify his peaceful alliance with the bordering country of Spain, he then married Isabella’s younger sister Maria at Alcácer do Sal on October 30, 1500. Despite their outward consolidation, both countries occupying the Iberian Peninsula continued to vie for power in the quest for new dominions during the age of navigation. Manuel’s selection of the armillary sphere as his unique device to underscore his territorial expansion was a manifestation of the Dominus Mundi complexion of his rule. He was fortunate to have followed in the wake of João II, whose reign had marked a beginning to a new era of epical exploration with the erection of the Ghana fortress of São Jorge to safeguard trade from the Gold Coast of West Africa.
Under Manuel I, the technological skills of the Portuguese explorers quite simply changed the medieval world picture. A decade after a trajectory by sea to East Asia was achieved by Bartholomeu Dias’s voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, Vasco da Gama achieved a route to India, arriving in 1498 at Calicut on the southern Malabar Coast. Then in 1500 Pedro Álvares Cabral on his way to India, encountered the magnificent land of Brazil, vastly abundant in natural resources. Portugal continued to excel in the building of ships, improving designs for strong winds and ever changing currents. The first large cargo ships of the early 1400s were the double and triple-masted caravels. With their lateen triangular sails, they accommodated as much as 200 tons of goods and were extremely agile in the waters. By the 16th century, however, the caravel was superseded by the even larger carracks, which had two decks, three to four masts, overlapping square sails and a storage capacity of 2000 tons. Manueine Lisbon, therefore, was a bustling city for trade, with carracks returning from many African, Indian, and Brazilian ports.
laden with spices, gold, ivory, rare woods, sugar cane, and fine silk (Berbara, 2013; Dos Guimarães Sá, 2009; Fonseca, 2003; Schwarz, 2008).

Between 1502 and 1506 Vasco Fernandes (“Grão Vasco”) painted a panel of the *Adoration of the Magi* as part of an altarpiece for the chancel of the Cathedral of Viseu, Manuel I’s natal town (Figure 9: a: Faria Paulino, Dias, & Rodrigues, 1992; Fernández Garcia, Lopez, & José, 2004; Rodrigues, 2002). The sacred subject inherently concerns the achievement of successful travel. After all, the three Wise Men described in the Gospel of St. Matthew (2:1-12) were guided by a most vibrant star over a sea of desert sand in Persia to a modest stable in Bethlehem. The painting additionally commemorates Portugal’s sighting of Brazil in 1500 because the navigator Pedro Álvares Cabral is portrayed as the eldest Magus Caspar (Greenlee, 1967). Caspar’s offering of myrrh, a common resin in Mali and the Horn of Africa, has been received by the Virgin Mary. She passes the hammered gold container to St. Joseph, Christ’s earthly father and a descendant of the House of David. The youngest Magus Baltasar, a Tupinamba Indian of Brazil, extends a container of indigenous aromatic Frankincense.

Manuel I strides into the composition as the Magus Melchior. He alone lifts his hat, an act that traditionally surfaces in Renaissance paintings of the “Wise Kings” who journey from afar to venerate the prognosticated “King of Israel.” Their removal of a crown or cap was interpreted as a patent sign of their humility in the presence of a higher authority, the Messianic Christ. The gesture specifically derives from an angelic vision purportedly experienced by Elizabeth of Schönau (1129-1164), a German Benedictine nun. In one of her 15 letters to St. Hildegard, the mystic describes the three kings removing their crowns and offering them to Christ, who promptly relinquished back to them the gilded insignia of earthly power. Pious legend relates Constantine’s mother, Empress St. Helen, had transported the skulls of the Magi first to Constantinople and then to Milan. The transfer of the Magi’s relics to Cologne in 1164 must have inspired Portugal’s first ruler Afonso Henques I to recover the remains of St. Vincent in 1173 from a cape at Sagres Point in the Algarve. In Book III of his *Geographica*, the Greek scholar Strabo (64 BC-24 AD) identified the coastal landmark of the *Cabo de São Vicente* as the westernmost edge of the known world under the Roman Emperor Augustus.

Vasco Fernandes shows Manuel I offering the infant Christ gold, a precious metal associated with kingship. The object in fact is a Eucharistic *ciborium*, which in context of the “Epiphany” theme, alludes to the spread of the faith in newly discovered lands. The monarch’s portrait was so appropriate as a gift giver because he delighted in sending exotic presents to European royal courts as tokens of his world imperial power. Such gifts would have comprised carved ivory objects from West Africa which were carved with Portuguese soldiers, heraldry, and Manueline armillary spheres (Figure 9: b; Bassani, Buller, Fagg, & Vogel, 1988; Martinez, 2007). Created by the ancestors of the Mende in the kingdom of Sierra Leone, the Sapi-Portuguese oliphants were not employed as hunting horns by European courts. As related again by Rafael
Moreira in correspondence (2012), the Manueline ivory trumpets were called *roncas* in court inventories and he informs they actually were modeled after the fog-horns of ships. Displayed at ceremonial events such as feast day processions and municipal parades, the *roncas* were a visible sign of Portugal’s wealth, power, and maritime supremacy. Other ivory objects, such as the salt cellar - termed *saleiro* in court inventories - and the pyxide, a cylindrical container with a lid, were not intended for actual use as tableware. Rather, the sculpted objects were typically exhibited as prestigious curiosities on shelves of cabinets set up at lavish banquets or formal occasions like royal baptisms.

Manuel’s emblems are observed on many works of art he commissioned. But they especially emerge in the distinctively organic, and frequently nautical genre of decoration that characterizes the architecture of his reign, such as the landmark *Tower of Bethlehem* near the beach of the Restelo facing the Atlantic. Built by Francisco de Arruda with its impressive Italianate arched loggia that served as royal apartments for Manuel I, the defense tower is near the magnificent São Jerónimos Monastery which was founded on the feast of the Epiphany, January 6, 1501/2 (Carvalho, 1990; Moreira, 1987; Pereira, 2002). Its church was dedicated to Our Lady of Bethlehem, the traditional guardian of seafarers. The medieval Latin hymn *Ave Stella Maris* (Hail Star of the Sea) was a hymn to the Virgin Mary chanted at Vespers, the sunset evening prayer service within the canonical hours of the day. Portuguese mariners were guided by the lodestar Polaris and other constellations when they ventured in uncharted waters.

São Jerónimos Church has an impressive ceremonial entrance on the south side, and navigators would enter this portal to attend Mass before departing Lisbon on the evening tide. Within the sanctuary’s *capela-mor* (main chapel) is the burial place of Manuel I. Although his tomb rests on the backs of elephants, the design is quite unostentatious compared with the sarcophagus of Vasco da Gama installed in a private chapel near the church’s entrance. Nicolau Chanterene, who carved the tomb monument at Coimbra of Afonso Henrique I, was the master sculptor responsible for the western primary entrance to the São Jerónimos church. Above his Manueline portal are carved vignettes of the *Annunciation*, the *Nativity* and the *Adoration of the Kings*. Realistic effigies of Manuel I and his second Spanish queen, Maria of Aragon (1482-1517), flank the ogival arched door. Their portraits are believed to have been done from life. While the *Epiphany* theme would have had exceptional meaning for King Manuel I, the blond-haired Queen Maria, like her mother Isabel of Castile, sought to emulate the Virgin Mary.

Another veristic likeness of the ruler makes an appearance in São Jerónimos’s Cloister, one of the most beautiful in Europe because of its opulent sculptural ornamentation that seems to reflect influences from the organic decoration of East Indian temples (Figure 10). Stonework carving that defines the “Manueline” aesthetic comprises diverse repetitive elements linked with the age of navigation: armillary spheres, seashells, twisted nautical ropes, intricate filigree designs over pillars, portals and arches abundant in botanical motifs and often
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illustrating the cross of the Order of Christ. Within a courtyard open to the constellations of the night sky which guided sailors, Manuel I’s image is well placed next to the Prophet Isaiah on the east side where daylight first appears. He is elevated as a Prophet-King analogous to the Biblical David. The metaphorical play upon the king’s name “Emmanuel” was not coincidental. The Gospel of Matthew (1:22-23) provides the genealogy of Jesus Christ from the House of David to St. Joseph, referencing the prophet Isaiah (7:12-14) to whom the sign of “Emmanuel” was given: Behold a virgin . . . shall bring forth a son, and they shall call his name Emmanuel . . . “God with us.”

Figure 9 (a)  
Figure 9 (b)

Figure 9: (a): Vasco Fernandes (1475-1542), Adoration of the Kings with Manuel I as the Magus Melchior, Cathedral of Viseu, oil on wood (51.6 x 31.9”: 131 x 81”); (b): Sapi-Portuguese Oliphant, ivory and metal (64.2 x 16.4 x 9 cm), early 16th Century, Washington, D.C., National Museum of African Art
Manuel I and his second wife, Maria of Aragon, had several children, as shown in *The Fountain of Life*, a painting in the Santa Casa da Misericórdia of Porto (Figure 11: a). Commissioned by the Misericórdia Brotherhood of Charity for their chapel in the Romanesque Sé (Cathedral) of Porto, the work illustrates the royal family and members of their court surrounding a basin filled not with water, but with the mystical blood of the crucified Christ, who is flanked by the Virgin Mary and St. John the Evangelist. The genesis for this rare imagery is the *Well of Moses* carved by Claus Sluter and polychromed by Jean Malouel about 1395-1405 for the cloister garden of the Chartreuse de Champmol in Dijon (Nash, 2005, 2006, 2008). All that survives of the Burgundian monument is its impressive base formed by six Hebrew prophets who stand beneath mourning angels. Pertinently, Dijon’s *Well of Moses* once was surmounted by a carved grouping of Calvary. Porto’s *Fons Vitae* presents an even more arcane theme as the Dijon ensemble, because the setting includes royal and secular portraits. As such, the painting appears to have been influenced by Jan van Eyck’s lost *Fountain of Life*, an altarpiece likely commissioned by João I in 1429 for the Lisbon Castle of São Jorge, lost in the 1755 earthquake, yet known through replicas in the Prado Museum and the Oberlin Allen Memorial Museum (Von Barghahn, 2013-2014). Quite possibly too, Van Orley’s painting reflects the inspiration of the *Vita Christi* by Ludolf of Saxony. The medieval Carthusian monk had stressed the need to employ the five Senses while contemplating
Christ’s Passion (Bodenstedt, 1944; Conway, Jr., 1976). The sense experience enabled the devout to imagine themselves as participants in sacred events of the past. Ludolf of Saxony’s *Vita Christi* was a prototype to the Jesuit *Spiritual Exercises*, a compilation of meditative practices developed by the order’s founder, St. Ignatius Loyola, and performed over a month to strengthen ties with God. During the 16th century, Portuguese ships transported missionaries and concepts of Ignatian spirituality to distant lands (Alden, 1996). Tinctured crimson, the distinctive crosses on the sails of Lusitanian carracks perhaps were considered an oblique tribute to Christ’s blood spilt at Jerusalem’s Golgotha (Figure 11: b).

The *Fountain of Life* has been attributed to the Flemish master Bernard van Orley, a court painter in Brussels to Archduchess Margaret of Austria (1480-1530), the only daughter of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I and Mary of Burgundy. She probably sent Van Orley’s painting as a gift to King Manuel I about 1515 (Pearson, 2001). When Queen Maria died in 1517, Manuel I wed a third time (July 16, 1518). His bride and niece by marriage was Eleanor of Austria (1498-1558), who had been raised in Belgium under the erudite tutelage of her aunt, Margaret of Austria and initially been promised to the king’s son, João III (1502-1557) (Domingues, 1962). When João III succeeded to the throne on December 19, 1521, the widowed Eleanor moved to the Hapsburg center of Vienna. Her youngest sister, Catherine of Austria (1507-1578), who had been reared in Spain, became queen of Portugal on February 10, 1525. On March 10, 1526 at the Alcázar of Seville, a second marriage was celebrated by the Portuguese dynastic house of Aviz. João III’s sister Isabel (1503-1539) wed Catherine’s brother and her first cousin, Charles V (1500-1558), Holy Roman Emperor in 1519, and King of Spain.

**João III—The Terrestrial Sphere and Portugal’s Mastery of the Seas**

Under João III and Queen Catherine, Portugal reached an apogee of power and prestige, continuing to enjoy a panoply of African, East Asian and Brazilian wares. In terms of courtly portraiture, the sovereign continued to be represented both realistically and allegorically. In 1552, Catherine invited the Flemish master Antonis Mor to Lisbon (Jordan, 1994a; Warnel, 2009, 2011; Woodall, 2008), where he enjoyed significant status at the royal court. Mor’s pendant panels of the Portuguese monarchs are patently naturalistic (Figure 12: a and b). While João III’s figure in black silk seems to suggest an understated elegance, Catherine in an East Asian brocaded tunic over a shimmering damask silk robe - articulated by a ruby, diamond, and pearl belt - proves all that glitters is gold. She wears five rings, and clasps a matching black fan in her left hand. Catherine stands near a table covered with a velvet cloth, the same “Aviz green” as the single emerald ring her husband displays, his only adornment save for a type of sheathed roundel dagger that seemingly is of African origin. The object replaces the more traditional long sword in a state portrait, and therefore, it plausibly was intended to invoke the memory of the legendary Nestorian Christian patriarch of India, Prester John (Sanceau, 1944, 1947). The Portuguese believed this legendary and
elusive ruler lived in Ethiopia and carried an emerald scepter, possibly symbolic of the hidden alchemic “philosopher’s stone.” Prester John was not unlike the “Fisher King: sought by Percival in his Grail quest.

**Figure 11 (a)**

![Figure 11 (a)](image1)

**Figure 11 (b)**

![Figure 11 (b)](image2)

**Figure 11**: (a): Bernard van Orley, *The Fountain of Life*: King Manuel I with his Sons (three eldest are João III, Luís, Fernando) and Queen Maria with her Daughters (Isabel and Beatrix), oil on oak panel (267 x 210 cm), ca. 1515, Casa de Misericórdia, Porto (b): Portuguese School, *Carracks of the Vasco da Gama’s India Armada of 1502*, from the *Livro de Lisuarte de Abreu*, 1565 compendium, New York, Pierpont Morgan Library, MS 525

Several paintings of the “Epiphany” theme by Gregório Lopes (1490-1550) were commissioned during the reign of João III and these works evidence subtle variations upon Vasco Fernandes’s earlier rendition of the subject for Manuel I (Carvalho, 1999; Seruya et al., 1999). Dated about 1539-1541, an *Adoration of the Magi* today is housed in Lisbon’s Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, along with five other panels belonging to the same dismantled altarpiece: the *Annunciation*, the *Adoration of the Shepherds*, the *Agony in the Garden*, the *Entombment*, and the *Resurrection*. The retable originally was installed in the “Chapel of Our Lord of the Passion and of the Incarnation” at Santos-os-Novo, a Hieronymite monastery in the Santo Antonio valley near Lisbon (Figure 13: a).

The Santos-o-Novo *Epiphany* presents an imposing royal portrait of King João III as the Magus Melchior. Dressed in a black and silver surcoat over
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red silk, the ruler bows and gazes directly towards the Christ child. He places his right hand against his chest, and this image evokes that of a chivalric knight pledging his oath to a sovereign lord. Almost as resplendent is the prostrated figure of the elderly Magus Caspar, whose face is shown in profile, but may provide a posthumous portrait of Manuel I. Attired in a cloth of gold and black tunic worn over an inner garment of lemon yellow, Caspar exhibits a heavy and intricately tooled collar which contrasts with the less ostentatious triple strands of gold preferred by Melchior. Resting on the stone pavement is Caspar’s imposing gold vessel ornamented with atlantes. Beside the object is his gold-tasseled, wide-brimmed and plumed hat that is tinctured the exact vermillion color as his voluminous mantle. From the reign of João I, sumptuary laws in Renaissance Portugal had approved the color primarily for royalty. According to the last testament of Manuel I, following his death in 1521, all the monarch’s lavish garments were given to the poor of Lisbon as a final magnanimous act of charity (Sequeira, 2012, 2014).

With regard to the Magus Baltasar, in lieu of Vasco Fernandes’s Brazilian Tupinamba Indian, Gregório Lopes elected to depict him as an African with pearl earrings, an elegant light azure silk turban with plumes, a silver tunic, and a citron colored mantle (Kaplan, 1985). His brown leather belt holds a dramatic scimitar (talwar), a long curved Muslim steel sword with a hilt and scabbard. The exotic king is not a native of the Gold Coast of Guinea or the Congo region. Rather, he appears to be from the kingdom of Ethiopia. This representation is relevant because it confirms Renaissance Portugal’s sustained belief that Prester John was in fact a descendant of Bethlehem’s Magi.

Attributed to Gregório Lopes, another Epiphany subject in the French Romanesque Church of Bourg-Saint Andéol in Ardèche has an unknown provenance (Reis-Santos, 1967), but the work must have been dispatched from Lisbon by Queen Catherine of Austria as a present to her eldest sibling, Eleanor of Austria. Having left Lisbon with her newborn daughter Maria following the death of her husband Manuel I, Eleanor was compelled to remarry according to stipulations of a peace treaty negotiated in 1529 between Emperor Charles V and King Francis I. When the Valois monarch died in 1547, the widowed Eleanor saw no reason to remain with the French court. She departed for Brussels to reside with favorite sister, Mary of Hungary (1505-1558), then the appointed Archduchess of the Spanish Netherlands.

The Ardèche Epiphany boasts an even more theatrical mise-en-scène than its counterpart in the Santos-o-Novo altarpiece, and for this reason, it may date slightly later, circa 1545 (Policarpo, 1999). Both works reveal the dual impact of Flemish and Italian Mannerism upon 16th-century Portuguese art. The figures in each work accord unequivocally with realistic Northern types. Otherwise, the architectural setting of classical ruins in the Ardèche Epiphany betrays greater familiarity with the “Romanists” in Antwerp, inter alia: wall reliefs of ancient spolia above the Virgin Mary; an arcade of round arches with an Aviz escutcheon in the spandrel; a distant vista showing the turbaned Magi mounted on spirited steeds with their retinue arriving to Bethlehem from the Levant.
As in the case of the Santos-o-Novo *Adoration of the Magi*, an inventive Mannerist color palette characterizes the apparel of the Magi. Depicted in the foreground on the right side of the composition, they approach the infant Christ wearing rich apparel in colors of forest green, citron yellow, salmon pink, and aquamarine. Their costumes contrast with the deeper, yet slightly bleached out hues of the Virgin Mary’s azure mantle and dark beryl dress. The Ardèche Melchior is portrayed with a splendid sword, of which only the hilt is visible. With his left arm slightly akimbo, the ruler does not offer the Christ Child a Eucharistic ciborium, but rather, an intricately tooled receptacle containing a costly chain necklace. Held securely in his mother’s arms, Jesus has reached out to clasp the hanging pendant with both hands. The curiosity expressed is very naturalistic. In actuality, however, the behavior is quite advanced for the age of the tiny infant shown in the composition. The inclusion of jewelry may relate to Elizabeth of Schönau’s 12th-century account about the kings visit to Bethlehem. One Magus purportedly gave Jesus a large gold coin with a royal image. The centerpiece stone of the Ardèche pendant resembles porphyry agate, a stone which often was carved in antiquity as a cameo with an emperor’s portrait.

Pictured as an Ethiopian and similarly recollective of the elusive Prester John, the standing Magus Baltasar is given even more prominence in the Ardèche painting. Another figure sharing kindred iconographical importance in the work is
St. Joseph. The elderly protector wears a bright coquelicot robe and plays the role of an onlooker in both versions of the “Epiphany” theme. The Ardèche St. Joseph is notably more contemplative. He sits cross-legged with his traveling staff in front of the lower drum of a fluted column that is entwined with ivy. His left hand is raised to his chin as he ponders the scene of gift-giving by “Wise Men.”

Founded in 1540, the Society of Jesus from its inception had promulgated popular devotion to St. Joseph, who watched over his family on the flight to Egypt, a journey that occurred soon after the Magi’s visit (Gospel of Matthew 2:13-23). The carpenter from Nazareth was selected as the primary patron of Jesuit humanist schools. João III was a staunch supporter of the order’s first missionaries who sailed to distant shores in Portuguese galleons. The elevated status of St. Joseph in post-Manueline “Epiphany” paintings must be interpreted in context of the special privileges the Jesuits enjoyed at the Aviz court and their accruing global influence.

By contrast to such credible portraits in “Epiphany” paintings commissioned by João III, a set of three 16th-century tapestries delves into the realm of pagan allegory (Figure 13: b). Woven by George Wezeler after cartoons by the Flemish master Bernard van Orley, the content of the Spheres may have been dictated by Queen Catherine, who placed the commission in Brussels about 1520 via her aunt, Archduchess Margaret of Austria (Ainsworth, 1982; Hewitt, 2010, Von Barghahn, 1986). The panel of the Terrestrial Sphere merits attention because Bernard van Orley provides a clever symbolical paragone: João III and Catherine were identified as the divine rulers of Olympus, Jupiter, and Juno. Pertinently too, the earth is turned so the continent of Africa is most visible, as well as South Asia—the king’s scepter is directed to the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic coast of Portugal.

When King João III died in 1557, his throne was left to a three-year-old grandson, Prince Sebastian, who was raised to rule by Queen Catherine until his majority in 1668 (Baños-Garcia, 2001; Loureiro, 1989; Saraiva, 1994). Perhaps inspired by the tales about Portugal’s earlier triumphs in North African campaigns, Sebastian sought to reclaim control of Morocco by securing strongholds that had been lost. Further, he wished to prevent the Ottoman Turks from increasing their power in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Commanding an army of 17,000 men, mostly mercenaries, the monarch was joined by 6,000 allies in Asilah. Even so, the Portuguese were decimated at Alcácer Quibir on August 4, 1578, by 60,000 warriors from Fez. The body of the nation’s last chivalric knight Sebastian was never recovered, and he left no direct heirs. Portugal’s vacant throne had dire repercussions, as the nation fell under the yoke of the Spanish Hapsburgs from 1580 until 1668.

This essay began with Antonio de Holanda’s manuscript illuminations for a Portuguese Genealogy and it will conclude with a few words about his talented son. Francisco de Holanda left Lisbon in 1538 to spend eight years in Italy studying classical monuments and enjoying discourse with humanists like Michelangelo, whose miniature he painted (Alves, 1986; Segurado, 1970; Vilela, 1982). In 1549 at the town of Santarém, Francisco de Holanda wrote the only
known Renaissance book on the art of portraiture. Entitled *On Extracting the Natural Image (Do Tirar Pelo Natural)*, the short treatise of 11 chapters reveals his preference for the Italian painterly portrait style over the rigorously precise and detailed type of likeness produced in the North (Holanda, 1549).

**Figure 13**

(a) Gregório Lopes (1490-1550), *Adoration of the Magi*, ca. 1539-41, oil on panel (135.5 x 122 cm), Lisbon, Museu Nacional de Arte Antiga, formerly at Santos-o-Novo, (b): Bernard van Orley (designer), *Earth Under the Protection of Jupiter and Juno*, woven under direction of Georg Wezeler, from a tapestry set of *The Spheres*, ca. 1520-30, gold, silver, silk, wool (11’ 3” x 10’ 3”), Madrid, Palacio Real

Another manuscript by Francisco de Holanda - *On the Ages of the World (De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines)* - is an extraordinary work with many complex levels of conceptual interpretation (Figure 14) (Deswarte, 1983, 1987; Von Barghahn, 1986). The opening folios of the *Seven Days of Creation* seem to provide a “spiritual” portrait of a small nation that used knowledge of maps, astrolabes, stars, winds, and ocean currents to better understand the earth, and in doing so, achieved epic goals. Gil Vicente (c. 1465-1536), famed poet and dramatist attached to the courts of both Manuel I and João III, described in a *canção* (song) Lusitanian ships as steered by a divine captain and propelled by heaven’s angels. Roy Campbell’s (1960) translation is an apposite verse to close a discussion about the blending of myth and reality in Portuguese art during the Renaissance age of navigation:
Rowing go the rowers
In a ship of great delight
The captain at the helm
The Sun of God is Light
Angels at the oars
Rowed with all their might
The flag of hope was flying
Lovely to the sight.

The mast was of endurance
Like crystal shining bright.
The sails were stitched with faith
and filled the world with light.
The seashore was serene
With not a wind in flight.
(Costa, 1989, p. 124:).

Figure 14: (a): Francisco de Holanda, The Fourth Day of Creation: The Creation of Light, from Genesis of De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines, 1543-1573, Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, f. 6r
The triple-masted caravel surfaces serve as one of the most important visual leitmotifs of Portuguese Renaissance Art as evidenced by the examples in this essay including: the coastal views in Antonio de Holanda’s illumination of the Dynastic Tree of King Afonso Henriques I; the View of Manueline Lisbon in Duarte Galvão’s historical chronicle about the kingdom’s first monarch; the Landing at Asilah from the Pastrana tapestries designed by Nuno Gonçalves, which captures the appearance of Afonso V’s famed flagship São Antonio; João II’s wooden banqueting hall at Évora constructed with a hull-shaped ceiling supported by actual ship masts and venue for ephemeral festivities featuring a flotilla with the principal caravel captained by the “Nine Worthies”; the Reliquary Altarpiece of St. Auta that displays the fleet of St. Ursula and Prince Etherius at Basilea and Cologne as veritable “ships of faith”; Vasco da Gama’s celebrated India Armada (1502) illustrated in the Pierpont Morgan Library codex of Lisuarte de Abreu, a voyager who sailed in 1558 for Goa in the company of Dom Constantino de Bragança, the appointed viceroy of Portuguese India—their ship, the Queen, was named for Catherine of Austria, the consort of King João III (Sanceau, 1967).

An equally persistent trope in Renaissance Portuguese art is the accent upon messianic expectation, by which the ruler is elevated as Christ imitator, prophet, Magus and Dominus Mundi. Accordingly, the seafaring nation of Portugal with its vast knowledge of science, cartography, and astronomy, assumes the complexion of a “chosen” kingdom divinely guided by the stars to far destinations. In such a symbolical context, the ship metaphors of Gil Vicente’s poetic verse converges eloquently with art commissioned by Manuel I and his immediate heir. The caravelões and larger carracks of João III accelerated trade with India and Brazil and they also established the first European contact with China and Japan. Jesuit missionaries traveled from Lisbon to all major stations within the network of the Portuguese empire.

While the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 has resulted in a fragmented view of Portugal’s many cultural contributions, even vestiges of Renaissance art reveal a most inventive manner of melding truth and fable. Although a small country in Europe, the nation that faced the Atlantic along its entire western coast had a far-reaching global impact in art history. Resolute Portuguese mariners unquestionably changed the medieval world picture with their forays to remote lands, but this is another chapter of Lusitanian legend and lore.

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Vasco da Gama, The Explorer: Motivations and Myths

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Abstract

The Portuguese explorer, Vasco da Gama (1460-1524), was the first European to sail from Portugal to India. The “da Gama epoch” refers to the era of European commercial and imperial expansion in Asia. The primary motivation for the 1498 voyage, however, was messianic, to “vanquish and subdue all Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and other enemies of Christ, to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to convert to Christianity,” as declared in various Papal Bulls, together called “the Doctrine of Discovery.” The Church divided the world into Spanish and Portuguese zones, both to be part of the Papal Empire. Over time, the apocalyptic mission led to the Age of Discovery, followed by the Age of Colonialism/Imperialism. Descriptions of the voyage, however, need to be tempered in light of several “myths” often associated with those accounts. Thus, the paper pursues two objectives: (1) discuss the messianic “Christianizing” motivation for the voyage, and (2) discuss the “myths” associated with the journey.

Introduction

The Portuguese explorer, Vasco da Gama (1460-1524), was the first European to travel by sea from Portugal to India. The term “da Gama epoch” is often used to describe the era of imperial expansion in Asia launched by “the outward-looking process by which Europeans sought to redefine the commercial and political

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1 The author is indebted to his colleague, Professor-Emeritus Nick Gier, University of Idaho, for arousing his curiosity on the Doctrine of Discovery literature. Also thanks to Prof. Dan Paracka for helpful comments and some editing; and to anonymous reviewers for their feedback.
networks of the early sixteenth century” (Subrahmanyam, 1997, p. 368). In two voyages that spanned six years, Vasco da Gama would fight a running sea battle that would ultimately change the fate of three continents. The story has taken on mythical proportions in much of the literature. The Portuguese national epic poem, *The Lusiadas*, written in Homeric style by Luis Vaz de Camoes in 1572, celebrated his voyages. And among the numerous symbols of glory (including naming a crater on the moon), the most recent is the Vasco da Gama Bridge, linking Lisbon to Europe, inaugurated in 1998, in celebration of the 500th anniversary of the voyage. However, suggestions to celebrate the occasion in India and elsewhere were rebuffed.\(^2\) Further, in an expedition to mark the 500th anniversary, a vessel from the da Gama armada, sunk in 1503 off the coast of Oman, was discovered in 1998 and excavated in 2013 (Lewis, 2016).

In September 1497, the young da Gama sailed from Portugal, circumnavigated Africa, crossed the Indian Ocean, and “discovered” the maritime route to the Indies and, thereby, obtained access to the fabled wealth of the East. It was the longest voyage known to history. The small ships were pushed beyond their limits, and their crews were racked by storms and devastated by disease. However, their greatest enemy was neither nature nor even the dread of venturing into unknown worlds: it was the “Islamic world.” The goal was to launch a “sweeping counter offensive against Islam and inaugurate a new era in which the faith and values of Europe would be exported across the earth” and “fighting the Infidel was the highest calling” (Cliff, 2012, p. 6).

With Crusader crosses emblazoned on their sails, the explorers arrived in the heart of the Islamic East at a time when, in the post-Islamic Spain world, the old hostilities between Christianity and Islam had risen to a new level of intensity. As an epic tale of adventure, greed, and messianic zeal, Vasco da Gama’s arrival in the East is seen as a turning point in the centuries-old struggle between Islam and Christianity. Vasco da Gama (and his archrival, Christopher Columbus) set sail with the clear purpose of launching a Crusade and spread Christianity; both were “obsessed with the idea of a Crusade against Islam” (Hobson, 2004, p. 136).

As we shall see, the “divine” sanction for these messianic explorations was grounded in Papal bulls, aimed at “universalizing” Christianity. More mundane goals for da Gama were to reach the Indies and seize control of its markets in spices, silks, and precious gems from Muslim traders (displacing the Muslims and Venetian middlemen) and to claim for Portugal all the territories they discovered and establish Portuguese hegemony over Oriental trade. Da Gama succeeded in his mission and drew a dividing line between the Muslim and Christian eras of history and thus began several-hundred years of European domination through sea power and commerce, and 450 years of colonialism in India.

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\(^2\) Suggestions to celebrate the 500th anniversary in India and elsewhere were rejected, however. In India, the idea was sucked into a whirlpool of controversy. Da Gama’s effigies were burnt, black flags were waved, and politicians angrily protested: “We can’t forget the Gama came to India with a sword in one hand and Bible in the other” (see Masih, 1998). Also, see “Crossfire: Claude Alvares and Sanjay Subrahmanyam debate on Vasco da Gama Quincentenary,” *India Today*, July 28, 1997.
In light of the foregoing, our purpose here is two-fold. First, this narrative will illuminate the foundational motivation for the da Gama epoch: several Papal Bulls, together, called the “Doctrine of Discovery.” While the essential cause was the pursuit of holy war against Islam, the eventual results were commercialism, colonization, and imperialism. What were those Papal declarations all about? Second, the paper will explain what some scholars have called the “myths” that surround the da Gama story. The argument is that da Gama is often “mythified” and “divinized,” and viewed as “emblematic of imperial aspirations, and, as such, an objective of reverence and opprobrium” (Russell-Wood, 1997, p.1). Such representations are said to be rather exaggerated. The paper will conclude with a brief contextualization of this history in reference to what seems to be an Islam-West “clash” environment presently.

The Doctrine of Discovery and the Christian Conquest

On June 18, 1452, a Papal Bull, *Dum Diversas*, 40 years before Columbus’ voyage and 46 years before da Gama’s mission, was issued by Pope Nicholas V and addressed to King Alfonso V of Portugal, declaring war against all non-Christians throughout the world, and sanctioning and promoting the conquest, colonization, and exploitation of non-Christian nations and their territories. Thus, “under various theological and legal doctrines formulated during and after the Crusades, non-Christians were considered enemies of the Catholic faith and, as such, less than human” (Newcomb, 1992, p. 18). Specifically, the Bull says:

We weighing all and singular the premises with due meditation, and noting that since we had formerly by other letters of ours granted among other things free and ample faculty to the aforesaid King Alfonso - to invade, search out, capture, vanquish, and subdue all Saracens (Muslims) and pagans whatsoever, and other enemies of Christ wheresoever placed, and the kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, dominions, possessions, and all movable and immovable goods whatsoever held and possessed by them and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery, and to apply and appropriate to himself and his successors the kingdoms, dukedoms, counties, principalities, dominions, possessions, and goods, and to convert them to his and their use and profit. [www.doctrineofdiscovery.org/dumdiversas.htm](http://www.doctrineofdiscovery.org/dumdiversas.htm)

Later, there were other Papal Bulls which further reinforced the basic mission - *Inter Caetera* (1456, by Pope Calixtus III; 1481, by Pope Sixtus IV; 1493, by Pope Alexander VI), and *Precise Denotionis* (1481). And there was *Romanus Pontifex* (1454) that specifically granted the same privileges to Portugal, as granted to Spain earlier. Some historians, to be noted, view these Bulls as extending the theological legacy of Pope Urban II’s Crusades to justify European colonization and expansionism, accommodating “both the marketplace and the yearnings of the Christian soul” (Bown, 2012, p. 75).

