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The Missed Dialogues of the Euro-Turkish Relationships

Juliette Tolay

This paper attempts to assess the state of dialogue between Europe and Turkey. Using Thomas Risse's application of Habermas' theory of communicative action, it covers and analyzes four opportunity spaces for dialogue: the European Union-Turkish institutional relationship, the bilateral diplomatic relationships between European countries and Turkey, Turkish immigration to Europe, and European tourism in Turkey. Overall, most communicative interaction between Europe and Turkey is done under the logic of appropriateness (rule-guided behavior) as opposed to the logic of consequentialism (interest-guided behavior) or the logic of arguing (reasoning-guided behavior). As interactions remain superficial and one-sided, they merely are "missed dialogues."

Introduction

The idea of dialogue among civilizations has been recently revitalized as a potential remedy against the perceived clash of civilizations, as well as reaffirmed as an ethical and efficient way of approaching intercultural cooperation and mutual understanding. Among this general civilizational dialogue, the particular relationship between Europe and Turkey is considered as critical for the future of Europe, the future of the Muslim world, as well as the future of the broader West/Islam relationship.

The relationship between Europe and Turkey is strategically very important at the juncture of political, security, and economic interests of many important world actors. The United States has an invested interest in the success of Turkish accession to the European Union, even though the United States strives not to be too vocal about it. The European Union is facing deep challenges when
confronting the issue of Turkey's membership, which affects the very nature and meaning of the European Union project. The Muslim world is looking at the Turko-European relationship with curiosity and anxiety, as they consider it a test of the sincerity—or the hypocrisy—of the European discourse. Turkey is also self-aware of the importance of this relationship. Besides keeping the EU accession negotiations at the top of the political agenda, Turkey also takes seriously its role as a promoter of dialogue, illustrated by its 2005 initiative—in cooperation with Spain—of creating an Alliance of Civilizations, under the auspices of the United Nations (www.unaoc.org). The European Union is also granting significant consideration to the need for dialogue, as the dialogue with Turkey figured at the core of the initiative of European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 (www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu), at the core of the declaration of a “Turkish season in France” for 2009 and 2010 (www.saisondelaturquie.fr), and at the core of the European Union's decision to choose Istanbul as the 2010 European Capital of Culture (www.en.istanbul2010.org/index.htm).

But this emphasis on dialogue retains an ambiguous character. At a philosophical and theoretical level, the importance of dialogue is affirmed and demonstrated. Authors from Gadamer to Habermas, from Thomas Risse to Jacques Derrida, have emphasized the benefits and the workings of the use of dialogue to improve on relationships. However, within circles of political science and studies of international relations, dialogue between different political actors is largely ignored as a politically significant factor. Rather it is largely seen as a procedural matter, that does not affect the ways political, security, and economic interests of actors emerge and interact. As such, the activities of "dialogue" in which different actors in Europe and in Turkey engage are not considered worth consideration for scholars of political science. And when some scholars recognize value to dialogue, they dismiss it as endeavors that are too general, broad, and abstract endeavors to be easily grasped, hence studied and evaluated scientifically.

In this paper, I address this skepticism. The underlying assumption of this paper is that, in principle, dialogue can have an important political impact. The reason why dialogue is often disregarded is because when it is successful, the focus is kept on the successful outcome and not on the process of dialogue. And when it fails, then dialogue is dismissed as being useless. On the contrary, I argue that dialogue matters especially when it is unsuccessful, as it constrains and limits the possibility of positive outcome. It is therefore necessary to understand how dialogue works and why it fails. Consequently, I propose a way of studying dialogue, by focusing on opportunity spaces—which are instances of extended contact where dialogue could take place—and analyzing the rules and mechanisms that apply in each of these spaces. To
evaluate in practice the failure and success of different forms of dialogue, I apply the three logics of social actions: the logic of consequentialism, the logic of appropriateness, and the logic of arguing. More specifically in the context of the Euro-Turkish relationship, four different spaces are analyzed: the European Union-Turkish institutional relationship, the bilateral diplomatic relationships between European countries and Turkey, Turkish immigration into Europe, and European tourism in Turkey. All of these spaces, bringing together people of both sides, provide opportunities for exchange and dialogue.

