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SECURITY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF MANUSCRIPT HOLDINGS
AT SOUTHERN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES

Katherine F. Martin

Part I:
Administration, Staffing, and Physical Security

Any study, however cursory, of the professional care and management of manuscripts and related materials brings to light an important difference between the handling of such items and of other resources more commonly found in the academic library. Only in the domain of the rare book librarian is the manuscript curator's emphasis on preservation, rather than the more characteristic accent on service, mirrored.

Preservation and protection have traditionally been the maxims of those responsible for manuscript and archival materials. This orientation has developed naturally out of the recognition of the uniqueness of such resources and their consequent historical and monetary value. With the development in this century of a new appreciation for original source materials, the manuscript curator has more and more come to realize the need to balance the objectives of preservation and service. Hence a middle ground between answering the demands of today's patron and insuring the preservation of irreplaceable records of the past for the enlightenment of future generations has become the goal of the responsible administrator.

The last quarter century has seen the evolution of a growing uniformity in principle and practice where the security of manuscript collections has been concerned. The goal has been the reduction of physical damage and impaired usefulness caused by both human tampering and such natural enemies as fire and water. If the emphases in the professional literature can be accepted as accurate gauges of archivists' concerns, an increased awareness of security problems in general and a growing first-hand contact with theft and mutilation in particular have focused attention on the problem of insuring preservation while continuing to provide service to qualified applicants. Any reluctance to codify and uniformly enforce security regulations has largely disappeared; and a formal onslaught on security problems, highlighted by the Society of American Archivists' creation of an Archival Security Program in 1975, has been initiated.

In the development of a professional consensus on what is desirable if not always attainable in security procedures, attention has frequently been focused on combating thievery. Changes in staff training, surveillance techniques, exit control, physical arrangement
of collections, inventorying, marking of manuscripts, and the screen-
ing, registration, and regulation of the reading room conduct of
patrons have been implemented in developing defenses against theft.
The role of fire and intruder detection devices and of records on the
use and duplication of materials in improving security and collection
control has also been widely recognized. Complete and accurate rec-
ords have proven crucial as well to the recovery of missing items and
the collection of insurance premiums. In order to combat both "know-
ing and innocent destruction and abuse" in all sectors, blind confi-
dence and public faith have been abandoned and a variety of precau-
tionary measures instituted.

What then have emerged as the primary keys to achieving the crit-
ical balance between collection security and maintaining accessibil-
ity? Two closely connected areas have been most frequently discussed
in the literature: the selection and training of personnel and the
regulation of readers.

Security begins with the screening and scrutiny of those employed
by the repository and of all others having access to the premises, in-
cluding the maintenance, housekeeping, and other professional staff of
the institution. Staff attitude, particularly as it affects security
procedures involving interaction with patrons, has also been recog-
ized as crucial. As James B. Rhoads, then Assistant Archivist for
Civil Archives at the National Archives, noted in 1966, the training
and indoctrination of staff members must revolve around the precept
that "a good archivist must also be suspicious." He encouraged the
development of "collective vigilance" as a professional trait, believ-
ing it to be particularly valuable in discouraging the professional
thief.

It is, however, as it affects relations with potential readers
that manuscript security has received the greatest attention. A
series of procedures which, as a whole, provide for complete control
of public use is commonly advocated. It is widely recommended that
credentials of a potential researcher be carefully reviewed, his re-
search purposes determined, and he be provided a written explanation
of the rules governing access. All personal possessions not essential
to the use of manuscripts are to be left outside the reading room; in
many instances it is suggested that only pencil and paper be allowed.
To monitor the actual use of collections, direct staff supervision,
daily registration, use of signed request forms, and limits on the
amount of manuscript material provided at one time are recommended.

Other favored security measures include such access controls as
restricted entry to stack areas and staff supervision of duplicating
procedures. Even where such strict precautions are exercised, many
observers also recommend inventorying materials following their use
and examining patron possessions on departure.