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3 See [www.en.m.wikidepria.org](http://www.en.m.wikidepria.org) for details. Also, see Haynes, 2003.
And the Crusade also included capturing Islam’s second holiest site, Medina (where Prophet Mohammad is buried) and ransoming it for Jerusalem; this was also seen as the fulfillment of a prophetic “vision” that Columbus once had (Hamdani, 1994, p. 289; also see Delaney, 2012, Sweet, 1986; Watts, 1985). Columbus explains “his ‘vision’ in a book compilation of his biblical prophecies after returning from his third voyage to the ‘New World.’ He hoped that his prophecy would inspire King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella to fund a fourth trip for him, one that would allow them to fulfill the millennial prophecy of becoming monarchs of the New Jerusalem” (West & Kling, 1991, viii). Further, Columbus’ obsession also becomes evident from the fact that, on the day before he died (May 19, 1506), he stipulated an addendum to his will, originally drawn on February 22, 1498, that a “fund be set up for the purpose of liberating Jerusalem” (Delaney, 2006, p. 266). And “Columbus linked the crusading tradition to an apocalyptic vision of himself as messiah” (Phelan, 1970, p. 20; also see, Hamdani, 1994; Delaney, 2006, Watts, 1985). Indeed, for Columbus’ pursuit of the crusading mission, his name was proposed, unsuccessfully, for canonization. 4 To be sure, this was the era of medieval apocalyptic thinking - “the mother of all Christian theology” (Fried, 2000, p. 303). And the conquest of Jerusalem was not the ultimate end but beginning of the end, “the clarion call for the Second Coming and Last Judgment” (Cliff, 2012, p. 2). The pursuit of this endeavor was viewed as “God’s work.” The Crusaders “went into battle armed with an ironclad guarantee from Christ’s representatives on earth: mass indulgences for those who died, which absolved them of doing penance for their sins and guaranteed immediate admittance to heaven” (Cliff, 2012, p. 26). 5

In order to launch the Crusade, as declared in the Papal Bulls, King Manuel of Portugal commissioned Vasco da Gama in 1497 to seek and join hands with Eastern Christian forces. The King, like many Europeans, was under the impression that India was the legendary Christian kingdom of Prester John with whom to build an anti-Islam alliance. Manuel thought he “had inherited a sacred obligation,” with his own “startling messianic streak.” His “foreign policy” was based on “a divine mandate to fight Islam” to launch “a Last Crusade to recapture Jerusalem, the great event from which, the Scripture foretold, the Last Days of the world would follow as light follows dark” (Cliff, 2012, pp. 160-161). Thus, “soon, Mecca, the tomb of the Prophet, and ‘the evil sect of ‘Mafamede’ would all be

4 Columbus was known as a pious man; he “never used profanity” and during the voyages, “the ships’ crews observed religious rights.” For having “brought the Christian faith to half the world, Irish and French Catholics argued (that) he should be named a saint. Though the move had the approval of Pope Pius IX (reign 1846-1878), Columbus was never canonized because he fathered an illegitimate child, and there was no proof he had performed a miracle” (Giles, 1991, p. 1).

5 Such “heavenly” incentives, as during the earlier Crusades, were the equivalent of the “72 virgins promise” to Muslim suicide-bombers in the current conflict-ridden Middle-East environment.

Manual was convinced, da Gama was the one who would “negotiate alliances that would oust Islam and entrench Portugal as an Eastern Power . . . all before the Spanish arrived. He would inspire, cajole, and threaten, and if argument failed, he would have to persuade at the point of a gun . . . a Crusader fit to carry the standard of Christ” (Cliff, 2012, p. 161). Significant to his selection was also da Gama’s personality: “grim, cynical man, notoriously merciless, an expert at torturing prisoners” (Sheppard, 2006, p. 1). Further, he was known to have a “surly disposition; unlettered, brutal, and violent. For some assignments, he would have been useless, but for this one he was made to order. The work lying ahead could not be accomplished by a gentle leader” (Newell, 1954, p. 32).

Thus, da Gama sailed west across the Sea of Darkness in 1498, with the express understanding that he was authorized, as a sacred mission, “to invade . . . vanquish . . . and subdue all Saracens (Muslims) and pagans and other enemies of Christ . . . and to reduce their persons to perpetual slavery . . . “ (Dum Diversas, 1452; Romanus Pontifex, 1455). By such means, declared the Pope, the “Christian Empire would be propagated” (Newcomb, 1992, p. 18). Together, the Papal Bulls served as the basis and justification for launching the global slave-trade of the 15th and 16th centuries, and the Age of Imperialism.

Later, however, a controversy arose between Spain and Portugal. The 1493 Bull, Inter Caetera, issued by Pope Alexander VI, granted to Spain the right to conquer the lands which Columbus had already found, as well as any land which Spain might “discover” in the future. The Portuguese sought the same privilege. So, as the Portuguese protested, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed in 1493 and the Pope drew a line of demarcation between the two poles, giving Spain rights of conquest and dominion over one side of the globe, and Portugal over the other (see Bown for details). Thus, the Papacy aimed to become the global “spiritual empire destined to unite the world, with the Pope as priest-emperor and vicegerent of God on earth . . . it was the duty of Portugal (and Spain) to snatch them (the heathens) - however much they might resist—into the arms of Christ and His salvation” (Edwards, 1971, p. 171). Moreover, what is clear is that the Papal Bulls represented but two clear examples of how the “Christian Powers,” viewed indigenous peoples as “the lawful spoil and prey of their civilized conquerors” (Newcomb, 1992, p. 18). In fact, the Christian “Law of Nations” asserted that Christian nations had a divine right, based on the Bible, to claim absolute title to and ultimate authority over any newly “discovered” non-Christian inhabitants and their lands.

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6 In 1513, Great Alfonso d’Albuquerque had planned an expedition to “disembark in the harbor of Liumbo (i.e., Yanbu), march rapidly to the temple of Mecca (Mecca is confused with Medina) and strip it of all its treasures, for they were, indeed, many; taking as well the body of its false prophet and conveying it away, with a view to ransoming the holy temple of Jerusalem in exchange for it” (Livenmore, 1976, p. 142).
In sum, the Papal Bulls launched the “Age of Discovery” (Portuguese as well as Spanish), with the “divine mandate to fight Islam, and eventually to fulfill the call for the Second Coming and Last Judgment” (Cliff, 2012, p.2) By the time of Vasco da Gama’s second voyage in 1502, however, “there was no distinction between the trading mission and crusade against Islam, and da Gama proceeded with atrocious brutality to secure an exclusive market” for Portugal (Fleming, 2003, p. 305). More importantly, “It is essential not to confuse the cause with the result. The end result was colonization and a commercial revolution; the motivating cause was the pursuit of holy war against the Muslims . . .” (Hamdani, 1994, p. 277).

Myths about the Vasco da Gama Epoch

It is often argued that the post-1492 era constituted the European Age of Discovery that ushered in Western-led proto-globalization. Or in the Asian context, there is the familiar depiction of Asian history between 1498 and 1800 as the Vasco de Gama epoch. Thus, John Roberts (1985) asserts,

One fact is so obvious that it is easily overlooked: the exploring was done exclusively by Europeans . . . It was only a comparatively small boast that the Portuguese king (Manuel) soon called himself “Lord of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India” . . . The conquest of the high seas was the first and greatest of all the triumphs over natural forces which were to lead to the domination of western civilization of the whole globe . . . it is quite correct to put Europe at the center of the story in modern times. (pp. 175, 185, 194, & 201, quoted by Hobson, 2004, pp. 134-136)

However, there are others who have challenged such “facts” as part of the exaggerated “Eurocentric” view of history. A widely-acclaimed book by an eminent scholar of Indian history is described as “a startling new interpretation of the myth and the reality of the life of one of the great figures of the Age of Discoverers” (Subrahmanym, 1997, p.ii). This scholar argues that “while national heroes for some are objects of derision for others, there is considerable myth-building enterprise around Gama” (Subrahmanym, 1997, p. 360). Further, “Examples of mythmaking around Gama are still legion . . . . Five hundred years from the voyage of the Sao Gabriel, the myth of Vasco da Gama has been successfully exported from Portugal through the entire world” (Subrahmanym,

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7 To be sure, at the initiative of various native-American scholars, supported by many mainstream churches, the Doctrine of Discovery was repudiated by the World Council of Churches in February 2012. The statement of repudiation rejected “the idea endorsed by the doctrine that the Catholic explorers had full and free power, authority, and jurisdiction of every kind . . . and duty to lead the peoples dwelling in those islands and countries to embrace the Christian religion . . . if they refused, the Vatican granted its envoys the authority to enslave and kill.” The statement argued that such positions are “fundamentally opposed to the gospel of Jesus.” See http://www.danielpaul.com/DoctrineOfDiscovery.html
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1997, p. 363). A Portuguese scholar suggests a “contradiction arises” when we consider “the so-called glorious era of the Portuguese maritime enterprise, with the missing data generally obtained through a simplistic retrospective projection of known information. On the other hand, when the information is really obtainable . . . . we enter the dark side of the Portuguese maritime history” (Domingues, 2003, p. 1; also see Alvares, 1997; Kalsi, 2016; and others).

However, the succeeding discussion relies largely on John Hobson, who, in his widely-acclaimed book, Eastern Origins of Western Civilization (2004), disputes assertions such as those by Roberts and others. Specifically, Hobson discusses six alternative propositions which, together, paint a different picture of this period.

**Myth #1: Voyages Represented the Modern European Age of Discovery in Asia**

The voyages were not the embodiment of a pioneering modern European age of discovery that demonstrated the signs of a unique “rational restlessness” or an impulsive curiosity, Hobson (2004) argues. Thus, “they were in fact the ‘last gasp,’ or the ‘second round,’ of the medieval age of Crusades - the ‘first round’ having occurred between 1095 and 1291. The immediate cause of the voyages was the Ottoman capture of the Byzantine Constantinople in 1453, which created a major crisis in Christendom. The Islamic ‘threat,’ along with the disunity of Christendom, caused the Catholic Church to react. For the Church, it was very much a matter of life or death; that is, the very survival of Christendom was at stake. As Pope Pius II proclaimed, “An unavoidable war with the Turks (Muslims) threatens us. Unless we take up arms and go to war to meet the enemy, we think all is over with religion.” Having granted legitimacy to Portuguese imperialism in the Indies, another papal bull (Inter Caetera, 1456) was issued, that granted “spiritual jurisdiction of all the regions conquered by the Portuguese now or in the future.”

Hobson (2004) concurs, however: “None of this is to say that economic motivations were unimportant. But economic riches would also be an important means to carry the war to the ‘infidel.’ Indeed, in 1457, the Portuguese mint issued a gold coin with the striking of cruzado (Crusade)” (p. 134).

**MYTH #2: “Twin Myths of the Portuguese Age of Discovery and the Western Age of Proto-Globalization**

According to Hobson, the Portuguese neither “discovered” Asia and the Cape of Good Hope, nor were the post-1497-98 “explorations” the first sign of Western proto-globalization. The fact is the Portuguese were the last to discover the Cape; various Eastern peoples had already reached it, if not circumnavigated, many centuries earlier. About 1450, the famous Arab navigator, Ahmad Ibn Majid, sailed westwards to the Cape and then up the west coast of Africa (see Lunde, 2005). Moreover, the Chinese Muslim admiral, Cheng Ho, sailed up the east coast of Africa at the very beginning of the 15th century, some even earlier. Numerous Eastern traders had already made their way across to the Cape and up the east, if
not the west, coast of Africa, well before Vasco de Gama. And for centuries, Persian and Arab sailors and navigators had traversed these waters and were more advanced in their skills than their European counterparts.

Further, another dubious assumption is that Indians were an hitherto “isolated” and “primitive” people. The fact is that India, and the rest of Asia, for that matter, had played a crucial role with the Afro-Asian-led global economy for many centuries earlier. As to Indians being “primitive,” here is the contradiction. When da Gama met numerous rulers en route, especially in India, the gifts he offered as the best of Europe, partly to seek trade, were usually rejected as inferior.

In sum, Hobson insists, neither the rounding of the Cape nor the Portuguese arrival in India constituted the label of a “pioneering” discovery (p.140). To the Africans and Asians, it was merely a footnote.

**Myth #3: European Ingenuity in the Portuguese Voyages**

The Portuguese arrival in Asia was not the sign of a unique European ingenuity, Hobson argues. Rather, it was only made possible by Europe’s assimilation of superior Arab/Asian nautical technologies and scientific ideas. Had it not been for the diffusion and absorption of Islamic knowledge as well as navigational and nautical technologies, da Gama would not even have reached the Cape, let alone India. The Portuguese borrowing of this knowledge began in the 12th century, through translations from Arabic and contacts with Muslims during the Crusades (see Ghazanfar, 2006).8

Oceanic sailing presented new challenges to the Portuguese in terms of shipping design and navigation; and they turned to the Easterners, especially the Muslims via the Jews, to solve these challenges. There was the challenge of strong winds around the Cape, solved in the 1440s by the construction of caravels, a design that, going back to the 13th century, originating with the Islamic *qarib* (Arabic for caravel). There were also features of the ship design (the stern-post rudder, lateen sail, and the all-important triple-mast system) without which the voyages of discovery would never have occurred. Such design features had long been common in Islamic and Chinese shipping (Clowes, 1927, p. 216).9

8 Like Spain, Portugal, part of Islamic Spain from 711-1249, also bears the legacy of Islam, in terms of language and other socio-cultural dimensions, including numerous historic sites. See Salloum, 2002.

9 “The Islamic influence affected many subjects which relate to seafaring—geography, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. The transcription of Arab manuscripts in the 13th century left many of these philosophies at the seaman’s dispense. Many devices, such as the astrolabe, compass, and sextant were applied to seafaring in innovative ways. Now that European nations were immersed in these philosophies spread by Muslims, many people became frightened of Muslim influence. Consequently, this resulted in a demand to increase the centralization of Christian kingdoms, which helped unite Europe. This collaboration influenced shipbuilding and led to a fusion of ideas, theories, and methods that became more and more widespread.” See
Another challenge was the need for accurate navigational charts than those available already. While some have suggested that da Gama had a “good grasp of astronomy,” that is another “myth” (Subrahmanyam, 1997, p. 62). It was Islamic astronomy that provided knowledge of the lunar cycles, enabled calculations of the size of the earth, and by using degrees, enabled recording of the distances travelled. Another important instrument available was the astrolabe, which had been perfected by Muslims and passed onto Europe via Islamic Spain in the mid-tenth century. The Portuguese also needed various other pieces of knowledge to be successful and these were available only because of the breakthroughs in Islamic science upon which the Portuguese voyages depended.

But the Islamic influence did not end here. Once da Gama reached Malindi below the Horn of East Africa in April 1498, the next challenge was how to venture out onto the Islamic waters, heretofore uncharted by the Europeans and onto broad expanse of the Indian Ocean without a seasoned navigator. Arab sailors were already masters of the Indian Ocean. Fortunately, he found in Malindi the most illustrious Muslim navigator of the time, Ahmad ibn Majid, who had sailed the Indian ocean from shore to shore (see Lunde, 2005).

Da Gama found Ahmad ibn Majid willing to help, as he had done for numerous Arab and African merchants, and offered his nautical knowledge to the Portuguese sailor. Even in far off Europe, they had read Ahmed ibn Majid’s *The Advantages of Knowing the Sciences of the Sea*, an internationally celebrated sailors’ handbook; now the author was aboard da Gama’s flagship. He plotted for de Gama the route between Malindi (now Kenya) and Malabar (India), and on May 20, 1498, Vasco da Gama’s fleet reached the Malabar Coast, a feat that would have been impossible without the help of Ahmad ibn Majid (see Lunde, 1962).

**Myth #4: European Maritime Superiority in Asia**

This claim is perhaps the weakest - that the European maritime power was superior. As noted earlier, the Chinese Muslim admiral, Cheng Ho (1371-1434), had traversed the Indian Ocean and landed on the east coast of Africa decades before da Gama, albeit in reverse. And a comparison of the size and dimensions of his fleet can only cause embarrassment for the Portuguese and the Europeans. The largest of Cheng Ho’s ship was 500 feet long and 180 feet wide, compared to da Gama’s longest about 85 feet. And da Gama’s four ships and 170 men paled in comparison with several ships and 28,000 men of Cheng’s 1431-33’ voyage. Another striking fact is that the number of men carried on some Chinese voyages exceeded the size of even the largest armies of European powers at the time. The crucial point is that Asian - Chinese, Arab - were militarily sufficient to hold their own against European ships. Even after 1434, the superiority of Chinese navy continued for several decades.

http://nautarch.tamu.edu/shiplab/01George/caravela/htmls/Caravel%20History.htm.
Obviously, the Portuguese eventually succeeded in colonizing the Indies. It was, however, more a function of their ability to play off rival factions in the region. Among the many, two are noteworthy. First, he took advantage of the conflict between the Sultans of Mombasa and Malindi. The Malindi ruler was also aware of da Gama’s destruction in the southern coastal areas of eastern Africa; he decided to cooperate and allow da Gama to establish trading posts. And, second, the enmity of Zamorin (ruler of Calicut) and the ruler of Cochin enabled the Portuguese to gain a foothold in Calicut.

In sum, says Hobson, the fact is that the Portuguese (and their European successors) did not have the military or manpower to go into Asia “all guns blazing” and force the Asians into submission in the three centuries after 1498 (p.148). That the Portuguese had to rely more on luck, manipulation, and deviousness is hardly surprising.

Myth #5: The European Trading Monopoly in Asia

Another common myth is that the Europeans dominated Asian trading system and that by 1500 (i.e., with the Cape route available) the Islamic heartland of the world economy had just about faded, as the declining Ottoman empire was replaced by the all-conquering Europeans. In this portrayal, it is as if the European creation of a new route dried up the old Muslim routes and Portuguese flow via the Cape became prominent.

Hobson identifies several problems with this claim, one being that the Portuguese were mainly joining the trade that was dominated by the Ottoman Muslims. Second, the Cape route was unprofitable for the Portuguese because of prohibitive transport costs. Third, far more trade passed into Europe via the Levant and Venice, which in turn arrived via the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and overland caravan routes. Indeed, until 1585, over three times more trade to Europe took place via the Red Sea and overland than via the Cape. Fourth, before 1650 far more of Europe’s bullion exports to the East went via the Ottoman and Persian empires than via the Cape (Pearson, 1987, p. 44). Finally, the Portuguese dominance is falsified by the simple fact that in the 16th century only 6 percent of total shipping tonnage employed in the Indian Ocean trading system was Portuguese (Hobson, 2004, p. 152; see Hobson, for additional details).

Myth #6: European Political Dominance in Asia

Finally, if military power could not secure a European trading dominance, how then did the Europeans secure their modest prominence in the Asian trade zone? The Europeans (Portuguese, followed by the Dutch and English) were compelled to collaborate, cooperate with, and sometimes cajole the stronger Asian rulers and merchants. Despite the initial proclamations of “death to the (Islamic) infidel,” when the Portuguese arrived in the Indies, they also entered the domain of hegemonic Islam and had no choice but to cooperate (Hobson, 2004, p. 154).
There were several aspects to this partnership. First, Asian rulers granted the Portuguese a limited form of extra-territoriality that extended to Macao in China and to the eastern coasts of India. Second, given their lack of financing, the Portuguese had to rely on local sources of financing, especially the Indian money-lenders. Third, there was considerable intermingling of Portuguese and Asian traders, sometimes humiliating for the Portuguese (and the Dutch and English), but advantageous nevertheless. And, finally, the Portuguese had no choice but to rely on local sources of knowledge - language, guidance concerning trading logistics and dealings, etc. Hobson (2004) writes, “Help, collaboration, collusion, coexistence, symbiosis - all these became necessary as time went by” (p. 155).

In sum, Hobson concludes, the greatest legacy of the Portuguese (as well as the Dutch and English) seaborne “empire” was not how much but how little things changed concerning Asia’s dominance of the global economy between 1500 and 1750/1800. Hobson (2004) maintains, “The conclusion is hard to avoid: the ‘European age’ or the Vasco da Gama epoch of Asia turns out to be but retrospective Eurocentric wishful thinking” (p. 156). The fact is that until about 1800, the Ottoman and Persian empires were economically and politically strong enough to resist the European incursion. Yet, King Manuel I boasted to the Pope in August 1499 that he was “Lord of Guinea and of the Conquests, Navigations, and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia, and India” (Hobson, 2004, p. 156). The claim might well have impressed the Pope, but it was entirely pretentious. Far nearer to truth was the claim of Ottoman emperors. In 1538, the Ottoman Sultan, Suleyman (known as “the Magnificent” in Europe), pronounced: “I am Suleyman, in whose name the Friday sermon is read in Mecca and Medina. In Baghdad I am the Shah, in the Byzantine realms the Caesar and in Egypt the Sultan, who sends his fleets to the seas of Europe, the Maghrib and India” (Hobson, 2004, p. 157).

Elsewhere, while discussing the “discovery” of America (what he calls the “Myth of 1492”), Hobson (2004) observes, “suffice to note that Christopher Columbus, like da Gama and the Spanish monarchy, was obsessed with the idea of a Crusade against Islam” (p. 163). With respect to reliance on appropriated knowledge, an eminent historian emphasizes the point, “as the Spanish would later do in Spain and Peru, so the Portuguese encountered indigenous knowledge of the past in Africa and the Indies that was difficult to reconcile with the Christian notions of world history or their overwhelming sense of boundary between myth and ‘facts,’ but which they were often obliged to use in the absence of alternative sources” (Woolf, 2011, p. 236). Hobson (2004) is a bit more blunt, however, in that “the irony here is that while da Gama sought a Crusade against Islam, it was the passing of Eastern - especially Islamic - ‘resource portfolio’ via the Islamic Bridge of the World that had enabled him to undertake his journey in the first place” (p. 144; also see Ghazanfar, 2006). Similarly, another author argues, “the pursuit of holy war against the Muslims” was launched by “using, at the same time, much of the Muslim enemy’s knowledge and expertise gained by virtue of medieval Christian Europe’s crusading contacts with the Middle East and through the extensive translation of Arabic works into Latin undertaken in Spain, Italy and France during the 12th and 13th centuries” (Hamdani, 1994, p. 277).
Conclusion

While acknowledging the Vasco da Gama epoch as historical in terms of linking the three continents, the preceding pages have discussed a relatively unexplored perspective about this historic figure, based on a review of the substantial literature. Both the Vasco da Gama and Christopher Columbus voyages were fundamentally driven by the messianic zeal, “the divine mandate to fight Islam,” as dictated by various Papal Bulls. Beginning in 1452, the “divine mandate” subsequently mutated into the Doctrine of Discovery that merged into the Age of Discovery and was soon followed by the Age of Imperialism/Colonialism. As for the Islamic world, it was an early “clash of civilization” that seems to resonate in the present-day Islam-West relationship.

Moreover, there are scholars who point to the exaggerated glorification of da Gama - a national hero for some, but an object of derision for others, with considerable “European myth-building.” The preceding pages have identified several such “myths,” which together suggest a less flattering historical legacy for da Gama. Perhaps more importantly, da Gama’s image becomes considerably tarnished in light of the brutalities inflicted during his voyages upon those vanquished--a topic not pursued in the paper, though abundantly documented in the literature (Cliff, 2012; David, 1988).

Relevant to the “Islamic problem,” over 900 years ago, in 1095, Pope Urban II launched the First Crusade and the two great religions clashed with each other

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10 Interestingly, Vasco da Gama had an older, “illegitimate half-brother, with exactly the same name as he,” whom his father, Estevao da Gama had “fathered when still single” (Subrahmanyam, 1997, p. 61).

11 Forced conversions were a common practice, the alternative being the same fate as under Spanish Inquisition. David (1988) writes, “The Jesuits staged an annual mass baptism on the Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, and in order to secure as many neophytes as possible, a few days before the ceremony, the Jesuits would go through the streets of the Hindu quarter in pairs, accompanied by their Negro slaves, whom they would urge to seize the Hindus. When the blacks caught up with a fugitive, they would smear his lips with a piece of beef, making him an ‘untouchable’ among his people. Conversion to Christianity was then his only choice” (pp. 18-19). Da Gama “would be very cruel to Muslims who didn’t listen and would often use torture” (Sheppard, p. 5, NewWorld). Similarly, Jews also suffered the wrath of the Inquisitors. There is plethora of literature that documents the details of brutalities associated with Vasco da Gama and his predecessors/successors. For example, Alvares (1997) says, “Da Gama would take captives, chop off their limbs and string them in pieces on the masts of his ships to intimidate others” (p. 2). See Alvares, 1997; Cliff, 2012; Goel, 2010; Hall, 1998; Jayne, 1910; Masih, 1998; More, 2013; Priolkar, 1961; Subrahmanyan, 1997; Ullattil, 2011; Warrior, 2013; and others; also see Meri massacre, Cliff, 2012, pp. 309-313; Subrahmanyan, 1997, pp. 204-207; and “Plunder and Massacre of the Meri,” http://historicalalleys.blogspot.com/search?q=story+of+miri+ship. Also, there is a recent Indian movie (Urimi) on this subject; see “Vasco da Gama - Urumi: history from the vanquished eyes,” http://www.news18.com/news/india/urumi-history-from-the-vanquished-eyes-365070.html; and “Vasco da Gama’s atrocities now on screen,” http://www.newindianexpress.com/entertainment/telugu/article304465.ece.
not just for the soul of world, but also its resources. Both Christianity and Islam were nurtured by the same soil, and both claimed to possess the ultimate truth. Driven by an ironclad certainty that they were destined to spread the true faith, by cannon-power as well as by systematically taking advantage of local conflicts, the Portuguese changed the course of history. Then there was the “accidental discovery” of America. Two centuries later, humanists such as Adam Smith lauded the consequences in a secular way as the “two greatest and most important events recorded in the history of mankind . . . and it was long apparent that for the West to be won, the East first had to be overcome” (Cliff, 2012, p. 419).

Da Gama’s arrival in the Indian Ocean also sparked Europe’s belief that the global balance of power had shifted its way. New mental as well as geographical horizons opened up, and the Islam’s supremacy no longer seemed unassailable. The Age of Discovery, or the Age of Exploitation as the “discovered” choose to call it, enabled vast wealth in natural and human resources to fall under Christian control. The world order founded in the wake of colonialism is viewed by some Muslim true-believers as an ongoing Western plot to impose an alien way of life - the Crusades in a subtler form.

There is another way, however, as history informs us. There were the Muslims of Cordoba and Baghdad, the pioneers of explosions of cultural interaction - and the Christians of Toledo and Sicily, who carried on the progressive tradition. There was Frederick II, who negotiated a lease on Jerusalem with a Turkish sultan. There were the Ottoman Emperors, who “turned Istanbul into an international melting pot” and who, in the wake of Spanish Inquisition, “rescued Jews and Muslims alike . . . , welcomed refugees to Istanbul as full citizens, threatened with death any Turks who mistreated a Jew” (Cliff, 2012, p. 146). Like the early Crusaders, there were also Europeans who were enamored by the ancient cultures and went native, albeit at times to the horror of their compatriots back home. That mutual history along with renewed emphasis on shared understanding and respect for cultural diversity and religious pluralism provides reason for some optimism for the future. Certainly, if the “age of exploitation” was founded on religious intolerance, then the development of an “age of peaceful coexistence” must be grounded in religious freedom.

References


The Integrity of Women in Re-making a Nation: The Case of Guinea-Bissau

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Abstract

This article both acknowledges and celebrates the role of women in re-making the nation of Guinea-Bissau. A gendered perspective and historical and multi-scalar framing demonstrates that women have played integral roles in nation-building over time and space in Guinea-Bissau. How have the women of Guinea-Bissau fashioned their agency? Where are the new forms of agency for women in Guinea-Bissau? An examination of nation-building shows the foundational roles of women, unique aspects of innovative economic enterprise before, during, and after the colonial period, and contemporary political efforts by women toward the production of a successful and inclusive country. Gender has opened unique opportunities in Guinea-Bissau toward the promotion of nationhood; gender is also experiencing a restriction of socio-political opportunities for women contemporarily that needs to be checked. Theories of African feminisms and intersectionality help explain this phenomenon. No analysis of community (re)building and maintenance is complete without incorporating the integrity of women.

Introduction

In her book *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea Bissau*, Stephanie Urdang (1979) emphasized the need for women to play equal political, economic, and social roles during the fight for independence. She reflected, “Women suffer a dual oppression in Guinea Bissau expressed as the need for women to fight against two colonialisms the one of the Portuguese and the other of men” (Urdang, 1979, p. 15). It is from this perspective that we present this article emphasizing that in the history of Guinea-Bissau’s national development, women have played and continue to play integral roles in the making and re-making of the country and its foundations. We use Trajano Filho’s (2010b) concept of nation-building as resulting from “the clash between reason and history, universalism and cultural
distinctiveness” (p. 172). In other words, if nation-building is a hegemonic exercise of empowerment to create a shared sense of belonging to a community (i.e., a process of becoming), imagined or otherwise, then there must be those who belong, those who do not, and those whose status is in flux according to associations deemed meaningful (Mayer, 2000; see also Anderson, 2006; Forrest, 2003). Further, those shared and meaningful attributes are changeable (i.e., contested) in time and space.

In this article, we show that women in Guinea-Bissau clearly exhibit unique cultural characteristics that contributed and continue to contribute to the making, un-making, and remaking of the nation as African women engage in both complementary and intersectional relationships with their male counterparts. In this article, we ask: How have the women of Guinea-Bissau fashioned their agency and, where are the new forms of agency for women in Guinea-Bissau? We find that gender in Guinea-Bissau carries an expectation of complementarity, respect, subjectification, and intersectionality with competing forms of identification. Our analysis of six gender-specific cases of nation-building supports Urdang’s earlier conclusion that gendered identification and recognition remains embattled on many fronts in Guinea-Bissau. Therefore, our endeavor of revisiting this issue almost 40 years later is critical toward opening a gendered space for re-engaging capacity-building that benefits the nation as a whole and women specifically.

This article begins with a brief overview of Guinea-Bissau followed by our explanatory framing and methodological approach. We then present six gendered cases of community- and nation-building from customary, economic, and political perspectives that showcase our argument. The conclusion revisits our findings and makes a plea to invest in gender-related social spaces and recognition while simultaneously acknowledging the complex relationships between gender and other forms of identification that are at times symbiotic and at other times, are found to be in direct competition over scarce economic and political resources.

**Characteristics of the Bissau-Guinean Nation**

After almost two decades of armed rebellion against the Portuguese colonial regime, Guinea-Bissau achieved recognized independence on April 25, 1974. The movement suffered a tremendous loss in January 1973 when the nationalist architect Amilcar Cabral was assassinated. Guinea-Bissau was oft referenced for its original and strong fight for independence. Its struggle against Portuguese colonialism was internationally recognized by its popular mobilization, the enlightened leadership of Amilcar Cabral, its policies of non-alignment, the emphasis on both political theory and everyday realities, and women’s involvement at all levels of decision-making. For example, a mere 10 years after independence, Carmen Pereira, one of the most important women fighters for independence, became and the first woman National Assembly President (1984-1989). To date, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) remains the most influential political party in the country, although 40
years of underdevelopment, military interventions, and political instability have left the party divided.

Guinea-Bissau has an estimated population of 1.7 million people separated between five major and more than 15 minor ethnic groups including the Balanta (30%), Fula (20%), Manjaca (14%), Mandinga (13%), and Papel (7%). While the official language is Portuguese, the majority speak the national lingua franca Krioulo. In the early 21st century, many adopted Islam, which is now practiced by 50% of the country’s population. Approximately 10% of the country’s population identifies as Christian although an estimated 40% continue to hold their indigenous beliefs concurrently with either Islam or Christianity. The Guinea-Bissau sex ratio is 0.95 males per female; women give birth to 4.8 children on average over their lifetime; males have a literacy rate of 74.8% while women’s is 45.9%; and the maternal mortality rate is 790 deaths/100,000 live births, the seventh worst in the world (2014 est.; World Bank, 2016). The unemployment rate for men is 6.5% compared to women at 7.4% (2014 est.; World Bank, 2016). The primary (19.3%) and lower secondary (8.9%) school completion rates for women are abysmal and worse than their male counterparts with only 38.6% and 5.9% of girls even enrolling in primary and secondary schools respectively (2014 est.; World Bank, 2016). Further, in 2015, women held between 10-30% of the national parliament and only 31.3% of the ministerial level positions going to women (World Bank, 2016). These indicators suggest that the women of Guinea-Bissau are some of the poorest and most disempowered in the world although there have been slight improvements since 2000 (World Bank, 2016).

The development of the modern nation of Guinea-Bissau is a complex process mired by frequent political crises, coup d’états, civil war, and political instability with heavy effects and ongoing burdens on the well-being of the population, its development, and a worsening international reputation. The UN classification places Guinea-Bissau among the world’s lowest in terms of their Human Development Index (HDI). The Millennium Development Goals for the country remain out of reach.

However, there are signs of positive change noticed over recent years. The international community observed that the 2014 general elections were well-organized and demonstrated a calm atmosphere that was free of tensions. In 2015, a new political crisis with the dismissing of the Prime Minister Domingoes Simoes Pereira by the newly-elected President Jose Mario Vaz was resolved in the courts with political negotiations and the interpretation of constitutional rules instead of through military intervention. A Donor Roundtable hosted by the European Union in Brussels on March 25, 2015, pledged more than one billion euros to support Guinea-Bissau’s social and economic development (Reuters, 2015), although political infighting remains (UN News Centre, 2016a, 2016b).