The overall tonality of this argument is highly suggestive. It suggests a new way to look at the relationship between Europe and Turkey, a new way to understand dialogue in international relations and a new way to uncover expressions of the logic of appropriateness. However, more research in the future should be done to confirm or infirm the following conclusions.

**Defining Dialogue and Missed Dialogues**

The notion of dialogue is often conceived as being something positive and laudable. The practice of dialogue seems to be engrained in human nature and most people tend to capture intuitively how dialogue can lead to positive outcomes. However, few people actually understand and explain how dialogue is supposed to bring about the expected positive changes. Three complementary types of explanation—the knowledge-adjustment approach, the constructivist/transformative approach, and the critical approach—can help understand the linkages between dialogue and outcomes.

What I refer to as the knowledge-adjustment approach is best represented by the works of Gadamer and Habermas. For Gadamer, conversation is the only means to achieve a consensual agreement: “Conversation is a process of two people understanding each other... The thing that has to be grasped is the objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, so that they can agree with each other on a subject” (1979, p. 894). Conversely, Habermas sees communication, by the use of reason in the public sphere, as the source of agreement and common ground, which in turns advances understanding and human well-being. Habermas is however also aware of the difficult conditions required for genuine communication, which he calls “ideal-speech situation” (1984). Defection in communication is considered by Habermas as the main cause of violence in the international arena; opening ways to true dialogue and to “mutual perspective-taking” would therefore resume more harmonious relationships (Borradori, Habermas & Derrida, 2003, pp. 64-65).

Beyond the idea of dialogue to find stable and fair agreements between different parties, a branch of constructivist theory has highlighted the power
of ideational forces. The constructivist/transformative approach goes beyond the idea of learning and adapting its position to the positions of the other, but rather emphasizes the transformative nature of dialogue: people change not only their views of others, but they change their very normative frameworks. Finnemore and Sikkink affirm “in an ideational international structure, idea shifts and norm shifts are the main vehicles for system transformation” (1998, p. 894). Thus dialogue might lead to new norms which might construe a more democratic, peaceful, and just world. Here again, dialogue exhibits a great potentiality for change, but the conditions under which such a transformative power can be exerted remain not fully understood or difficult, which is what the constructivist school of international relations is focusing on.

Derrida goes further in analyzing dialogue’s potentiality to lead to change. For Derrida, dialogue opens “the possibility to think and to think differently” (Chérif & Derrida, 2006, p. 80). Even though Derrida is suspicious overall of language, he believes in the human ability to deconstruct language and discourses and, as such, to introduce an essential critique and contestation. This critique, practiced by dialogue and communication, is at the core of his concept of “democracy to come.” Democracy, for Derrida, is an ideal that can never be fully reached, but “democracy-to-come” is a process of auto-critique, contestation, and acceptance of contestation and perfectibility that opens up the possibility of a future democracy (Chérif & Derrida, 2006, p. 69). The main point for Derrida is the possibility through dialogue to deconstruct existing word-norm-behavior nexus and be open to alternatives.

There are therefore three main complementary channels through which dialogue can lead to better mutual understanding and common ground: reaching agreements on practices and knowledge, transformation of the normative structure, and continuous critical stances. The main problem of these three channels is that they exist as a potentiality, but are never engaged systematically in any type of dialogue.

These approaches to dialogue indeed highlight some of the conditions necessary for a true dialogue to take place. As mentioned earlier, Habermas coined the term “ideal-speech situation” to refer to the set of conditions needed for dialogue. Risse summarizes the “ideal-speech situation” as follows. First, it “requires the ability to empathize, that is, to see things through the eyes of one’s interaction partner” (Risse, 2000, p. 11). “Second, actors need to share a “common lifeworld” (gemeinsameLebenswelt), a supply of collective interpretations of the world and of themselves, as provided by language, a common history, or culture” (Risse, 2000, p. 11). “Finally, actors need to recognize each other as equals and have equal access to the discourse, which must also be open to other participants and be public in nature” (Risse, 2000, p. 11). Habermas has
been criticized for conditioning the possibility to communicate to unrealistic preconditions. However, this “ideal-speech situation” should be taken as an ideal-typical category, which does not exist in reality, but helps identify the strength and weaknesses of particular interactive settings. Still, the criticism holds that conditions of real dialogue are overall difficult to meet.

