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*Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets*  
Volume 3  
November 2011

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*If real development is to take place, the people have to be involved.*  
Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Development*, 1973

Consider another moment in which social science was remade together with the world: the period after World War II, when social scientists were called on to participate in the international project of modernization and development. Modernization frameworks brought together scholars, policy makers, politicians, and social activists in a common program for social betterment. It offered the hope of moving beyond the colonial segregation of Europeans and “natives” to a world in which every nation could aspire to the highest standards of livelihood and culture. Even social scientists who feared its destructiveness or despised its imperiousness thus came to imagine modernization as the world-making process of the times. The charisma of the notion of an era of globalization is



comparable in many ways to the charm of modernization in that postwar period. Like modernization theory, the global-future program has swept together scholars and public thinkers to imagine a new world in the making. Do globalization theories contain pitfalls for engaged social scientists similar to those of modernization theory?

Within a span of over 40 years, Tanzania is possibly the only country in Africa, and perhaps among a few in the world, that has gone through such a rapid degree of radical transitions. After arising from a colonial system, the country proceeded through a nationalist/Africanization phase, a massive man-made internal migration/relocation, and the ‘villagization’ program before finally embracing a market economy. The processes associated with these transitions necessitated drastic transformations in social, political, and economic institutions as they adjusted and conformed to changing guidelines and priorities. The changes had a tremendous effect on Tanzania’s economy and social fabric, resulting in noted economic decline during the 1970s and 1980s.

In many developing economies that are predominantly agricultural, the national development strategy transitions and takes different routes depending on concrete material conditions related to the specific economy. For Tanzania under Nyerere, rural development was, for obvious reasons,<sup>1</sup> the strategy of choice. It entailed a complete stratagem to revamp national livelihood and meet the aspirations alluded to during the struggle for independence and the dream of each and every pre-independence Tanzanian.<sup>2</sup>

For economies such as Tanzania’s, the GDP is predominantly comprised of agriculture; the majority of the people derive their livelihoods from it, and the majority of exports are primary agricultural commodities. That notwithstanding, it behooved Nyerere to address the fact that agriculture was still very much underdeveloped and that rural dwellers were among the most poor!

The adopted compulsory villagization that took place between 1973 and 1976 was one of the largest resettlement efforts in Africa and a deliberate internal displacement. It was intended as a noble development effort with demographic consequences related to migration. In this paper, I review Nyerere’s villagization policy through the lens of its impact on rural populations and focus on the way these efforts at rural development were achieved and the lessons to be learned from the experience.

The rest of the paper proceeds with a discussion of pre-villagization; followed by a discussion of villagization and its aftermath, especially displacement, unfruitful

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<sup>1</sup> This is a reference to Tanzania’s overwhelmingly rural population and economy, as well as to Nyerere’s well-known Arusha Declaration and *ujamaa* programs, adopted soon after Tanzania’s Independence and discussed below.

<sup>2</sup> Havnevik, Kjell. *Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above*. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, in cooperation with Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Tanzania; 1993.

development efforts, and its effects on rural income. Finally, I discuss rural development, demographic trends, and migration effects and implications in the contemporary period.

## PRE-VILLAGIZATION

The post-colonial period in Tanzania strived for and witnessed a rise in rural production and increased emphasis on commercialization of agriculture through a variety of policy initiatives. Like elsewhere in Africa, these developments were accompanied by further accentuation of differentiation among rural dwellers.<sup>3</sup>

Insofar as early post-colonial agricultural policy is concerned, two main approaches can be identified: transformation and improvement. The transformation approach, which entailed heavy capitalization emphasizing mechanized agriculture in new village settlements, aimed at nothing but enhanced crop production. The improvement approach, on the other hand, placed more emphasis on the use of extension services to gradually improve production of smallholder agricultural producers. As Kahama et al.<sup>4</sup> argue, these policy measures were especially favorable at the time, precisely because they proved to be inexpensive and supposedly effective in terms of reach. This is very much in line with the emphasis on cooperative philosophy prior to the Arusha Declaration. As it turned out, the village schemes were not only too costly but also unable to penetrate to the masses as expected. This led to increasing inequality in income distribution among rural dwellers. Subsequently, the schemes were abandoned in 1966.