1 The HDI is a summary measure for assessing long-term progress in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Guinea-Bissau’s HDI – 0.396 places it 177th out of 187 countries indexed according to these indicators (UNDP Human Development Report, 2014).
This potential influx of funding and somewhat political calm makes revisiting the role of women in re-making the nation of Guinea-Bissau quite timely. Women’s involvement is examined through a review of primary, secondary, and ethnographic source materials. Loosely based on African feminist theory, we emphasize context and the integral complementarity of men and women. We define complementarity as foundational roles distinct to men and women within the context of Guinea-Bissau. This article postulates that women are formative agents within society and have the potential to effect change and/or stability. As will become clear from both the historical and contemporary contexts, women’s power and agency in Guinea-Bissau is often derived from their integral social positions, not necessarily as a matter of institutional authority. We identify that women’s agency in Guinea-Bissau over time can be broadly categorized into customary, economic, and political agencies, but these forms of agency are not restrictive and often overlap with one another. In presenting accounts of women’s agency, we use the concepts of African feminisms and intersectionality to help frame these explanations, emphasizing the link between intersectionality and agency.

Theoretical Perspective

African feminist theory is not a clear-cut concept that can be precisely defined and clearly delineated. It can, however, be understood in relation to liberal feminism. Liberal feminist scholars interpret the agency of women through a single focus, that of political equality, while African feminist theory emphasizes that the agency of women in Africa are not homogenous and their experiences and needs should be not be seen through a single lens. Within the different communities of Guinea-Bissau, women’s agency is viewed through multiple lenses while acknowledging their interconnectedness as well as their intersectionality with other competing forms of identification and power dynamics. From a sociological perspective, we understand agency as the power people have to think for themselves and act in ways that shape their experiences and life trajectories. Oyewumi (1997) continues to explain that “analyses and interpretations of Africa must start with Africa, they should reflect specific cultural and local contexts; while rooted in the lived experiences and cultural beliefs of the women, they must involve respect for women” (p. 8). She further clarifies that “more importantly, these interpretations must also acknowledge the agency and potential of African women” (Oyewumi, 1997, p. 8). Thus, relationships are fluid and social roles are situational, continuously placing individuals in context-dependent, hierarchical, and non-

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2 African feminist theory captures the fluidity and dynamism of the different cultural imperatives, historical forces, and localized realities conditioning women’s activism and underscores the heterogeneity of African feminist thinking and engagement as manifested in strategies and approaches that are sometimes complementary and supportive, and sometimes competing and adversarial (Guy-Sheftall, 2003; Nnaemeka, 2004).

3 For how liberal feminism has achieved equal rights and political power for women, see Epure (2014).
hierarchical roles. For instance, the definition of family is not rooted in the nuclear family; the husband and wife unit is not “natural” as explained by Oyewumi (1997, p. 3). Instead, the family in many societies throughout the African context can include the extension of cousins, aunts, uncles, nieces, and nephews, which go beyond the husband and wife unit, a concept often central to liberal feminist thinking.

The African feminist approach stresses the significance of motherhood as an integral part of the community, tracing back to pre-colonial societal structures, but is also relevant in contemporary times in the sense that it informs the dimensions of daily African lives (Cruz, 2015). Within the African feminist concept, gender is socially constructed reflecting differing “world senses” (Oyewumi, 1997). With these senses, gender can be understood as being shaped by African contexts and experiences directly. Oyewumi (1997) maintains that “African societies are complex and recognize exceptions to general normative rules. Similarly, female ancestors can share equal status with male ancestors, while ‘third genders’ ‘agendered and trans-gendered entities’ and ‘alternative genders’ have been discovered in many parts of the non-Western world” (p. 48). Thus, women in African societies are defined and positioned to run alongside, in conjunction with, in front of, and in opposition to men. According to Oyewumi (1997), African local knowledge of women in society, by its nature, is accommodating, flexible, adaptive, and inherently tolerant. Oyewumi (1997) writes, “This local knowledge brazenly and playfully admits the Other into its frame in order to critique as well as work and rework a whole array of influences” (p. 77). Noting that pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial identities, institutions, and systems exist in contemporary Guinea-Bissau, and gaining an understanding of these, presents a framework for gender policies that is appropriate. Oyewumi (1997) asks, “Why should we assume that the pre-colonial structures could be so easily wiped out” (p. 78)? Instead, understanding the effects of pre-colonial and colonial structures on women of contemporary Guinea-Bissau through an African feminist lens shows the different roles women play foundationally, politically, and economically.

The concept of intersectionality or intersectional theory is also important for understanding gender in Guinea-Bissau and how it intersects with related systems of oppression, domination, or discrimination. Intersectionality is fundamental to understanding how gender traverses borders, social networks, informal and formal sectors. Osborn (2011) highlighted the lack of women’s political and economic agency as one of the core challenges underlying under-development. Thus, the need for discourse engaging women’s agency in African nation-building is critical. African feminist theory together with intersectional theory forms the framework within which women’s agency towards the re-making of Guinea-

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4 Intersectionality here refers to the interaction between gender, race, and other categories of difference in individual lives, social practices, institutional arrangements, and cultural ideologies, and the outcomes of these interactions in terms of power (Crenshaw, 1991; see also Davis, 2008). For an exceptional example of this theory as it relates to Guinea-Bissau, see Stephanie Urdang (1979).
Bissau is explained, taking into consideration the cultural context and setting within which women make their own spaces and forms of engagement.

**Methodology**

Based on a thorough review and analysis of existing written records as well as a reliance on years of prior experiences in the country of Guinea-Bissau by two of the authors, we selected six gendered cases purposefully centered on the most common forms of gender discourses found in the country’s scholarship and society. Areas identified as significant for this review include customary agency (e.g., Bijagos and Nalú), economic agency (e.g., Nharas and Bideiras), and political agency (e.g., two colonialisms and contemporary politics). Cases are built from extant primary and secondary source materials as well as ethnographic descriptions. The intention is to make observations that are useful for engaging in further discourses about women’s agency in the re-making of the nation of Guinea-Bissau and are not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive.

**Cases**

In considering the customary roles of women in Guinea-Bissau, we stipulate that customary roles are not fixed. They evolve and express contradictions between women and men, age groups, socializations, and community institutions.

**Bijagos: Gender as a Form of Customary Agency**

Female agency in traditional Bijagos society before the advent of the trans-Atlantic slave trade could be described as complementary, with males and females performing specific spiritual, political, and economic tasks divided along age and gender lines from populating workgroups and maintaining religious secret societies to king-making. As coastal slave raiding intensified and the Bijagos raiders acquired more female slaves, gender stratification gradually intensified as female social status diminished (Lundy, 2015a). During the isolationist colonial period, however, the Bijagos were forced to repel Portuguese incursions into the Bissagos archipelago to protect their autonomy and way of life, disrupting societal norms yet again. Contemporarily, gender roles have once again begun to “normalize” on the islands: for example, women’s spiritual leadership and economic activities are garnering acknowledgement, support, and respect from their male counterparts (Bordonaro, 2010; Gallois Duquette, 1979; Lundy, 2015a; Scantamburlo, 1991).

Divided among four distinct matrilines, the Bijagos people inhabit 20 of the 88 islands and islets that make up the Bissagos Archipelago. According to Robert C. Helmholtz (1972, pp. 52-53), the four lineages or “soil generations” are determined through matrilineal descent, which is important because chiefs can only be selected from the founding lineage of particular areas. Lundy (2015a) writes, “Political and religious sanctions come from an established link between
the living and the dead of the founding generation in a particular area through the protection and ownership of a statue-repository of the souls of the ancestors” (p. 6). In this respect, women are figuratively and literally responsible for the maintenance and propagation of Bijagos society.

Gender roles refer to the rights, responsibilities, expectations, and relationships of men and women. Within Bijagos society, gender roles shape economic, cultural, and political institutions. Bijago society has a social organization based on a hierarchical system of age classes. The institutionalization of age class is defined differently between men and women. For males, although small differences exist between islands, each is socialized into a specific age class. Age classes express psychological, biological, and sociological entities. These are socially constructed stages of life following a clear trajectory. The age class framework can be drawn according to the following stages: nea (children), kanhokan (adolescent), kabaro (youth), kamabi (mature), and kasuka (elder). Each stage has its defined symbols, dances, and tasks. They are also linked to the production process including rice cultivation, fishing, and palm fruit collection. The graduation implies particular rituals monitored by the elders and ancestors.

For both men and women, the main initiation ritual is known as manrace which allows kabaro to become kamabi. This is a long process of initiation organized as a human agency between promoting and promoted groups, called the kusina relationship. The former pays tribute in the form of palm oil, fish, food, or palm wine to the latter who allows them into their new status. The promotion group is constituted by men or women who have experienced manrace. For example, kamabi becomes kasuka under a new status allowed by the elder kasuka, the promoting group.

However, while biology is the base of this agency (i.e., controlled entirely by age and gender), the sociological implications (e.g., becoming marriageable), and political power (i.e., change in social status), it then implies are the determining factors for this graduating process that constitutes and renews political leadership (based on seniority). This framework is common between Bijagos men and women, but the ways that each group organizes their agency are distinct.

Women organize their social promotion not only through age groups, but also through a symbolical transformation into a spiritual entity, known as Orebok. These spirits are young males who die before participating in their manrace. Women can capture this spirit and become Orebok at which time they can claim a form of equality comparable to that of Bijagos men. Women accomplish this fundamental ritual, targeting a dual goal: their own status elevation and the promotion of deceased young men allowing them to join the ancestors. This ritual is necessary to calm spirits left in limbo in order to control their energy and avoid social disorder and disaster. Without women’s power, Bijagos society would be vulnerable to natural and social disorders such as disease, violence, death (particularly the death of children), and bad agricultural production.

Although women share similar rituals and performance acts with their male counterparts including dances, decorative masks, dress, and ceremonies, the meaning of women’s social promotion is distinct. This difference constitutes an
important source of female power among the Bijagos. The promoting group, made up of elder women, is known as *Okinka*. Within this group, women choose their leader, also called *okinka*. Therefore, women power institutions have two levels, one collective (through the *Orebok* ritual and *Okinka* elders) and the other representative (through the *okinka* leader).

Normally studies on Bijagos culture do not recognize the representative power of *Okinka* and postulate this power in the same way that they analyze male power, the power of *Oronho*, which is an individual power legitimated through the male’s relationship to the royal lineage. *Okinka* power, however, is based on a collective community created and promoted by women. *Okinka* has different sources of power and cannot be compared with the men’s power, *Oronho*. This misunderstanding shapes confused interpretations on Bijagos gender and political studies. Bijagos women also continue to negotiate their positions in society through everyday acts such as fishing, gathering crustaceans, and their processing and sale, which are essential to their sustainable ways of life and world sense (Fernandes, 1987). Simultaneously, their customary roles renew continuity with the past that verify their integrity to Bijagos nationhood (Fernandes, 1984).

**Nalú: Gendered Solidarity and Alternative Development**

Cooperation and consensus building through shared experiences are important markers of peaceful coexistence, thus, women promote their livelihoods and maintain social cohesion by fostering various forms of common ground. Women among the Nalú ethnic group of southern Guinea-Bissau have actively fostered positive social interactions in their daily lives as an equalizing force within their communities and as a way to cultivate alliances beyond its borders. Due to space constraints, we provide only two brief illustrations of these localized mechanisms aimed at unification between women, between women and men, and between the natural and supernatural worlds.

According to Luigi Scantamburlo (2003, p. 382), a *mandjuandadi* is a group of women or men who are approximately of the same age and who participated in their initiation together. They tend to be hierarchical across age groups as members control more resources with seniority. Christoph Kohl (2012) argued that these local associations promote a type of nation-building from the ground-level in Guinea-Bissau. He showed that the proliferation of these associations across ethnic divisions since independence is indicative of national integration, which he contrasts with the largely failed attempts at state-building in the country. Along similar lines, we argue that the *mandjuandadi* groups found among the patrilineal Nalú are a significant public unifying force for women within and even beyond the borders of their communities. These groups were observed to mentor, train, and socialize subsequent initiation groups within the community; they fundraised to support their social and economic activities; they represented their village at public events; and they helped maintain social harmony between women and men by “outing” men’s misdeeds through shaming in the form of often lewd songs performed in public. This airing of “dirty laundry” publicly as a collective
unit often worked to protect the victim from retribution and forced the perpetrator to conform to expected social norms.

One warm and moonless evening during a funeral ceremony, the local *mandjuandadi* women’s group stood together, dressed in matching prints waiting for darkness to fall. The dresses, matching headscarves, and drum were all purchased through fundraising efforts as recent recipients of a micro-credit program initiated in the region. At twilight, these young women began to chant and dance in a circle to the beat of the drum; many young men lurked in the darkness, listening for what might be revealed on that particular night. The dancing would go on until morning with support from other visiting groups of women also wearing matching dresses. Many songs were sexual in nature either praising or chastising lovers for their physical abilities or lack thereof. There were also warnings dispensed to would be thieves-in-the-night and what might become of them if they pushed unwanted advances. Some of the chants were also educational in nature praising the community for its solidity, dispensing advice about what makes a good spouse, reminding the men how hard their womenfolk work to maintain the home, and making reference to women’s power to appease the husband and spirits.

African traditional religion among the Nalú remains quite complementary along gendered lines (Lundy 2012). Initiations and circumcisions known collectively as *fanadu* are divided by gender, age, and geography. Elders operate sacred groves that cater to the public where they can visit and make requests and offerings to its spiritual inhabitants. Scantamburlo (2003) described this division, "*Na baloba, mindjeris ta sinta na un ladu di baloba, omis ta sinta na utru ladu*" [In the baloba, women sit on one side of the baloba, men sit on the other side] (p. 102, translation ours). Each group, men and women, have special contracts with, duties to, and powers from the spirits that they then share with the community to promote pregnancy, maintain order and respect for societal norms, and dispense justice. While the nature of the interventions, spirits, and associated rituals vary between the Nalú male and female operators, at the end of the day, visitors attend to both sides and the offerings are evenly split. Further, when a plea is satisfied, the supplicant returns to *torna boka* or make an additional offering in thanks. These offerings often result in a shared meal for the community at large; the males butcher the sacrifice, often a goat or chickens, while it is the women who collect the firewood and cook the offering.

As evidenced in the preceding ethnic cases, customary roles of both Bijagos and Nalú maintain unique forms of agency and power within their communities. We now turn to economic agency among the Nharas and Bideiras to engage with the intersectionality of women traversing borders and forming social capital and networks as they operate within informal, semi-formal, and formal economic sectors.
Nharas: Intermediary Women of Wealth

Two of the most influential histories written on the Guinea-Bissau region to date both engage women’s centrality in establishing pre-colonial trade networks (Brooks, 2003; Havik, 2004). This heritage is crucial in understanding the evolution of women’s roles in nation-building. The historical tracings begin in the 1600s, just after the tumultuous early contact period with European explorers, missionaries, emissaries, and traders. For centuries, cultural and political differences along the Upper Guinea Coast influenced landlord-stranger interactions or what Philip J. Havik (2004) referred to as “cultural brokerage.”

In discussing the fate of Eurafricans or Luso-Africans, the offspring of European traders and African women, George E. Brooks (2003) summarized the outcomes of Eurafricans maturing in the stratified and patrilineal societies of Senegambia as opposed to among the decentralized and matrilineal societies just to the south in the Guinea-Bissau region. In Senegambia according to Brooks (2003) “Social outcasts, Luso-Africans lacked the rights and privileges of other members of their age sets, including the right to cultivate land” (p. xxi). He continued, “Luso-African males in these societies sought employment as sailors [grumetes], interpreters, and compradors working for Portuguese and fellow Luso-Africans, with bleak prospect that whatever wealth and possessions they acquired would be expropriated by rulers and other elites” (Brooks, 2003, p. xxi). Both Luso-African males and females fared much better further south.

On the other hand, because social status was determined through the mother in the matrilineal societies of the Guinean littoral, Luso-African fates were often very different. Lançados, “venturesome Portuguese and Luso-African inhabitants of the Cape Verde Islands, who were allowed to reside in African communities” (Brooks, 2003, p. xix-xxi), were encouraged to intermarry with the female dependents of the local coastal leadership to promote trade relations. Further, the children of these unions, both male and female, “shared the same socialization and opportunities as all other children . . . Luso-Africans could participate in their parents’ commercial undertakings . . . female entrepreneurs were known as nharas, from the Portuguese word senhora, meaning a woman of property and status” (Brooks, 2003, p. xxii; see also Brooks, 1997). Havik (2004) acknowledged, the “remarkable roles played by women and the considerable scope for initiative they acquired as intermediaries in the context of Afro-Atlantic exchange in the region,” continuing, “women in trade settlements succeeded in significantly extending their autonomy by exploiting their role as cultural brokers” (p. 13, italics ours).

Although the eventual colonial occupation of Portuguese Guinea squeezed out the nharas as influential matrons of position and wealth largely through racially charged and misogynistic colonial ideologies and accompanying policies, their importance was felt up through the second half of the 1800s. It was Havik (2004) who noted that these female “brokers and traders” were not only wealthy in slaves and human capital, but were also able to own and cultivate land as well as export crops extending their “cross-cultural entrepreneurship . . . far beyond
trade settlements into both rural areas as well as Atlantic markets” (p. 28). For Havik (2004), the likely long term impact of the *nhara* phenomena is due to the fact that they were able to successfully establish “themselves as land owners and planters in the 1800s” (p. 28). Something akin to the traditional economic role of the *Nhara* continues today in the informal sectors among the Bideiras community of merchant women throughout Guinea-Bissau.

**Bideiras: Contemporary Merchant Women**

*Bideiras* are contemporary merchant women that engage in the informal markets and trading places of Guinea-Bissau (Domingues, 2000). The women face several hierarchical hurdles, such as social inequality based on the homogeneity of the formal markets and political rules mainly inherited from the colonial and patriarchal norms. *Bideiras* transcend these structures by building new forms of everyday exchange by focusing on their innovation and creativity (Lundy, 2015b; Lundy, Patterson, & O’Neill, 2017). They take advantage of the decentralization and multi-dimensionality of their practices of daily entrepreneurship. Because of these efforts, *Bideiras* help create networks and relationships not only within Guinea-Bissau, but across borders traversing West Africa.

The concept of hybridity (Bhabha, 2004) helps to explain their social mobility when exploring such trans-border practices. In this concept, the formation of hybrid cultural identity is used to exploit and engender moments of ambivalence that structure social authority. Cultural identity is produced on the boundaries in between forms of difference, in the intersections and overlap across spheres of class, gender, and location, displacing structures of cultural domination and revealing a “third space” (Bhabha, 2004). It is this concept of cultural hybridity that is extended to understand the *Bideiras* as well as the historical role and status of *Nharas/Lancados*. We examine this trans-border concept and recall the history of the *Nharas’s* role in the colonial power structure. *Nharas* were able to join trans-border links with colonial settlers and high-ranking aristocrats in traditional societies to build an important female economic power base. *Bideiras* are also claiming economic space in their enacting of social capital through extensive kinship networks to improve their everyday livelihoods. While on a smaller scale, *Bideiras* become women of means in contemporary Guinea-Bissau with an ability to influence the social, economic, and political landscapes of the country.

Restrictive gender roles within the colony and contemporary poverty, however, force women back into the “silences” where they faced “dual oppression” (i.e., lack of means and gender discrimination) (Havik, 2004; Urdang, 1979). Stuck in between these historical and contemporary moments though, the nationalist struggle emphasized gender equality; this for Urdang meant that Guinean women were at the dawn of “newfound social mobility and political responsibility” returning to them their pre-colonial “autonomy and agency,” right

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5 Interestingly, Havik’s own inspiration for his research came from Stephanie Urdang’s book.
The next case explores the colonial gendered recession in Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) and how women continued to facilitate their own social and political integrity in spite of a continued retraction of public space in which to act leading to strong support for the independence movement.

**Fighting Two Colonialisms: A Struggle for Equality**

“Our revolution will never be victorious if we do not achieve the full participation of women” (Cabral, 1972).

“In the context of armed struggle, the liberation movement appealed to the rights of women, to their *integrity* and their respect” (Gomes, 2013, p. 283, italics ours).

Commenting on Stephanie Urdang’s (1979) groundbreaking book, Lars Rudebeck applauded her on the books dust jacket for capturing not only the “changing role of women,” but also “the general transformation of Guinean society.” It is this “revolution within the revolution” that must be continually enacted to ensure the equitable participation of women in modern Guinea-Bissau. There is much that can be learned from Urdang’s portrayal of actual situations of women in the country that were shaped by Amilcar Cabral’s revolutionary thoughts regarding the integrity of women. Urdang (1979) writes, “PAIGC showed a consciousness of the fact that women’s liberation had to be fought on two fronts—from above and below. Party pronouncements in themselves were insufficient: it was essential that women themselves take up the issue so that liberation would be truly theirs” (p. 17). In other words, women’s rights had to be taken.

Customary practices such as polygyny, forced marriage, bridewealth, religious sanctions and segregation, sexual divisions of labor, female circumcision, prohibitions on divorce, and domestic abuse could not be changed by decree. Of course, these practices varied by cultural group. For example, among the matrilineal and matrilocal Bijagos discussed above, the husband moved in with the wife’s family. If she was dissatisfied with the arrangement, she could end it by forcing the man to return to his kin, while any children remained with her and her family (Urdang, 1979, p. 154). On the other hand, among the patrilineal-patrilocal Nalú, women’s rights within the household were restricted since they remained outsiders to their husband’s kin.

Working within this web of cultural traditions, some beneficial and some detrimental to the nationalist cause, PAIGC political mobilization encouraged a process of self and community evaluation and in some instances, incremental social transformation. Party messages clearly reflected concerns for social and political justice in tandem with cultural sensitivities and the expectation that the populace’s collective consciousness would be raised one person at a time. This approach was reflected in the common phrase, *puku, puku*, or “a little at a time” referring to incremental advances. Urdang (1979) presented these recognized gender disparities when she cited a PAIGC document: “In spite of the importance
of women in the life of African peoples, it is only rarely that they take an active part in political affairs. In our country, women have almost always been kept out of political affairs, of decisions concerning the life which they nonetheless support, thanks to their anonymous daily work” (p. 107). Recognizing these challenges, PAIGC called for change.

Women “supported PAIGC because they saw in it the potential for their own liberation” (Urdang, 1979, p. 123). At first, women grew and cooked food for the movement. Later, they began to transport supplies for the fighters or worked as nurses in the liberated zones. Others eventually took up arms as part of the regular army or local militias. Gjerstad and Sarrazin (1978) write, “Many proved extremely capable in mobilizing the population and were made political commissars or elected to village committees and the People’s Tribunals . . . without the participation of women the liberation of the country could not be achieved” (pp. 45-46). At the party level, women were quickly integrated into leadership positions. Urdang (2013) writes, “A quota system was in place for the [PAIGC] tribunals and councils, in an effort to ensure that at least two of the five elected members were women” (p. 275). In a 1966 speech, Cabral stated,

Comrades, we are going to place women in high-ranking posts, and we want them at every level from the village committees up to the party leadership. What for? To administer our schools and clinics, to take an equal share in production, and to go into combat against the Portuguese when necessary . . . We want the women of our country to have guns in their hands . . . The women must hold their heads high and know that our party is also their party. (cited in Urdang, 1979, p. 125)

Female children within the liberated zones were soon sent off to party schools; women served as PAIGC mobilizers; and they fought alongside men in armed conflict against the Portuguese. In an interview with Urdang, Bwetna Ndubi stated, “Today I work together with men, having more responsibility than many men . . . But we have to fight twice—once to convince women and the second time to convince men that women have to have the same rights as men” (2013, p. 276). Kumba Kolubali of PAIGC said, “We know that everybody is from Guinea-Bissau . . . A boy can be a girl and a girl can be a boy. In other words, each can do what the other can do” (Urdang, 2013, p. 277).

PAIGC under Cabral’s leadership and foresight was able to make great strides toward women’s emancipation, education, and equality (Lundy, 2013). For example, “The percentage of women with middle level training and university education increased from 6 in 1964 to 132 in 1972” (Gomes, 2013, p. 287; see also Lundy, 2013). As one woman told Urdang, “‘There was no alternative [to marriage].’ Except through education: ‘in this way I could defend myself. I realized that the more ignorant a woman was, the more she was dominated’” (1979, p. 205). In fact, by 1974, the year of independence, more than one-third of those continuing with their studies outside of Guinea-Bissau were women (Urdang, 1979, p. 222). Another woman of the revolution stated,
By a liberated woman I mean a woman who has a clear consciousness about her responsibility in the society and who is economically independent. By a liberated woman I mean one who is able to do all the jobs in the society without being discriminated against, a woman who can go to school to learn, who can become a leader . . . Without equality of all people, without equal opportunity to go to school, to get medical care, without equality to work, it is not possible for a woman to be free. (Urdang, 1979, p. 258)

The independence movement in Guinea-Bissau acknowledged the needs for gender-based reforms throughout the country. Many conversations were initiated around equal rights, social justice, and the cessation of structural violence aimed at keeping women in support roles to their male counterparts. Reforms were introduced, debated, and initiated over time. It seems, however, that the germination of gender-based institutions in Guinea-Bissau has remained underdeveloped alongside many of the other state sectors in need of reform due to ongoing political instability, social divisions, and economic stunting since achieving independence. It is the case of women’s political agency contemporarily that we turn to next.

Contemporary Political Agency: Towards Re-making a Nation

Today, Guinea-Bissau has scant evidence of women’s participation in state-building within public sectors although there is a glimmer that this may be changing (Cardoso & Sjöberg, 2011). For example, in September 2015, Prime Minister Carlos Correia appointed two female ministers to key positions, Adiato Djalo Nandigna, a previous advisor to President Jose Mario “Jomav” Vaz, as Minister of Defense, and Aida Injai Fernandes as Minister of Justice (Agence France Presse, 2015). Although institutional policies aim to encourage women’s advancement and participation within formal public spheres, little is being done on the ground to ensure the continued progress of women’s rights and equality in Guinea-Bissau.

Today, women in Guinea Bissau are fighting against political instability and poverty. A new feminist movement, created on August 24, 2015, called “Mindjeres di Guine No Lanta” (Women of Guinea-Bissau let us Rise Up), was established by a group of women of Guinea-Bissau as a movement for peace, stability, and legality, asserting “enough” to political instability and poverty. This movement, created by 29 women and supported by 80 others from several professions, publicizes a Manifesto that expresses their weariness of persistent political waste of the potentials of women and youth and puts forward some goals for “a new political discourse,” and “the engagement of women into high levels of political action” (Lusa Report, 2015). This feminist movement is an indictment of the overall contraction of women’s rights since independence and looks to combat their weakened position in civil society as an autonomous political force. The movement intends to serve as a government watchdog and to “bring the national debate back to issues such as good governance, democracy, human rights, and gender” (Lusa Report, 2015). These types of initiatives must be acknowledged,
lauded, nurtured, and expanded if Guinea-Bissau is to achieve real social, economic, and political development in the near future.

**Conclusion**

“Each of us has to live our own times with all our integrity and sincerity” (Henriques & Barros, 2013, p. 213, italics ours).

African feminisms demonstrate both the importance of complementary gender relations in society and the significance of cultural context. It also emphasizes greater advocacy toward gender equality, particularly when it comes to rights, protections, and security even when in direct opposition to other forms of identification and power structures. This article has argued that women have been integral in the re-making of nationhood in Guinea-Bissau through six gendered cases: Bijagos women’s power, Nalú women’s solidarity, women as pre-colonial and contemporary economic intermediaries, the dual struggle for independence and equality among women in Guinea-Bissau, and the autonomy of women’s political movements. What we found is that women are integral to the development of contemporary Guinea-Bissau while this legacy remains partially obscured in the face of general political and economic obstacles.

What is clear is that societal gender roles vary within a diverse country such as Guinea-Bissau. What is equally as clear is that women’s advocacy is essential to the further development of broad nationhood and state reform. Gender complementarity and female equality are not exclusionary as we hope was demonstrated in this article. One implication of framing this article through the African feminist perspective is the promotion of dialogue where social positioning and identity hybridity continue to be derived through a complex and dynamic web of social relations, or intersectionalities, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in conflict, but always in need of further elaboration and clarity. Identifying mechanisms for promoting and supporting the integrity of women’s voices as leaders in society is advanced through a better understanding of historical processes of change and stability (positive and negative) and by acting in solidarity through the advancement of gender inclusion.

**Acknowledgements**

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The Portuguesinhos: Reintegration of Angolan Police Officers Trained Abroad

Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues

Abstract

This paper analyses individual pathways of Angolan commissioned officers educated in Portugal, focusing specifically on their return to their country of origin and on the features of their reintegration into professional life. It aims at contributing to the discussion of mobility and migration, discussing issues of qualification and circulation of ‘brains’ between developed and developing countries. The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data obtained by conducting field research. It calls for the elaboration of strategies to deal simultaneously with the individual, the organisational and the societal conditions and consequently provides an important viewpoint of the processes of transformation of the Angolan society and institutions.

Introduction

Traveling, living, and studying in other countries transforms people to different degrees and in different ways. When returning to their places of origin, migrants also have variable influences in their communities and society. This paper analyzes individual pathways of Angolan commissioned officers trained in Portugal, focusing specifically on their return to their country of origin and on the features of their reinsertion in the professional life. The research is a result of a multidisciplinary project titled Circulations of Police in Portugal, Lusophone Africa, and Brazil, which focused on transnational issues and cooperation. A central research question of the study in all case-study countries was to know whether the police officers are agents of change when they return to their home countries, which has proven to be the case.1 Integrated with the objectives and

1 Beyond Angola, other African countries—São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde, and Mozambique—and Brazil. The project was carried out at the Institute of Social Sciences of Lisbon (see http://www.copp-lab.org/).
results of the project, this analysis aims at contributing to the discussion of theories of mobility and migration, in this case temporary and with a pre-defined duration, discussing issues of qualification, and circulation of “brains” between developed and developing countries. This analysis extends, whenever relevant, beyond the discussion of the evident gains and losses that the movement of skilled professionals entails, questioning the more “subjective” effects, such as the circulation of social models, values, attitudes, or cultural perspectives. These are related to not only the experiences and learnings acquired “informally” in a different cultural setting but also with notions of civic rights, the construction and functioning of democratic institutions or with community policing practices, provided by the formal academic training. The paper is based, therefore, on the portrayal of the objective contours and features of return and (re)integration and on the identification of the intertwined subjective aspects, and how these combinations dialogue with the ongoing changes in society and institutions in Angola. In broad terms, this study asserts that high education training in Portugal contributes to profound changes at the individual level with regard not only to technical skills and to ways of working closer to more modern policing models but also regarding values, attitudes, or ways of thinking. Upon their return to Angola, commissioned officers are faced with a changing society that is based on different organizational rationales and mechanisms and on different cultural mind-sets.

In order to be able to negotiate between the transformation that took place through training and the actual conditions on the terrain in Angola, the officers develop solidarity networks based on this common educational experience. The difference of being trained following modern European policing models–as opposed to a majority of Angolan policemen primarily trained in Cuba–is one of the reasons why they are often referred to as the “Portuguesinhos” (the Portuguese) among their peers. These networks not only contribute to the maintenance of a particular identity within the police system as a whole but also constitute a support to the efforts of replication of the policing models learned abroad. The networks and the rationales associated with them also take advantage of the ongoing social and political changes in Angola made possible by the attainment of peace, a perspective of democratic openness, the promotion of the role of the police, and a strong commitment to qualification and training.

The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data obtained by conducting desk and field research, the latter involving interviews with a number of police commissioned officers, the majority of them trained in Portugal and a few trained in Cuba. The selection of key informants interviewed was based on convenience, a “snowball” type of sampling method where respondents indicated successively other potentially relevant and interesting interviewees.  

2 The field research was conducted in April 2014 in Luanda in cooperation with the General-command of the National Police of Angola (Polícia Nacional de Angola–PNA) and with the Higher Institute of Police Sciences (Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna–ISCPSI) in Portugal. It involved interviews with 24 former students of the ISCPSI returned to Angola and (over 10) others with varied key informants sensitive to
has proven to be quite effective for this type of research in view of the context in Angola, a country recently emerging from a long 30-year period of civil war and from a militarized mode of police action. Despite this guidance provided by local partners, who were in charge of setting most of the initial interviews, the researchers were able, on the field, to diversify their sources of information, bringing together complementary research data, both qualitative and quantitative.

Before focusing on the strategies of these migrants returning to Angola and on the forms of reintegration they mobilize particularly under the designation of “Portuguesinhos,” it is important to recall the multiple combined influences brought by the formal training and by the diverse individual learning processes triggered by the stay abroad. The article therefore starts with an introduction to migration and higher education in Africa, highlighting the characteristics of “brain” circulation. It then describes the changes that the Angolan police went through in the last decades, providing the background for the analysis of the types of training and policing models involved and in processes of transformation. Return to Angola after training abroad involves dealing with a changing society emerging from war, where presently there is a combination of models and types of training and performance governing police activity. This calls for the elaboration of strategies to deal simultaneously with the individual, the organizational, and the societal conditions and consequently provides an important viewpoint of the overall processes of transformation in Angolan society and institutions.