In support of such use regulations, a number of physical proce-
dures have been developed; these also provide protection against
after-hours theft and environmental hazards. These measures include the control of access to collection facilities, installation of devices to warn of fires and intruders, arranging for special storage for particularly valuable items, providing protective devices for displays, and preparing thorough descriptions of a collection's holdings. Foremost among these precautionary measures, however, are those which reduce the dangers connected with the handling of manuscripts. Recommended procedures include, for example, the substitution of copies for valuable items in order to avoid wear, reduce the possibility of theft, and provide proof of ownership in the event the original is stolen and subsequently recovered. 

A related, although far more controversial, practice is the marking of certain manuscripts with an indelible inseigne of ownership. While some believe that such alteration or defacement is to be discouraged, many authorities agree that the practice can be of value when selectively applied to those items which are both valuable and marketable, and thus most likely to tempt the professional thief.

The recommendations that have been made by earnest and well-qualified analysts of the security problem constitute in toto a comprehensive program for manuscript preservation that does not interfere with use by qualified applicants. It remains to be determined, however, to what extent such proposals have been and can be translated into practice. What is not to be found in the literature is an indication of the degree to which such procedures have been implemented.

This study, conducted early in 1979, was designed to examine the correlation between the theory propounded in the literature and the safeguards actually employed by those institutions responsible for the housing and protection of manuscripts. A questionnaire covering the areas of administration, staffing, physical security, reader services, insurance, and collection control was developed for this purpose. Academic library repositories were surveyed in order to provide information on a broad variety of manuscript materials, collection sizes, administrative structures, and financial conditions. It was also hoped that by this limitation of recipients to a single, although admittedly heterogeneous, type of repository that the problem of erroneous generalization could be avoided.

Questionnaires were distributed to institutional libraries in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia so that a cross section of academic library situations broad enough to permit national as well as regional conclusions might be obtained. At the same time, this geographic limitation insured that the number of responses would remain manageable. This was not a random sampling of the academic libraries in the region, but an attempt at a comprehensive polling of the institutions where manuscripts were to be found, whether in separate collections, institutional archives, or multimedia special collections, or as isolated items. Provision was made for anonymity on the
part of the respondent.

Libraries were included in the survey on the basis of descriptions of special collections contained in the 1976-1977 and 1978 issues of the American Library Directory and the lists of repositories included in Philip M. Hamer's A Guide to Archives and Manuscripts in the United States, the National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections, J. Albert Robbins's American Literary Manuscripts, and A Checklist of Holdings in Academic, Historical and Public Libraries, Museums, and Authors' Homes in the United States (2d ed.). Where these sources proved inconclusive, individual college catalogs were also consulted.

Those libraries whose holdings appeared to consist wholly of oral history transcripts or tapes or of college archives were excluded from this survey. Where multiple libraries on a single campus had manuscript holdings, all were slated for separate surveying. When the presence or absence of manuscript materials could not be confirmed, institutions were included in order to avoid omission of any repositories.

The result was a list of 210 academic libraries. During the month-long survey period, some type of response was received from 129 of these (61.4%); however, only 86 (40.9%) were usable in this project. Most of those eliminated reported having no manuscript materials.

It is hoped that analysis of the information obtained through the survey will contribute to an understanding of the way in which security policies and procedures in individual repositories differ with size of collection, administrative structure, and the nature of the host institution. While the impact of financial constraints does not go unrecognized, this evaluation should also illustrate institutional priorities and preferences as they relate to the range of security procedures that can be implemented. Finally, it is hoped that this study will aid in identifying areas in need of continued attention and improvement.

The nature of the security measures prevailing in the institutions participating in this survey might tentatively be explained by the relative youth of those manuscript collecting programs. Sixty-six institutions reported the founding date of the manuscript collection or the collecting practice of their libraries. Only eight (12.1%) of these respondents laid claim to pre-twentieth century origins, with three dating from the 1830's. Thirty-six (54.5%) reported that manuscripts had become part of their library holdings only in the 1960's and 1970's, with this number evenly divided between the two decades. The youngest collections were established in 1977.