In 1967, the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere's economic blueprint for Tanzania, adapted socialism as a policy framework for addressing rural development. The underlying framework stated that, as of 1967, "the growth of urban centers and of wage employment was insignificant with only 4% of Tanzanian's living in towns and less than 340,000 people working for wages, out of a population of 5 million."<sup>5</sup> Following the adoption of *ujamaa* (literally: family-hood), major policy changes in the agricultural sector were introduced. The Arusha Declaration's policy documents, namely "Socialism and Rural Development" and "Education for Self-Reliance," emphasized the importance of agriculture for the country's development. The creation of *ujamaa* villages was an important related feature and, as Kahama et al.<sup>6</sup> asserted, was similar to earlier village schemes but with marked difference in implementation. The emphasis, in this case, was on *kujitegemea*—self-reliance

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<sup>3</sup> Lugalla, Joe. *Adjustment and Poverty in Tanzania*, Bremer Afrika-Studien Bd 12, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Kahama, C. G./Malyamkono, T. L. and Wells, Stuart. *The Challenge for Tanzania's Economy*, James Currey, London, 1986.

<sup>5</sup> Mwapachu, J. V. *Confronting New Realities: Reflections on Tanzania's Radical Transformation*. E&D Ltd: Dar Es Salaam, 2005.

<sup>6</sup> See Kahama et al, 1986.



and collective agricultural production. Moreover, there was a de-emphasis on agricultural mechanization, export crop production, and especially the use of communal ownership of the means of production.

These measures went hand in hand with the adoption of policies aimed at improving the overall performance of the agricultural sector. Pronouncements such as *Siasa ni Kilimo* (politics is agriculture) in 1972, *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kupona* (agriculture as matter of life or death) in 1974, and *Kilimo cha Umwagiliaji* (irrigation agriculture) in 1977 were little more than political rhetoric as the rural populace witnessed no improvement in their livelihoods.

As an economic manifesto and a true economic blueprint for Tanzania's African brand of socialist construction, the Arusha Declaration represented a crucial turning point in Tanzania's political and economic development endeavors. These tenets were to be implemented under village and ujamaa village settlement programs. Rural development, the tenets intimated, was to be achieved through "self-reliance," mobilization of the populace, and optimal utilization of domestic resources. The declaration led to state nationalization of all the major means of production—the "commanding heights" of the economy—including wholesale trade, import and export business, commercial agricultural plantations, banking and insurance, and major industrial production facilities.

### WHY VILLAGIZATION?

Rural Tanzania witnessed a number of changes in the more than two decades of Nyerere's leadership. Post-independence rural development policies were apparently not adequate enough for Nyerere, hence the government's launch in 1973/1974 of the gigantic "villagization" program. The program entailed replacing the traditional system of rural settlements, comprised of scattered households located in small isolated pockets, with much larger, more organized village settlements.<sup>7</sup> Within a short period of time, millions of people were moved into these new, mostly government-earmarked areas.

Much has been said with respect to the manner in which the program was implemented. Arguments for and against merits and demerits of the program have revolved around the force associated with its implementation.<sup>8</sup> The government's basic argument behind the move was to enhance as well as facilitate the provision of much needed, essential social services and infrastructure, including primary health care, education, water, and the like. What remained questionable, however, was whether the aim was creating urban settlements

<sup>7</sup> Townsend, M. *Political Economy issues in Tanzania: The Nyerere Years 1965-1985*. The Edwin Mellen Press: Lewiston-Queenston-Lampeter, 1998.

<sup>8</sup> Mwansasu, B. U. & C. Pratt. *Tanzania's Strategy for transition to Socialism*, in *Towards Socialism in Tanzania*, Dar Es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1979; Lofchie, M. L. *Agrarian Crisis and Economic Liberalism in Tanzania*. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 16, 34, 1978; McHenry, D. *Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages*. Berkley institute of International Studies, 1979.

in rural areas since, without being tested, it was considered a working model, or rather, the rate at which such provisions were made needed to be expedited.

The village was Mwalimu<sup>9</sup> Nyerere's passion and became the basis of the esteemed Arusha Declaration. Subsequently, the first post-Arusha decade can be described as the decade of villagization. What one recalls in terms of villagization is Nyerere's personal involvement in the village and issues related to development in the rural areas. He went to the extent of establishing a state house in Chamwino, Dodoma, following the transfer of the state capital from Dar es Salaam. From time to time, he retreated to his home village of Butiama to relax, re-group, or make tough decisions. At the heart of his ujamaa was a concerted effort to change the rural setting for the better. He was very much open to discussion and engaged scholars like Rene Dumont, the author of *False Start in Africa*, to assess his rural development policies such as *ujamaa vijijini* (i.e., rural socialism).<sup>10</sup>

### Population Distribution

In terms of population density, Tanzania has had among the lowest in African countries. The 1978 census indicated that an overall density of about 2.82 hectares per capita. In terms of the rural economically capable population, it averages 7.27 hectares per capita or 16.97 hectares per household. Table 1 provides more detail about the population distribution of Tanzania.