**Brain Circulation as Transformation**

The ongoing discussion on “brain drain” has moved beyond the idea that development in origin countries proportionally reduces the levels of migration (De Haas, 2010). The globalization of mobility systems, a process that rapidly accelerated in the late 1970s (Urry, 2007), implies multiple directionalities, involves countries of different social and economic backgrounds with different levels of development, and, consequently, different educational systems. Migration encompasses the circulation of different types of qualifications and skills as migrants have different reasons for migrating. Both in origin and in receiving countries, migration and migration perspectives can alter not only the level but also the composition of human capital (Di Maria & Lazarova, 2012). In addition, migration produces socio-cultural and political impacts, which are as important as the macro-economic (Ammassari, 2004). Training abroad not only involves the circulation of qualified work force at the technical levels, but also promotes important transformations in terms of worldviews of the type referred above. Simplistically, skilled migration—which became generally coined as brain drain—can impede growth in countries of origin, particularly those with low levels of technological sophistication (Di Maria & Lazarova, 2012) as it represents the

the context of police/police training in Angola. The interviews, following a previously discussed interview guide focusing on questions related to return to Angola after training abroad, were also conducted with the support of sociologist Gabriela Simas.
exit of the more skilled from the society and the economy. However, on the other hand, the regular contact with countries of origin and return, produce other objective impacts, in the form of remittances or technological diffusion (Le & Bodman, 2011), which can be considered more positive. In this sense, brain drain started to be analyzed in its qualities as brain gain (Olesen, 2002) among scholars and this perspective has become commonly perceived as beneficial (or at least simultaneously a brain drain and a gain) (Stark, Helmenstein, & Prskawetz, 1997). The return of professionals with enhanced skills is progressively seen as a positive diaspora externality, namely as it may increase the demand for education in certain countries (Ratha et. al., 2011, p. 111) as potential migrants invest in education and skills to facilitate future migration, contributing to the accumulation of human capital (Beine, Docquier, & Oden-Defoort, 2011).

Downstream, during migration and upon return, skilled migration has effects in terms of higher remittances and transfer of knowledge and capacities. For this reason, there is today a general renewed interest among development agents to look at remittances as development tools and, most importantly, encourage innovative possibilities for making greater use of return migration as a brain gain (Olesen, 2002; Skeldon, 1997). While there are directly measurable relations between remittances and decreasing poverty and inequalities (Carling, 2007), a number of studies have further led to the conclusion that skilled migrants’ remittances are higher due to the fact that they have access to higher incomes (Bollard, 2009). However, the positive effects of these contributions are contingent on other factors. The return of migrants to their country of origin where their family stays is still considered more positive not just due to remittances alone but also because the next generation is not exposed to the hardships of migration and more investments are likely to be made in the country where they stay. In addition, there is a high likelihood of building transnational networks that benefit the country of origin in terms of scientific and technological knowledge (Portes, 2007, p. 37). There is, however, a great variability of the processes across contexts and a number of possible contradictions in each of the cases, like more income provided by remittances but increased apathy in the society or their use to supporting conflicts (Carling, 2007, p. 59). Each country and context for skilled return migration needs then to be analyzed in its specificities (Solimano, 2008) and the Angolan police students/officers are in this sense a very particular example in a particular context.

It is questionable that the effects of mobility and global migration are always positive or directly generating social and economic change by themselves, particularly in contexts where other changes are needed such as reform of property land, combating corruption, improving transport, and communication, health, education or welfare (Castles & Wise, 2007, p. 10). Migration is only one of the factors in further processes of transformation (Castles, 2007) and of development (De Haas, 2007). The discussions on the various types of effects of migration in countries of origin have focused on the more objective ones, especially in what regards remittances (Bollard et al., 2009). The Angolan emigration, particularly to Portugal, generates significant direct effects at the level of remittances sent to
Angola by migrant household members (Tinajero, 2009). However, these and other specific effects, like the observable technological diffusion fuelled by remittances, are hardly comparable to qualitative contributions (Le & Bodman, 2011), namely the social and cultural and particularly those stimulated by the returning highly-skilled elite migrants (Ammassari, 2004), as they are more difficult to measure. The effects are also different across generations and in relation to historical periods (Ammassari, 2004) particularly in terms of their features. At a broader scale, contributions to development, in addition to remittances, extend from the exchange of knowledge to the increase in networks and better access to foreign capital markets; investment, trade networks, skills, and technology transfer (Plaza & Ratha, 2011, p. 1; Ratha et al., 2011, p. 7). As a consequence, research on migration has made great advancements in terms of the combined analysis of both objective and subjective aspects in order to grasp the heterogeneity of the impacts of migration, replacing the reductionism that emphasized positive and negative perspectives of migration, matching “pessimistic and optimistic views” (De Haas, 2010), focusing instead on combined multiple effects. These combinations have been of particular importance to development and development related instances (Castles & Wise, 2007), and the complex relationships between global change, migration, and development are of major concern in this sense (Castles, 2007). In general, the enthusiasm with returning migrants to Africa is currently reinvigorated (Plaza & Ratha, 2011) and this applies to Angolan migrants as well (Ferreira, Lopes, & Mortágua, 2008).

**Police in Angola in a Shifting Context from War to Peace**

The return to Angola of commissioned officers trained in Portugal takes place within a context of important transformations in the society, politics, and international relations. The economic and political transformations, from socialism to market economy and the establishment of a democratic political system, initiated in the 1990s, were accompanied by years of civil war that only ended in 2002. Training within bilateral agreements in the area of higher education of police officers started only five years before the end of the conflict.

The creation of a police force in Angola dates back to the colonial period and its year of formation was 1837, when the Company of Public Safety was created by the then-Governor General Manuel Bernardes Vidal (Sá, 2013). The Luanda Police Force was constituted 50 years later, evolving later on in 1887 to the Luanda Police Company. In 1923 a Police Force of the Angola Province was created, under the Governor-General and with nationwide scope, which was soon replaced in 1929 by the Public Security Police Force of Angola (PSPA), located in Luanda and in each of the country districts. Since then, the sections of Fiscal Police, Criminal Investigation (PIC) and Criminal Identification became separate authorities. From 1961 on, other internal reorganizations, mainly due to the political contestation that began to change the country, the number of staff of the Public Security Police (PSP) increased and the Judicial Police was created (and
the PIC extinguished), while the repressive colonial International Police and State Defence and the army were reinforced.

After independence in 1975, the transitional government determined that the PSPA was to be called Angola Police Corps, which came to integrate elements and heads of the various liberation movements. However, with increasing clashes between these, the police was soon reorganized by Commander Santana André Pitra Petroff and the first international cooperation agreements for the training of cadres were signed with Cuba. In 1976 the police was renamed Popular Police Corps of Angola and the police training school changed its name to Kapolo Martyrs. At the time, police depended on the Ministry of Defence but soon in 1978 the Police Corps, the Judicial Police, the Inspectorate of Prison Services, the Roads and Traffic, among others, were transferred to the newly created Secretariat of State of Internal Order. This meant extinction of the Popular Police Corps of Angola and the creation of a National Directorate of Popular Police, the very next year, framed in a reorganization that turned the Secretariat of State of Internal Order into the Ministry of Interior, which still exists today. In 1986 and under the direction of Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, a new regulation for the police was approved and the designation of Commander-General replaced that of National Director. The Criminal Investigation Police, the Inspection and Investigation of Economic Activities, and Procedural Instruction Police became integrated under the same structure and leadership and therefore the concept of Integral Police—that is, one that has in full all the functions and powers relating to police work (Sá, 2013)—dates back from that time. By this time, the legacies of the post-colonial Angolan police had been transformed, leading to a type of “repression” policing, as defined by Alice Hills (2000a, p. 28), much related to the war: “the police were subject to ideological and institutional controls and were heavily influenced by Soviet, East German and Cuban doctrines and practises” (Hills, 2000a, p. 48).

In 1991, before the first elections, the Angolan police got the designation it still holds today, National Police of Angola (PNA). After the end of the civil war in 2002, the PNA began to prepare a Plan of Modernisation and Development that gives strong priority to the component of staff training. Noteworthy in this effort is the creation of the Medium-Level Institute of Police Sciences (later School of Police Osvaldo de Jesus Serra Van-Dúnem) and afterwards the Middle-Level Institute of Police Sciences Santana André Pitra Petroff, in Benguela. The National Police is still headed by a General-Commander with similar status to Vice-Minister, depending on the Minister of the Interior and comprising both a General-Command and Provincial Commands. The General-Command integrates Technical, Instrumental and Consultative support organs at central, national, and regional levels. Two operational areas, Public Order and Intervention, add to the internal organisation in several branches of activity.

African police forces in general and the Angolan in particular inherited the “stamp of militarisation and politicisation,” both from their colonial and the post-independence periods (Van der Spuy, 2009a), although they have also developed specific competences in dealing with specific local conditions, creating locally
appropriate forms of conventional policing (Hills, 2012). The progression from an authoritarian colonial police, to a more militarized one during the Angolan civil conflict and the gradual opening to modern policing are today discernible, despite the advancements and retreats and the mixed features along the way. These processes pose important challenges to the institutional and societal dispositions as “police reform is one of the most important and complex challenges in any environment (…) particularly in post-conflict situations” where the police have often perpetrated serious human rights violations (O’Neill, 2005, p. 1). Other African examples, of countries emerging from authoritarian regimes like South Africa where policing has become more tolerant and democratic despite keeping some repressive, authoritarian, and violent responses to the public (Marks, 2002) provide indications for the gradual changes taking place.

International cooperation, both intercontinental and regional is a key area for the transformation of the police in Angola. For instance, police cooperation in the South African region has resulted in a degree of harmonization of policy and standardization of police training as well as in indications of commitment to common values and standards associated with democratic policing (Van der Spuy, 2009b). Reform, however, demands transformation of wider policies and mobilization of resources, including processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; reforms in the justice and security sectors; and crime control and prevention (Van der Spuy, 2009a). Moreover, structural constraints and dynamics overlapping the vaunted democratization persist in Africa (Hills, 2007). Hills (2008) writes, “Reform can make a normative and organisational difference,” but needs to be supported by fundamental socio-political change (p. 215). Training abroad and cooperation in the area of police training has been perceived in the recent decades as the crucial support for this transformation.

Training in Angola and Portugal: Modernising the Angolan Hybrid Policing Model

Ongoing transformation of the Angolan police is particularly related to international cooperation in the area of training, involving the circulation of both students and trainers. Angolan emigration is typically made within the “Lusophone migratory system” (Baganha, 2009), despite its particularities and the countries belonging to this system “use Portugal to educate their elites (…) since these new states do not have an educational system fully developed” (p. 9). However, the number of Angolans studying in Portugal has clearly been decreasing in the years from 2000 to 2005 dropping from near 700 to less than 200 (Baganha, 2009, p. 10). General migration figures of Angolans in Portugal have also decreased in 2015 (by 7.4%) (SEF, 2015) and, although there are no official aggregated numbers, the crisis that started to affect Angola in 2014 has most likely contributed to a decrease on the number of students abroad as well. Moreover, in terms of remittances, the Portuguese living in Angola were sending twice the money the Angolans living in Portugal did to their home countries (Baganha, 2009, p. 13).
Despite the changing conditions, education obtained in Portugal continues to involve, beyond the objective implications, several underlying “symbolic, affective, cultural and economic issues” (Faria, 2009, p. 45) and is of real importance in the training supported by international cooperation policies and agreements (Costa & Faria, 2012). Angola has developed over the years a number of international cooperation activities in the area of police training, especially as a beneficiary country. While police training cooperation is historically diverse, it tends to change in recent years as a result of the diversification of cooperation partners in this area. Although the largest contingent of the Angolan police is trained under the long-term cooperation agreements with Cuba, especially at the level of basic training and some specialties, other international partners include Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Mozambique, Cape Verde, or Israel (Sá, 2013). As a whole, commissioned officers are trained in varied areas and fields of knowledge beyond Police Sciences. Cooperation with countries like Portugal or Spain is considered more specialized, and the Portugal training is made specifically on Police Sciences and at higher levels.

Angola is also a well-recognized training country in the region. The PNA trains police officers in different areas and levels in African countries: Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Congo Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Namibia. Training in general is booming in the country and training of the police in particular has recently been extended to university education. Table 1 shows the significant variety of expertise and levels within the police training system. In the country, there is currently only one institution dedicated to police training at university level, the Higher Institute of Police and Criminal Sciences General Osvaldo de Jesus Serra Van-Dúnem (ISCPC), located in Luanda. Still, initiated only a few years ago, this represents a major advancement in academic training of the police in Angola. Available training as a whole ranges from the primary school provided by the Nzoji center run by the PNA to university and is therefore considered “a fairly complete progressive system” (L., Director of ISCPC, personal communication, August 2014).

The ISCPC, within its very specific orientation for advanced training was created by a presidential decree (of January 2012), “which shows its importance” (M. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014) and started to operate in March that year. With 114 faculty members, 16 of them expatriates, it has a board of directors, a scientific, a pedagogical, and a discipline board. In 2013, the institute had 276 students (47 females) enrolled in the first year and 189 students (22 females) in the second year. The latter is the expected number of students who will graduate 2015. The total number of students included 13 officers of the Cape Verbean police admitted under the existing cooperation between the police forces of the two countries and there were prospects of integrating students from Sao Tome and Mozambique as well. In the four-year degree course (480 hours), the cadets have two optional areas starting in the third year, public safety (64 disciplines) or criminal investigation (65 disciplines). The Institute also teaches specialized and refresher courses in various areas of police...
knowledge: in 2013, a total of 259 police officers participated in these trainings, in various areas such as human resource management, taxation, education and citizenship, criminal investigation, or investigation of traffic accidents, to name a few. Every year, there is an average 1,000 candidates for the 240 vacancies, and therefore admission and evaluation rules are quite selective: students failing in two consecutive years have to return to their units. Progressively, the ISCPC plans to integrate their best students as teachers, funding their master and doctoral training abroad, envisaging in the medium/long run less dependence of international cooperation in this field. So far, the majority of teachers are Cuban, Spanish, and Portuguese.

**Table 1: Police Training Institutes in Angola, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National School of Public Order Police (ENOP)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National School of Protection and Intervention Police (ENPPI)</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sede</td>
<td>Centro de Formação do Kikuxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Institute of Police and Criminal Sciences General Osvaldo de Jesus Serra Van-Dûnem (ISCPC)</td>
<td>1,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-Level Institute of Police Sciences Commander Santana André Pitra Petroff (IMCP), Benguela</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry and Dog Training Police Command</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Regional Training Centre (CRN)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Centre of the Border Police Mârtires do Môngua, Ambritz</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boarding Centre of CPIP</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multipurpose Centre Nzoji</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DNRH/PN, 2014b.

**Training in Portugal**

Police cooperation between Portugal and Angola, which started in 1997, is managed by the General Directorate of Internal Administration and is part of a bilateral program, the Special Agreement on Cooperation on Internal Security Matters, signed between the Ministry of Interior of Angola and the Ministry of Internal Administration of Portugal (Decree-Law 25/97). Basically, it targets training of Commissioned Officers at the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security (ISCPSI) located in Lisbon. Between 1998 and 2013 (Table 2), the Angolan students were the largest in number among those of the African Portuguese-speaking countries.

At the beginning of the cooperation, the number of Angolans trained at the ISCPSI was higher than it is now. Of the total that graduated in the Institute, a large majority of 80% did it before 2003 (DNRH/PN, 2014a). Justifications
provided for this are mainly related to increased requirements for admission in the courses, as some of the interviewees stated: “To be selected is the culmination of a difficult application process. When we receive the news that we have passed, that we were selected, it is a joy” (A. S. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Moreover, many fail to complete courses, as they are “very demanding. Not everyone ends” (N. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Despite the low success rate of 63.5%, Angola is nevertheless among the African cooperation partners the country that has sent more students to study at the Institute over the last decades. Adapting to the country constitutes a major difficulty that requires an additional effort to overcome, as often referred: “we did not understand the Portuguese way of speaking” (A. L., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014), “we speak differently” (N. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014), and “we were different people” (H. Q., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Some skills such as computer competences, especially in the courses in the 1990s, called for additional efforts in order to keep up with the other colleagues. Finally yet importantly, separation from family and friends for an extended period made the life easier of those who took their families with them to Portugal, and harder for the others.

Table 2: Students trained at ISCPSI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total students 1998-2013</th>
<th>% of African students</th>
<th>Bachelor / masters(^3) 1993/2012</th>
<th>Students enrolled in 2012-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé &amp; Príncipe</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Timor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>876</strong></td>
<td><strong>638</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ISCPSI, October 2013.

However, the exigencies of the course are also considered a positive factor in terms of prestige, enabling the successful students to access positions of responsibility and stimulating further achievements. Examples like the following are abundant among those interviewed: “I ended up doing two graduate courses, a Master’s degree and am in the process of completing a PhD, all in Portugal” (M. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Crisis in Portugal and in Angola, starting roughly in 2012, produced further constraints to

\(^3\) Pre-and post-Bologna regimes.
the cooperation but those who conclude their training in Portugal and return to Angola are generally placed in responsible and prestigious positions. In 2014, the PNA scholarship holders who graduated in Police Sciences in Portugal occupied several high-ranked positions in various organs, mainly in Luanda where the central services are located.

Cooperation with Cuba in the area of police at all levels is the oldest and most continuous, and it involves the exchange of significant numbers of teachers and students. Comparatively, the number of students being trained by teachers of other cooperation program is lower, namely within the Portuguese cooperation agreement.

**Table 3: Integration of Commissioned Officers Trained in Portugal**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Commissioned Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deputy Commissioner <em>Subcomissário</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Superintendent <em>Superintendente Chefe</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superintendent <em>Superintendente</em></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Intendente <em>Intendente</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chief Inspector <em>Inspector-chefe</em></td>
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<td>Inspector <em>Inspector</em></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Subinspector <em>Deputy Inspector</em></td>
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<tr>
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<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 4: Training in 2014 within Cooperation Agreements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Angolan students being trained in Angola</th>
<th>Angolan students being trained abroad/in country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuban Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>4,474</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese Ministry of Internal</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARPCCO⁴ (in several countries)</td>
<td></td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,860</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PNA, 2014.

⁴ Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation.
Although Angola has distanced itself from a socialist political model for several years, cooperation with Cuba in this and other areas, like non-police education and health, is still very significant. As will be further developed, this has contributed to the construction of a hybrid model of police, with implications to the values and types of societal and cultural approaches within the police way of acting and its image. For now, however, it is important to retain that despite the reduced (absolute and relative) number of Commissioned Officers trained on the basis of the cooperation agreement with Portugal, this training abroad is a source for the changes taking place in the Angolan police.

**Challenging Return: the Individual, the Outer World and Angola**

As evidenced by our study, the small group of high-ranked police officers trained in Portugal perceives their return to Angola after the period spent abroad and the type of training received as a process of discovery of the differences and particularities of Angola itself. On one hand, they report the importance of acquiring the notion of the diverse models of policing and on the other, the challenges of adapting these to the social, economic, or cultural conditions and context of Angola.

It is important to stress the significant individual transformations that take place along the training and return processes, not only in terms of the technical and scientific knowledge but especially in what concerns values and ideas, cultural learning, and maturity as well. These are above all individual experiences of life that depend on the students’ previous police training and/or operational experience. For example one officer interviewed emphasized: “I had more than nine years of making, for example, coercive disarmament in wartime” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). There are also differences between those who had previously studied or have been trained abroad, for example in Cuba: “I was in the military career in Huambo, in 1989 I was selected to study in Cuba and, at the end of the course there, to proceed to higher education in Lisbon” (L. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Moreover, age of admission in the courses also makes a difference, particularly among already high-ranked officers who decided to get a diploma: “We were already Commissioned Officers; I was 28 when I went to the ISCPSI. I went to study with 18 year old colleagues” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Another factor, that was comparatively more important before the end of war, was the possibility of accessing higher education that the courses abroad represented. Finally, like in many other professions, there is apparently a strong influence of family ideals and careers: “I took the course influenced by my father, who was already police; but also because at the time [in 1996] it was very difficult to enter higher education” (A. M. M, Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014); “My mother was an official of the police and knew about the course. I was studying economics but by that time, I was recruited for the army because the country was at war. I then applied for the course and was admitted” (J. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014).
Combined or isolated, these preconditions establish in great part the varied conditions for the changes at an individual level that can take place due to training and the relatively prolonged stay abroad.

The Transformation: Techniques, Values, and Perspectives

The end of the war marked the beginning of major changes at various levels in Angola, including within the police. Wartime dictated the conditions for the type of policing in place for decades: conflict itself, rural migration, increased urban crime, currency and other black markets, and smuggling, particularly of diamonds (Hills, 2000a, p. 48). Angola went through various stages of restructuring during and after the end of the war that involved profound changes in terms of the composition of police staff. Namely, the police had to integrate demobilized soldiers while others joined private security firms, and between the military and the police forces several interchanges also took place. While its image remained for long associated with the war, muscled action, and precariousness, there are indications that gradually this is being changed: “Most of the current staff comes from the military forces, so we have a military character; this is our image in society” (A. S. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Another interviewee said, “In the early 1990s, the curriculum of police training was 80% confrontation, ‘shooting and flip-flops.’ With peace, everything was restructured” (L. C., police director, personal communication, April 2014). Yet another interviewee reported, “In times of war, we had heavy weapons” (J. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Nevertheless, the public image of suspicion takes time to change, especially in relation to the traffic police and the bribing systems; the police performing forced evictions for the construction of new neighbourhoods; and wartime raids then called “cleansing,” “people have a negative image of the police; they think they never arrive on time; they want the police always present” (M. I., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). On the other hand, “there were many bad policemen who left many marks in the community. The image is still negative” (J. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). The transformations already recognisable are predominantly of increased professionalism, seen in the capacity of conducting and organizing major events such as sporting competitions or international events like the pope’s visit, making use of new models of action and new techniques. One interviewee maintained, “The police is now more ‘brain’ and less rappel and gymnastics” (M. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Another said, “It employs more scientific methods in their actions” (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). This technical shift is perceived as a logic and necessary progression considering the evolutions of the modern world: “increased white-collar crimes, greatest attraction of the country to foreigner immigration due to its wealth” (A. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April, 2014).
This transformation is largely attributed to the training of officials in countries that pursue modern models and methods of police work based on values of democracy, civic and human rights, and proximity to the citizen. An interviewee said, “We follow generally the Francophone model, the Portuguese. Other countries have evolved even more, to the Anglo-Saxon model that foresees police involvement with the citizen; the policemen go to the citizen for prevention” (J. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Currently, ways to involve the community in their own safety are being thought, as part of community policing: “this involves identifying the institutions, the possible and relevant mechanisms, the community leaders” (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). An interviewee reported, “From a practical point of view, we have no totally effective proximity policing or community policing; there is only an intention” (M. F., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Conditions to improve the police image and practise have been recently created: there was a dramatic increase in the salaries of police in 2014–from a minimum of 30/40,000 kwanzas to 95,000–which is seen as an important measure for reducing corruption. In February 2014, new and more severe disciplinary regulations were adopted, foreseeing more sanctions. These measures are part of the Modernization and Development Plan of the National Police of 2002 and support greater accountability of agents and an elevation of the police work. As “the nature and functioning of policing is thus useful for understanding the broader issues of state-society relations and state behaviour in Africa” (Hills, 2000b, p. 190) these transformations need to be perceived in their long term and gradual effects.

There are many things in common between Portugal and Angola: the colonial common past, language and some cultural features, specific types of police work and organisation, or similar legal systems. The Angolan Penal Law inherited the Portuguese structure and was later after independence only minimally revised, being generally quite divergent to the legal system of Cuba, the largest partner of police cooperation. However, the differences between both countries and societies are notable, and clearly recognized in the individual transformations those who studied in Portugal indicate: “we learned to deal [in Portugal] with a totally different culture” (A. S. oc., May 2014). Contact with different working and living realities affected the way migrant Angolan students perceived both the other and their own societies and cultures. Like other students abroad, the police officers also pass through an “intense reformulation of identities and contacts with difference, reinforcing a sense of ‘aliened’ identity, of an European tone, which will be reconfigured at the time of return and re-entry into Angolan society” (Faria, 2009, p. 61). For some, completing the course in Portugal is above all attending a “school of life” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014), a combination of practical and subjective learnings: “It was the acquisition of technical knowledge and of values” (A. F. S., co., May 2014). Often this occurs at the same time as individual maturity is being built, with effects on the forms of reintegrating in the society and culture upon return: “I stopped, for example, throwing cans and trash out the car window; I came to
One interviewee reported, “After the training, I felt I had changed my knowledge, my capacity of argumentation and of leadership” (M. I., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

As in other examples of displacement experiences, the perplexing situations, conflicts, and effects considered negative also abound. Adjustment to the new culture was not always easy as mentioned by the interviewed, particularly at social moments: “we had to be acculturated. For example, we had to pay our bill even if a colleague had invited us for a drink. And I was never invited to the house of colleagues in Portugal while if they come here, we take them everywhere, especially to eat at our house” (W. J., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). The interviewed also recognised that their Portuguese colleagues were also going through social learning processes: “we met people who never had a relationship with black people before” (F. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Within the training environment of the boarding system of the school in Lisbon the students referred that initially “there was much separation between the Portuguese and the Africans; there were no mixed groups and the rooms were even separate until a certain time when the school changed this system” (W. J., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Some students also feel that somehow grades were discriminatory, although recognizing the educational fragilities African students in general have: “our [Angolan] better grades were the ones the worst Portuguese students got. We thought this was because of the language difficulties, but then realized that many of them cheated in the exams, and we did not” (A. M. M., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). According to the former students interviewed, these grievances and claims have contributed to a personal and social transformation that accompanied the technical transformation fostered by the training.

Despite of what the students consider positive or negative experiences in terms of their individual values and attitudes and ways of dealing with difference, numerous technical and objective aspects are part of the list of effects of the training abroad. One of the crucial aspects of training abroad relies on the contact with a different model of policing, which has started for some years to be incorporated in the Angolan police methods and often referred to as a necessity in the present context and the way Angola is integrated in the global world (Virgílio, 2010). Having inherited an already authoritarian police regime by independence (Blanes, 2013), Angola has engaged during the civil war in particular in a more militarised fashion of police performance, largely supported by the Cuban training methodologies. This has created a hard to define type of policing forces, “neither police nor military in the conventional sense” (Hills, 2000a, p. 48), which in turn contributed to today’s still hybrid model. In the last decades, however, the contingents trained in countries such as Portugal gained a privileged contact with the more modern methods, more concerned with proximity to the citizen and for instance with rights (Udelsmann Rodrigues, 2015). In that sense, the mixed features are visible for example in the Angolan hierarchical model, which is unique, meaning that it is neither equal to the Portuguese or to the Cuban, the
main cooperation partner. In Angola, salary is not exclusively a combination of rank and years of service, like in Portugal, yet rank is critical for accessing benefits, like cars, housing, or domestic services. Nevertheless, although Angola has a unique police model, with various influences and based on the integration of all police forces, the tendency for alignment to police models of the global world is noteworthy: “our integrated police model is unique in the world and is often referred as being functional and well-coordinated; many countries think of following an integrated model” (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). And also, “The big advantage of Angola is that we seek Spain, Cuba, Israel, Brazil and Portugal [for police training]. This is a wide scope and we get a little of each and adapt to our reality” (A. J., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Another interviewee agreed, “The Angolan police model today is hybrid: on one side militarized, as the Brazilian [that kept much of this character from the dictatorial regime within a context of high violence], the Cuban and the Israeli; on the other, the [post-dictatorial] Portuguese influence. The greater or lesser inclination depends on the line of training of the leadership” (A. M. M., police director, personal communication, May 2014).

**Applying What was Learned Abroad in Angola**

It is mostly at the time of return to Angola that the recognition of individual changes takes place, in objective and subjective terms: “I now even convey some of the values acquired to my children, like discipline or pursuing more education” (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). However, in most cases, these transformed “ways” of thinking, living, or working face various resistances. One interviewee stated,

> The return to Angola, for people like me, who were already police, was very difficult; you learned new things and when you arrive you have to implement, to show that you have learned something. But you will always find a barrier, of the older, who do not accept the change and what comes from the outside. The greatest difficulty is to pass the message and many colleagues have failed and had many problems. (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014)

The recurrent reference is that return is not an easy process, especially because students brought new values, ideas, and ways of living and working that at certain points clashed with the Angolan reality, even within such an institution that is governed by relatively rigid principles and guidelines. An interviewee stated, “It was difficult to change the mentality of police officers with over thirty years of service; it was difficult to change the police relationship with the population” (C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). And another: “I had to adapt myself to the environment because it clashed with the values and interests; it implied other values, other rigors. The rooted practices are very
difficult to change” (A. M. M., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

Although the total contingent of police officers who have graduated from Portugal is small and tending to decline, it is recognized that some influences have been transmitted, especially as regards police work in part because these Commissioned Officers were placed into high-ranked posts. This is perhaps further evidenced by the fact that Angola is undergoing a gradual introduction of new models of action in the framework of police practice. One interviewee said, “In 1997 [when starting his studies in Portugal] there was war in Angola. The education system was very bad, the mentalities were much closed. The citizen then was seen as an enemy” (A. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Today, officers feel that “we are moving gradually to greater proximity to the citizen” (M. I., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). And, “With the end of the war, the police has been changing, both technically and structurally” (A. F. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

In general, it is recognized that the values of the police trained in Angola still have a lot to be changed, although “some just want the wages but some young people already want to learn more” (A. L., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). In this area, the transmission of new values, particularly by those trained in Portugal, is considered very active: “the police [agents and other non-Commissioned] begin to imitate the leaders, in order to be promoted, and so have been changing their attitudes” (A. L., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Former students in Portugal recognize the importance of the training they received abroad and the role it plays in transforming the institution, despite the challenges this entails: “It is hard to go back to the Angolan reality because we were shaped for the Portuguese reality, it is different.” (A. S. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Institutional effects are harder to produce but some are already noticeable, such as an overall increase in investment in training; improved services namely with the creation of an administrative division; or the development of specialized services such as the safety brigade. Nevertheless, these processes of institutional transformation take time, much longer than the individual change fostered by higher education abroad as they are intertwined with the societal dynamics and mechanisms. An interviewee reported, “We are currently working towards ‘proximity.’ It is a process that requires not only efforts from the police but also coordination with other public and private institutions, to make people feel that they can improve the police and their own safety” (A. S. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Given the combination of individual, corporate, and contextual changes, a long-term slow transformation is today producing some visible results. While the technical objective ones are more

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5 In 2014, of the 100,000 Angolan police, 47 had been trained in the ISCSP and were actively working in Angola.
easily identified, the transformation of perceptions and attitudes requires a more prolonged process.

The Portuguesinhos: Strategies, Identity, and Solidarity

The first major impact that takes place after returning to Angola is in terms of career, as interviewees often refer. Trained Commissioned Officers enter the higher-ranks directly, as Police Commissioners, Intendents, or Inspectors. Career progression starts at the moment of acceptance for the course in Portugal. The candidates are immediately incorporated in the police—if they were not previously—and the family starts receiving the salary in Angola. Also, only a few of these officers returned to the operative area in the provincial command in Luanda—the so-called area of “cangaço,” referring to the hands-on work in the streets—while the majority went to more administrative and management areas and functions. The few that did not even have an operational type of work before are called “bread and milk policemen,” as a reference to exclusive office work (A. L., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Not always, however, the expected rapid progression and access to prestigious positions and posts takes place and tensions show the particularities of the Angolan context where solidarities based on workplace friendship and—not less important—on the educational background have an influence on career progression, as often mentioned. While determined by legal instruments—Decree Law 117 and Presidential Decree 119—career progression is dependent on several factors including evaluation and availability of posts (L. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Especially after the first courses, there were visible tensions between those recently graduated and the leaders, particularly among those with no university degree. Said one interviewee, “We were seen as a threat because there was a shortage of graduates and the chiefs felt unsafe. They called us ‘the kids’” (W. J., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Despite these tensions, most high-ranked Commissioned Officers are placed in Luanda, near the “decision centres” (A. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). In 2014, only four of the officers trained in Portugal had been placed outside Luanda, in prestigious positions, however. One of the reasons for this is the necessity of using more effectively the knowledge and the specialized academic skills for its replication and therefore many are employed in the police academies or at the university institute, located in Luanda.

Differences in terms of academic degrees and the places where these have been obtained contribute to the formation of groups and networks. The construction of an internal identity related to the educational background and its objectification in solidarities and networks constitute the core of the strategies developed by the trained abroad police officers when returning to Angola. Since the arrival back in Angola of the first contingent trained in Portugal, immediate differences were recognised and they rapidly became known as the “Portuguesinhos” (A. C., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Said one interviewee, “When we arrived [from Portugal] others would tell
‘those here are the Portuguese’” (O. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

The solidarities are based not only on the country where the training took place but also often on the specificity of the training. On the basis of the internal networks and shared identity, the police obey a typically rigid hierarchical code, friendship, and more intense relationships are fostered and continued by the common education: when returning to Angola, the ISCPSI students are almost “obliged” to go and introduce themselves to the older ones who also studied at the institute. This “reinforces the comradeship between them” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014) and identity becomes to be perceived as a shared positive sentiment: “we are proud of the course. The general-commanders of Sao Tome and Cape Verde studied in the school; the National Director of Public Security Police too; we have six colleagues already in the class of Commissary Commissioned Officers [equivalent to Army Generals]” (H. Q., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

One of the central elements of distinction of those trained in Portugal is the reference to the quality of training received as compared to the less demanding education in Cuba: “for example, a Master’s thesis [in Cuba] has 40 pages and is much easier to do than in Portugal” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). Another interviewee agreed, “It is easier to do a course in Cuba because attendance to classes is not compulsory. A Cuban professor comes to Angola a few times and supervises the theses. The course is distance learning and we only have to go to Cuba for the defence” (N. C., director, personal communication, May 2014). To the objective technical skills acquired, the officers add the importance of the prestige assigned to the education in Portugal: “It gave me status” (F. B., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014).