It seems indeed rather easy to mistake some forms of interactions and exchange of words for real dialogue. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between “genuine” dialogue and “missed dialogue,” i.e. situations of communicative interaction where there is an appearance of dialogue but no real practice of dialogue. The debates that opposed rationalist and social constructivists on the modes of social action and interaction can help here understand the rationale behind “missed dialogue.” March and Olsen, in their 1989 book, distinguished between two forms of logic underlying social action, which relate to two different forms of rationality: the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 2001; March & Olsen, 1989, 1998). The logic of consequentialism is the traditional realm of rational choice approaches and is the result of the practice of instrumental rationality. Under the logic of consequentialism, agents engaged in strategic interaction “participate on the basis of their given identities and interests and try to realize their preferences through strategic behavior” (Risse, 2000, p. 3). On the other side, agents operating under the logic of appropriateness do not attempt to maximize their preferences; rather they try to do the “right thing.” The logic of appropriateness therefore assumes that actors associate particular identities to particular situation, and associate particular norms to particular behavior. Consequently, actors behave so as to fulfill their norms and identities (Risse, 2000, p. 4).

Thomas Risse, applying the insights of Habermas to international relations, identifies a third type of logic of social action and interaction, namely the logic of arguing. He argues that under the logic of arguing, agents engage in “truth-seeking.” Such truth-seeking occurs when “doing the right thing” (logic of appropriateness) is impaired by the existence of simultaneous conflicting rules or norms. In this case, actors need to argue regarding which norm should apply (Risse, 2000, p. 6).

As Risse points out, these three logics of social action are not mutually exclusive; rather most human actions are characterized by a mix of the three logics. However, as ideal-types, they help understand the types of missed dialogues and their underlying rationale. The logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness can indeed characterize two forms of missed dialogues, whereas the logic of arguing is the one underlying genuine dialogue. In a situation of communicative interaction dominated by the logic of consequentialism, the actors’ interests are given and fixed and actors simply attempt to maximize
their preferences; actors may engage in rhetorical devices to try to alter the other parties’ interests, but without being ready to change their own interest; or they may simply apply different forms of pressure on the other party. In this case, there is no real dialogue because the actors are not taking into consideration the position of the other, but rather engage in instrumental behavior.

Interactions under the logic of appropriateness can be more consensual, but as coercive as the ones under the logic of consequentialism. Under the logic of appropriateness, there is no need for much discussion: this time interests can be negotiated but identities and norms are fixed and there is a consensus regarding what needs to be done. Given the situation, the identities of the parties and the normative framework, the actions to take and decisions to make are pre-determined even before the interaction. Only when the logic of arguing prevails can there be a real situation of dialogue. In this case, actors can engage in real “mutual-perspective taking” and real forms of argumentation can take place to decide which interpretation of the problem is the most appropriate, as well as which solution is the most fair. The key distinction between genuine and missed dialogues is the extent to which both partners in the dialogue are ready to accept change on their own side if the outcome of the dialogue commands so. With these different forms of dialogue and missed dialogue in mind, the remainder of this paper attempts to evaluate the types of dialogue that are taking place between Europe and Turkey.

Four Spaces of Dialogue between Turkey and Europe

To evaluate the type of communicative interaction in which Europe and Turkey are engaged, the concept of opportunity space is used to refer to instances of interaction between Europe and Turkey that seem structurally favorable to dialogue and where one can expect dialogue to take place. Two spaces that are covered below represent classical cases of diplomatic relationship: one is the institutional relationship that Turkey has with the European Union, especially under Turkey’s accession negotiations; the other one covers the bilateral political relationships between individual European countries and Turkey, i.e. the more traditional diplomatic bilateral relationships. The other two spaces reviewed here are places where large-scale interaction occurs between Turkish and European actors even though these are not considered traditional cases of diplomacy. As will be shown, however, these places of interactions, namely Turkish immigration to Europe and European tourism in Turkey, have important political and diplomatic implications and hold a central place in the overall dialogue between Europe and Turkey. The findings presented below build mainly on the existing literature of these four different areas. My goal
here is mainly to reframe these findings so as to evaluate the nature of dialogue between Europe and Turkey in the four areas identified, and highlight which logic of social action is dominant in each area.