A similar clustering of responses characterized the reports of the number of separate manuscript groups administered by each repository. Of the sixty-five respondents on this topic, twenty-one (32.3%)
held fewer than twenty-five such groups, while another twenty (30.7%) had between twenty-five and one hundred. Only six collections (9.23%) administered more than one thousand manuscript groups.  

The majority of the manuscript collections in the responding libraries were not only recently established and fairly small but were also administered jointly with other special materials; this was true in fifty-nine (68.6%) cases. Only twenty-two institutions (25.6%) reported having separate manuscript departments in their libraries. In four institutions manuscript holdings were under the jurisdiction of the reference department.

Whatever the size of the collection, and whether it was administered separately or in conjunction with other materials, it was dependent for its security first and foremost upon the staff responsible for its care and management. In the majority of libraries surveyed, manuscripts were administered by a very small number of staff members. Of the seventy-nine institutions providing information about their personnel, thirty-one (39.2%) reported that manuscript materials were the concern of only one full-time professional staff member, who had either one or no full-time nonprofessional assistant. Eighteen libraries (22.78%) had only one full-time staff member with responsibility for their manuscript collections. The largest staff reported numbered thirty-eight full-time employees, including five professionals; two other libraries had combined full-time staffs of thirteen individuals in the department responsible for manuscript holdings. Very few institutions noted the presence of numerous part-time staff members; for the most part, these appeared to be students with limited duties.

The first factor in security is prevention, and, whatever its size or training, the alertness and general reliability of the staff are critical elements in achieving this goal. Staff contributions to an effective security program can include, in addition to such expected expedients as careful surveillance and the regulation of patron behavior, the maintenance of a reliable catalog and other finding aids, regular inventorying of at least the more important individual items, and the preparation and long-term preservation of access logs, all of vital aid in the identification and recovery of materials.

Surprisingly, in spite of strong recommendations to the contrary in the literature, 10 few of the responding libraries appear to have any formal organization for security purposes; this is true of both the individual departments and of the library systems. Only in eighteen (22.2%) of the eighty-one institutions that provided information on this topic is there a library security officer. And in only two repositories (2.46%), both of which number among the largest collections, is there an individual who can be considered a staff security officer in the manuscript department; even here, the allocation of this responsibility is informal and does not reflect any special training.
Few libraries run security checks on those responsible for manuscript materials, although the participation of insiders in the theft of these items has been amply demonstrated in recent years. Only in six (7.69%) of the seventy-eight institutions responding to this query were such background investigations conducted, and then not always as a regular practice. In certain repositories only those whom the staff already knew or who were recommended by trusted mutual acquaintances were ordinarily hired. The general absence of such formal precautions might well be attributed to the nature of institutional hiring policies, and to limits on time and resources, as well as a natural reluctance to go beyond the written record and personal impressions.

One of the simplest and most economical security measures is the use of staff identification badges. Yet only one library among the eighty-six respondents makes such a demand of both its special collections and regular staff; another limits this practice to the student assistants in its manuscript department. In five other cases the wearing of such badges is optional, and it is under consideration in a sixth. The small size of many staffs would, of course, limit the need for such identification for security purposes. Yet the practice would be helpful in distinguishing between nondepartmental staff and outsiders for the purposes of restricting access and challenging intruders.

Supplementing the activities of a carefully selected and well-trained staff and, in fact, making worthwhile their security consciousness is a secure physical plant. This is effected through the implementation of a variety of procedures which support surveillance efforts and enhance physical security without unduly impeding or inconveniencing the public. What archivist Theodore R. Schellenberg wrote of archival construction is equally applicable to the quarters housing a manuscript collection: "An archival building should be designed for the purpose of protecting and making accessible to the utmost degree the contents of the building." One of the simplest ways to promote security is by limiting the number of public entrances that need to be observed during operating hours and made fast against intrusion at others. On this point the majority of those surveyed score high, with sixty-two (72.09%) having only one entry to the area housing the collection. Another thirteen (15.1%) reported two entrances, while four (4.65%) have three entries.

