Department

Economics, Finance and Quantitative Analysis

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-2011

Abstract

We use a within-subject experimental design to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct features of individual preferences: altruism in a two-person context, risk aversion in monetary outcomes, and social preferences in a group context. We find that altruism is related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their self-interest in a group tax redistribution game which we interpret to be an expression of social preferences.

Journal

Experimental Economics

Journal ISSN

1386-4157

Volume

14

Issue

3

First Page

307

Last Page

321

Comments

This is the accepted version of the following article: Ackert, Lucy, et al. "Are Benevolent Dictators Altruistic in Groups? A Within-Subject Design." Experimental Economics 14.3 (2011): 307-21., which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-010-9269-x.

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