**The Institutional European Union-Turkey relationship**

The relationship between Turkey and the European Union is a very dense and complex relationship which dates back to 1959 when Turkey applied for an associate membership to the then European Economic Community. While the European Union officially recognized Turkey as a member candidate in 1999 and opened accession negotiations in 2004, Turkey's relationship with the European Union is also characterized by serious challenges. Given the high expectations and numerous obstacles that this relationship faces, one might expect a great deal of dialogue between the two parties so as to come up with creative and beneficial solutions for both parties. The multiple facets and complexity of the relationship cannot be assessed here in a couple of lines; rather, I focus on two particular features of this relationship, namely the *process* of accession negotiations and the *discourse* made about this process.

The European Union's enlargement also has a long history and, over the decades, the European Union has established an institutionalized *process* through which candidate countries have to go. In short, it consists mainly in, first, satisfying the "Copenhagen Criteria" so as to become eligible, and, second, once the negotiations are open, in adopting the "acquis communautaire." The Copenhagen criteria, decided in the 1993 European Council, stated three sets of criteria that need to be met: the political criterion, which call for a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect, and protection of minorities; the economic criterion, which requires a functioning market economy; and the legislative criterion, which requires the countries' commitment to the adoptions of the laws, rules, and norms of the European Union. The technical aspect of this legislative criterion comes with the actual adoption of the *acquis communautaire* during the negotiation phase. The *acquis communautaire* refers to the total body of EU laws that have accumulated over the years. Given the impressive size of the *acquis* and the complexity of the adoption of such a large number of rules for the candidate country, the *acquis* is divided into chapters (35 in the case of Turkey) and it takes a couple of years for the country to actually adopt and implement these new measures. The interesting part of this process is that in the big picture, neither the Copenhagen criteria, nor the *acquis* is negotiable. This is easily explained by the nature of the European political and institutional project: new countries joining the European Union are not creating a new polity; rather they are joining an existing polity to which
they should comply. However, in terms of dialogue between the European Union and Turkey, it means that the only things that can be subject to dialogue is the timing of the adoption of the *acquis*, not the content. This basic fact, often overlooked in daily discussions over the European Union, is a core element in the relationship between the European Union and Turkey, which shrinks, almost nullifies, the scope of dialogue.

Interestingly however, the European side actually uses the term of dialogue with Turkey in their *discourse* to characterize their relationship with Turkey. Even though "dialogue" can only lead to change on the Turkish side, but no change (in discourse, action, and identity) on the European side, leaders from the European Union oftentimes emphasize the importance and central role that dialogue play for smooth negotiations. One example here can illustrate this last point. On May 27, 2008, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement made a speech at the European Union-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. The title of the speech was "EU and Turkey: Constructive dialogue and a spirit of compromise are key for the accession process." Quite bluntly, the title seems to indicate the willingness and hope of the European side to engage in a dialogue with Turkey. And indeed, the commissioner goes on to say, "The history of past enlargements shows that constructive dialogue and a spirit of compromise are key for the accession process to succeed" (EU and Turkey, 2008). But the following sentence reads as follows: "During our recent visit to Turkey, President Barroso urged *both government and opposition parties* to engage in dialogue, and to seek compromise on the sensitive issues dominating the domestic debate" (emphasis added, EU and Turkey, 2008). So, the actual dialogue that the commissioner is talking about is not one between Europe and Turkey, but rather between different parties within the Turkish domestic landscape. And the speech goes on to say, "The Negotiating Framework spells out these values, and it is the Commission's duty to monitor them. The Commission's role in the accession process can be described as the *friend who tells the truth*—even if the truth is sometimes unwelcome in parts of the EU or Turkey" (emphasis added, EU and Turkey, 2008). From these lines, it seems indeed that the European Union does not need to engage in dialogue, because it already knows the truth, so the European Union is simply helping the other parties to have dialogue among themselves, with the European Union showing the way and telling the truth. Other similar examples could be provided, as this tendency to talk about dialogue, but to expect change only from the Turkish side seems to be pervasive in the European Union-Turkey relationship.