Success and prestige materialize not only in the discourse about perceived distinctive characteristics of the ‘Portuguesinhos’ but also in the ties and solidarity, translated in, and reinforced through their mutual communication, contact, and sharing. Communication and contact, much based on social internet networks, are particularly active in terms of sharing documentation and working materials. This involves in Angola the solidarity network of the “Portuguesinhos” but also the extensions of this network to the countries of the colleagues, to Portugal and the other Lusophone countries. One interviewee reported, “When I need, for example, some materials for classes, I contact my colleagues in Portugal” (L. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). This includes most significantly information, documentation, and data, learning materials, among others, that circulate preferentially within this network. In the more private sphere, the alumni maintain contact with each other and with colleagues of other nationalities who have studied in ISCPSI, especially over the internet and Facebook (A. S. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014): “with the colleagues from Portugal, I use the Facebook; with the Mozambican, Cape Verdean, and Santomean, the telephone” (M. P. J., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). On the other hand,
there is a concern to maintain contact through visits: “when we go to Portugal, we always go to the Institute, to see colleagues, teachers, and even staff” (A. S., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, April 2014). And another, “We always miss our colleagues, friends forever” (M. I., Commissioned Officer, personal communication, May 2014). Classmates who visit Angola also usually contact their Angolan colleagues. Communication and sense of shared identity and solidarities are thus normally the features that characterize the processes of reintegration into work and society of the police officers trained in Portugal. They reveal, at the same time, the transformation produced by the stay and education abroad and the creation of new identities within the police force.

**Conclusion**

If a conclusion is to be drawn with still many transformations taking place at the individual, organizational, and contextual levels, it is that there are multiple objective and subjective gains and effects of education related migration, within the broader abstract societal dimensions and the specific police practice. Despite the very limited contingent of Angolan staff trained in Portugal, it is widely recognized that there are effects that slowly take place in the police due to the education abroad and their general reintegration into positions of leadership. These effects combine with other socio-political changes within the global processes and contribute to the transformation of the Angolan police in terms of image, values, attitudes, and working methods. While the “militarized” style of policing is still marked, both the transformations foreseen in traditional cooperation partners such as Cuba and the gradual absorption of modern community policing methods and models anticipate further changes in the Angolan police. Among the commissioned officers trained in Portugal and within such hybrid context, new strategies are mobilized when returning to Angola and (re)integrating in the organizational and societal dynamics. Due to the characteristics of the training received in Portugal, the “Portuguesinhos” became recognized as a special category implementing modernized policing efforts and who have built a certain identity within the police force and created their own networks. The reverberations of the “brain gains” of this circulation of police officers are expected to happen both through the transformation of technical skills and the subjective influences on worldviews.

**References**


Rui sat at a long dinner table glittering with candles and many wine glasses. A waiter rolled down clear plastic sheeting that was typically meant to protect the restaurant’s verandah from rain, though it was not raining. When Rui asked why the verandah had been closed up in this way, the waiter smiled and hugged himself. “Frio,” he said, chattering his teeth. But it is not cold, Rui thought. And now the smoke from his friends’ cigarettes would be trapped inside the plastic, swirling around and around, without escape.

That very day the cacimbo had moved in over the city as a white haze hanging low in the sky. Rui regretted that he had not taken his girl to the beach one last time before the weather changed. Now the beach would be misty, humid, and abandoned.

“How can it be the dry season, when there is so much moisture in the air?” asked the German colleague sitting to his right.

“That is why they call it the cacimbo, after the cacimba: the mist in the air. If we call it the dry season, it is only because it does not rain,” Rui explained.

“But it feels like it could rain at any moment. The air feels so heavy,” his colleague marveled.

“It won’t rain again for many months. Neither will the sun come out. It is a season in between, friend,” Rui warned.

“This is a strange part of the world,” the man said. Rui would have felt offended if it weren’t that he disliked the cacimbo himself. He knew that many Angolans enjoyed the turn in the weather; they liked to pull out the fancy coats they had purchased in Europe, and to close up all their windows and shiver. But he would miss the beach, and he would miss the sight of Neusa wading into the ocean.

The South African man sitting to his left made a comment about it being the right time to stay at a lodge.

“I know of a lovely place out in Bengo, with little cabins all around a lake. It’s only a few hours from here, but it feels like another world. If you’re lucky you might see an elephant walking about.”
“Elephants? That can’t be true,” Rui said with a laugh. The South African shrugged. Elephants or not, the lodge did sound like a good idea. He imagined himself enjoying a cozy dinner with Neusa next to a warm fire, overlooking the lake.

His brother, Mário, would want to go. There was no telling him that he could not. So, on a Friday afternoon Rui left work early and roused Mário from where he was sleeping on the sofa at their parents’ home. Together they packed Rui’s Rav4 with a cooler full of beer and fetched Neusa from her job at the mobile phone store. There was some tension when Rui told Mário to sit in the back so that Neusa could sit next to him, but within a few blocks Mário was lightly snoring, his black-rimmed glasses slipping off his face, and it was all forgotten.

As they turned onto the highway leaving the city, they immediately encountered a wall of traffic. The road was filled with trucks carrying crates of beer and Coca-Cola, blue and white candongueiros⁴ recklessly winding in and out of poorly defined lanes. A young woman sat on the back of a drifting motorcycle, one arm wrapped around the driver’s waist, the other arm cradling her nursing baby. The police had lined the busy road with rolls of barbed wire to keep the people from crossing on foot, but the wire had been cut and pushed aside in many places. Young vendors wandered between stalled vehicles hawking drinks, batteries, cashews, and adaptors. Neusa bought herself a stick of grilled corn and a magazine.

Mário stirred sleepily. “We haven’t even left Viana² yet?” He opened a can of beer and reached from the back seat to turn on the radio.

“Why don’t these people use the bridge?” Rui wondered angrily, looking up at the massive metal pedestrian bridge that had been built over the road.

“It’s out of their way,” Neusa said, between bites of corn. “It would take them ages to cross the road that way.” It was true, the pedestrian bridges were so sparsely spaced and the staircases so steeply stacked that it would take, as Neusa said, ages to get to the other side.

The candongueiro before them suddenly sped up. Just as Rui began to accelerate, he had to hit the brakes as a trio of zungueiras⁴ ran out in front of the Rav4, basins of avocados balanced on their wrapped heads, babies asleep on their backs. Neusa was thrust forward and hit her head on the dashboard. She winced and held her hand to her forehead.

“Angel! Are you alright?” Rui asked, slipping the car into park. One of the women pounded her fist on the hood of the vehicle and spouted off Kimbundu⁴ curses he did not understand.

“I think so,” Neusa whispered, rubbing her head.

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¹ Private minibus that serves as public transportation.
² Neighborhood in Eastern Luanda.
³ Female street vendor.
⁴ Major Bantu language group in Angola.
The Rav4 remained still for a long time. An accident involving several vehicles turned out to be the cause of the bottleneck. There was a crowd of women wailing. A boy selling packets of cookies told them there were several bodies. Neusa saw the feet of a dead woman sticking out from under a bus, wearing the same white plastic sandals Neusa herself was wearing. She crossed her ankles and tucked them away.

“I imagine some idiot was running across the street and caused all of this,” Rui said, gesturing at the scene.

“Don’t say that,” Neusa sighed sadly. “Poor souls.”

When they finally put the city behind them, Rui began to drive very fast. The white cloud of the cacimbo followed them into the bush, pressing down on the hills of dry grass that would have waivered in a breeze, had there been one. Imbondeiro trees stood crooked against the horizon. Neusa looked up from her magazine and watched the land race past her window. Sometimes they passed a string of women carrying wood or water on their heads. The women would step off the highway and disappear into the tall grass as the car sped past them. Neusa would watch for them in the mirror, waiting for them to reappear on the road.

Around a bend, they came across a rusted tank, beached on the roadside. Mário clutched at Rui’s shoulder and demanded he stop. “I want to take a photo.” Rui stopped the car and reversed. Mário got out and inspected the tank. The metal was a swirl of the colors of oxidation: white, rust, green mold.

“Don’t touch it. Don’t be stupid.” Neusa warned. Mário handed her his phone and asked her to take a picture of him posing in front of it. Ignoring her protests, he climbed on top of the tank and asked her to take a few more pictures. Rui leaned against the Rav4, his arms crossed. He looked disapproving but when Mário had finished and come down, Rui took Neusa by the hand and they posed in front of the tank too. He stood behind her and wrapped his arms so tightly around her he could touch his own elbows. She pulled her hand away when he tried to climb on top. “I’m scared, Rui. They used to put mines all around them.”

The sun began to set behind the haze—a perfect red sphere lying low on the white horizon. It was nearly dark before they spotted a sign for the lodge. It was a large, hand-painted sign promising comfortable cabins on a lake, with a pool and a restaurant. It cheered them.

The road to the lodge was narrow and unpaved. They drove for a very long time without seeing anyone or anything related to a lodge. The air was thick with the smoke of cooking fires and it made their throats itch. Yet they saw no houses or people.

As they slipped under the darkness, their headlights fell upon the body of an old woman, walking alone along the road, a bundle of firewood on her head. Rui drove up next to her.

“Mamá, is this the road to the lodge?” he asked. But the woman did not respond. She did not stop walking or even turn to look at the car.

“Maybe she doesn’t speak Portuguese.” Neusa suggested. “Speak to her in dialect.”
“No, it’s like she doesn’t even see me,” he said, waving his hand out the window, trying to catch her attention. “Strange. Maybe she’s crazy.” When they passed the old woman, Neusa looked for her in the rear view mirror, but there was only darkness behind them.

At last they came upon the entrance to the lodge. A guard sat on an overturned bucket, the amber light of his cigarette glowing in his mouth. Rui leaned out from his window and called out to him.

“Mais Velho, good evening. We are here to stay at the lodge. Can you open the gate?”

“The lodge is closed,” the guard said, without standing up.

“But there is a sign on the highway that says you are open.”

“Eh, that sign is very old,” he said with a groan, his hand beating the air before him. “The lodge has been closed for a long time now.”

“Why don’t you take the sign down then? Why do you let people drive all the way out here just to learn it has closed?” Rui threw up his hands in frustration.

“Calm down, love,” Neusa said, lightly touching his arm.

The guard shrugged.

“Is there anywhere else we can go?” Rui asked. “It’s late and we’ve been driving for hours. We need somewhere to sleep.”

“You can sleep here,” the guard said.

“But you said it was closed.”

“Oh, but you can sleep here,” the guard said, standing up to open the gate.

The lodge was dark, but they could see a low light bleeding out from the office. There they found a young woman behind the desk, a small kerosene lamp illuminating her round face.

“Can we have a room?” Rui asked.

“The lodge is closed,” she said.

“The guard told us we could sleep here. Just for one night. We’ll leave first thing in the morning.” Rui pulled out a few bills and laid them on the desk. The young woman took a key off the wall and slid it across the desk with lowered eyes.

“Is the restaurant closed too?” Mário asked.

“Yes.”

“Is there any food? We’ve just come from the city and we’re hungry.”

“I don’t know.” She appeared discomforted by their presence.

“You don’t know if you have any food?”

“I don’t know. I will have to ask.”

“Well, where is the owner? Could I talk to him?”

“We haven’t seen the owner in a very long time. I will see what I can find.”

“Thank you, you’ve been kind,” Neusa said, even though the girl hadn’t really been so kind.

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5 Term of respect.
They took their bags and the cooler and walked to the cabin. Though the night sky was clouded over, moonlight glowed all around them. Neusa and Rui could see their shadowy figures walking hand in hand down the sandy path. Mário walked ahead to unlock the door.

“It’s so empty,” Neusa whispered with a shiver

The cabin was dark. Rui held out his phone for light and looked for candles in the small desk by the door. There were none. Neusa sighed and dropped onto one of the sagging beds.

“No service.” Rui looked sadly at his phone. “I’m so sorry love, this is not how I imagined the weekend would go.” he sighed.

“It’s all right. It isn’t your fault. Look, the moon came out.”

“Let’s sit outside and have a beer?” Mário suggested.

The room opened onto a narrow verandah from which they could view the small lake and the long white reflection of the moon running across the water as the clouds cleared away. They drank slowly. Rui sighed and sunk deeply into his seat.

“The lake makes me think of a story my grandmother told me, a long time ago,” Neusa said softly.

“Tell me,” he said, placing an arm around her and pressing her head against his chest.

“There was a lake near my grandmother’s house. No one would take water or fish from it, even in a long dry season. Even when everyone was hungry. The story was that long ago there had been a village there. One night a beggar came and knocked on the door of each home, asking for water. He wore rags and had sores all over his body. People were so frightened of him that no one would help him. Only one family gave him water, out of pity. Later in the night, the beggar returned to that house and warned the family that they should leave, right away. That something terrible was about to happen. So they fled. When the family returned in the morning, the entire village was under water, a lake in its place. No one will drink or fish from the lake because beneath it there is a drowned village.” Neusa shivered in his arms. Rui held her tighter. “They say the lake moves around. One day it will be in the valley, the next day up near the road.”

“That sounds like a church story, about how you should never mistreat beggars, because they might be Jesus in disguise.”

“Don’t be stupid Rui. The beggar wasn’t Jesus,” Mário laughed.

“No,” Neusa said firmly. “It is not a church story. The beggar was a water demon. No one would give him water because they knew it would make him powerful. The family was foolish. They caused their village to flood by giving the demon what he asked for.”

“Ah, grandmothers and their stories from the bush,” Mário clucked his tongue, overturning his empty beer can. A rustling at the front door startled them. Rui jumped up and Neusa clutched his arm.

“Be careful!” she said as Mário opened the door.
It was only the girl from the front office, laying a tray of food at the door. She seemed unhappy that they had seen her and she was in a hurry to leave.

“Sorry!” Rui said, “We didn’t know it was you.” The girl didn’t say anything, but slowly backed away.


“Are there crocodiles?” Rui chuckled.

“You must ask the soba before you swim.”

“The soba? And where can we find him?”

“He lives on the other side,” she said, pointing towards the lake with her chin.

She turned to go.

“Good night, rest well,” Neusa called after her. But she did not turn around and did not return the good wishes.

The next day, Rui went to pay the bill, but the girl was nowhere to be found. The lake was misting in the early morning warmth. As the fog cleared away, the blue water seemed to invite them in.

“Mário, go ask the soba if we can swim,” Rui said.

“The soba? You care what the soba says?”

“Please, Mário. Go ask him for me,” Neusa chimed.

“I don’t understand. If you want to swim, go swim. What do you think the soba will do? Chase after us with his stick?”

“He could hex us,” Neusa whispered with a smile.

“Rui, what is she talking about? We don’t believe in fetiço.”

“Maybe we don’t. But I don’t want to make an old man angry when I’m swimming in his lake. Go ask him, Mário. Then come back and we can all go for a swim.”

The couple watched Mário walk down the path that wrapped around the water. When he was out of sight, they turned to each other and bolted to the bed.

At the shore there was an old wooden dock. The dry planks shifted under their feet as they walked to the end. The lake was a brilliant blue from the cabin, but from the dock the swirling water was green and milky. They pretended not to care. Neusa stood at the end of the dock, poised to dive in head first. She had been on the swim team at the Portuguese School of Luanda and took her swimming very seriously. Even in the gray light she was strikingly beautiful. She wore a white, one-piece bathing-suit that promised to be slightly transparent when wet against her dark skin. Rui wanted to capture this beauty of hers. He ran back to the cabin for his phone so that he could take a photo. Neusa did not wait for him.

“What did the old man say?” she called out to Mário before diving in.

“He wanted five hundred kwanzas,” he laughed.

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6 Traditional village leader.
7 Witchcraft.
8 Angolan currency, named for the Kwanza River.
She took a gasp of air and jumped. The green water swallowed her whole.

When Rui returned with his phone, Mário was just emerging from the water. “Rui! Rui!” he called, “She’s gone! She’s disappeared!” He had already searched under the dock, along the sandy bed. There was no rock, no object on which she could have hit her head. She had simply jumped in and never come up for air. Rui too dived in and searched for her. Then they decided to go for help.

The girl at the front desk was unmoved. “I told you to ask the soba first,” she said, lightly waving her finger at them.

“But we did!”

“No, I think that you did not. If you want that girl’s body, you must talk to the soba. Only he can make her reappear.”

“What kind of nonsense is this? Help us find her! Call the police!” She remained unmoved.

The brothers set off to find the soba. As they walked around the edge of the lake, the wind whipped the water so that it seemed to boil with devilment. And yet, they remained hopeful. Mário imagined that they might gather some of the men in the village and together they would spread a large fishing net into the water and walk into the depths. He imagined her body, twisted and wet, caught like a mermaid in the ropes. He did not imagine her alive. But Rui did.

“Mário, tell me exactly what the old man said this morning.” The wind off the water raced past them and into the village before them, lifting swirls of dust up, into the white sky.

“Rui.”

“What?”

“I did not talk to the soba this morning.”

Rui halted in his shoes. “You said what?”

“I just walked around the lake. I didn’t see him. I didn’t see anyone over here.”

Rui pulled his brother in by the chest. “You have caused this!”

“No! No, Rui! The soba cannot make her drown.”

“She knows how to swim. She is a strong swimmer.”

“He cannot make her drown.”

“You yourself said she simply disappeared.”

“And he cannot make her reappear. We do not believe in this.”

Rui pulled at the collar of Mário’s shirt and hit the back of his brother’s head. Tears filled his eyes.

They approached the dusty village on the other side of the lake. While they saw no one, they certainly felt eyes watching from behind rusty metal doors and between cracks in mud walls. The soba’s house was marked by the tattered flag of the Party, flying high over a thatched roof. Rui hesitantly knocked on the flimsy metal door.

The old man emerged from the hovel. He wore his military cap lightly atop his head. Two strings of white beads crisscrossed his puffy chest.
“Mais Velho, please help us. My wife has drowned in the lake. They say that only you can bring her back.”

The old man stared back at them with a vague smile and cloudy, red-rimmed eyes. For a moment Rui doubted the man spoke Portuguese and struggled to remember even a single word of Kimbundu. He thought of his grandmother’s face, mouthing words to him as a child. How he wished he had listened to her then. He couldn’t remember even the sound of her voice.

A deep laugh. “I am hungry. Didn’t you bring an old man something to eat? I would very much like a chicken.”

“A chicken?”

“Yes, bring me a chicken and we can talk about the girl.”

The brothers looked behind them at the empty village. There were no signs of life; not from people, not from chickens.

“Please, help us.”

“A very fat chicken.”

“You are hiding her!” Rui shouted. Mario pressed his hand lightly on his brother’s shoulders.

“Come, come. Let’s get the car. Let’s find some help.”

“We can’t just leave her here!”

Mário looked out onto the lake and shook his head. He did not believe the soba could help them even if he wanted to, which he clearly did not. Neusa’s body floated somewhere between the silver reflection of the clouds and a green film of algae. He worried now for his brother, who was holding too firmly onto the hope that he might again see her alive.

The brothers ran to the Rav4 on the other side of the lake. Rui drove with emotion, spraying mud in all directions, the wheels sliding down the road and into a frustrated halt before the closed gate.

“Are you leaving?” the guard asked.

“Let us out!”

“Is this about the girl?”

“Yes, my wife has gone missing. We are looking for help. Are you opening the gate or not, chefe?”9

“You should have talked to the soba,” he said, waving his finger as they drove away.

The road was empty. They saw no other cars, no villages, no animals. They had never seen their country so desolate, so void of people or even signs of people. Not a beer can on the ground. The clouds thickened and the red sun followed them, whichever direction the road turned.

“Mário look - chicken!”

“What about it?”

“The soba wanted a chicken,” Rui stopped the car. “Mário, get out.”

“No.”

“Get out. We need that chicken.”

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9 Boss, informal term of respect.
“I thought we were looking for the police.”
“Get that damned chicken or I will leave you here in the middle of the bush.”
Mário chased the scrawny, white chicken around the vehicle a few times, a performance of futility, even when he had the creature trapped in his hands.

At last they came upon a checkpoint. The police would not listen to their story until they had printed and signed their names in the crumbling register book. They each noticed that the last traveler before them had passed through many years before.
“My wife, rather, my girlfriend, Neusa, she has gone missing, at the lake, by the lodge.”
“What lodge?”
“The lodge, up the road. The one with the sign that says it’s open, when it really isn’t. Please come! Just follow us, we will show you. The soba says he knows where she is, but he won’t help us.” Rui began to sob. “Until we bring him a chicken.”
“The soba, em? He took your girlfriend? You believe he is bewitching her?”
The one officer looked at the other, and they both had a laugh. Rui’s sobs grew quiet, but his body continued to shake. Mário stepped forward.
“It’s not so funny. What my brother means to say is that she has drowned in the lake, and no one at the lodge or in the village will help us find her body. Could you come help us look?”
“And how do you know she has drowned?”
“She dove into the water and she never came up.”
“And where were you when this happened?” The officers looked towards Rui.
“I was in the cabin. I was getting my phone, I wanted to take a picture of her.”
They looked back towards Mário, “So, you were the last to see this girl alive?”
“Yes.”
“And you say she just dove into the water,” the thinner one made a diving motion with his left hand, “And never surfaced?” He did not bring the hand back up.
“Yes.”
“And you expect that we will believe you?”
“What?”
“Why should we believe what you say, when no one else has seen it?”
“Why would I lie?” Mário protested.
“Perhaps you were in love with this girl. Perhaps you were jealous and in a fit of passion.”
“No,” said Rui. “She disappeared because he refused to ask the soba for permission to swim in the lake.”
Both officers opened their mouths and sighed, “Ah.”
“So either way, it is this one’s fault,” the fatter one said.
“Yes, but which is it,” the thinner one asked. “Did you kill her with your own hands or did you kill her by letting the soba bewitch her?”

“We don’t believe in witchcraft,” Mário said feebly. “Our parents taught us not to believe in these things. I didn’t ask the soba because I didn’t believe it mattered and I didn’t want to walk all the way to the village.”

“So you killed her because you were too lazy to walk all the way to the village!”

“I never wanted this to happen. I loved Neusa,”

“You see! The brother loved her too! This was an act of jealousy,” the police laughed.

Rui, who had continued his trembling, again took Mário by the collar of his shirt and struck him several times in the head. The blows were muffled and quiet and were somehow more terrible because they made no sound.

The policemen separated the brothers. “Yes, young man, your brother has done this. But how? Perhaps we should go speak to the soba and ask him if he bewitched the girl or if your brother acted alone.”

Mário began to shout in his own defense as the two men encircled him. They placed a pair of rusty handcuffs around his wrists and led him outside. They all piled into the Rav4 and headed back towards the lodge, the lake, the village.

The soba was pleased to have a little crowd around his home. He looked on at the pair of brothers and the pair of policemen with amusement, as if he were watching a scene that he himself had composed.

“Where is my chicken?”

Rui held up the white chicken, which had sadly suffocated in the back seat. The soba clucked his tongue and sucked his teeth, but took the chicken from him anyway. The policemen and the soba held a conversation in Kimbundu, which Rui and Mário could not follow. Again, Rui saw his shriveled grandmother, leaning into him as she waved her finger at him and scolded him in a muted tongue.

“The old man says to leave your brother here with him and you will find the girl.”

“Leave him?” Rui looked over at his handcuffed brother. It seemed only fair. A body for a body. And Mário had betrayed him, only he couldn’t figure out just how.

“Leave him here with us. Go on, young man. You will find her, right where you left her.”

“Rui, don’t leave me here,” Mário wept softly. But he knew by his brother’s face that he was already forgotten. The air between them sliced in two. Mário watched his brother walk away, towards the lake, as if he were on a screen. With each step Rui took, the distance he put between himself and his brother grew exponentially wider so that with but a few quick strides he was already at the lakeside. Mário made a move to follow him, but the two policemen held him back, lightly pressing his shoulders.
“Calma,” the soba said. “Where that one is going, you cannot follow.”

Rui walked over the rotting planks of the dock. The gray sky cast whiteness across the green water, so thick he could not believe that they had ever wanted to swim in it. He walked to the very edge and leaned over the water. He thought, at first, that it was his own face reflected on the surface. But the eyes were closed and beautiful and not his own.

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10 Calm down.
The Universality of Traditional Folktales in the Portuguese Speaking World

M. Margarida Pereira-Müller

Abstract

Throughout the ages, the traditional tale has been the vehicle transmitting culture from generation to generation—the memory of a community. Since the beginning of mankind there have always been tales in all countries and cultures of the world. Many of the traditional stories we think are Portuguese or European are also found in other parts of the world, but are told in a very similar ways. Sometimes the only difference is the physical frame: the landscape, the flora and the fauna, how people dress or eat. Most of these tales have animals as main characters usually inserted in a social context, thus portraying humanity’s intrigues, ambitions, generosity, violence, and justice. They are used to explain the origin of habits and customs, natural phenomena, and to teach fundamental concepts in human relations, as, for example, what is good and what is evil. This paper examines different categories of folktales in the Portuguese-speaking world emphasizing their role teaching important lessons of life often of universal appeal but through specific local context.

Ngungu, the Bird, and the Python

“It’s mine, it’s mine. This land is mine.”

Ngungu, the bird, spent his days singing, his eyes closed, craning his neck and shaking his wings. He sang laying the eggs. He sang while brooding the eggs. He sang searching for food.

“It’s mine, it’s mine. This land is mine.”

The other animals were outraged. They did not like these words at all.

“What does Ngungu mean with ‘This land is mine?’ The earth belongs to all of us. The earth is ours.”

One day the python decided to teach Ngungu a lesson.

“Let’s see what he will do when he sees what I’m up to.”
The python crawled to the leafy tree where the bird had his nest. As Ngungu was gone searching for food, the huge python climbed the tree and curled up in the nest, on the bird’s eggs.

When Ngungu returned, he saw the huge python on his eggs. He was afraid and decided to sleep somewhere else.

“How is it possible? I don’t understand. I am a bird and so I lay my eggs on the top of the trees. The python is an animal that lives on the soil. How did the python come to my nest?”

As soon as the sun rose, Ngungu returned to his nest to see whether the python had already left. But no. The python was still there, on his eggs.

“I don’t understand this at all. I have to go to a sorcerer.”

When the sorcerer heard the whole story, he just said, “My dear, there is no evil eye here.”

“I beg your pardon? No evil eye? It’s not possible!”

“The only thing that is evil are your own words.”

Ngungu was astonished.

“I really don’t understand anything. In my words?”

“Exactly. What do you usually sing?” the sorcerer asked.

“Well, I . . . I usually sing like this: It’s mine, it’s mine. This land is mine.”

“See?! This is very bad! Do not sing ‘this land is mine.’ The other animals don’t like it. Next time you’ll have to sing like this: ‘It’s ours. It’s ours. It’s ours. It’s ours. The land is ours.’ You will see what will happen.”

Ngungu returned to the tree where he lived and where he had his nest. The python was still there. For the second night he had to sleep somewhere else. As the first rays of sun appeared on the horizon, Ngungu sang, “It’s ours. This land is ours.”

And all animals answered in a choir, “It’s ours. This land is ours.”

Far away drums could be heard. Everyone was happy. The python stretched up and began to dance, shaking its head and crawling down the tree.

When the nest was free again, Ngungu went back and sat down on the eggs. Once the chicks were born, he taught them the new song, “It’s ours. This land is ours.”

And since that day, the bird never sang again, “It’s mine, it’s mine. This land is mine,” but “It’s ours. This land is ours.” And Ngungu learned that shared joy is a double joy that your world is more than your eyes can see and that the higher the nest, the more modest should be your ambitions, because those who are on the ground, they can also climb . . . (Pereira-Müller, 2012, pp. 27-29)

I begin my article with an Angolan tale that features common elements of many such folktales. Folk literature is primarily didactic, prepares for life, and tries to convey the information people need to carry on their lives properly. This is the rationale of most tales everywhere in the world: teaching young generations how to behave in society. Here in this story we learn:

- Shared joy is double joy;
- The world is bigger than what your eyes can see; and
- The higher the nest, the more modest you should be.

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1 This tale is translated into English here for the first time.
Before going on I have to admit that this is not necessarily the best time or format for such storytelling. Traditionally, in Africa, stories are told at night, around the fire. It is a belief that if a storyteller tells stories during the day he/she will grow a tail. And we can follow this thought: if you sit to listen to stories it means you are not working. Therefore, the best time to tell stories is at night, around the fire. The storytellers used to be the elders of the village; they are a well of wisdom. In this mysterious atmosphere, only lit by the fire, they tell stories and they share love, betrayal and trust, luck and misfortune, consciousness and sub-consciousness.

Bernando Kusseri Cigaro Samatenje, the kasesi, or spiritual leader from Cahora Bassa, in Mozambique, says,

The Elders say  
The stories are to be told  
In the evening  
If you tell stories during the day,  
Your head swells.  
“That only happened in the past,” you say.  
“The Elders say this because  
They wanted everybody to be there  
When they told their stories,” you say.  
But I’ll tell you:  
The stories are to be told  
In the evening.  
After you have eaten,  
When the fire is crackling,  
This is the time  
To open the book  
From long, long ago. (Tkacz & Muala, 2009, p. 51)

Storytelling is a social event for the whole community; it educates children and entertains adults. At night, around the fire, stories are told, riddle games are organized and proverbs are said.

Traditional tales are the residual history, linked to nature, to the memory of places, to superstitions; they are the justification of traditions that endure over time. We know that in societies based upon oral tradition, tales and proverbs are the most powerful means of information transmission. They are the memory of the people that goes from generation to generation. As Alfredo Hauenstein (1965) writes, they reflect our common roots, “wisdom and common sense monuments” (p. 11). The tales have a didactic nature, reflect the people’s life philosophy, and serve to express what has to be said in an abstract and therefore non-threatening way. For example, through folk tales, revenge, or corrective-justice, is achieved through cleverness. Folk tales handle every issue: education, traditions, judgments, rewards, and myths.
How Can We Group the Folk Tales?

Many folk tales try to explain natural phenomena, the myths of creation, the origins of customs, a sort of science encyclopedia, describing the nature of various animals and plants, of such distant objects as the stars, or even the world itself. Examples include: the Mozambican tale “A lua feiticeira e a sua filha—ou donde surgiram os cágados” (The Sorcerer Moon and its Daughter—or Where Do Terrapins Come From), or where come drums from (in the tale from Guinea-Bissau “O macaquito do narizito branco”—The Monkey with the White Node), why lions eat hyenas or why hyenas eat rabbits (the Mozambican tale “O coelho, o leão e a hiena”—The Rabbit, the Lion, and the Hyena), why wasps always build their nests in special places (the Angolan tale “Peito celeste e a vespa”—The Blue Waxbill and the Wasp) or why cats and mice do not get along—as we can see in this Mozambican tale. I believe everywhere people say that cats and mice are enemies.

The Cat and the Mouse

Many thousands of years ago, cats and mice were close friends. Cats were even teachers at the mice school. They taught them everything they knew, especially how to flee when human beings chased them.

One day, the cat teacher came to class without having lunch. He blew his horn and all mice came in running. He started the class, but he could not think because of his hunger.

“What shall I do?” the cat was thinking while teaching math. “Wait, I have an idea.”

He ordered all mice to close their eyes and told them, “keep your eyes closed until I say you can open them.”

All the mice children thought it was a game and closed their eyes. The cat jumped, caught a mouse, and went outside to eat it. When he finished, he returned to the classroom and told his pupils that the game was over. The mice opened their eyes and noticed one mouse was missing.

“Master, where is our friend?” they asked.

“I ordered him to fetch an axe.”

The class ended and the mice went home. But the good taste of the mouse did not leave the cat’s mind.

On the next day, the cat played his horn as always before classes start and the mice children came to class. They did not know that the cat turned evil.

This time, the cat was not hungry, but he still remembered the good taste of the mouse in his mouth. So he asked the mice to close their eyes. As he did the day before he jumped, caught a mouse, went outside and ate it. When he finished, he returned to the classroom and told his pupils that the game was over. The mice opened their eyes and noticed one mouse was missing.

“Master, where is our companion?” they asked.

“I told him to get food.”

Day after day, the cat ordered the mice to close their eyes and ate one, telling a lie about his whereabouts. However, one day, while jumping on a mouse, he missed
frightening the mouse who ran away shrieking. The other mice opened their eyes and began to flee as well. Some went to the barn, others went to the bush.

But those who were in the barn could not leave because the cat was at the door waiting for them. And those who fled into the bush could not return because the cat would eat them. And so the friendship between cats and mice ended.  

(Pereira-Müller, 2013, p. 17)

Like this, there are many folk tales that explain natural facts.

Let’s consider other categories of tales. Very important are the tales that teach the ethics that help to train the character, complementary to family and tribal taboos. According to Henri Junod (1936), folk tales are a type of tribal ethics, being taught and repeated from generation to generation. They are “the quintessence of the moral education” (Hauenstein, 1965, p. 10). In this type we have folk tales whose main characters are animals or human beings that serve as a role model for the moral and cultural traditions of the community. Some examples:

- Those who follow the laws are rewarded and for misdeeds they are punished—as in “O grilo ladrão”—The Thief Cricket (Angolan tale)
- Friends who betray friends—a very common topic—as in “A hiena e o coelho” (“The Hyena and the Rabbit” or in “A raposa e a toupeira” (“The Fox and the Mole”), an Angolan tale that I will relate now.

The Fox and the Mole

Once upon a time a fox and a mole were very close friends, living together and eating together.

One day, they decided that the fox would go for chickens and the mole would steal the flour that the village women usually grind.

And so they did. In the morning, the fox left to hunt a chicken and the mole tried to steal flour. He made a hole in the ground where the women had the flour baskets and filled his bag. He returned home where the fox was already cooking the chicken. He prepared the cassava broth, and had a wonderful dinner.

The next day, they did the same procedure. But as the meal was ready to eat, the mole invited the fox for a swim in the nearby river before dinner.

“What a great idea!” said the fox.

What the fox did not know was that his friend had built a tunnel that connected the bank of the river to the house, as she knew the fox loved to dive and play the game who could stay longer under water.

