

2014

Teaching Notes for CHAPTER 10: Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa

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Recommended Citation

Piombo, Jessica, "Teaching Notes for CHAPTER 10: Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa" (2014). *Teaching Notes*. Paper 2.

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TEACHING NOTES

Military Provision of Humanitarian and Civic Assistance: A Day in the Life of a Civil Affairs Team in the Horn of Africa

By Jessica Piombo*

This case study is designed as a retrospective study to encourage discussion about the ways that Civil Affairs teams operate; the logic and implications of how and where the U.S. military conducts strategically focused humanitarian assistance; and the impact of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in the region. The case raises larger issues about civil-military coordination in stabilization and reconstruction activities as a secondary focus. It engages the student in an in-depth examination of the activities of one Civil Affairs team attached to the CJTF-HOA in 2007, operating in Lamu, Kenya, and how this team interacted with the headquarters of the CJTF-HOA that was located in Djibouti. From these perspectives, the case introduces the concept of the Civil Affairs team and how it operates, and uses the experience of this particular team to shed light on a large number of debates that surround military provision of humanitarian and civic assistance and the military's increasing involvement in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Presented in a narrative style that presents a stylized account of the team and the way that it operates, the case study periodically switches from the team's perspective to the broader background of the CJTF-HOA and then back to the team and its supervising officers at the CJTF-HOA headquarters in Djibouti. In this way, the student is presented with the collective life experience of a typical Civil Affairs team, to use that experience to raise issues involved in the military provision of humanitarian and civic assistance, and to present some of the larger background that situates the activities of the team. The dialogue contained in this narrative is a near literal reproduction of what I was told as a researcher by the team members and the officials at the headquarters but also includes insights from similar visits in Ethiopia and Djibouti in 2007 and 2008.

The case study is appropriate for courses on stabilization and reconstruction activities, on the military's involvement in humanitarian and civic assistance, and Africa-specific courses on the Horn of Africa and U.S. foreign policy in Africa.

STUDENT PREPARATION

The case study is designed to provide enough background to orient those not familiar with the CJTF-HOA to understand its basic operation, rationale for existence, and scope of operations. The case should be general enough to be used for various purposes in different courses, but the specific direction of the student discussions will depend on instructor cues and course preparation prior to engaging in the exercise.

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If the case is used in courses that include modules on stability operations and military provision of humanitarian and civic assistance, students should be familiar with the following before conducting the case study:

- Department of Defense rules, regulations, and standard operating procedures regarding the various humanitarian assistance programs; AFRICOM-specific guidance on humanitarian assistance programs;
- Doctrine on the U.S. military's role in stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign disaster assistance, and related topics; and
- Critiques of U.S. military involvement in humanitarian assistance, civic assistance, and related areas.

If the case is used in courses on Africa and/or U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, students should, at a minimum, be familiar with the following:

- Debates about the militarization of aid to Africa;
- The creation and mission of the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM);
- U.S. strategy for supporting fragile states;
- U.S. developmental policy and interagency processes in support of developmental objectives; and
- Drivers of Islamic radicalization and terrorism in the Horn of Africa. (If the case is used as an example of combating terrorism through engagement and development.)

The case study is designed to initiate conversation and debate on the following questions/topics (listed in no particular order):

- The rationale for establishing the CJTF-HOA; its goals and whether its methods of operation will achieve those goals.
 - This discussion could be expanded—on a broader scale, the use of humanitarian and civic assistance to achieve counterterrorism goals. Is this appropriate? Effective?
 - What are the official goals of DoD's humanitarian and civic assistance programs?
- Are such militarily oriented goals effective tools for development?
- Are they appropriate tools in a counterterrorism strategy?

- Is developmental impact an appropriate metric by which to evaluate the impact of DoD humanitarian and civic assistance? (DoD will say no—refer to the previous two questions; the goal is to shape the environment.)
- Can these types of programs really “shape” the environment through short-term projects spread throughout a country?
- Issues that are important for developmental projects to succeed, and how these are or are not incorporated into CJTF-HOA projects.
 - Local ownership;
 - Use of contractors versus local vendors and laborers for projects; and
 - Appropriate selection and vetting of projects.
- Why is the CJTF-HOA so short-term oriented? (This discussion can be extended to apply to Provincial Reconstruction teams and the navy’s “partnership” programs like the Africa Partnership Station, the Pacific Partnership, and the Southern Partnership Station).
 - What are some of the effects of the short-term orientation of the core staff of the CJTF-HOA?
 - Should an operation like the CJTF-HOA be pursued with a longer-term administrative structure than the current “task force” model allows?
 - What are the issues and tradeoffs involved in this decision?
- What kind of effect can projects have? This discussion should consider some of the following, and if students are having trouble, refer them to the section that describes Lamu and what it is like there, how it is (or is not) integrated into the rest of Kenya, etc.:
 - The location of projects within countries (sensitive areas versus areas with high population concentrations or areas important to a country’s economic activity).
 - The cumulative effects (if any) of numerous, short-term projects.
 - The effects of targeting Muslim populations as opposed to the general populace.
- How does the way that Civil Affairs teams operate affect their impact?
 - What do students think of the work-around that the teams have developed to avoid onerous paperwork and the approval process for the official humanitarian assistance programs?
 - Is civil mapping undermined by the search for minimal expenditure projects?
 - Can these projects be fit into an overall U.S. policy goal for a country? If so, how? Is there evidence that this happens—either based on the case or outside reading?