Exit control during operating hours mirrors this limitation on access to the collection area. Seventy-two (83.72%) of the eighty-six institutions surveyed employ some type of observation or inspection designed to prevent unauthorized removal of manuscript materials. Of these, twenty-eight (38.8%) require patrons to check out with a staff member stationed in the exit area. Twelve more (16.6%) rely on a more informal observation of those departing. The building exit control facilities suffice for another five (6.94%). Twenty-two repositories (25.5%) employ more rigorous measures, with eleven maintaining locked quarters at all times, five possessing door alarms or buzzers to
control unapproved exit, and six relying on habitual inspection of either materials used by the patron or his personal possessions. Of the remaining nineteen repositories, five utilize some unspecified form of exit control while nine depend on public trustworthiness alone.

An equal variety in method, including use of both local and externally connected alarm systems, lock and key control, and after-hours lighting, characterizes the prevention of unauthorized entry after hours. By far the most popular of these provisions is lock and key control, with eighty (95.2%) of the eighty-four respondents to this question indicating their reliance on this procedure. Approximately one-fourth of the libraries employ security guards (22.6%) or after-hours lighting (25%), either singly or in combination with other practices. Some thirty-nine of the responding repositories (46.4%) use a combination of preventative measures. Twenty-three employ a pair of protective measures, twelve rely on three approaches, and two utilize either four or five means of restricting entry. The most common combinations are lock and key control and after-hours lighting (seven institutions) or lock and key controls and security guards (six institutions).

Forty-three (50%) of the security systems were described as being part of overall library security and thirty-three (38.3%) as peculiar to the department housing manuscripts. In six instances intruder control shared certain characteristics with the entire building while also introducing individual features. Not surprisingly, twice as many of the multiple element systems were part of total library security (twenty-three) as were peculiar to the administering departments (eleven).

Successful after-hours security also demands severe limitations on the number of individuals permitted access at such times. Ideally, no one other than tested members of the departmental staff should be allowed unsupervised after-hours access. Such is the case in twenty-one (24.7%) of the eighty-five libraries addressing themselves to this topic; sixteen more (18.8%) are even more security conscious, with no one granted after-hours entry. For the most part, however, the library staff is generally extended this privilege; fifty-two (61.17%) of the repositories permit such access to departmental staff and twenty-nine more (34.1%) to other staff members.

Security (twenty-four respondents or 28.2%) or maintenance and housekeeping (thirty-four respondents or 40%) personnel are frequently allowed after-hours access. In two institutions only the security and housekeeping personnel are then admitted. Yet, only four departments (4.7%) allow faculty such entry, with three (3.5%) extending the privilege to graduate students; one institution grants access to both parties. Twelve institutions (14.1%) include another individual in this privileged group; as a rule, this is the library director or university librarian. One repository permits the university historian and his assistants such access.
Another means of providing protection to the collection, particularly to its exceptionally valuable items, is the use of a vault or such substitutes as locked closets, storage cabinets, or stack areas. The widespread appreciation of such security devices is reflected in their use by fifty-one (59.3%) of the responding institutions. While only seventeen repositories have an actual vault, another thirty-one employ some other type of special locked storage. These facilities are frequently well-utilized. Of the forty libraries estimating the number of manuscripts so stored, five reported that all items are so housed. It should be noted, however, that some repositories frown on this segregation of special items in a vault or similar storage area, believing that the practice merely makes valuable materials more vulnerable to theft and total destruction by fire or flood.

To be truly effective as a security procedure, such safekeeping should be accompanied by the use of a log registering the removal and return of manuscripts, and by limiting access to the storage area. Yet only seventeen (33.3%) of those so housing materials maintain any such records. Similarly, of the twenty-seven libraries which limit the staff who have access to such storage quarters, fourteen (51.8%) permit entry to three or more individuals. Twenty-three report that these areas are open to all staff members, although in some instances it is not clear whether this means only departmental or all library personnel.