When they reached the river, the fox proposed a game.

“Let’s see who can stand longer under water.”

The mole nodded and said to the fox, “You will not see me so soon!”

He jumped into the water and swam to the tunnel. He went to the house, ate a whole dinner and returned to the river. Then he came up to the surface and told the fox, “I can’t stay no longer under water. Let’s go home. I’m starving.”

When they got home and saw that the food was gone, the fox asked astonished, “Who has eaten our food?”

“I do not know,” said the mole, pretending to be astonished as well. “We went out together and we got back together. How can I know?”

2 This tale is translated into English here for the first time.
So the fox had to go to bed starving. The next day, they did the same procedure again: the fox hunted a chicken and mole stole the flour. After the meal was ready, the mole suggested, “Let’s go to the river and take a swim.”

“It is better to eat first,” replied the fox. “Who knows if someone will come here and steal our food again?”

“What are you saying?” the mole replied. “Who would steal our food?”

“I do not know,” the fox said. “Look what happened yesterday.”

“Don’t be afraid. Nothing will happen.”

“OK, but let’s go fast.”

They ran to the river, and plunged. The mole swam to the tunnel, went home, ate the whole food, and returned to the river.

“OK,” the mole told the fox. “Now we go home and have dinner.”

But to the fox’s astonishment the pots were empty again.

“Haven’t I told you to eat first, and swim afterwards? Who has eaten our food?”

And once again, the fox went to bed starving.

On the next day, the fox told the mole he would hunt the chicken later.

“I’m going right away,” the mole said. “I cannot go later as the women only grind cassava in the morning.”

The mole went to the village, leaving the fox at home. The fox began to brood over who would steal the food every day.

“The mole is not worried at all. She is up to something. Is she betraying me?”

The fox went to the river and began to look around, trying to discover something suspicious. All of a sudden he discovered several mounds leading from the house to the river.

“Oh, there it is! The mole has been stealing the food. Let’s see who will have the last laugh.”

The fox gathered several sticks and set up a trap inside the tunnel.

Then he went to hunt a chicken. When he returned home, the mole was already there with the flour. They prepared the dinner, and as usual the mole suggested going for a swim in the river.

“Of course, with pleasure,” answered the fox.

When at the river, the fox dived and swam to the other bank. The mole plunged, entered the tunnel and was caught in the trap that the fox had prepared.

Seeing that his friend mole did not return, the fox went to the house. The food was still there! He returned to the tunnel and told the mole in the trap, “How did you dare to betray me? The game’s over. You were eating what I hunted. Now I am going to eat you.”

The mole died in the trap. The fox took it, took the fur and ate it. (Pereira-Müller, 2012, pp. 17-19)

Other topics of folk tales include: doing good deeds and not being rewarded, tales about seemingly weak or despised people who overcome dangerous situations because of their intelligence, courage, and heroism, as we can see in “O julgamento do coelho” (The Trial of the Rabbit—Guinea-Bissau, a tale that is very similar to “O avô crocodilo” (Grandfather Crocodile, about the Foundation of East Timor), or “O caçador, o coelho e a raposa” (“The Hunter, the Rabbit and the Fox” from Mozambique) or “O galo e o gato bravo” (“The Cock and the Wild Cat”, from Angola).

Some tales wrap up the whole essence of life: we all depend on each other, no man is an island, as we see in the Mozambican tale “Todos Dependem da Boca” (“All Depend on the Mouth”):
All Depend on the Mouth

One day, the mouth asked, “Although the body is one, which is the most important organ?”

The eyes answered, “We are the most important organ: we see what is happening.”

“No,” the ears said. “We are the most important, because we hear.”

“You’re wrong,” the hands said. “We are the most important organ because we grab things.”

That’s when the heart spoke: “I am the most important: I make the whole body work!”

“And I carry the food!” the belly said.

“Come on! The most important thing is to keep the body up, as we do,” the legs answered.

In the meantime, the woman brought the food for them to eat. The eyes saw the bread, the heart was touched, the belly waited to be fed, the ears heard, the hands could take bits and legs walked . . . but the mouth refused to eat—and kept refusing food for many days. All other organs gradually began to fail.

Then the mouth asked, “Well, who do you say is the most important organ in the body?”

“Art thou, o mouth!” they all answered. “You are our king!”

And so we see that we are all important, and that we need each other to live.3 (Pereira-Müller, 2013, p. 31)

Tales are characterized by a basic pattern and by narrative motifs, enabling them to cross language boundaries without much difficulty. Since their essence is oral and subject to its survival in the human mind, it is full of devices to aid memory—the same episode is repeated many times with little or no verbal change. For example, as a hero encounters his successive adversaries, the description changes only enough to indicate the increasing terror of the enemy always leading to a climax and usually to the hero’s success. These long repeated passages often enable the teller of tales or the singer of an epic to extend his performance as much as he desires. We can see this in the Portuguese tales “A formiga e a neve,” or “O coelhinho branco,” for example.

The White Rabbit (a Portuguese tale)

Once upon a time, a white rabbit went very early to his garden to get some sprouts for a soup. Back at home, he found the door locked from the inside.

He knocked and said, “I am the white rabbit. I went to the garden to pick up some sprouts for a soup.”

A goat answered from inside, “I am the Cabrês goat, I’ll jump upon you and kill you.”

The white rabbit was very sad. He sat on the door steps and was very sad. A dog came by and who asked him, “What’s the problem, white rabbit?”

3 This tale is translated into English here for the first time.
“I woke up very early, went to the garden to pick up some sprouts for a soup and when I came back, the Cabrês goat was inside my house. He’ll jump upon me and kill me. Can you help me?”

But the dog replied very fast, “I’m sorry. I’m not going in there. I’m afraid of the goat.”

The white rabbit sat again on the door steps and was very sad. A cock came by and who asked him, “What’s the problem, white rabbit?”

“I woke up very early, went to the garden to pick up some sprouts for a soup and when I came back, the Cabrês goat was inside my house. He’ll jump upon me and kill me. Can you help me?”

But the cock replied very fast, “I’m sorry. I’m not going in there. I’m afraid of the goat.”

The white rabbit sat again on the door steps and was very sad. A cow came by and who asked him, “What’s the problem, white rabbit?”

“I woke up very early, went to the garden to pick up some sprouts for a soup and when I came back, the Cabrês goat was inside my house. He’ll jump upon me and kill me. Can you help me?”

But the cow replied very fast, “I’m sorry. I’m not going in there. I’m afraid of the goat.”

The white rabbit sat again on the door steps and was very sad. An ant came by and who asked him, “What’s the problem, white rabbit?”

“I woke up very early, went to the garden to pick up some sprouts for a soup and when I came back, the Cabrês goat was inside my house. He’ll jump upon me and kill me. Can you help me?”

And the ant replied very fast, “No worries. I’ll go inside and will solve the problem for you.”

The ant knocked on the door. A goat answered from inside, “I am the Cabrês goat, I’ll jump upon you up and kill you.”

And the ant replied, “And I’m the impertinent ant that is going to perforate your belly.”

The ant went inside the house through the key hole and killed the Cabrês goat. Then he opened the door, the bunny could come inside. He cooked his sprout soup and ate it with the ant. And from there on, they lived happily together. (Pereira-Müller, 1993, pp.3-6)

When talking about moral virtues, we know that intelligence and smartness triumph over power. The size does not matter: small beings overcome big and powerful animals, as we can see here in this tale of the “O coelhinho branco” (The Little White Rabbit, a story from Portugal), or in the “A velha e o ladrão” (The Old Woman and the Thief, also from Portugal) and many others.

We can also see here, as in almost any folk tale, the relation between the animal and the human is very close (Lucas, 2008). The cultural heroes who are responsible for the good and the bad in the life of the tribe may upon one occasion appear as men or women and upon another as animals, always acting as human beings. Folk tales are universal as they deal with issues that are important everywhere in the world. They send similar messages focusing on important cultural values. And that is why we can find different versions of what appears to be the same tale in many countries. However, the tales are not necessarily the same tales that have been transported and adapted as they were carried around the
Portuguese World from one locale to another, but arose independently from one another to emphasize similar if not universal values (Lucas, 2008).

Every folk tale has many versions, a direct consequence of the oral tradition and the absence of written documents. In general, the core of the tale, the main message to teach and pass along important cultural norms and values, is the same. Among tales with similar lessons, only the vicissitudes, the scenery changes. Furthermore, as consequence of the oral tradition we know that “Who tells a tale adds a tail.” According to Alfredo Hauenstein (1965), each traditional tale “has many versions, depending on the region, on the story teller, on the circumstances how they are being told” (p. 7). Each storyteller has the freedom to embellish the tale as long as he/she stays within the limits of local taboos. The folktale is anonymous and exists in many versions, all equally valid. Instead of being fixed like a literary document, it is in continual flux. But it is possible to establish certain norms of plot structure and to point with some assurance to the varieties of subtypes that give clues to its life history.

One example: the story of the crocodile that is found almost dying. We have a crocodile tale in East Timor—this is the national tale of the foundation of their island—and a very similar tale in Guinea-Bissau, two identical tales from two countries thousands of miles apart. In both tales we have a child who finds a crocodile that is dying. The crocodile asks for help and promises not to eat the child if he/she helps him to go to the river.

Although both tales figure a child, in the East Timorese tale we have a small boy and in the tale from Guinea-Bissau we have a girl. In both tales, the crocodile promises not to eat the child once it is saved but once it is in the water, the crocodile jumps to eat him/her. The main difference comes at the end: in the tale from Guinea-Bissau, the girl asks a rabbit for help—in Africa, the rabbit is the clever animal, just like the fox in Portugal, which is symbol for cleverness. He suggests the girl should show him how she managed to bring the crocodile to the river. She shows him, wrapping the crocodile’s mouth and legs. And then the rabbit says, “Now bring the crocodile to your parents, for them to make a nice soup, because you have to be grateful when someone does something good to you.”

In the East Timor tale, the boy asks other animals for their opinion. They all say the same: you have to be grateful when someone does something good to you. The crocodile acknowledges this and makes a pact with the boy: he will bring him wherever he wants. They have fun together until the day he dies and the Timorese island appears. We can clearly see here the didactic function of the tales: to honor one’s word and to be good to those who are good to you. Both tales give consistency to daily situations and structure them.

Another example: the Mozambican tale “The Antelope and the Snail” (“A Gazela e o Caracol”) brings the familiar topic of the animal races, like Aesop’s fable “The Tortoise and the Hare.” However, the Mozambican tale has a modern touch: paper and writing! Why would a tale of oral tradition talk about the importance of writing?
We have already noted that “Who tells a tale adds a tail.” Each storyteller tells the stories in his/her own way, enriching them with personal/tribal details, according to his/her imagination and his/her religious beliefs and cultural background. Here we cannot forget the influence religion and Christian missionaries had in Africa. The missionaries were the first to collect the African folk tales, proverbs, and riddles in writing—and by doing so they changed whatever they thought would not fit in their religious beliefs and social norms. The missionary storyteller interprets what he hears through the filter of his Western culture, of Jewish-Christian tradition, his white settler spirit and passes the story on to others (Costa, 2010). Furthermore we cannot forget that some folk tales lost their original meanings through linguistic misunderstanding. While the question of origins and dissemination of the folk tales is largely beyond the scope of this article, it is generally accepted that such sharing, borrowing, and adaptation of folktales is commonplace across cultural contact zones.

In the Mozambican tale “The Antelope and the Snail” the paper sheet pollute “the whole structural line” as the anthropologist Viegas Guerreiro (1968) highlights: “The story teller wants to bring the attention of the reader to the paper” (p. 130).

The Antelope and the Snail

An antelope met a snail and told him with contempt, “Snails cannot run. All you can do is drag yourself on the floor.”

The snail did not like the way he was being spoken to and replied, “Come back on Sunday and we’ll see!”

The snail got then 100 sheets of paper and wrote on each sheet, “When the antelope comes by and says Snail, you’ll have to reply, I am here.”

The snail went to his friends and handed out the sheets of paper, asking them, “Could you please spread out and when the antelope goes by? You’ll have to say what is written in the papers.”

On Sunday, the antelope arrived in town, saw the snail and said, “Let’s run. But you’re going to be left behind anyway!”

The snail hid in a bush, and let the antelope run.

While he was running, he would call, “Snail!”

And there was always a snail that replied, “I am here.”

The antelope ran even faster and faster. Eventually he fell down, exhausted, out of breath. And the snail won the race, due to its cleverness of writing 100 sheets of paper. 4 (Pereira-Müller, 2013, p. 23)

In many folk tales there is a race between unequal partners but most often brain is matched against brawn and the race is won by means of trickery or cleverness: either the slower animal jumps on the other’s back or tail and hops off at the end when the creature turns round to see where his challenger has got to, like in the São Tomé e Príncipe “A Aposta da Tartaruga” (“The Tortoise Bet”), or else he is deceived by lookalikes substituting themselves along the course—or

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4 This tale is translated into English here for the first time.
writing papers. In this particular tale, the importance of being educated is highlighted, one of the aims of the missionaries in Africa.

Tales with a similar theme very often emphasize persistence or doggedness. In many tales the main characters are animals that act like human beings with their own personality, thinking like humans, fooling themselves, lying, cheating, betraying, loving, etc. They are a part of their environment and of their own social context. They are a mirror of life with intrigues, ambitions, generosity, violence, and justice. Social injustice is often dealt with through diplomacy and politeness - "tales show personality traits, notes of local traditions, political, social and religious system, and superstitions" (Costa, 2010).

Cleverness is one of the main features in folk tales—everywhere in the world. An example is the Portuguese tale about the “Stone Soup” (“A Sopa da Pedra”). Similar tales can be found in Hungary, France, Russia, and many other countries.

**Stone Soup**

In the story of the Stone Soup, a poor monk comes to a village, carrying nothing more than a stone. Upon his arrival, the villagers are unwilling to share their food stores but the monk tells them he can make a wonderful soup with his stone. One of the villagers becomes curious and asks how he can do it. The monk answers that he only needs a pot. The villager gives him a pot. Another villager walks by, inquiring about the stone soup; the monk answers he only needs a little bit of water. More and more villagers walk by, each adding another ingredient: cabbage, carrots, potatoes, sausages, and so on. Finally, a delicious and nourishing pot of soup is ready to be eaten and enjoyed by all.

We have seen that there are many features that are common to the tales of the Portuguese-speaking countries, making them really universal and serving as a guideline to educate the younger generations. Tales portray the intrigues, ambitions, generosity, violence, and justice of a community and have a didactic function, teaching fundamental values in human relations and explaining the origin of habits, customs, and natural phenomena.

I finish my article with a small text by Jorge Francisco Afonso, chief of Tambarara, Mozambique (Tkacz & Muala, 2009):

The spirits are like the wind.
They are with you wherever you go.
Can you see the wind?
Can you keep it in your hand?
Your spirits walk with you.
They are part of your family. (p. 15)

Let us stay with our spirits, with our stories, our tales, our proverbs, our riddles—as they help ground us in our humanity.
References


Critical Pedagogy and Language Acquisition: Studying Brazil’s Crisis to Improve Second Language Acquisition

Jamile Forcelini

Abstract

Education has the power to influence learners to think critically. It empowers society to move from inertia to Freire’s practice of freedom. The present article reflects upon language and culture. It supports including culture when promoting L2 instruction and implementing Critical Pedagogy: a problem-solving approach to discuss language and culture in Brazil, a country handling difficult transformations in fighting corruption and resolving economic crisis. Consequently, Brazilian Portuguese, a fundamental language worldwide, is the main language presented. It aims to combine Critical Pedagogy and second language acquisition and to benefit from a country’s hardships to develop L2 acquisition.

Introduction

Education has the power to influence learners to either accept reality or critically deliberate and change it. Critical thinking is vital to empower learners and society as a whole to move from a practice of inertia to Freire’s practice of freedom as well as humanization. Such change, however, is only attainable if pursued with one of the most powerful social tools: language; the most perceptible manifestation of culture, our connection to the world, what unites us in society, identifies us communally, and serves us as guidance for civic conduct (Larson & Smalley, 1972).

It is important to reflect upon the role of culture in the acquisition of another language as well as what implications culture brings to the teaching and learning process of a second language (L2) and the responsibility educators have when providing learners pedagogical tools to acquire a second language and consequently become aware of its intrinsic culture. L2 learners will only master
L2 communication if stimulated and prepared to think critically towards L2 cultural values to unfold deeper layers of culture and linguistic knowledge so that socio-cultural tolerance and empathy can be developed. As Brown (2000) affirms, becoming bilingual is a different and new approach in life. Previous principles and skills are impacted and a new challenge is encountered, to go beyond L1 boundaries into a new way of communicating, thinking, and (re)acting. As a result, a critical pedagogical approach is preferred in order to provide learners with skills to learn and communicate effectively in L2.

Critical Pedagogy seeks to empower education by enabling learners and educators to promote healthy, reciprocal opportunities for discourse, opinions, attitudes, and consciousness to be built. The construction of the self within or against mainstream conceptual views is secured through critical pedagogic practices. It builds tolerance towards distinct cultural views, develops social and political awareness, and cultivates moral practices aligned with social and political integrity.

The present article aims to present a compound view of language and culture acquisition. It emphasizes the intrinsic connections between language and culture learning that makes it impossible to adequately address both elements separately. Due to the compound nature of language learning, the present work seeks to show the importance of including cultural components when promoting L2 instructional practice since it is a vital element for effective L2 communication and comprehension. It also discusses the inclusion of Critical Pedagogy as a viable pedagogical practice in L2 instruction, a different educational practice that can blend problem-solving practices to think critically about language and culture, and diverge from stereotypical views of L2 cultural elements in order to overcome decontextualized and ineffective language instruction.

For this study, Portuguese as a Foreign Language, specifically Brazilian Portuguese (BP) will be used as the main language to exemplify such pedagogical practices. BP was chosen because Portuguese is considered a fundamental language worldwide and because Brazil currently occupies a unique position in the world today. Because of its size and vast resources, it is considered a promising economy with great international influence. Nevertheless, Brazil is facing a difficult transformation as the country attempts to reform a deep-rooted and long-lasting history of corruption and resolve its current economic crisis. A brief account of Brazil’s current political and economic situation is presented in order to generate themes and ideas for Portuguese foreign language (PFL) instruction. This work aims to combine Critical Pedagogy utilizing the country’s crisis to improve second language acquisition.

**Language and Culture**

According to Valdes (1986), a language cannot be simply classified as a formal system formed by vocabulary, syntax, and phonemes because it also entails its humanistic sphere. It is a domain that follows rules, and consents its speakers to assimilate experiences through the language and express themselves with it. Not
only does language influence its speakers, the language itself can also be influenced by the experiences speakers have when reasoning their own reality.

Culture is one of the most influential factors in a language. Therefore, in order to comprehend how culture influences language, it is important to conceptualize it. Moran (2001) perceives culture as composed of multiple meanings. It can be seen as any source of communication (verbal, non-verbal). McCarthy and Carter (1994) understand and divide culture into three different ways. Firstly, Culture, in capital letters encompasses artistic manifestations such as music, art, and literature. Secondly, culture is perceived as traditions and social forms of worldview that a group of people share and use to rationalize their own experiences. Thirdly, culture can also be perceived as social discourse and the social skills developed to enable comprehension of knowledge used for communication.

Brown (2000) states culture and language are intertwined and simply incapable of separation without costly loss of meaning. As Larson and Smalley (1972) state, it is also the social guidance of behavior in community. According to Orlandi (2006), words cannot signify in isolation. They are ideologically assembled and unfolded through relational discourse. Therefore, it is important to reflect upon the role of culture in the acquisition of another language as well as what implications culture brings to the teaching and learning process of a second language (L2) and the responsibility educators have when providing learners pedagogical tools to acquire a second language and consequently become aware of its intrinsic culture.

What is key to point out is the nomenclature used to refer to processes of “knowing” a new language and culture. Linguistically, language has been referred to as either being learned or acquired (Krashen, 1982). In other words, one can explicitly learn a language along with its syntactic, phonological parameters or implicitly acquire these rules and convert such parameters into effective L2 comprehension and communicative skills. Nor does acquiring an L2 imply negating a native tongue and consequently discarding previous cultural knowledge and values for the sake of new ones. Still, by knowing and understanding new cultural realities associated with L2, learners may accommodate new concepts and views comparing and even shifting former cultural and societal views of reality. Baktin (1999) states languages are ideological and its use is associated with ideological evolution.

Finally, Patrikis (1988) points out the risks of misjudgment of other cultures based on ethnocentric and prejudiced views of the culture of origin. Stereotyping, triviality, and political bias as well as incompleteness are common but imprecise interpretations of another culture divorced from the meaning of their context.

**Culture and Second Language Instruction**

It is pertinent for L2 learners to be attentive about the reasons guiding L1 speakers to comprehend and preserve their cultural values the way they do. Thinking critically towards L2 cultural values includes unfolding deeper layers of culture
and consequently linguistic knowledge so that socio-cultural tolerance and empathy can be developed. As Politzer (1959) declares, because socio-cultural tolerance is not considered innate, education becomes essential in the process of enabling learners to think critically about their socio-cultural realities as well as others. The linguistic and genuine communicative ability speakers have in L2 is directly and intrinsically connected to the amount of cultural knowledge and awareness L2 speakers have absorbed.

Motivation also plays a role in the incorporation of cultural aspects on L2 acquisition (Castro, 2004). When learners are able to see L2 knowledge produced in the classroom as also legitimate and applicable to their own daily lives, then the information becomes meaningful. The more relatable content becomes to learners’ lives, the more linguistic confidence learners present to communicate effectively in a different language and engage in the learning process.

After seeing the multiple connective layers language and culture have as well as the motives underlying the inclusion of socio-cultural practices into L2 teaching, a distinct theoretical framework, that can be used to account for non-traditional forms of instruction and implemented in L2 classrooms, is presented below.

**Critical Pedagogy**

According to Reagan (2010), Critical pedagogy is a theoretical framework, a political and ideological effort that attempts to enquire about current views and practices present in schools. First introduced in the 1970s, it is based on the premise that education can enable learners and educators to promote healthy, reciprocal, or more neutral opportunities for discourse, opinions, attitudes, and consciousness to take place. Construction of the self within or against mainstream conceptual views is secured through critical pedagogic practices to build up tolerance towards distinct cultural views, to develop social and political awareness, and to cultivate moral practices that are aligned with social and political integrity. Critical pedagogy aims to deconstruct the view of what Barbara Craig (1995) calls “education as a quantifiable intellectual commodity.” Dewey (2008) claims that societal dichotomy promotes individuals to pursue communal transformation and benefits securing change and improvement.

As one of the mains contributors of Critical Pedagogy’s core concepts, Paolo Freire’s works assert that learners are fully capable of critically observing their world in order to construct their own social reality. However, this process is only possible through dialogue with others. Inertia and illiteracy, that provoke mere social reproduction and reactions by the oppressed, need to be transformed into critical responses of social engagement and action. A transition denominated *from object to subject* by Freire (1970).

Traditional educational practices are refuted by Freire (1970) and categorized as a system of *banking*. Part of a repressive and dysfunctional structure, it generates an oppressor-oppressed relationship. Educators (oppressor) retain power and knowledge while learners (oppressed) function as passive and uncritical
recipients. By implementing critical pedagogic practices, educators and learners become partners; learners are encouraged to express their ideas, generating channels where teachers and students can learn from each other’s ideas and experiences, and develop conclusions together. Everyone is responsible for a joint growing process. What mediates this process is not the “teacher-preacher” approach but the reality within which both educator and learner are immersed. It serves as a generator of themes and issues, and consequently the educational materials to be used, developed, and solved through Freire’s pedagogical proposal. Life itself becomes a self-renovating textbook without an answer key. Reality is not static but an ongoing progression of acts. A problem-solving education fits into a continuing process of life enabling socio-cultural growth.

The apparent risks of promoting critical pedagogy revolve around the challenges of bias and neutrality. Several scholars endorse educational practice that remains as neutral or reduces bias. Education has the power to influence learners to either accept reality or critically deliberate and change it. Critical thinking, as developed by Critical Pedagogy, can empower learners and society as a whole to move from a practice of inertia to Freire’s practice of freedom as well as humanization.

**Critical Pedagogy, the Classroom, and the Role of the Educator**

The role of the educator is uniquely powerful in the process of introducing learners to a new culture as well as promoting opportunities to think critically. Moreover, as Eslami-Rasekh et al. (2004) note, the work and inclusion of pragmatic and cultural knowledge in the L2 curriculum is still a personal choice of every educator. Unfortunately, as previously noted, there are several reasons that diminish or impede the inclusion of cultural aspects into L2 classrooms. Non-native teachers do not feel comfortable enough to discuss cultural matters often claiming lack of knowledge. They feel they do not possess the same expertise as native speakers do. The process of L2 cultural awareness can also be seen as a potential threat to L1 cultural and linguistic knowledge. Hadley (2001) adds by saying some educators have limited time to include cultural knowledge in the classroom. Structural and linguistic information in L2 classrooms usually commands the most instructional importance and time commitments. Cultural knowledge may even be considered impertinent, unnecessary, or uninteresting. Cakir (2006) claims some educators do not seem to realize the importance and necessity of cultural guidance. Language is seen as a mere application of grammar rules and not as components of a complex unit, along with culture, responsible for effective communication in L2.

According to Hadley (2001), several educators also rely on future, authentic, cultural exposure abroad to meet the needs learners have and aspire to perfect their linguistic and cultural knowledge. However, as Castro (2004) outlines, foreign experiences are not reliable guarantees for learners to obtain such cultural understanding. It can simply unfold a continuation of learners’ former cultural principles in another geographical setting. The natural and habitual inclination
individuals have to preserve and guard their own cultural principles remains present and may serve as an obstacle to the interaction and acceptance of new values and linguistic knowledge. The process of acculturation is healthier if promoted gradually with supervision and guidance instead of an abrupt encounter in native speaking territory. Educators can ease learners’ apprehension on the acculturation process by properly managing the progression of potential discomfort, intimidation, and threat caused by the deliberation of unknown principles and standards. Failure to do so can jeopardize the progression of L2 acquisition and acculturation (Valdes, 1986). Therefore, the classroom becomes a critical and essential environment for the development of suitable processes of acculturation. Castro (2004) claims educators are in command to mediate the effective discovery and exposure of different ways of living and communicating as well as to assist learners while unfolding such discovery of information. As Freire (1996) recapitulates, education is not simply about spreading information but it is about generating possibilities for learners to develop their own understanding.

In order to solve some of these issues, it is important to remember educators have access to daily, original, and authentic information and materials on several different cultural aspects of any given language online. Such resources serve as an important opportunity for learners and educators to reflect upon different worldviews and may ease learners’ anxiety and insecurities towards new information as well as relieve educators from supposed responsibilities to preach or claim what to know or learn. In this way, learners become more responsible and active actors in the educational process. Such method has the added benefit of reducing the instructional burden on educators when presenting and discussing cultural views in the classroom (Castro, 2004).

**Portuguese as a Foreign Language**

As mentioned beforehand, language is the most perceptible manifestation of culture and culture is our connection to the world, what unites us in society and identifies us communally. After reflecting upon the importance of integrating language and culture, especially in foreign language instruction, this work focuses on the inclusion of cultural elements in PFL instruction settings, more specifically Brazilian Portuguese (BP).

According to the Division of World Languages, Literatures, and Cultures from the University of Iowa, Portuguese is the official language of eight different countries and has significant representation in four continents. Over 250 million people speak Portuguese natively in Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Portugal, East Timor, São Tome, and Principe. Brazil alone is responsible for nearly 200 million native speakers. Considered the official language of imperative and renowned organizations such as the European Union, Portuguese has become an important language to acquire in the 21st century. Knowing Portuguese allows business and international relations majors to become more marketable and expand their work territory to different global regions.
The issue lies with the fact that although interest in PFL classes has indeed increased over the past years, the development of adequate materials for such a growing population of L2 Portuguese learners is yet to be prepared, especially learners with a need for more advanced PFL instructional content. Quality and reliable materials for specific learning purposes such as business, international relations, second language acquisition of Portuguese, medical interpretation, and so on are scarce and infrequently offered by today’s instructional market and publishing houses. In addition, existent materials continue to focus on structural matters of the language and either lack the inclusion of cultural aspects of the language and their native communities or reference them in a superficial and restricted manner. Unfortunately, most existent cultural instructional approaches in PFL teaching materials introduce stereotypical and one-sided views of cultural practices of the Lusophone world. Instruction then continues to be developed as a banking system (Freire, 1970) where educators are responsible for depositing information into learners, who are considered, according to Freire (1970) “empty receptacle for these deposits.”

Terçario, Rizzotto, and Greuel (2015) also recognizes that Portuguese as a second language (PL2) classes face a series of obstacles such as lack of support materials, lack of curriculum tailored for the foreign students’ needs, and lack of materials that can tackle social-cultural issues. Learners recognize linguistic and especially cultural differences can interfere with the learning process. These differences can challenge learners when attempting to take ownership of PL2 (Terçario, Rizzotto, & Greuel, 2015).

Schlindwein (2013) acknowledges it is challenging accommodating heterogeneous students of Portuguese as Foreign Language, especially in Brazil, in terms of providing them fitting linguistic and cultural content in the target language. The gap between language instruction and learners’ language cultural knowledge can become even wider when considering the ongoing shift from what Schlindwein (2013) calls a page-based to a screen-based world. Schlindwein (2013) suggests a multimodal approach can help learners understand the linguistic and cultural aspects of Brazil. However, Schlindwein (2013) admits a multimodal approach that can stimulate critical thinking and assist learners to acquire Portuguese in an involving and appealing manner is yet to be developed and implemented, broadly, and effectively.

An immediate but possibly lasting solution for the current situation is to follow what Freire’s Critical Pedagogy presents as a problem-posing and problem-solving educational model as an alternative to our current traditional practices. Consequently, for a problem-solving approach to work in PFL classes, educators should limit the presentation of stunning or stereotypical cultural content such as the beauty and magnitude of Brazilian Carnival, the taste of Brazilian food, the victories and glories of Brazilian soccer, the hospitality of the Brazilian population, and Brazil’s abundant natural and biological diversity. Instead, educators should work to combine Critical Pedagogy with socio-cultural awareness in L2 by tackling the complex socio-economic issues facing Brazil such as the political and corruption scandals omnipresent in today’s media. It is not about
focusing only on positive or negative views but actually showing learners how every country and every population faces daily struggles. Presenting learners with today’s concerns and reality can help them become better global citizens, better critical thinkers, and prepares them to interact more effectively and appropriately if later immersed in this new culture.

Traditional practices of “education” are capable of actually (un)educating L2 learners and (un)preparing global citizens to enter a competitive and rapid-moving world. There is a disconnection with reality when the education system chooses not to engage in current debates or struggles. Young learners are fully aware of current issues in today’s world displayed daily in the media and other means of mass communication, but these issues are largely absent from traditional classroom curriculum.

A brief account of Brazil’s current political and economic situation is presented below in order to generate themes and ideas for PFL instruction. Critical Pedagogy requires that educators be on top of current issues and trends. It does not expect them to know the “right answers” but it demands from them a capability to show different versions of an issue and assist learners to find their own answers. As seen lately in the media, Brazil as the B in BRIC, was considered an emerging and promising economy. However, Brazil is now facing a great political and economic crisis due to several different reasons.

**A Brief Account of Brazil’s Current Political and Economic Situation**

After enduring 21 years of a brutal military dictatorship that started in 1964, Brazil, South-America’s largest country and economy, has been governed by a democratic system since 1985. According to March’s 2016 edition of the newspaper *Medium*, Brazil’s 1988 constitution has assured a series of citizen democratic rights to its population (Green & Quinalha, 2016). Despite a range of political and economic advances in the last few decades, Brazil has also been facing notorious corruption scandals that have weakened Brazil’s legitimacy as an effective democracy and powerful internationally reliable economy. While corruption scandals have always been present in Brazil, what changes now in the present national scenario is that the colossal amounts of money linked to current corruption scandals have outraged Brazilians.

Widespread mobilization of protests started right after the nomination of Brazil as host of both The World Cup in 2014 and The Olympic Games in 2016. The majority of the population claims Brazil’s lack of excellence in education, health, and public safety, shows there is no need for the government to spend massive amounts of money on infrastructure for such events when not accommodating the population’s basic needs.

The most recent operation against corruption called Operação Lava-Jato (*The Car Wash Operation*), has been investigating, over the last two years, a money laundering scheme of approximately 10 billion Brazilian reals (2.8 billion dollars) and it involves *Petrobras*, one of the biggest and most successful state-controlled oil company. For this reason, President Dilma Rousseff’s administration has been
discredited by the immense bribery and corruption scandals going public during her government.

The country now faces the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s. Although inflation is decreasing with a 7.04 projection for 2016, it is still affecting the economy significantly. According to Kelly Oliveira (2016), a reporter from Agência Brasil, a Brazilian newspaper, inflation causes destabilization of public finances, which leads the country to raise taxes and cut budget expenses.

May’s 2016 edition of The Washington Post affirms the country’s first female president, Dilma Rousseff, 68, a former Marxist guerrilla is accused of a “crime of responsibility” based on fiscal maneuvering (Miroff & Phillips, 2016). She is accused of inadequately spending billions of dollars from the government as loans in order to cover the administration budget, hiding its insufficiency and financing social initiatives. For those reasons, she has been facing impeachment proceedings. On May 12, 2016, Dilma was removed from the presidency and vice president Michel Temer became the new Interim President.

Temer’s administration is also receiving criticism for attempting to merge the education and culture ministries and for merging science and communication ministries. The current administration is accused of a democratic backlash in an attempt to “save” the economy and for lacking female representation in the power. According to May’s 2016 edition of the Science Journal, scientists, environmentalists, and artists are also showing disapproval and discontent towards these changes.