This speech is symptomatic of a bigger problem that characterizes European Union's behavior towards Turkey (and other third countries as well for that matter): the European Union regards itself as a model, a superior normative
construct that cannot be challenged, or rather that can only be challenged internally by existing members, but not by non-members, whose position as candidate, i.e. “in-demand” towards the European Union, indicates their inferiority. As analyzed by Yannis Stivachtis, among others, the whole system of membership conditionality of the European Union is replicating the “standard of civilization” which was applied in the 19th century to decide which country could belong to the International Society (Stivachtis, 2008). It reproduces implicitly the 19th century understanding that there are no “civilizations” but rather that there is only one civilization, i.e. one normative model to which others should comply to be accepted as an equal partner. This oftentimes unconscious but pervasive understanding is also strengthened by the fact that many Turkish parties actually agree on the fact that the European Union presents a superior model, hence reinforcing the European feeling of superiority. This analysis does not mean that the European Union is “bad,” or that Turkey should disagree with the European Union for the sake of dialogue. Rather, it simply highlights the fact that this situation is rendering genuine dialogue impossible or meaningless: the underlying discourse of the superiority of the European Union’s model is covering the entire relationship with a heavy normative veil, which makes it difficult to be critical on some issues and hence undermines dialogue. Instead, it seems that the European Union-Turkish relationship tends to be a missed dialogue characterized by the logic of appropriateness, where it is overall appropriate to follow the European Union: this appears to be the “right thing” to do. The internalization of the norm that the European Union presents a desirable model ensures some levels of compliance from Turkey and eschews possibilities for dialogue (Checkel, 2001; Diez, Agnantopoulos & Kaliber, 2005).

The bilateral relationships with European countries

Turkey's bilateral relationships with individual European countries also suffer from similar problems, although the structure for dialogue is different. For one thing, there are a couple of particular issues—such as the issue of the Armenian “genocide/events of 1915” in the relationship with France, the Turkish Diaspora in the relationship with Germany, or historical neighboring issues with Greece—that often sets the tonality of individual bilateral relationships. But overall, the question of Turkish accession to the European Union remains the main issue at stake in bilateral relationships. In the framework of the EU-Turkey institutional relations, Turkey's accession is a technical issue (depending on the quality and pace of the adoption of the aquis); but in bilateral relations, Turkey's membership to the European Union is a political issue. Some countries
such as France, Austria, and Italy, have mentioned the possibility to submit the final decision over Turkey's membership to a national referendum, even if the European Commission has already approved Turkey's accession. Even though such referendum would only happen at the end of the negotiation process, which is not expected before 2015 (in the most optimistic, already unrealistic views), these statements create an uncomfortable situation of tension and uncertainty. Moreover, if other countries have not expressed their willingness to condition Turkey's accession to a referendum, being for or against the membership of Turkey has become an important political position to take for political parties and politicians all over Europe (Akagül & Vaner, 2005).

The question of Turkey's membership, however, does not seem to be a source of dialogue between Turkey and European countries. This issue is indeed more conceived as a domestic political issue, rather than a foreign political issue. On the one hand, the issue of Turkey's membership raises an internal political debate in Europe questioning the identity and values underlying the European Union project. On the other hand, Turkey's membership is creating unique political polarization in individual countries, such as France, Austria, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, etc. Consequently, most of the dialogue is taking place inside domestic constituencies, with leaders mainly concerned by voters' opinion and with domestic groups being the main framers of the issue. Here, as democratic theory would expect, the structure of elections and political leaders' dependency on public opinion greatly reduces the room of maneuver for dialogue. Turkish counterparts are, for the most part, excluded from these debates. European political leaders undergo some forms of adjustments, but only so as to satisfy public opinion while addressing their political agenda, and not through interactions with Turkish partners.