Special protection against human foes also needs to be afforded to manuscript materials on exhibit, common victims of thievery. While the use of a local alarm system is recommended to protect these items, with the warning that it should not be audible to the intruder who in his panic might cause greater damage, such a device is rarely employed. The Burns Security Institute's National Survey on Library Security, published in 1973, found that 70 percent of the public libraries it polled provided no special protection for valuable displays. Manuscript repositories can claim no better record. While seventy-seven (98.7%) of the seventy-eight libraries which maintain manuscript exhibits do provide locked cases, only three (3.84%) also employ an alarm system.

The protection provided for valuable or particularly vulnerable manuscript items through vaults or locked exhibit cases can also be extended to the bulk of the collection by curtailing stack access during operating hours. Surveillance of the reading room and the exercise of physical collection controls are useless as security procedures if outsiders are permitted unattended admission to storage areas. Such a restriction is, in fact, one of the four basic requirements for collection security put forth by James B. Rhoads in his landmark article, "Alienation and Thievery: Archival Problems." In thirty-eight (53.52%) of the seventy-one libraries having formal storage areas, patrons are permitted a certain freedom of access. However, the exercise of this privilege frequently requires that a staff member be in attendance.
These precautions are geared primarily to the prevention of theft, but the thorough repository is also concerned with the protection of fragile items from both innocent and intentional abuse. One procedure that fulfills both functions is limiting access to certain materials. Fifty-six of those surveyed (65.1%) restrict the use of certain collections, while forty (46.5%) libraries make some materials available for use only under special conditions. In forty-one cases, however, these restraints arise primarily from conditions imposed by the donor. In four cases archival discretion and concern for confidentiality also govern access. Physical condition is cited as a reason for restricting access or requiring special handling in only nine cases. The various conditions imposed include the substitution of microfilm for items in poor condition, limiting the use of old film, banning xeroxing of fragile items, and requiring cotton gloves when handling photographs. Use of special materials may also result in increased surveillance.

The use of photocopies or other duplicates such as typescripts and microfilm is, however, more widespread among the survey group. This widely recommended procedure calls for making substitution for rare, fragile, and even controversial items, and storing the originals in a different location. This practice prevents deterioration through use, reduces the opportunity for theft or mutilation, and, in the event the original is pilfered, provides both a record of ownership and an irrefutable means of identifying the item if recovered. Among the manuscript departments surveyed, such substitution is widely exercised, with fifty-seven (66.2%) employing the practice to some degree.

Use of finding aids can also prove of value in maintaining collection control. The descriptions of individual items contained therein, likely to be of the monetarily valuable materials most subject to theft, are vital to the inventorying, identification, and recovery of these items. Conversely, exclusion of information about exceptionally rare or valuable items, particularly from published and widely circulated collection guides, may deprive the professional thief of vital knowledge. The massive and almost always impossible task of completely identifying holdings is reflected in the analysis of their finding aids conducted by seventy-six of the libraries participating in this survey. Of these, forty-four (57.8%) assert that missing materials can be identified through information contained in such tools. Only fourteen (18.4%) of the libraries having such a resource report the deliberate exclusion of certain valuable materials from the collection guides.

The protection of manuscripts while in use is, of course, one of the primary concerns of those responsible for their administration and preservation. One of the most controversial ways of insuring against theft, particularly as it is motivated by resale possibilities, is the marking of individual items with an indelible institutional indicium. The stamping of manuscripts is one of the most widely recommended security procedures and is preferred over embossing or perforation.
There is a significant impediment to widespread implementation of this procedure: "No automatic self-feeding stamping machine has so far been found to do the job satisfactorily for materials which are as variable in size, thickness, area of inscribed surface, and sturdiness as the individual components of a collection of manuscripts." For this reason, the need for selectivity in utilizing this measure is recognized, with the greatest attention being given individual items that are both valuable and marketable. The manual labor and time commitment involved in isolating, stamping, and recording the marking of these materials also goes far in explaining the limited adoption of this process by the libraries surveyed. Eighteen (20.93%) of these institutions mark some manuscript items. Another three repositories report that portions of their collections are property-stamped, although this is not their current practice. Two others intend to institute such a program. No correlation can be made between use of this security procedure and either size or age of the collection.