The instructor might want to base a minidebate about this aspect of the case study—do the benefits of local involvement and ownership, and quick impact, outweigh the cons that these

projects are less integrated into the overall U.S. assistance strategy for a country or region than the official humanitarian assistance projects (since these latter ones require coordination with USAID as part of the approval process). There is an entire field of study about the impact of humanitarian assistance programs that can be captured in microcosm here.

In fact, while this is written as a retrospective case to facilitate discussion about many debates over whether or not the U.S. military should provide humanitarian and civic assistance, the instructor could turn it into a decision-forcing case on this point about the way that Civil Affairs teams bend the rules: Overall, does this action promote positive outcomes? Should the teams be prevented from operating in this way? Are there potential negative consequences that outweigh the benefits?

The case could also be used to facilitate discussion about principal-agent problems in military operations, as there are many elements of this in the story of the Civil Affairs team in Lamu and the Horn of Africa, more generally. This discussion would focus on Hicks' comments and the last few pages with the Djibouti headquarters' reactions to the story of the Civil Affairs team in Lamu.

Suggested Supplemental Readings:

America's History in Nation Building

Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina. 2003. *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation.

This multiauthor volume presents a series of case studies that chronicle the U.S.'s successes and failures in state building in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Tate, M. L. 1999. *The Frontier Army in the Settlement of the West*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Discusses how as the U.S. Army explored the western region of the United States in the nineteenth century, it built roads, compiled scientific records, improved river transportation, delivered mail, and supported new governmental institutions such as police forces and the agricultural extension service.

Analyses of the Evolution of Military Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction

Note: This is very selective; there are literally hundreds of works that an instructor could use. When picking, be careful to maintain the distinction between humanitarian assistance as defined by the military and humanitarian assistance as defined by the NGO and development community. The military combines development and disaster relief under humanitarian assistance, while the NGO and development communities treat them separately. In the realm of stability, security transition, and reconstruction, these two different concepts often become conflated.

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. December 2004.

Washington, DC.

This study recommends that the U.S. military should increase its capabilities in four principal areas, two of which are related to stabilization and reconstruction: (1) stabilization and reconstruction capabilities; (2) strategic communication; (3) knowledge, understanding, and intelligence relating to stabilization and reconstruction; and (4) identification, location, and tracking for asymmetric warfare.

Available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf.

Government Accountability Office (GAO). May 2007. *Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning*. Washington, DC: GAO.

This report addresses (1) DoD's approach to enhance stability operations capabilities and challenges that have emerged in implementing this approach; (2) DoD military planning for stability operations and the extent to which the department's planning mechanisms facilitate an interagency approach; and (3) the extent to which DoD is applying stability operations-related lessons learned from past operations as future plans are developed.

Available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/gaostabopsreport.pdf>.

Hoffman, Frank G. September 2006. *Changing the Tires on the Fly: The Marines and Postconflict Stability Ops*. Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute.

This study focuses on the U.S. Marine Corps' activities in the initial postconflict transition period in Iraq in 2003, as well as the subsequent protracted efforts to reestablish security under the rule of law, representative government, and essential services in Iraq during 2004.

Miles, Donna. January 25, 2005. Defense Science Review Board Report Recommends New Focus on Stabilization, Reconstruction. *American Forces Press Service*.

Analyzes the Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study.

Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050125-afps01.htm>.

Stone, Paul. December 20, 2003. DoD Considers Creating Stability and Reconstruction Force. *American Foreign Press Service*.

Discusses the evolution of DoD thinking about stabilization and reconstruction—in particular, moves to create a military stabilization and reconstruction force that would include both military and civilian capabilities in an interagency effort. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/12/mil-031230-afps01.htm>.

Development and Defense

Barnett, Thomas. July 7, 2007. The Americans Have Landed. *Esquire*.

Provides a brief review of the CJTF-HOA and its operations from a slightly sensationalist angle, likely to capture the imagination of undergraduates in a way that formal academic writing and histories cannot. Available at

<http://www.esquire.com/features/africacommand0707>.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. December 2007. *Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance: Final Report of the Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance*. Washington, DC.

This document summarizes findings of the CSIS Task Force on Non-Traditional Security Assistance. It proposes policy, institutional, and legislative changes for consideration by the current and future executive branch and Congress. The task force reviewed DoD activities in

counterterrorism capacity building, postconflict stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural disaster and complex emergencies.

Available at <http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080118-andrews-integrating21stcentury.pdf>.

Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. July 2007. Winning Hearts and Minds in the Horn of Africa:

Humanitarian Aid in the War on Terror. *Harvard International Review*.

Lischer discusses and critiques the logic of humanitarian aid as a counterterrorism strategy.

She also puts humanitarian assistance for counterterrorism within a counterinsurgency framework.

Available at <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1481/>.

Selected Issues in Military Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance and Stability, Security Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations

Note: As above, this is also an extremely small sample of potential works that could be incorporated into the class. It combines case study and general works.

Abiew, F. K. 2003. NGO-Military Relations in Peace Operations. *International Peacekeeping* . 10, 1: 24–39.

Reviews coordination issues between civilians (government and NGOs) and the military in humanitarian assistance operations. Reviews tensions that are caused by military involvement, particularly for NGOs, and the disjuncture in goals between civilian and military agents.

Byman, Daniel. 2001. Uncertain Partners: NGOs and the Military. *Survival*.

Discusses the NGOs' concern that military involvement in a humanitarian mission will disrupt established relations between the host nation and the NGO community.

Franke, Volker. 2006. The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations. *International Journal of Peace Studies* 11, 2 (Autumn/Winter): 5–25.

Hernandorena, Carlos. 2007. U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2003–2006: Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation. In *The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles*. Ed. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs. Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Reviews the record of Provincial Reconstruction teams in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2006, arguing that while ambitious and diverse in their goals and accomplishments, most of the teams were affected by challenges related to interagency coordination and cooperation.

Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub828.pdf>. If the original link is broken, attempt at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA475717&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>.

Note: Instructors should examine the table of contents to this volume, as many of the chapters could be background, depending on what the orientation of the course is and how this case study will be used.

Licina, Derek Joseph. 2007. Developing a Monitoring and Evaluating Capability for the U.S. Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Program. *Military Medicine* 172.4: 339.

Evaluates the state of monitoring in DoD Humanitarian Assistance programs and suggests a new approach.

Available at <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Somalia/Somalia.htm>.

Lischer, Sarah Kenyon. June 28–29, 2007. Armed Social Work in the Horn of Africa. Paper prepared for delivery at the workshop on “Aid, Security and Civil Society in the Post-9/11 Context.” London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society, London.

This is an expanded version of the *Harvard International Review* article, with a larger scope. Lischer discusses humanitarian assistance provision by the U.S. military, arguing that if not carefully executed, such “hearts and minds” operations can undermine U.S. interests at worst and, at best, fail to achieve any positive effects.

Available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/events/conference/LischerPaper707.pdf>.

Pugh, Michael. 2001. The Challenge of Civil-Military Relations in International Peace Operations. *Disasters*, 25, 4: 345–357.

———. 1998. Military Intervention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues. *Disasters*, 22, 4: 339–351.

The Lischer and Pugh articles all raise issues of civil-military coordination and the impact of military involvement in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance operations.

Scenario-building Tool

Perito, Robert, ed. 2007. *Guide for Participants in Peace, Stability and Relief Operations*. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace.

This book is written as a field guide to all parties in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction operations—U.S. government civilians, NGOs, U.S. military, and international organizations. It would be useful for scenario building and debate preparation.

Field Manuals and Official Doctrine on Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance

Department of the Army, Headquarters. 2006. FM 3-05.40 (Replaced FM41-10). *Civil Affairs Operations*.

Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-40.pdf>.

———. 2003. FM 3-07 (replaced FM 100-20) *Stability Operations and Support Operations*. (Superseded by FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, October 2008.) Available at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf>.

———. 1993. FM 41-5, *Joint Manual for Civil Affairs*. (Originally, *Joint Manual of Civil Affairs, Military Government*).

Available at <http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-41-5-joint-manual-for-civil-affairs.shtml>.

———. 1985. FM 41-10, *Army Civil Affairs Operations*.

(Replaced in February 2000 by FM 41.10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.) Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/ar-my/fm/41-10_2000/index.html. (Replaced in September 2006 by FM 3-05.40.)

———. 1995. *National Military Strategy*.

Available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nms/nms_feb95.htm#CS.

National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44. December 2005.

Available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf>.

- JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*. Vol. 1. March 2006.
Available at http://www.js.pentagon.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_08v1.pdf.
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. March 2009.
Available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf.
- JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*. July 2008.
Available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_57.pdf.
- United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. October 2009. *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Washington, DC: USIP Press.
Available at <http://www.usip.org/resources/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction>.
- U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. November 2005.
(Superseded by Department of Defense Instruction Number 3000.05 on September 16, 2009. Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf>.)
- U.S. Department of Defense. January 2009. *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report*.
Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/ORMFinal_Report_v26Jan.pdf.

Additional Resources

- Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa
<http://www.hoa.africom.mil/>.
- Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action—information on official Humanitarian and Civic Assistance programs.
<http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HA.htm>.
- United States Africa Command
<http://www.africom.mil>.
- U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne)
<http://www.usacapoc.army.mil/>.