Interestingly, scholars of communicative interactions have made the point that the development of telecommunication technology and the replacement of secretive diplomacy by public diplomacy have open the door for sounder argumentation and less interested behavior in international relations (Lynch, 2000; Risse, 2000). The argument goes that, as decision makers have to justify their actions and decisions to a broader public encompassing diverse interests, they have to use public reason to provide a rationale acceptable to their audience. However, the relations between Turkey and European countries outlined above seem to indicate a reverse trend. In this case, it seems that the effect of public opinion on the way diplomacy is conducted reduces the possibility of dialogue. Indeed, when decision makers have to persuade their audience, they also become tied to this audience. And this tie between public/voters and decision makers reduces the scope of dialogue between the two countries. If there is a lack of conflicting and competing views within public opinion, then
domestic dialogue prevents international dialogue. Using Putnam's two-level game theory, the fewer margins the negotiator has at the domestic table, the less dialogue can occur at the international table (1988). In any case, the possibility of real dialogue between Turkey and individual countries is strongly impaired by political leaders' strict reliance on their electorate. Here again, the logic of appropriateness prevails as European leaders are locked in their necessity to do the "right thing," the right thing being defined by the norms held by their electorate. At that level again, it seems that Euro-Turkish diplomatic relationships are not naturally conducive to dialogue and mainly lead to missed dialogues.

This also means that there is overall an important need to better understand the position that different societies hold toward one another—here the Turkish and European societies—as well as understand the sources of these positions/attitudes.

**Turkish immigration into Europe**

Immigration, and especially the large numbers of Turkish migrants and "European citizens of Turkish origins" living in several European countries, is a good place to test the possibility of dialogue between two societies. Immigration started in the 1960s, with the establishment of temporary workers program in Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Austria, France, etc., when hundreds of thousands of Turkish workers immigrated to Western Europe. Even though considered mainly as a temporary phenomenon, by the 1980s the awareness that the Turkish populations were settling and would probably remain in Europe appeared incrementally (Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Vaner, 2005, pp. 555-577). Since then, much has been said about Turkish migration to and Turkish migrants in Europe. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel, in their study of Euro-Turks, have emphasized the potential for bridging the two cultures (Turkish and European) that some Turkish migrants' communities in Europe can fulfill (2005). In this space of migration, the question of whether dialogue is taking place relies on the issue of integration: how much are the migrant populations in contact, involved, accepted, and how does the integration take place, are central questions to understand dialogue.

Schematically and by oversimplifying, there are two main models of integration of migrants' communities that have been distinguished by the migration literature and tried respectively in France—the assimilationist (or universalist) model—and in UK and Germany—the communitarian (or differentialist) model (Kaya & Kentel, 2005; Schnapper, 1992; Todd, 1997). The republican assimilationist model as practiced in France emphasizes the idea that the only way to become integrated in the French society is to
become French, i.e. to buy into the republican ideal of being French (a mix of political and social values, knowledge of French language and history, and a particular way of life). This “becoming French” is open to everyone with, in theory, no distinction of race, ethnicity, language, physical appearances, etc. This openness to “becoming French” is counter-balanced by the requirement for the migrant to actually forget his or her cultural difference so as to blend in the French project. There is indeed no possibility for the migrants to question or challenge or slightly alter the fixed definition of “being French.” In a way, this assimilationist model resembles the EU process of accession, where one can either fully adopt or not the other’s identity, but without room to discuss and negotiate the content of what is adopted. The underlying assumption of the assimilationist model is that the Republican understanding of “being French” is a universal model, most likely seen as the best model, and that it cannot a priori be perfected, especially not by foreigners. This model has had its success, as well as worrisome failures, and has been followed by many migrants, including Turkish migrants who became French. But in this model there is no real dialogue taking place. While Turkish parties have the opportunity to be transformed, the French side is not learning anything about Turkey, and is neither engaged in much of a transformative experience. The French parties also get artificially confirmed of the validity of its model.

The alternative model, practiced with strong nuances in Germany and the United Kingdom, is the communitarian model. Contrary to the assimilationist, the communitarian model accepts and gives room to differences. It strives for a multicultural society. Each community can exert its own culture in cohabitation with other cultures. This more tolerant model has, however, one main problem: it is only “tolerant” instead of being inclusive. And it often raises barriers between communities, practically suppressing the possibility of cultural blend, or the possibility of “becoming English” or “becoming German.” In this case as well, even though for different reasons, there is no real dialogue possibly taking place: dialogue is considered not necessary and even useless given the perceived inaccessibility of the other, the impossibility to empathize, or take the perspective of the other.