The Role of Brazilian Media in Brazil’s Current Crisis

As a repercussion and cruel vestige of two decades of a cruel dictatorship and censorship, Brazilians usually had little to say publicly about their political system. What is different now is that the population has decided to speak up and demonstrate their resentment and rage towards the political dishonesty displayed in the media daily. Brazilians seem to have outgrown Freire’s (1970) dependence and self-deprecation towards their cultural reality. Since 2013, a rapidly growing number of massive protests were held against the government in a Movement called O Gigante Acordou (the giant is awake) according to Adriando Antoine Robbesom from Inside Brazil (2013).

The population has also been using new ways of protesting against the government and illicit corruption activity. Social media has been imperative in this movement. Besides numerous corruption scandals and the economic crisis, the population is also protesting against sexism, homophobia, urban violence, human rights, biased media, and so on.

The confusing side of this new civil movement is the fact that the actions taken to fight corruption are not always aligned with the number of “cyber” protests and complaints against our “democratic” processes. Even though the population is still engaging in massive protests, few public demonstrations of citizenship and social responsibility are organized to obtain more lasting or significant political reform. Still, the government seems to be responding fast to
this movement. The question is to what extent are these responses durable and effective for a democratic system to function accordingly.

Another potential social drawback caused by Brazilian anti-corruption movements is an intense political animosity between opposing political groups. Even though the battle against corruption is indispensable and desired from different parties, there is little political tolerance towards different political standpoints. The population is divided and consequently political parties risk losing legitimacy when simply discrediting opposing ideas without regard for the merits of such ideas.

**Criticism of the Battle against Corruption and the Impeachment**

Even though Brazilians, in general, are outraged with corruption scandals and the economic crisis, a portion of the population, mostly leftist-party sympathizers and people affiliated with the Workers’ Party, claim part of the investigations against corruption have violated basic civil rights. For example, civil rights that are guaranteed by the constitution, such as the presumption of innocence, the guarantee of the right to privacy, the assurance of impartial judiciary, and attorney-client privilege says Green & Quinalha (2016), from May’s 2016 edition of the newspaper *Medium*. They fear democracy to be at risk of becoming a new dictatorship. What aggravates the political scenario is that a smaller group of the population mostly right-party sympathizers and affiliated with the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party defend a radical re-establishment of a dictatorship regime in order to control widespread corruption in the country.

May’s 2016 edition from *The Washington Post* discusses the lack of maturity that some of the opponents of the impeachment process seem to show, in their opinion (Miroff & Phillips, 2016). Impeachment proceedings have received two distinct trends of criticism. On one hand, the process of impeachment is criticized for disregarding 54 million voters who elected Dilma Rousseff for two consecutive terms (2010 and 2014). On the other hand, it is an attempt to eliminate a corrupt leader.

**Authentic Materials for PFL Lessons**

After briefly looking at the current political and economic issues Brazil faces, it is important to think about practical themes that could be included in PFL lessons. Authentic materials can be used in the classroom to show these problems and students can engage in tasks where they are invited to think critically about the following:

a. What are the main political views in Brazil today? What have they proposed to the population? What have they done while governing the country?

b. Corruption scandals from Brazil: How do they work? Which politicians are involved? What kind of affiliations do they have? How is the judiciary power handling each scandal?
c. The process of impeachment: Should the president be impeached? Why? Why not?

d. The new presidency plan: What responsibilities does the interim president Michel Temer have in order to try to re-establish the economy and to unify the population?

e. The economic crisis: What has caused this crisis? How can the government handle this problem? What are possible solutions to this crisis, to control inflation and decrease unemployment rates?

These are only a few suggestions that can be implemented in the classroom. Each instructor as well as each learner can contribute to the inclusion of different themes, set the level, pace and progression of their debates, and the development of their learning process in BP. The present pedagogic proposal can be easily adapted to other varieties of Portuguese as well. Other issues and realities can also be debated for the development of meaningful pedagogical activities and instructional materials. As a result from the work with authentic materials in BP learners receive real content in Portuguese and can easily benefit from it by learning new Portuguese vocabulary, idiomatic expressions, and so on.

It is important to consider to what extent learners’ proficiency can hinder or stimulate the outcomes of this pedagogical proposal. In order to preserve and promote cultural “learning,” instructors can decide whether to propose a debate in the learners’ native tongue. That way, learners will be exposed, gradually, to the linguistic potential of such activity without missing the chance to benefit from its cultural content. Instructors can also choose to present classroom themes in more than one language. If instructors feel their learners are capable of reading and interpreting written information in Portuguese but need extra help while verbally stating their opinion, they can switch to their native language or use model sentences to build their thoughts and express their opinions. For example, when answering the question Should the president be impeached? Why? Why not? students can follow a model provided in class:

Question/Topic: The process of impeachment: Should the president be impeached? Why? Why not?

Model:
Sim, eu penso que a presidente deve sofrer o impeachment porque

Yes, I think the president should be impeached because _________________.
Ela cometeu um crime/She committed a crime.
Ela escondeu a verdade/She hid the truth.
Ela cometeu atos de corrupção/She was corrupt.

Não, eu não penso que a presidente deva sofrer o impeachment porque

No, I don’t think the president should be impeached because _____________________.
Ela é inocente/She is innocent.
Ela é vítima de um golpe/She is the victim of a scam.
Ela está tendo que governar o país durante uma crise política e econômica/
She is having to run the country during a political and economic crisis.

When applying these themes/ideas into PFL classes, it is up to instructors to decide what linguistic elements need to be included in order to meet their learners’ instructional and linguistic needs. The same topics can be used to present grammar topics as well as to develop different learning strategies and language skills such as writing, reading, speaking, and listening abilities in a foreign language.

Conclusion

Education frees and empowers people. It enables learners to think critically towards their own reality, to solve their own issues, and to promote social progress. Progress, however, is only attainable if educational practices are fully applicable in today’s fast growing and moving world. Critical Pedagogy comes to empower education. It attempts to connect learners to their real lives and provide them effective tools to conceptualize their reality and think critically about their own civic connections and responsibilities. It also builds tolerance towards distinct cultural views, develops social and political awareness, and cultivates moral practices aligned with social and political integrity.

Social change and global awareness are only possible when effective communication takes place among speakers of the same language as well as different languages. For that reason, L2 acquisition is suitable to critical pedagogical practices and Critical Pedagogy becomes a valuable resource for L2 lessons, in particular BP. Portuguese is considered a fundamental language worldwide as Brazil occupies a unique and influential position in the world today. The teaching of BP as a foreign language can benefit from the inclusion of Critical Pedagogy practices. Critical Pedagogy allows instruction to use naturally generated topics found within the native speaker community. It allows life itself to become a self-renovating textbook without an answer key. A problem-solving education fits into a continuing process of life enabling socio-cultural growth to occur and L2 acquisition to take place successfully.

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Macau’s Trade
With the Portuguese Speaking World

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Abstract
Macau has boomed over the last decade as its gaming industry has provided the massive Chinese economy with the only legal casino gambling services in the nation. But, recent Chinese political changes have resulted in a sharp downturn in Macau’s gambling revenues despite a major expansion of its gaming facilities. This may negatively impact efforts to promote a relationship between Macau and the Portuguese Speaking World. Portugal with its former Ultramar, to which Brazil has been added, is now termed “Lusophonia.” Initiated by China in Macau in October 2003, the efforts to promote a Lusophone trade and economic relationship with China through Macau have not resulted in any significant trade or tourist links between Macau and Lusophonia. Despite China’s trade with Brazil booming following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, its Brazilian trade is routed either through China itself or Hong Kong, not through Macau. Macau’s significantly weak links to Lusophonia, which were predictable from international trade theory that included the Gravity Model and Ghemawat’s CAGE analytical model, were not enhanced during Macau’s 10 year boom from 2004 to 2014, and may be forced to take a back seat to the re-positioning of its gaming industry over the next several years.

Macau and Lusophonia
Two-pronged efforts to develop a community of nations that utilize the Portuguese language have been in evidence for the last 20 years, one effort undertaken through the Portuguese government sponsored Comunidade dos Países de Línguas Portugueses, which was founded in February 1994, and the other effort
through the China-sponsored “Macau Forum” (中葡论坛)\(^1\) that was setup in the Macau Special Administrative Region (Macau SAR) by China’s central government in October 2003. Despite Macau’s population being well over 90% Chinese and with the Cantonese dialect dominating all commercial activities, Macau is considered to be a member of the Lusophone grouping due to its status as having both Chinese and Portuguese as official languages. The Macau Forum was established to strengthen economic and trade relationships, not cultural relations, between China (not solely Macau) and the Portuguese-speaking world, hence its name “Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Language Countries” (中国与葡语国家经贸合作论坛).

Following the Macau’s return to China in December 1999 and coincidentally with the 40th anniversary of the U.S.-China Shanghai Communiqué, Macau’s first chief executive, Edmund Ho Hou-hua (何厚铧), opened Macau’s gaming market to international casino operators in February 2002. The city’s economy then boomed on the back of a wave of gamblers from Macau’s neighboring Guangdong province who poured into the city subsequent to the opening of its first international casino in May 2004 (Las Vegas Sands). Macau’s traditional source of gamblers from Hong Kong dropped into second place. The combination of Macau being the only legal gambling jurisdiction in China and the spectacular rise of China’s purchasing power following China’s December 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization, attracted as much as US$15-20 billion of investments into the city’s gaming facilities between 2004 and 2014. As Macau’s gaming revenues ballooned 15 times from 2002’s (Macau Pataca currency or MOP) 23.5 billion (US$2.9b) to 2014’s MOP 352.7 billion (US$ 44.1b), Macau’s GDP grew by a spectacular 850% from 2001’s MOP 52.3 billion (US$ 6.5b) to 2014’s MOP 443.3 billion (US$ 55b) (Macau Government, 2016). Macau surpassed Las Vegas as the world’s largest gaming center in 2007. Over the next several years, between 2014 and 2018 the casino industry is again doubling the size of its gaming infrastructure through the investment of US$ 22 billion in new casino and hotels. Just as this was launched, however, Macau’s economy shrunk 16.85% due to a crackdown on corruption in China that the new central government leadership of Xi Jin-ping (習近平) had begun in mid-2014.

How might Macau’s gaming-based economy interface with the remarkably diversified Lusophone markets? A recent study by Macau’s University of Saint Joseph attempted to make marketing sense of the collection of remarkably diverse Lusophone states. Six separate Lusophone sectors were identified: (i) Brazil, (ii) Portugal, (iii) Angola, (iv) Mozambique, (v) Timor-Goa, and (vi) Cabo Verde-Guineas Bissau-Sao Tome. The importance of Brazil was clear: Brazil’s GDP is six times larger than that of all the remaining Lusophone markets combined, making Brazil the prime target for any strategy which seeks to promote a “greater

\(^1\)‘Permanent Secretariat of the Forum for Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Portuguese Language Countries’; Fórum para a Cooperação Económica e Comercial entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa.
Lusophone” commercial network. The table that follows identifies the six sectors, based on their diffuse economic, geographic, and demographic characteristics.

The data demonstrates that the priority relationship on which to build both China and Macau’s Lusophone economic interface is trade and investment with Brazil. Such trade relationship might be both an effective stimulant to the international Lusophone community and a way to diversify Macau’s heavy reliance upon Cantonese gamblers from South China.

**Table 1: Lusophone Markets**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pop (000s)</th>
<th>GDP-PPP Billion US$</th>
<th>GDP US$ Per Capita</th>
<th>CPIA: 6-0 Hours</th>
<th>MPI: 87 Catholic</th>
<th>% Catholic</th>
<th>1st Key City &amp; Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>202,656</td>
<td>US$3,073.0</td>
<td>US$15,200</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>20.8m: Sao Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (SAR)</td>
<td>10,813</td>
<td>US$276.0</td>
<td>US$26,300</td>
<td>-11</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>2.8m: Lisbon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>19,088</td>
<td>US$175.5</td>
<td>US$8,200</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>2.83-CP</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>5.3m: Luanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>24,692</td>
<td>US$29.8</td>
<td>US$1,100</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>3.67-CP</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>1.2m: Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>US$8.4</td>
<td>US$6,800</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.83-CP</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>0.2m: Dili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goa</td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>US$7.7</td>
<td>US$5,284</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>0.11m: Panaji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>US$3.3</td>
<td>US$6,300</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>3.83-CP</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>0.14m: Praia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>US$2.5</td>
<td>US$1,400</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>3.00-CP</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>0.47m: Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>US$0.6</td>
<td>US$3,100</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>3.00-CP</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
<td>0.071m: Sao Tome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above data also shows that the development of Macau economic relationships with the Lusophone nations is significantly constrained by the recognition that the Lusophone markets are not only of great distance from Macau, but also, with the exception of Brazil, are not of a substantial size. Trade theorists have expressed the difficulty of developing trade between distant and relatively small GDPs via the Gravity Model of international trade (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2007). This model has empirically demonstrated that bilateral trade between two nations is negatively correlated to distance and positively correlated to GDP. Here lies the great problem for developing trade between Macau and its Lusophone partners. The only Lusophone areas in reasonable proximity to Macau are Timor-Leste and Goa. Time zone differences express the relationship. With Timor being one hour ahead of Macau time and Goa 1.5 hours behind, both are theoretically within the city’s manageable sphere. But, not only are their GDP’s and markets small, they are fraught with political problems. Within Goa there is ongoing tension between the Hindu and Catholic communities, while Timor is only just now recovering from a socially devastating separation from Indonesia. Time zone differences also show that Macau is remote from the rest of the Lusophone world, with Brazil being in a zone 11 hours distant and Portugal and Angola seven hours off. In the IMF trade statistics that follow, low trade levels
between Macau and the rest of Lusophonia, which the Gravity Model of trade predicts, are in evidence.

Further, in recent years Pankaj Ghemawat at Harvard Business School has expanded the two variable scope of the Gravity Model (distance and economic size) to include cultural and political variables in an effort to predict likelihood of cross-border investment success (Ghemawat, 2007). His CAGE model, which includes Cultural, Administrative-Political, Geographic, and Economic variables, clearly recommends that Macau’s economic relations (and any investment strategy that its companies may wish to undertake) should be concentrated in the region of Greater China. Not only is China (the world’s second largest economy) on Macau’s doorstep, Macau is in fact an actual part of China. Gravity Theory predicts that Macau’s trade will be in the close orbit of Macau’s massive sovereign authority. The pull of Brazil, Portugal, and Angola will be only dimly felt. Ghemawat’s CAGE model reinforces the reality that Macau’s economic relationships will be inextricable from China. Macau is substantially a Chinese cultural entity, with only a residual Portuguese cultural linguistic influence, while its political and legal development is directly under Beijing’s control. The CAGE Model recommends that Macau look for economic diversification and success in Greater China, and that Macau’s theoretical Lusophone connection will not be a major determinant of the city’s economic future. Trade data that follows supports the conclusions of both the Gravity Model and Ghemawat’s CAGE methodology.

China Lusophone’s Trade

The first constraint on Macau trade with Lusophonia is the fact that these nations are not China’s major export markets or suppliers. IMF data demonstrates that the Lusophone nations represented only 1.78% of China’s exports in 2015, an amount that was reduced from the slightly larger, but still small 2.12% in 2014. The United States, with 18% of China’s total exports in 2015, is China’s most significant international partner. Within Lusophonia, Brazil is by far the largest market for Chinese goods, having absorbed $27.4 billion in 2015 or 1.2% of China’s total exports. Four of the other Lusophone markets that included Macau, Angola, Portugal, and Mozambique accounted for only 0.5% of China’s exports or US$13.2 billion. The smaller Portuguese speaking nations of Cabo Verde, Guinea Bissau, Principe and Sao Tome, and Timor-Leste, have little status in China’s external trade relations. As suppliers to China, IMF data for Lusophonia demonstrates that only Brazil and Angola are providing any significant level of resources. Of China’s imports in 2015 Lusophonia held 3.9%. Brazil shipped

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2 Exports to the United States are larger than Hong Kong market which took 14.6% of China’s exports. The European Union took 11.0%.
3 Trade statistics between China and Timor-Leste are not provided thru the IMF Direction of Trade data, but the Macau Forum intermittently provides data in articles and excerpts from China’s own customs data. Appendix I presents China’s trade with these countries for nine months of 2015, which amounted to Timor, US$62.8m, Cabo Verde, US$ 35.3m, Guinea Bissau, US$ 30.1m, and Sao Tome, US$ 4.5m.
2.77% and Angola just 1%. Portugal provided just 0.1%, while the remainder of Lusophonia barely registered in the statistics.

China-Brazil Trade

Trade between Brazil and China boomed following the fall 2001 U.S. agreement to allow China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), shortly after the events of September 2001 took place. In 2013 China-Brazil trade hit a record of US$ 83.3 billion, over 20 times the size of trade in 2001 (US$4.0 billion), the year before China entered the WTO. Minimal trade between China and Brazil had existed as little as 16 years ago, with only US$1.1 billion in 2000 (Could Macau be the Bridge, 2011), an extraordinary low level given the population, economies, and land area of the two states. After China’s entry onto the WTO, trade radically expanded and paralleled the explosive growth of Macau’s own economy. By 2009 China had become Brazil’s largest trading partner and Macau the largest gaming market in the world. But, Macau-Brazil trade remained negligible (Sohn, 2012).

Table 2: China’s Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade China, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015-2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2,343,220.90</td>
<td>2,280,539.58</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>397,099.31</td>
<td>410,782.82</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>363,222.84</td>
<td>332,728.41</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>266,887.70</td>
<td>250,678.98</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>34,925.22</td>
<td>27,428.47</td>
<td>1.490%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5,976.27</td>
<td>3,722.32</td>
<td>0.255%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3,137.25</td>
<td>2,898.65</td>
<td>0.134%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,969.90</td>
<td>1,941.03</td>
<td>0.084%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>44.92</td>
<td>0.002%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>17.12</td>
<td>19.45</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>3,605.91</td>
<td>4,614.75</td>
<td>0.154%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Brazil</td>
<td>14,763.40</td>
<td>13,249.00</td>
<td>0.630%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>49,688.62</td>
<td>40,677.47</td>
<td>2.121%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite a trade slowdown in 2015 that moderated economic growth in China and produced recession in Brazil, Brazil-China trade remained substantial and by far the largest of Lusophone nations. For 2015 the Financial Times reported

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4 IMF does not break out data for Timor-Leste in its Direction of Trade statistics. China data shows a level near Cabo Verde.
Brazil’s China trade slumping 20% to $66.3b (Leahy, 2016), while Brazil government statistics show imports from China falling to US$30.7 billion, down a sharp -17.74% over 2014. Brazilian exports to China also were down, but by a smaller -12.3%. These dropped from 2014’s US$ 40.6 billion to 2015’s US$35.6 billion. Brazil’s exports to China have been highly concentrated (65% in 2015) in unprocessed iron ore and soybeans, with Brazil’s major ore producer, Vale do Rio Doce, generating fully 33% of its sales through shipments to China (Hayashi & Lima, 2015). In a near classic colonial relationship, Brazil is source of raw materials to China, and a market for its manufactured goods: of the US$35.6 billion in Brazilian exports in 2015, nearly 80% (US$28.6b) were raw materials, while 97% of Brazil’s imports from China were manufactured goods. Fortunately Brazil has enjoyed a positive trade balance with China, which in 2015 rose modestly, increasing from 2014’s US$3.3b in 2014 to 2015’s US$4.9b (Brazil Ministério, 2016). Despite Brazil’s poor economic conditions, its overall trade balance swung sharply into the black, with a trade surplus of US$19.7b versus a deficit of –US$4.05 in 2014. Matching the same percentage drop in trade with China, Brazil’s total 2015 trade volume was down –20.4%, with total trade standing at only US$ 379.7 billion versus US$477 billion in 2014 (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, External Trade by Counterparts Brazil, 2016).

Table 3: China Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade China, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1,963,105.18</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1,601,760.79</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>197,659.68</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>169,029.34</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>-14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>154,136.22</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>144,867.08</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>12,920.24</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>8,161.48</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>-36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>51,975.64</td>
<td>2.648%</td>
<td>44,380.37</td>
<td>2.771%</td>
<td>-14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>31,094.94</td>
<td>1.584%</td>
<td>15,983.16</td>
<td>0.998%</td>
<td>-48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,664.86</td>
<td>0.085%</td>
<td>1,471.84</td>
<td>0.092%</td>
<td>-11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,653.01</td>
<td>0.084%</td>
<td>451.98</td>
<td>0.028%</td>
<td>-72.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>49.96</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
<td>17.81</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>-64.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>868.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>210.30</td>
<td>0.011%</td>
<td>183.23</td>
<td>0.011%</td>
<td>-12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Brazil</td>
<td>34,673.07</td>
<td>1.766%</td>
<td>18,110.05</td>
<td>1.131%</td>
<td>-47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>86,648.71</td>
<td>4.414%</td>
<td>62,490.42</td>
<td>3.901%</td>
<td>-27.881%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Trade Relationships: Brazil, China, Macau, and Hong Kong

A central issue for Macau in its relationships with the Lusophone world is the extent of its relationship with Brazil. Over the last 50 years there have been
sporadic attempts that were unsuccessful in developing the relationship. Brazil’s largest bank, the Banco do Brasil, opened a branch office on June 23, 1980, four decades ago, on the Avenida Praia Grande while Brazil was still under military rule, and two decades ago on July 16, 1994, Brazil’s Minister of Aeronautics signed Macau’s first international air transport agreement in anticipation of Macau’s new international airport that opened late that year. These initiatives did not produce significant results. The impact of the Second Oil Crisis on Brazil’s domestic and international financial affairs forced Banco do Brasil to close its little used offices by the mid-1980s. And, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 made uneconomic the air transport links directly from Europe to Macau. Portugal’s national carrier, TAP, abandoned its flights from Portugal to Macau 18 months later in November of 1998 (Sá, 1999, p. 105). Even as Asia recovered from its crisis, Brazil’s major airline, Varig, faced its own difficulties and was forced into bankruptcy by 2005 (Varig Files, 2005).

The level of interaction between Brazil and Macau remains surprisingly minimal given the size of the Brazilian economy and the increasing prosperity of Macau. In July 1989 the Brazilian “Casa de Macau” began operations in São Paulo, with another house opening in Rio de Janeiro two years later. The Casa de Macau in São Paulo, however, is relatively small, despite it being the largest organization of the Macanese Diaspora. By the 1980s it consisted of approximately 300 individuals. The Japanese-Brazilian Community of São Paulo and Paraná, which totaled 1.5 million (Duffy, 2008), vastly dwarfed the Macau’s Casa. Importantly, in Asia, the Japanese Brazilians residents in Japan number over 300k (Spacey, 2009) and represent approximately 50% of the entire population of Macau. Brazil’s ethnic and cultural relationships with Japan undoubtedly carry far greater influence than Macau’s small expatriate community. As demonstrated in the graph below, Macau’s total population, which has grown from 490,000 in 2006 to 640,000 in 2016, is little larger than Japanese Brazilians resident in Japan (Macau Population, 2016).

Brazilians have also been prominent in some of Macau’s most important sporting events, including the Macau Grand Prix and International Women’s Volleyball, but these participations appear not to have been part of a wider Macau-Brazil organizational development. The acclaimed Brazilian driver Ayrton Senna da Silva won Macau’s inaugural Formula 3 Grand Prix in November of 1983, and Mauricio Gugelmin won two years later in 1985. Two decades later in 2005, Lucas di Grass was the champion of the 52nd Macau Grand Prix, while in 2013’s 60th year-Diamond Jubilee Anniversary race “Pipo” Derani finished third. The globally top-ranked Brazilian Women’s Volleyball Team has also regularly played in major tournaments in Macau against China, Russia, and the United States, including the 2011 International Federation of Volley Ball (FIVB) Championship, and again in the recently completed June 2016 Grand Prix that

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5 The SARS crisis hit Asia in the spring-summer of 2003, while by June 2005, due to intensive competition domestically, VARIG declared bankruptcy.
featured Brazil and the winning Chinese women’s team (FIVB Past Events Info, 2016).

**Figure 1: Macau Population**

![Macau Population Chart]

The squeeze in Brazil’s 2015 total trade would not have been helpful to Macau-Brazil trade relations had Macau in fact been playing any role in this exchange. Brazil’s exports to China do not involve Macau, which has no capability of handling the large shipments of iron ore and soybeans. These are processed exclusively in Mainland China. Brazil’s trade with China has been of strategic significance for China and has not involved Macau as illustrated by trade milestones that include (i) supplying of iron ore from summer 1973, (ii) aircraft manufacture from 2001, and (iii) the launching of earth satellites from 2013. Despite Brazil generating trade surpluses with China of US$50.38 billion over the 12 years between 2001 and 2013 (including a surplus of US$11.2 billion in 2014) (Brasil Ministério, 2014), no entity has sought to expand Macau’s role. Because the injection of a trade surplus into the Brazilian economy has been a source of its continuing growth and stability, it might have encouraged Brazilian authorities to consider widening Brazil’s operating base in China. Complementing the Japanese-Brazilian community in Japan might have been a Brazilian cultural and economic base in Macau.

Such a position in Macau should not have been difficult to achieve because trade between Brazil and China dwarfed Macau’s total economy, while Brazil was generating strong surpluses from its China trade. In 2010 Macau’s GDP of US$28.36 (World Bank, Data, 2016) was only just over half of the volume of Brazil-China trade that had hit approximately US$ 56.73 billion (Brazil Ministério, 2016). But, closer Macau and Brazil relationships did not develop. Only one small advance in Brazil-Macau relations became evident with the 2009 opening of the low-impact “Casa de Brasil em Macau.” Brazil’s strategically significant trade markers with China had occurred without any involvement of Macau or any effort.
to insert Macau in the China-Brazil link, by either widening Brazil’s base in Asia or by Brazil building a larger Lusophone trade and political polity.

**Trade Relationships: Brazil and Lusophonia**

The lack of significant relationship between Brazil and Macau is not altogether unique from Brazil’s relationships with the other key Lusophone nations that include Portugal, Angola, and Mozambique. Brazil’s trade with the “Lusophone community” is remarkably low, given the size of the Brazilian economy and its leading theoretical position in a “Lusophonia.” This is not surprising. Apart from Brazil, “Lusophonia” is actually the Portuguese Empire pre-1974, of which the non-Portuguese portion was known as the “Ultramar.” The economic relationships that existed pre-1974 in the Ultramar were based on Portugal’s support of expatriate Portuguese settlement in Angola and Mozambique combined with the needs of companies engaged in raw material extraction in Africa. Brazil had not been involved in these efforts, while the military conflicts in the Ultramar that arose post-independence shattered the Angolan and Mozambique economies and drove the Portuguese ex-pat communities from the countries. When Angola began to build its trade links to China in the late 1990s, Brazil was dealing with its own precarious financial situation. Trade data shows Brazil had little interest in building economic links to the former Portuguese Ultramar.

**Table 4: Brazil Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Brazil, 2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>225,099.61</td>
<td>191,134.06</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, P.R.:</td>
<td>40,616.11</td>
<td>35,607.52</td>
<td>-12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainland</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>27,144.93</td>
<td>24,215.98</td>
<td>-10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3,322.87</td>
<td>2,108.00</td>
<td>-36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,261.72</td>
<td>647.99</td>
<td>-48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,060.26</td>
<td>822.20</td>
<td>-22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>63.86</td>
<td>69.10</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>21.27</td>
<td>21.37</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>4.94</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>2,415.81</td>
<td>1,571.15</td>
<td>-34.964%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the IMF data below displays, Brazilian trade with Lusophonia remains extraordinarily weak. In 2015, the entire Lusophone market represented only 0.82% of Brazil’s total exports (less than 1%). Hong Kong alone took more of Brazil’s exports than the entire Lusophone area. Stunningly, Brazil reported
negligible exports to Macau of only US$500,000 and the lowest to any Lusophone region. Brazilian exports to the Macau SAR are likely to be routed through Hong Kong and are not shown directly in trade statistics. Additionally, no Lusophone country was ranked as one of Brazil’s top 10 export markets or import suppliers. Despite being the second highest GDP of Lusophone GDP, in 2014 even Portugal only ranked as Brazil’s 41st largest export market with US$1.06 billion in revenues. Angola, though ranked above Portugal, stood in only 37th place with its Brazilian imports as reported by Brazil (not the IMF) totaling just US$1.26 billion (Brazil Ministério, 2015). By 2015 Angola’s imports from Brazil had dropped -48.6%, and it was receiving just 0.34% of Brazil’s exports (Table 4.0).

The 2015 trade situation for Brazil’s imports reflected an even worse position for the Lusophonia grouping. Brazil’s imports from the region represented only 0.5% of its total imports, with Angola and Portugal being the only significant suppliers. Nothing was exported to Brazil from four of the poorest Lusophonia states, while Macau only sent US$5.4m of goods, just 0.003% of Brazil’s total imports.

**Brazil and the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), 1997**

There are historical roots to the low level of Macau interface with Brazil. The Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) that hit Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Korea through the summer and fall of 1997 massively and negatively impacted an Asian economic arena to which Brazil was not significantly tied. The AFC not only popped the regional real estate bubble, but it reinforced the specific downturn in the Macau market that the city had already been experiencing in the aftermath of the opening of Macau’s new airport in November 1995. Macau’s economic profile sank as the Hong Kong Stock Market collapsed 30% in late October 1997, and the profits of Macau’s key commercial entity, the non-publicly traded, Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau, SA; (STDM; 澳門旅遊娛樂股份有限公司) dropped 50% (Gunn, 2005, p. 136). By November 1997 Portugal’s national flag carrier had stopped flying to the newly opened Macau airport. The AFC ended Macau’s boom and forestalled any development of Macau-Brazil trade relations that the Brazil-Macau Air Transport Agreement of July 1994 might have supported.

The AFC also impacted Brazil, deflecting the country’s leadership (Henrique Cardoso) from any effort to expand the economic interface with Asia. International fund managers suggested that Brazil’s finance structure resembled that of the stricken Asian nations and issued warnings that Brazil was a possible new problem (Skidmore, 1999, p. 233). With strong pressure against its currency, Brazil heightened its interest rates to a crushing 43%. This drastically shrank domestic demand. The following August of 1998, after the AFC tsunami hit Russia with debt defaults and Ruble devaluation, Brazil again was struck by a massive drop in its currency reserves and the need to arrange for a bailout package from the IMF and the US treasury. Brazil’s currency reserves shrank from US$73 billion to US$47 billion while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was forced
to extend a US$41.5b rescue package (Gordon, 2001, pp. 190-191). In Brazil no attention could be spared on the minor issue of Macau’s coming handover to China.

The year 1999 provided no relief. Having dodged the disastrous economic situations in Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Russia, Brazil still had to deal with a rising inflation rate near 9%, fiscal budget deficits, and heavy debt service. Confronted by a major current account deficit of (US$24.4 billion) that generated and even greater external debt, Brazilian monetary authorities pushed domestic interest rates to 49% p.a., which reduced the trade deficit to a (US$1.2 billion), but precluded any growth based on domestic consumer or business demand. For the three years from 1997 through 1999, Brazil’s first priority had been to stabilize its own economy. No residual resources or time was available to deal with the tiny economy and city of Macau.

**Table 5: Brazil Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Brazil, 2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>251,966.03</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>188,601.9</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China, P.R.: Mainland</td>
<td>41,074.67</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>33,790.98</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>-17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>38,829.05</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>29,435.74</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>-24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>976.56</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>679.76</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>-30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,220.80</td>
<td>0.542%</td>
<td>35.03</td>
<td>0.018%</td>
<td>-97.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1,205.89</td>
<td>0.536%</td>
<td>890.36</td>
<td>0.466%</td>
<td>-26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>11.23</td>
<td>0.005%</td>
<td>20.83</td>
<td>0.011%</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-62.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>571.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>16.19</td>
<td>0.007%</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
<td>-66.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>2,454.28</td>
<td>1.090%</td>
<td>952.18</td>
<td>0.498%</td>
<td>-61.203%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Macau’s Return to China**

Macau’s return to China in late December 1999 theoretically might have removed the city from the constraints of it having been under the limited Portuguese economic network, opening it to playing a larger role in an expanded Lusophone commercial world. But, the realities of Brazil’s financial struggles and the need for China to smoothly integrate Macau into its newly minted policy of “One Country, Two Systems,” kept the two countries of Brazil and China firmly focused on their own domestic priorities. China only established its “Macau Forum” (Fórum para a Cooperação Económica entre a China e os Países de Língua Portuguesa), in October 2003, four years after the city’s handover to China. And, there was some ambiguity in its mission: was its major function to
enhance China’s relationship with Lusophonia, or to build the Macau’s interface? In any event, Macau was preoccupied with creating its new international casino economy that had a profitability which dwarfed all other possible economic or political initiatives of the city, and transfixed its leadership. In these first years, neither Macau nor China realistically gave any significant priority to building Macau’s economic links to those non-Brazilian Lusophone nations who were struggling out of post-colonial conflicts and whose economies were minute, with the exception of Angola.

From China’s perspective, links to Brazil had been handled successfully from Beijing since the two countries had established diplomatic relations in August of 1974, 25 years before. Macau could add nothing to these strategic links, which were already in place. In Macau the opening of its gaming industry to international investors in February 2002 targeted three top American gaming companies Las Vegas Sands, Wynn Resorts, and MGM. Also coming to the city was a new Hong Kong-Australian firm (Melco Entertainment) that had its primary listing in New York City, and one Hong Kong-based real estate and construction materials firm (Galaxy Entertainment). The Lusophone world, which included Brazil and the former Portuguese Ultramar, had no relationship to this effort.