The most comprehensive means of maintaining collection control is to be found, however, not in the stamping of manuscripts or the preparation of complete finding aids but in the production, preservation, and continual updating of such tools as shelflists and access logs, and in regular inventorying, at least of designated special items. The value of these practices is recognized to varying degrees by institutions which participated in this study.

Sixty-three (73.25%) report the existence of a shelflist. Fifty-three (61.62%) conduct inventories; twenty-seven of the whole collection, sixteen of special items only, and five of both. Two did not specify the nature of their inventory practice. Shelflists represent a continual updating process at thirty-one (49.2%) of the sixty-three repositories which produce them; another six have updated this record during the past year. Five repositories were engaged in such updating at the time this survey was conducted. Of the fifty-three departments which inventory their holdings, twenty-five (47.16%) do so on a regular basis; thirty-one conducted some form of inventory during the past year.

Only twenty-nine repositories (33.73%) report that they maintain the access logs vital both in tracing thefts and establishing culpability; at least twenty of these appear to have near-complete records, most commonly in the form of researcher request slips. Of these twenty-nine repositories, nineteen (65.5%) report visits by 250 or more researchers during the previous fiscal year; these nineteen constitute nearly 50 percent of those reporting this number of patrons.

Physical protection, not only against the human foe but also against the hazards of the elements, can be extended to manuscripts through the installation of fire detection and control devices and through the elimination of storage areas susceptible to water damage. Where these precautions fail, the shelflist and inventory along with complete finding aids can prove invaluable in identifying damaged or
destroyed materials.

The National Fire Protection Association notes that the location of the parent building, type of construction materials, arrangement of the interior, quality of storage arrangements, and proximity of the local fire department are all crucial elements in combating this threat; but the individual manuscript department or special collection has little influence over precautions in this area other than soliciting the fire detection and suppression equipment necessary to protect its holdings adequately.¹⁷ Fourteen means of combating fire have been identified by the National Fire Protection Association,¹⁸ but in actual practice the choices of those concerned with protecting manuscript materials are much more limited.

Security expert Timothy Walch reports that the water sprinkler, which is the most economical, and the gas device, including carbon dioxide and the Halon system, are most commonly used in archival situations.¹⁹ There are problems with the use of noncombustible gas as a fire-fighting device because of its toxicity to humans; for many libraries such a system is also prohibitively expensive. Only four (4.87%) of the eighty-two respondents on this topic use the Halon 1301 system, while two others (2.43%) rely on carbon dioxide. In four of these six cases, the system was supplemented with other preventative measures.

The type of fire protection devices more commonly employed reflects little of the current emphasis on control without contributing to damage with water or chemical agents. Sixty-six of eighty-two respondents (80.48%) relied on fire extinguishers. Half as many use either smoke sensors (thirty-three libraries or 40.24%) or fire doors (thirty-four libraries or 42.68%) to control potential fire damage. Sixteen departments (19.51%) possess fire hose units and twelve (14.63%) have sprinkler systems, while only thirteen (15.85%) employ temperature-sensitive detection devices.

Some fifty-three of the eighty-two repositories providing information about fire prevention and control efforts utilize two or more means of combating or detecting this hazard. Of these, twenty-two (26.82%) employ two such measures, while twenty-one (25.6%) rely on three or more. The most popular combinations of devices always include fire extinguishers, reflecting economy and general library practice. Six libraries utilize extinguishers in combination with fire doors, five with smoke sensors, and four with hose units. Use of extinguishers, fire doors, and smoke sensors is combined by five institutions; while four depend on extinguishers, fire doors, and hose units.