The constraints created by the modalities of integration in Europe therefore create an unfavorable environment for dialogue. Many other factors, such as sociological constraints, geographical and social segregation, translation of languages, and cognitive framework, add to the difficulty to communicate. Some positive elements are also present, such as the existence of local dialogue initiatives, of interfaith or intercultural nature. Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel present a more optimist picture by showing how the majority of Turkish populations in Europe “have become permanent settlers, active social agents
and decision-makers” (2005, p. 3). However, it is not clear if these success stories led to dialogue or simply adaptation from one side only. Overall, the problem remains that once again, the only possible dialogue between Turkey and Europe is a one-way type of dialogue, hence a missed dialogue, where it is expected that change can only occur on the Turkish side. The belief on the European side, that the existing national identities are better creates a normative model, where real dialogue is excluded and the logic of appropriateness prevails.

**European Tourism in Turkey**

Finally, the last space where we will envision dialogue between Turkey and Europe is the symmetrical but unequal equivalent of Turkish migration to Europe: European tourism in Turkey. With estimates of tens of millions of tourists each year, tourism holds a very important position in Turkish economy, and, although it became more diversified these last years, tourism relies strongly on European tourists, mainly from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany. The large-scale number of tourists coming to Turkey and the industry that it has created over the last years led to a highly professionalized sector. One might indeed expect that such important numbers of contacts might be propitious to sustained dialogue. The field of sociology of tourism that developed in the 1980s onwards, and the findings made about the Turkish touristic system can help assess the type of interaction that occurs between tourists and locals (Cohen, 1984; Kozak & Tasci, 2005; Sönmez & Sirakaya, 2002).

The findings of this literature seem to indicate that overall tourism has a rather important effect on the local society and to some extent on the tourists. However, especially in "mature" tourist systems such as Turkey, genuine contacts between locals and tourists tend to be very limited. Rather, tourists encounter mainly agents of the tourist industry (tour guides, hotel managers, souvenir shopkeepers, etc.) (Cohen, 1984). A certain level of dialogue can occur during these contacts; however, such dialogue is often either superficial or biased. Tourism is indeed a business, where tourists have specific goals in mind (leisure and cultural activities), and the professionals of the tourist industry are here to please them, make them feel comfortable to spend their money, and make them want to come back. In such cases, any confrontational form of dialogue would be avoided, and in the dialogue itself, locals will try to please the tourists by telling them what they want to hear. Such behavior tends to be self-reinforcing, as tourists who travelled somewhere can easily declare themselves specialists on the country they visited and confirm the pre-existing views of the country. Such occurrences can easily be observed in many touristic places in Turkey, such as Sultanahmet in Istanbul, Bodrum or Antalya. This phenomenon is interesting as it reveals a new
aspect of the logic of appropriateness. In these cases, professionals of the tourism industry in Turkey do the "appropriate thing," i.e. acquiesce to the discourse of the tourist, not because it is true, or because it is ethically the right thing, but because it is easier and more consensual to confirm their discourse, even if they do not necessarily agree with it.

The Turkish government, especially through its Ministry of Culture and Tourism, is aware of the necessity for the tourism industry to deliver to tourists the discourse they want to hear, and its pernicious effects. For the last couple of years, the Ministry has been broadcasting promotional films on Turkey, short clips of dynamic and beautiful places in Turkey aimed at attracting more tourists. Many debates have surrounded these otherwise rather successful video clips. One of the main contention related to how "Oriental" should the mood of the clips be. There is indeed a dilemma for the producers of these clips whether to portray Turkey the way tourists see it (a center of the Oriental mysteries) or the way Turkish people see it (a mix of modernity and history, but not so Oriental). There is no easy answer to this dilemma, but the very existence of the debate shows how serious this problem is, and how the possibility of genuine dialogue through tourism is curtailed. Here again, tourism offers a missed opportunity for dialogue.