Massive earning from gaming industry investments hypnotized attention and monopolized resources, with activities that included building links to Brazil and the old Ultramar relegated to low-budget public relations activities. The only significant visit to the Macau SAR from Brazil since the handover, were the uneventful visits by Brazil’s vice president Michel Temer in the fall of 2013 for the 10th anniversary of the Macau Forum and the cameo appearance almost a decade earlier in the fall of 2004 of Brazil’s Minister of Culture and one of the country’s greatest musical artists, Gilberto Gil. His visit was incidental to his main purpose of visiting Hong Kong, not Macau, during the Hong Kong music festival. Up until Michel Temer in 2013, Gil was highest ranking Brazilian official ever to have visited Macau. Clearly Brazil has not had Macau high on its list of priorities for Asia.

**Table 6: Balance of Payments Macao SAR (10 million MOP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current Account</td>
<td>18,712.8</td>
<td>96,766.7</td>
<td>126,978.0</td>
<td>143,467.8</td>
<td>175,265.2</td>
<td>168,383.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods</td>
<td>-7,364.5</td>
<td>-43,706.6</td>
<td>-62,491.1</td>
<td>-70,641.1</td>
<td>-85,440.2</td>
<td>-98,190.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>26,417.7</td>
<td>171,070.8</td>
<td>234,023.5</td>
<td>270,844.3</td>
<td>333,420.5</td>
<td>339,399.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary income</td>
<td>-92.6</td>
<td>-24,352.9</td>
<td>-39,984.5</td>
<td>-51,163.2</td>
<td>-64,867.1</td>
<td>-63,070.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary income</td>
<td>-247.7</td>
<td>-6,244.5</td>
<td>-4,569.9</td>
<td>-5,572.2</td>
<td>-7,848.1</td>
<td>-9,755.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Macau’s Major Trading Partners: Hong Kong and China

Macau’s structure of trade reflects the domination of its gaming industry over traditional import and export trade. As below, the latest figures provided by the Macau government (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016) show that in 2014 Net Services generated positive revenues of MOP 339.4 billion (US$42.4b) versus a loss of MOP 98.1billion (US$12.2b) on the merchandise account. Also displayed is the remarkable jump in revenues that has occurred since the opening of the gaming industry to international operators in 2002. Gaming revenues are up MOP 313 billion (US$ 39b), 12.8 times the level of 2002:

Detailed reporting on the structure of services presented in the chart that follows also reveals that the “Travel Sector,” which incorporates gaming revenues is the overwhelming source of Macau’s Service revenue. Of total 2014 exports of services of MOP 424 billion, fully 96% (MOP 407billion) were generated by the Travel Sector. The lack of importance of Macau’s merchandise exports is also demonstrated by the fact that 2014 exports of goods stood at just MOP 15.2 billion, only 3.6% of the volume of services exports.

China (64.3%), Hong Kong (21.7%), and Taiwan (4.1%) generated 90.1% of all gaming tourists as of June 2016, with other close-in components of Greater China that included Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia pulling in another 3.1%. There were no gaming tourists to any significant degree generated from the Lusophone world, including Brazil, Portugal, and Angola (Macau Government Tourist Office, 2016).

With respect to merchandise trade as of 1Q 2016 as exhibited in the chart below, Macau’s major merchandise export market is Hong Kong with 60.3% of its total exports, followed by China with 16.4%. Its major suppliers are also China with 36.1% and Hong Kong with 9.2% (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016). Importantly, as in the official Macau graphic below, no Lusophone nation appears in its summary trade statistics, including that from the largest two Lusophone economies, Brazil and Portugal, and the two largest countries of Portugal’s former Ultramar, Angola, and Mozambique. Significantly, the Macau government does not report any significant import or export merchandise trade with Brazil on its main statistics site (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016).

Macau is primarily an importer of goods, as its export earnings come from gaming services not from product export. Trade numbers reported to the IMF by Macau showed that in 2015 Brazil provided only 0.38% of Macau’s total imports. The IMF data (Table 8.0) also demonstrated that while Macau is a relatively large market with imports of goods of US$11.3 billion in 2014 and US$10.6 billion in 2015, Brazil plays no role there. On the export side, Macau is a much smaller exporter of product as displayed in Table 9.0.

Of note is the issue that while the IMF provides comprehensive data on mutual trade, there are differences between what countries report for their
respective mutual imports and exports. The IMF data from Brazil, Macau, and Hong Kong for trade between Brazil-Macau and for Hong Kong-Macau shows large discrepancies. The IMF claims privately that this results from Hong Kong being a transit shipment point for Macau’s merchandise trade. Any product that touches Hong Kong shore in transit is apparently claimed by Hong Kong to be a Hong Kong export. The size of the discrepancy between Hong Kong and Macau data is startling and points to inconsistent data collection between the two SARs. Macau reports to the IMF as in Table 8.0 that Hong Kong supplies 10.3% of Macau’s total imports, or US$1.156. Hong Kong on the other hand reports that its exports to Macau are in the order of US$6 billion. This problem in the IMF-Macau-Hong Kong statistical system should be resolved.

**Table 7: Balance of Payments Components: Current Account (10 million MOP)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
<td>18,712.8</td>
<td>96,766.7</td>
<td>126,978.0</td>
<td>143,467.8</td>
<td>175,265.2</td>
<td>168,383.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credit</strong></td>
<td>63,123.9</td>
<td>249,679.8</td>
<td>342,196.4</td>
<td>393,410.0</td>
<td>464,566.1</td>
<td>475,316.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Debit</strong></td>
<td>44,411.1</td>
<td>152,913.1</td>
<td>215,218.4</td>
<td>249,942.2</td>
<td>289,300.9</td>
<td>306,933.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods</strong></td>
<td>-7,364.5</td>
<td>-43,706.6</td>
<td>-62,491.1</td>
<td>-70,641.1</td>
<td>-85,440.2</td>
<td>-98,190.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>18,925.4</td>
<td>8,324.0</td>
<td>9,024.9</td>
<td>11,839.1</td>
<td>12,694.6</td>
<td>15,197.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>26,289.9</td>
<td>52,030.6</td>
<td>71,516.0</td>
<td>82,480.2</td>
<td>98,134.8</td>
<td>113,388.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Services</strong></td>
<td>26,417.7</td>
<td>171,070.8</td>
<td>234,023.5</td>
<td>270,844.3</td>
<td>333,420.5</td>
<td>339,399.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>39,707.5</td>
<td>232,118.0</td>
<td>319,479.6</td>
<td>362,451.1</td>
<td>428,377.3</td>
<td>424,390.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>2,366.3</td>
<td>4,004.0</td>
<td>4,792.2</td>
<td>4,668.1</td>
<td>4,957.3</td>
<td>5,100.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>35,431.4</td>
<td>222,475.8</td>
<td>308,391.8</td>
<td>350,433.4</td>
<td>414,296.9</td>
<td>407,414.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>694.7</td>
<td>3,210.6</td>
<td>3,013.0</td>
<td>4,429.8</td>
<td>6,415.3</td>
<td>8,793.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance / pension</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>244.2</td>
<td>293.1</td>
<td>405.5</td>
<td>514.0</td>
<td>735.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5,936.5</td>
<td>2,183.6</td>
<td>2,989.5</td>
<td>2,514.4</td>
<td>2,193.9</td>
<td>2,347.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>13,289.8</td>
<td>61,047.2</td>
<td>85,456.2</td>
<td>91,606.8</td>
<td>94,956.8</td>
<td>84,991.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>940.7</td>
<td>2,405.8</td>
<td>3,052.6</td>
<td>3,052.8</td>
<td>3,537.2</td>
<td>3,869.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>3,953.1</td>
<td>9,236.5</td>
<td>11,020.7</td>
<td>12,760.3</td>
<td>13,602.7</td>
<td>14,622.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>639.6</td>
<td>1,824.5</td>
<td>2,288.1</td>
<td>2,837.7</td>
<td>2,501.6</td>
<td>2,751.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance / pension</td>
<td>553.4</td>
<td>745.5</td>
<td>850.5</td>
<td>1,083.1</td>
<td>1,292.3</td>
<td>1,331.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7,203.0</td>
<td>46,834.8</td>
<td>68,244.3</td>
<td>71,873.0</td>
<td>74,023.0</td>
<td>62,416.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brazil in the data shown in Table 4.0 reported in 2014 and 2015 that its exports to Macau were stunningly low, said to be only US$500,000 in 2015 and even smaller amount than the 2014 level: a mere US$520,000. This ranked Macau as Brazil’s 171st export market out of 181 countries. However, Macau reported per Table 8.0 below that Brazil’s exports to the Macau SAR stood at US$41.38m in 2014 and US$40.38 in 2015. An explanation from the IMF and the customs
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authorities of these countries is needed over these significant differences. Nevertheless, even the higher numbers from Macau demonstrate that Brazil, the largest Lusophone economy, is not playing a significant role in Macau.

Table 8: Macau Imports from Lusophonia and the World (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Macau, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>11,262.14</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>10,627.18</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>3,735.63</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>3,590.35</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>-3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>1,156.16</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>934.01</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>-19.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>733.18</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>712.18</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>2,445.12</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>2,116.17</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>-13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>41.38</td>
<td>0.367%</td>
<td>40.38</td>
<td>0.380%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>0.275%</td>
<td>34.88</td>
<td>0.328%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.019%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Brazil</td>
<td>31.01</td>
<td>0.275%</td>
<td>36.88</td>
<td>0.347%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, apart from the second largest Lusophone economy of Portugal, the remaining members of Lusophonia have virtually no role in Macau’s international trade relations. Given Portugal’s five century long relationship with the city Portugal’s level of exports to Macau is disappointing. Portugal sold the city just US$31m 2015. This was just 0.275% of Macau’s total imports of US$10.627 billion.

Because Macau is predominantly a provider of gaming services, its export of product ranks considerably below its imports. Year 2015 shows that Macau exported only US$1.25b worth of product while importing US$10.6b, for a net trade deficit of US$9.35b. Gaming receipts covered the gap. Nevertheless, as reported by Brazil to the IMF, Brazil’s imports from Macau again demonstrate that Brazil, the largest Lusophone economy, and Macau, the rising Lusophone city, have an extremely low level of economic interface. Brazil’s imports from Macau in 2015 (Table 5.0) had dropped to only US$5.36 million versus the small US$16.2 million of 2014. These had already ranked Macau 94th out of Brazil’s total suppliers (International Monetary Fund, External Trade by Counterparts, 2016). For the remainder of Lusophonia, as reported by Macau, the situation was
worse. Macau’s 2015 data (Table 9.0) clarified that the city was exporting a minimal amount to Portugal of US$100,000, and nothing to Brazil. For Macau, there apparently were no exports to any other Lusophone nation in 2015. As in a prior assessment of 2014 (Spooner, 2016), despite the stunningly successful growth of the Brazilian, Chinese, and Macau economies since China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001,

. . . direct trade relations between Macau and Brazil are minimal. The two economies, to date, operate in completely distinct arenas: while Brazil provides resources to China’s expanding economy, Macau provides entertainment via its casino economy. Macau and Brazil have not yet developed a direct mechanism through which trade and social interaction can grow naturally and commensurate with each other’s booming economies. (p. 331)

**Figures 2 and 3: Merchandise Exports and Imports**
Table 9: Macau Exports to Lusophonia & World (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>1,241.33</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>1,249.77</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>194.58</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>228.01</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>727.69</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>792.39</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>36.71</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>24.60</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-33.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>34.67</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>25.34</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>-26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.005%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.008%</td>
<td>-65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Brazil</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.008%</td>
<td>-69.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.032%</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.008%</td>
<td>-74.232%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hong Kong’s Trade with Brazil and Lusophonia

The level of trade between Hong Kong and Brazil is massive when compared to Macau. It assuredly is based upon Hong Kong’s commercial infrastructure that included its major bank (HSBC) having been one of Brazil’s largest Banks up until August 2015. Hong Kong reports that its level of trade with Brazil, which was US$3.4b in 2015, is far in excess of anything Macau might contemplate for a considerable period into the future. Hong Kong’s 2015 exports to Brazil of US$1.375b (Table 10.0), despite being -26.6% lower than 2014’s US$1.874b, overwhelmed Macau’s virtual absence of any exports (Table 9.0). Hong Kong’s 2015 imports from Brazil of US$2.11b also were substantially higher than its exports, despite a 28.5% reduction from 2014’s US$2.954 (Table 11.0).

However, comparing Brazil’s trade to China with its trade with Hong Kong shows that even Hong Kong plays a relatively minor role in Brazil’s interface with China. In 2015 Brazilian exports to Hong Kong of US$ 2.11 billion were only 5.9% of Brazil’s exports to China of US$ 35.6 billion (Table 4.0). For Brazil though, its Hong Kong trade generates attractive returns. Brazilian data (Table 5.0) shows imports from Hong Kong in 2015 were US$ 680m (versus US$ 977m the year before), netting Brazil an attractive US$ 1.42 billion from its Hong Kong commerce. Nevertheless with total 2015 Brazil-Hong Kong trade of US$2.78 billion representing only 4.2% of the Brazil-China trade of US$ 66.1 billion, Brazil’s main focus will be on the China mainland, not Hong Kong. Macau is not likely to be even an afterthought.
Table 10: HK Exports to Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade HK, 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015-2014 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>473,964.50</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>465,483.27</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>255,337.23</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>249,945.55</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>44,149.88</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>44,281.58</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>31,925.72</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>30,658.72</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1,874.00</td>
<td>0.395%</td>
<td>1,375.65</td>
<td>0.296%</td>
<td>-26.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>155.41</td>
<td>0.033%</td>
<td>96.93</td>
<td>0.021%</td>
<td>-37.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>282.39</td>
<td>0.060%</td>
<td>253.36</td>
<td>0.054%</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>76.79</td>
<td>0.016%</td>
<td>52.46</td>
<td>0.002%</td>
<td>-31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>104.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Macau &amp; Brazil</td>
<td>523.67</td>
<td>0.110%</td>
<td>408.78</td>
<td>0.078%</td>
<td>-21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>6,296.77</td>
<td>1.329%</td>
<td>6,021.02</td>
<td>0.264%</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia w/o Brazil</td>
<td>6,820.44</td>
<td>1.439%</td>
<td>6,429.80</td>
<td>0.342%</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>8,694.44</td>
<td>1.834%</td>
<td>7,805.45</td>
<td>1.677%</td>
<td>-10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect to Lusophonia outside of Brazil, Hong Kong’s trade is not of critical size for Hong Kong, but it is far larger than that of Macau’s negligible levels. Concentrated in Angola, Portugal, and Mozambique this commerce generates for Hong Kong over half a billion U.S. dollars annually, which in 2015 included US$408m of exports and US$155m of imports. As with Brazil and China, the four small Lusophone nations of Cabo Verde, Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau, and Principe-Sao Tome seem to have virtually no significant trade with Hong Kong.

As demonstrated in the data Hong Kong provides to the IMF, competition between Macau and Hong Kong might be observable through the levels of trade that the two SARs report into the IMF. Hong Kong’s data shows that its exports to Macau, which stood at US$6 billion in 2015 (Table 8.0), are massively larger than the figures reported by the Macau government. According to Macau its 2015 imports from Hong Kong stood at only US$934 (Table 6.0), creating a reporting gap between Macau and Hong Kong of US$5 billion dollars. IMF puts this problematic issue on the back of the Hong Kong government, reporting that all goods transshipped thru Hong Kong are claimed as Hong Kong exports. Other explanations for the discrepancy may be: (i) a flaw in the IMF trade statistics collection system, (ii) the Macau government wishing to minimize general knowledge of the level of influence that Hong Kong maintains over the Macau economy, or (iii) the Hong Kong government being not sufficiently rigorous in its
export categorization. Given that both SARs are under the sovereignty of Beijing, this unsettling discrepancy should be rectified with the IMF assisting in its resolution.

**Table 11: HK Imports from Lusophonia (US$ millions) (International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade HK, 2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% 2015-2014</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>544,937.20</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>522,599.87</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>-15.1%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>47.1%</td>
<td>256,158.59</td>
<td>49.0%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>5.2%</td>
<td>27,305.36</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>-3.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro Area</td>
<td>30,859.72</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>27,389.90</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>-11.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2,954.65</td>
<td>0.542%</td>
<td>2,112.16</td>
<td>0.404%</td>
<td>-28.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>18.23</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
<td>24.12</td>
<td>0.005%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>145.00</td>
<td>0.027%</td>
<td>125.26</td>
<td>0.024%</td>
<td>-13.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>5.59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>-32.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste (n.d.)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.000%</td>
<td>905.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>166.21</td>
<td>0.031%</td>
<td>155.08</td>
<td>0.030%</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>w/o Macau &amp; Brazil</td>
<td>814.66</td>
<td>0.149%</td>
<td>922.12</td>
<td>0.176%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>980.87</td>
<td>0.180%</td>
<td>1,077.21</td>
<td>0.206%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL Lusofonia</td>
<td>3,935.51</td>
<td>0.722%</td>
<td>3,189.36</td>
<td>0.610%</td>
<td>-19.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Institutional Change in China’s Macau Forum**

Given the low level of progress in expanding trade relations between Macau and Lusophonia since the opening of China’s Macau Forum over a decade ago in 2003, despite its mandate to focus on trade and economic relationships, one should not be surprised to observe significant management change in the organization. To that effect, in late June of 2016 the Macau based *O Clarim* newspaper reported (*O Clarim, 2016*) that the new Secretary General and head of the Macau Forum was to be Ms. Xu Yingzhen (徐迎真), presently Deputy Director of the Department of American and Oceania Affairs of China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) under Director Jiang Shan (江山). Additionally, on July 1, 2016, Wang Zhimin (王志民), one of three deputy directors of the State Council’s Hong Kong and Macau Office (港澳辦) replaced Li Gang (李剛), who since late 2012 had been the Director of the China’s Liaison Office in Macau (中央人民政府駐澳門特別行政區聯絡辦公室). No specific reason was given for
the change other than health issues, while Li Gang has not been criticized for actions during his Macau tenure.

The expected arrival of Ms. Xu in November 2016 would seem to signal China’s new emphasis on Brazil, for which she has had extensive responsibility at a senior level in MOFCOM. She will replace Chang Hexi (常和喜), a Portuguese-speaking Chinese diplomat with experience in Lisbon who had been appointed to the position seven years ago in September 2009 following the death in office in July 2008 of Zhao Chuang (趙闖). Also leaving the Macau Forum will be the head of administration (Coordenadora do Gabinete de Administração do Secretariado Permanente), Ms. Zhang Jie (張杰) for whom a replacement has not been announced. In 2008 it took almost a year and half to find a replacement for the deceased Zhao Chuang, leading some to speculate that China was downgrading the Forum. Zhao had only been in office four months when he died, having been elected in March 2008 to replace Wang Chengan (王成安), a long-time African specialist familiar with the African liberation movements. Wang had been Secretary General since its 2003 founding.

In addition to changes on the PRC side, three significant changes recently materialized on the Macau side. Long-term Macau representative Rita Santos Rosario (Secretária-Geral Adjunta do Secretariado Permanente do Fórum de Macau), who had been with the organization since its inception, was replaced in March 2015 by Echo Chan, the Executive Director for Macau’s Trade and Investment Promotion Institute (IPIM). Ms. Chan remained just half a year until October 2015 when she resigned for personal reasons to take up residence in Brazil. Her replacement is Cristina Morais, the former head of External Economic Relations of the Macau Economic Services Department. The Macau Forum’s new officers from China and Macau will be confronting significant challenges.

**Macau After 2015**

Macau’s pre-occupation with its own development and gaming industry has been heightened since mid-2014, as a downturn in gaming revenues has focused Macau’s leaders on the future of their own key industry. Initiatives with Lusophonia will not take a priority over restructuring Macau’s gaming business. Macau’s reliance on the gaming industry was heightened between 2008 and 2014 when three new mega-casinos were added to its casino inventory. During the period Macau’s gaming revenues tripled, rising from MOP 109.8 billion to MOP 352.8 billion.

The gaming industry, however, expected an even greater growth. US$22 billion is being invested in new facilities. Macau gaming concession holders have launched plans for six new casinos on the Cotai Strip to be opened 2015 -2017. These include (i) the Galaxy Casino Project Phase II of US$ 5.5 billion that opened in May 2015 (GGRAsia, 2015b), (ii) Melco Crown’s Studio City of US$ 3.2 billion that opened in October 2015 (Studio City Macau, 2015), (iii) The Parisian of LVS of US$ 2.5 billion scheduled in second half of 2016 (Parisian Macau, 2015), (iv) Wynn Resorts Casino of US$ 4 billion scheduled for August
2016 (Stynes, 2016), (v) MGM-Macau’s of US$ 2.9 billion casino scheduled for first part of 2017 (Stutz, 2016), and (vi) SJM’s colossus of US$ 3.9 billion, the Lisboa Palace, scheduled to open in 4Q 2017 (GGRAsia, 2015a).

Just as implementation of these plans began, China’s new leadership launched an anti-corruption campaign on Mainland China that caused a sharp drop in Macau’s gaming revenues. From a high point of MOP 102 billion that was reached in 1Q 2014, gaming revenues shrank a dramatic 46.7% to MOP 54.6 billion 18 months later (by 3Q 2015). Macau government reported that quarterly levels stopped falling in late 2015 and rose 3.27% to MOP 56.3 billion by the end of 1Q 2016, but the hoped for bottoming out has not materialized.

Just released reports for June 2016 indicate a continuing contraction. In June casino gross gaming revenue declined by 8.5% over the previous June and stood at MOP15.9b (US$1.99 billion). This is the lowest monthly figure since September 2010, when revenues were MOP15.30b. Revenues of MOP107.79b for the first six months of 2016 also showed a drop of 11.4% over 2015 despite the up-tick in 1Q (GGRAsia, 2016).

Despite the downturn, the Macau gaming industry has not collapsed: 1Q 2016 revenues were 203.2% over those of the base year of 1Q 2007 (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, 2016). Nevertheless, the unexpected fall of revenues, which directly impact the funds flowing to the Macau government, cannot help but affect Macau’s new large-scale casino projects as well as nature of the facilities that each will offer. One can expect delays in casino openings, smaller casino operators being forced from the market, and new policies from Beijing to address the transition in Macau’s gaming industry.

**Conclusion**

Present trade data for Macau demonstrates the significance of the Gravity Model of international trade that predicts that Macau’s trade will remain in the close orbit of China, Macau’s massive sovereign authority. The pull of Brazil, Portugal, and Angola will only be weakly felt. Ghemawat’s CAGE model reinforces the reality that Macau’s economic relationships will be inextricably linked with China: Macau is overwhelmingly a Chinese community, with only residual Portuguese cultural and linguistic influence, while its political and legal development is directly under Beijing’s control. Macau’s present merchandise trade pattern exhibits a tight relationship with Hong Kong and China, with a much lesser role being played by the European Union, the United States, and Japan. There is virtually no trade with the Lusophone world, including a relatively weak relationship with Portugal. In the critical services sector, 91% of Macau’s clients are coming directly from Greater China. No Lusophone nations are listed as client sources.

Macau’s minimal level of trade with the Lusophone World in either goods or services has not been reversed by the decade-long attempt to build China’s
Table 12: Macau Gaming 2007-2016 Quarterly (Macau Government, Direcção dos Serviços de Estatística e Censos, July 2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Gross Revenue Total (million MOP)</th>
<th>% Change Q to Q</th>
<th>% Change Base Yr</th>
<th>Tax from Casino gaming million MOP</th>
<th>Gaming table No.</th>
<th>Slot machine No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>18,598</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>7,023</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>19,772</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>7,655</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>20,535</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>7,223</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>24,942</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>9,048</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>30,085</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>10,777</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4,311</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>29,179</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>56.9%</td>
<td>11,076</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>26,204</td>
<td>-10.2%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>11,024</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>24,358</td>
<td>-7.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>9,020</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4,017</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>26,252</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>9,392</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>25,619</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>10,191</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>32,036</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>11,116</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>36,476</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td>13,610</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>41,248</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>121.8%</td>
<td>14,900</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,811</td>
</tr>
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<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>45,219</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>143.1%</td>
<td>16,997</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
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<td>156.6%</td>
<td>17,362</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>55,398</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>197.9%</td>
<td>19,517</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,791</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>58,835</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>216.4%</td>
<td>21,864</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>65,900</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>254.3%</td>
<td>24,519</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>70,521</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>279.2%</td>
<td>26,371</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>73,802</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>296.8%</td>
<td>26,902</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5,302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>74,596</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>301.1%</td>
<td>27,748</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>5,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>74,670</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>301.5%</td>
<td>28,747</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>74,854</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>302.5%</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>81,115</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>336.1%</td>
<td>28,883</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
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<td>85,600</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>360.3%</td>
<td>31,217</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>86,419</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>364.7%</td>
<td>33,688</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>89,447</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>380.9%</td>
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<td>35</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>100,401</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>439.8%</td>
<td>36,071</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,750</td>
</tr>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>102,491</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>451.1%</td>
<td>37,976</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
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<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>91,236</td>
<td>-11.0%</td>
<td>390.6%</td>
<td>37,377</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,710</td>
</tr>
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<td>83,143</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
<td>347.1%</td>
<td>31,925</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>75,844</td>
<td>-8.8%</td>
<td>307.8%</td>
<td>29,432</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>65,033</td>
<td>-14.3%</td>
<td>249.7%</td>
<td>25,383</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,704</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.2</td>
<td>57,115</td>
<td>-12.2%</td>
<td>207.1%</td>
<td>23,112</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.3</td>
<td>54,602</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
<td>193.6%</td>
<td>25,383</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qtr.4</td>
<td>55,061</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>196.1%</td>
<td>23,112</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Qtr.1</td>
<td>56,389</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>203.2%</td>
<td>25,383</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5,704</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
relations to Lusophonia via the Macau Forum. Its new leadership in coordination with the China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has a formidable task ahead.

In the meantime, the major expansion of Macau’s gaming infrastructure that is taking place in the face of a significant downturn in gaming revenue will preoccupy Macau’s key economic leadership over the next several years. The restructure is likely to bump up against the negotiations over gaming concession extensions that begin to expire in 2020. Key drivers of Macau gaming have been major American gaming operators, who would approach the potential Brazil gaming market from offices with responsibility for the Americas. There are no indications that Macau-Hong Kong based Galaxy, SJM, or Melco Crown, along with local junket operators, are playing any role in attempting to build a gaming industry in Brazil. The most significant non-Asian initiative of the locally based firms has been Galaxy’s investment in Monaco’s gaming monopoly, Société des Bains de Mer.

With respect to Macau’s relationship with Lusophonia, the potential of a larger relationship might be gauged through the barometer of Macau’s trade with Brazil, which has an economy that dwarfs all other Lusophone GDPs combined. While both jurisdictions are theoretically part of the “Lusophone world,” Macau and Brazil have historically been in isolation from one another despite booming economies in Brazil, China, and Macau since China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization. The IMF reports that Macau-Brazil trade was extraordinarily low in 2015 and even smaller than the minute level in 2014. Brazil’s primary economic relationships are with China and the United States, and that trade will not be rerouted through Macau any time soon. Additionally, Hong Kong, whose Brazilian trade represents approximately 4.2% of the volume of Brazil-China trade but generates $1.2 billion in surpluses for Brazil, will not be easily displaced from its present entrenched and superior position with Lusophonia.

Providing a major stumbling block for Macau’s Lusophone efforts is the fact that Brazil’s relationships with China, which parallel its relationships with Angola and Mozambique, have had little to do directly with Portugal or Macau. Brazil-China relationships developed bilaterally based upon the geo-political alignments that were in place and evolving between 1974 and 1999 and were not intermediated either through Macau, Portugal, or the former Portuguese Ultramar. Decades ago attempts were made to launch a Macau-Brazil economic relationship via the opening of a Banco do Brasil branch in Macau in June 1980 and the signing of Macau’s first international air treaty in July 1994, but these initiatives were insufficient to overcome the reality that the economic development of both Brazil and Macau was taking place in separate economic and political regions. Without Macau building an economic interface to Brazil, it is difficult to see how Macau might build a separate significant relationship with the much smaller, less developed, and politically more problematic nations that constitute the remaining portion of the Lusophone grouping.

Part of the mandate of the incoming Secretary General of the Macau Forum, Ms. Xu Yingzhen (徐迎真), must certainly be to tackle the lack of success in building any trade between Macau and the Lusophone world over the last 12 years
Despite the organization’s objectives, Ms. Xu will also need to address the strategic quandary of how to build relationships with Brazil in the face of its present difficult economic difficulties and Macau’s preoccupation with reconfiguring its gaming industry.

The Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Macau Forum scheduled for November 2016 will need to handle concretely the policy expressions by China and other Lusophonia countries to build and strengthen an operating global Lusophone network from China and Macau in the face of Macau’s weak merchandise trade with these nations. The city’s less-than-competitive international trade infrastructure will obstruct the effort, while the need to rebuild Macau’s gaming revenues and renegotiate gaming concessions will have priority.

References


APPENDIX I: China’s Lusophone Trade 3Q 2015

Chinese trade data from the Macau Forum for the first three quarters of 2015 reinforces the reality that Brazil dominates the Chinese relationship with Lusophonia: Virtually all of China’s trade with Lusophonia (99.9%) was carried on with the four states of Brazil (72.7%), Angola (20.4%), Portugal (4.4%), and Mozambique (2.3%) (Macau Forum, 2015). The four smaller states of Timor-Leste, Cabo Verde, Guine-Bissau, and Sao Tome-Principe play very little role in China’s international trade.

Table 13: China Trade with Lusophonia, 2015 January-September vs. 2014 (US$000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$55,608,303.5</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>$21,968,685.4</td>
<td>$33,639,618.0</td>
<td>$68,237,721.2</td>
<td>-18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$15,564,352.5</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>$2,938,217.0</td>
<td>$12,626,135.6</td>
<td>$28,262,101.5</td>
<td>-44.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>$3,382,366.6</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>$2,195,249.9</td>
<td>$1,187,116.7</td>
<td>$3,613,305.5</td>
<td>-6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>$1,789,339.9</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>$1,450,747.7</td>
<td>$338,592.2</td>
<td>$2,329,132.3</td>
<td>-23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>$62,858.1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>$62,179.4</td>
<td>$678.7</td>
<td>$41,324.3</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>$35,326.2</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$35,309.7</td>
<td>$16.5</td>
<td>$40,333.7</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guine-Bissau</td>
<td>$30,628.3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$12,907.7</td>
<td>$17,720.6</td>
<td>$60,609.7</td>
<td>-49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome-Principe</td>
<td>$4,530.5</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>$4,520.8</td>
<td>$9.6</td>
<td>$2,824.5</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$76,477,705.6</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>$28,667,817.6</td>
<td>$47,809,887.9</td>
<td>$102,587,352.7</td>
<td>-25.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About the Contributors

Raul Mendes Fernandes Jr. is Vice-Rector at the University Amilcar Cabral in Bissau, Guinea Bissau and was a Fulbright Scholar-in-Residence at Kennesaw State University during the Year of the Portuguese Speaking World (2015-2016) at Kennesaw State University. He is also a Senior Researcher at the National Institute for Research and Studies in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau, and an Assistant Professor in Social Sciences Research Methodology at Colinas de Boé University in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. (ramefes@gmail.com)

Jamile Forcelini is a doctoral candidate in Spanish Applied Linguistics from the Florida State University. She has been teaching for over 15 years and currently teaches Spanish and Portuguese. Her research investigates bilingual and trilingual lexical processes of typological similar languages, the nature of trilingualism and multilingualism. Email: jforcelini@fsu.edu


Heather Jordan served as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nampula Province, Mozambique from 2003 to 2005. She later earned her MPH from Tulane and worked in Angola from 2010 to 2012. She currently works for the Vanderbilt Institute for Global Health, supporting an HIV treatment project in Zambézia Province, Mozambique.

Kezia Lartey is a PhD student in the International Conflict Management program at Kennesaw State University. She graduated from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in 2012 with a Master of Arts degree in Conflict, Peace and Security. (klartey@kennesaw.edu)
Brandon D. Lundy is Associate Director of the PhD program in International Conflict Management and Associate Professor of Anthropology at Kennesaw State University. (blundy@kennesaw.edu)

Dan Paracka is Professor of Education in the Interdisciplinary Studies Department at Kennesaw State University, where he also coordinates the signature Annual Country Study Program for the Division of Global Affairs. His areas of scholarship center on processes of global learning and intercultural competency.

M. Margarida Pereira-Müller travelled as a child throughout Portugal’s African colonies and received many profound influences through this experience. After a degree in English-American-German Studies from the University of Lisbon, she went to Germany for a post-graduation course, having worked as a Portuguese teacher at different universities and technical high schools. She returned to Portugal, where she now works as a translator and writer. She has over two dozen published books, primarily in the area of tales and legends and gastronomy, and more than four dozens of translations published.

Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues specializes in African Studies and is currently a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in Sweden. She has coordinated and participated in a number of research projects and has several publications. Main research areas are urban anthropology and sociology, focusing on the Portuguese speaking African countries, particularly Angola.

Paul B. Spooner, CFA, MBA is a specialist in finance in East Asia. He has held senior positions at Deloitte in Beijing, ABN Amro Bank in Singapore, and Barclays Bank in New York. In 2014 he was a Visiting Fellow at Yale University at the Council on East Asia Studies and is now a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Macau University of Science & Technology. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern Chinese History from the University of Hong Kong.

Barbara von Barghahn is Professor of Art History at George Washington University. In 1993 President Mario Soares of Portugal conferred on her the status of O Grão Comendador (Knight Commander) of the Order of Prince Henry the Navigator. She is also the recent recipient of a publishing grant from Lisbon’s prestigious Instituto de Camões.