Sixty-four (75.29%) of the eighty-five respondents on this topic also prohibit smoking under all conditions; this is a precaution strongly recommended by both the National Fire Protection Association and the Committee on the Use of Manuscripts established by the Association of Research Libraries. Of those who do permit smoking, many

¹¹ Martin: Security and the Administration of Manuscript Holdings at Souther

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restrict this privilege to staff members while they are not handling manuscript materials, or limit the practice to certain areas of the collection, such as the director's office.

Perhaps more of a threat than fire is the other elemental enemy of paper, water. Water is omnipresent in the form of institutional piping and can be more difficult to control when flood situations occur. Water can also inflict substantial damage when employed in firefighting. As Pamela W. Darling, head of the Preservation Department at Columbia University Libraries, notes in her 1978 article, "Our Fragile Inheritance: The Challenge of Preserving Library Materials," disaster in a library almost always means water. At least some of the manuscripts and departmental records of thirty (34.8%) of the libraries participating in this study remain where they are believed vulnerable to damage from this agent.

Even the fullest preparation for disaster, whether natural or wreaked by human hands, is not complete as long as it remains unsupplemented by adequate insurance coverage. Insurance monies cannot, of course, replace lost or destroyed manuscript materials. But they can make possible the substitution of related or similar items. A majority of those surveyed do not possess such protection.

When items are insured under an "agreed risk clause," their stated value for this purpose may be the purchase price or an appraised worth estimated by an expert in the field. In the case of manuscripts, when the items in question are not replaceable, such valuation becomes purely arbitrary. Under a "valued" policy, the insurance company accepts the stated value as the amount of the loss if the item is stolen or destroyed; the amount of recompense may depend on whether the proposed value is viewed as reasonable or on the size of the insurance premium the library is willing to pay.

Few libraries appear to take advantage of this opportunity to insure adequately their special collections. Only fourteen (16.27%) of those surveyed hold such special insurance policies on valued items; two others remain uncertain as to whether such coverage is available to them. Of the fourteen, only eight have policies that reflect current market values; the same number report having updated their coverage during the past year, with three describing this as an annual practice. Twelve of the fourteen possess insurance that provides for the loss of individual items.

An equally important element of insurance protection is even more frequently neglected by the repositories participating in this study. Departmental personnel may be insured under an employee dishonesty bond that includes all staff without their having to be specifically identified. Such bonding is available in two forms: with a limit per employee involved in the defalcation, or with a limit per loss. Only seven (9.85%) of the seventy-one respondents on this topic report holding such insurance; another ten are ignorant of the state of their coverage. The seven that do insure against employee theft have...
staffs ranging from one full-time employee to seven full-time and ten or more part-time personnel.

The security record of manuscript repositories, judging from the institutions surveyed, remains a mixed one. Yet the concern for improving security procedures is there. Largely small and understaffed, frequently underfunded and confined to antiquated and unsuitable quarters, many of these facilities have implemented the physical safeguards and established the record-keeping systems recommended for protecting the valuable materials under their care.

(Part II of Ms. Martin's study of security practices at southern academic libraries, "Security Procedures and the Patron," will appear in the fall issue of Georgia Archive.)

NOTES


8Not available at the time the survey group was drawn up was the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, Directory of Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the United States (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1978).

9The term group is used herein to signify the individual bodies of manuscripts placed together by reason of origin or subject as a means of organizing a repository's manuscript holdings.


19Walch, Security, p. 15.


21Under an "agreed value clause," the insurance company pays a given amount per item in the event of total loss of the material specifically appraised therein. The participating library makes its own
evaluation of the property to be covered; in one section are limited items of high worth so individually valued, while others are grouped by class with agreed upon average values per unit applied to each category. See Douglas W. Cooper, "Library Security: An Administrative Overview," North Carolina Libraries 32 (Winter 1974): 16; and Charles W. Mizer, "New Developments in Insurance and Protection of Library Contents," Library Trends 11 (April 1963): 433-34.


23 Ibid., p. 37.