In the four spaces identified—European Union, bilateral relationships, immigration, and tourism—it seems consequently that the potential for dialogue is not realized: missed dialogues are more pervasive than genuine dialogues. There are structural conditions discouraging dialogue, oftentimes in the form of a pernicious normative framework which disables dialogue by providing a predetermined discourse on what the right thing to do is.

**Conclusions**

So far, this paper might appear to portray a rather gloomy picture of the state of dialogue between Turkey and Europe at different levels of analysis. In the four spaces reviewed above—the European Union-Turkey institutional relationship, the bilateral relationships, immigration, and tourism—possibilities for genuine dialogue seem to be very weak. Overall, the failure of the logic of arguing seems to be based on the pervasiveness of the logic of appropriateness. The overall belief in the superiority of the European way of life and know-how, more or less strong on both sides, leads only to the possibility for Turkey to comply to the European model, without much room for adjustments, contestation, and transformation of the European side. The pervasiveness of the logic of appropriateness creates a situation where there is dialogue, but not genuine dialogue; there are some transformative processes, but only one possible direction for change. This situation raises questions
regarding the possibility for dialogue in situations of unequal normative powers, the origins of particular normative discourses, and the conditions under which such situations can be rebalanced.

Furthermore, the above analysis is interesting at two levels. First, the prevailing of the logic of appropriateness suggests, on the one hand, that the logic of consequentialism or instrumental motives do not characterized most of the Euro-Turkish relationship. Rather, people engaging in this interaction are concerned about the normative content of the interaction and care about mutual perceptions. Everyone is seeking the "good" as opposed to individual interests. The fact that this understanding of the "good" is biased and rigid is a core problem. But this problem seems to rest mainly at the subconscious level. This raises both concerns and hopes as uncovering subconscious process is a laborious task, but it shows that it is also possible to build on the goodwill of well-intentioned people. European actors especially need to become more aware of this situation. On the other hand, the weakness of the logic of arguing demonstrates that, in practice, most of the interaction tends to remain superficial or one-sided, and fails to address core and deep concerns. Such interactions therefore constitute "missed dialogues."

Another interesting finding is the role that Turkey's middle position plays in the efforts of dialogue and engaging in the logic of arguing. On one side, it seems that Turkey's middle position on different scales (geographical, cultural, economic, etc.) is hurting Turkey's position in dialogues. Given Turkey's in-between identities and mixed interests, it is indeed difficult for Turkey to have a strong, extreme stance on one topic. It is also difficult for Turkey to find strong supporters within international public opinion. In a way, Turkey is not poor enough to be pitied, not Western enough to be admired or desired, not exploited enough to become a front for anti-imperialist movements, not secular enough to be depicted as an icon of secularism, not Islamic enough to be supported by Islamist movements, etc. As such the most motivated actors of the public sphere do not have an easy hook to become strongly supportive on Turkey.

Alternatively however, being in the middle can allow Turkey to engage in empathizing, in being able to understand both sides, and in building on two or more existing normative frameworks. If Turkey manages to articulate, in an argumentative manner, the core dilemmas faced by today's globalized world, faced by a world of conflicting civilizations (or the perceptions of it), Turkey's role in the alliance of civilization could be colossal. It seems indeed that Turkey's principal contribution to the European project lies in its ability to challenge it and criticize it constructively. This is something difficult to achieve, given the structural and normative impediments outlined above, but Turkey's greater awareness of this role could help. What will be critical in this project will be to be able to use
strong argument and language that can make sense from the perspective of one’s normative framework, while challenging it at the same time. This is a very needed and challenging task, but one Turkey is very well positioned for.

Endnotes

1 With the exception of some particular subfields, such as “peace and conflict resolution.”
2 “La possibilité de penser, et de penser autrement” [my translation].
3 Alternatively, Lynch defines ideal speech situation as “a shared lifeworld, some level of trust, a willingness to set aside identities and power” (Lynch, 2006, p. 196).
6 See for instance an article on EU-Turkey “unidirectional” dialogue over Cyprus (www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/interview-eu-turkey-dialogue-key-cyprus-reunification/article-174661), or over Human Rights values (www.re-public.gr/en/?p=441).
7 Such clips can be found on the website of the Ministry at www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D31395FB1C5180B6EBD6A18E78E0AF5B93B4 (last accessed August 31, 2009).

References