Table 1 shows, among other things, the relative expanse in terms of land area and population density in Tanzania. Translated, tremendous variation of density can clearly be seen, with the majority residing in relatively low-density areas (e.g., 30% live in areas with less than 15 persons per square kilometer, and half of the entire population lives in areas with less than 20 persons per square kilometer). This is not to say that there is no population pressure on the land as of yet. Some areas do have tremendous population pressures (e.g., pastoral vs. cultivation activities). Despite the relatively vast landmass, only a small proportion is, at the moment, inhabited. Hence, the entire smallholder cultivation is carried out on only 5% of the landmass. In other words, the peasant population was concentrated in small pockets yet possessed considerable leeway for maneuver. Peasants can and do move a great deal, opening up uninhabited areas for cultivation. For many decades, especially during the colonial period, many rural areas continued to use the shifting method of cultivation, despite government attempts to abolish it. Both colonial and post-colonial governments have emphasized containing the peasantry in designated settlements in order to enforce their agricultural policies.

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<sup>9</sup> Mwalimu is literally: "teacher," and was a title of respect universally used for President Nyerere.

<sup>10</sup> Shivji, Issa G. *Let the people Speak: Tanzania Down the Road to Neo-Liberalism*, Codesria, Dakar: Senegal, 2006. *Vijijini* translates literally as: "in the villages," or villagization.


**Table 1: Tanzanian Population Distribution**

<b>No. of Persons Per Sq. Km</b>	<b>Total Population (Thousands)</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Less than 10	1,544	9.5
10 – 19	6,469	39.9
20 – 29	2,295	14.2
30 – 39	2,771	17.1
40 – 49	772	4.8
50 – 59	-	-
60 – 69	902	5.6
70 – 79	1,443	8.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16,196</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: The census bureau, TZ

Thus, one can argue that the first phase in the creation of rural development policies in Tanzania was more or less a continuation of colonial efforts to integrate, to the furthest extent possible, the peasantry and the rural economy into the world capitalist market system. This was undertaken via sufficient organization of large settlements, through facilitation of government supervision and control. Basically, due to the introduction of a cash economy and continued dependence on foreign markets for primary agricultural products, marketing, and their supply of inputs, rural dwellers in Tanganyika officially joined and became part and parcel of the world capitalist economic system. The initial manifestation of this external integration was the growth in social differentiation in rural areas, marked by the difference between cash crop producers and non-cash crop producers (i.e., cattle owners, pastoralists).

Based on the belief that without “villagization” rural development would be in jeopardy, ujamaa’s basic “foundation for rural development” embraced the resettlement of the rural population, comprised of peasants, into new, larger, and supposedly well-organized villages. *Ujamaa vijijini* thus became central to the Arusha Declaration’s socialist development endeavors. A specific and very important policy addendum to the Declaration, “Socialism and Rural Development,” stressed rural development through the establishment of ujamaa villages. Ujamaa villages were seen as the springboard upon which the much sought-after change would emanate, thus enabling the attainment of higher production levels and the elimination of poverty. Perceived as a member-owner cooperative production

entity, ujamaa villages were facilitated by state organizations to avail technical services and production inputs.

During the first phase of implementation (1969-1973), the government realized that the effectiveness of mere persuasion and provision of inducements to increase agricultural output left much to be desired. The peasants always found ways to circumvent implementation of policies imposed from above. According to Goran Hyden, “The use of inducements and amenities during policy implementation in modern economic terms was wasteful and an example of how economics is asked to feed politics in pre-capitalist societies, the end result being that both peasant and official levels of expectation are increased. This is a factor which adversely affects government and peasant relations.”<sup>11</sup>

In general, then, initial attempts to radically change the rural scene in Tanzania were largely a failure. It is true that in the 1960s, agricultural output generally did register some growth, but as we have seen, such growth could not easily be ascribed to the specific policies or programs then pursued. In Nyerere’s efforts through ujamaa villages and villagization, one can see a genuine concern and concerted efforts toward development aspirations for rural dwellers. Given the breakdown in terms of population distribution in rural Tanzania, it is apparent that the mobilization of the populace toward that end was no easy task. Evidently, failure was inevitable from day one.

### **Villagization and the Aftermath**

Since the implementation of the villagization program, performance in rural areas was not on par with aspirations, and more questions than answers arose in the process over the years. On the whole, agricultural output has been declining, and only in a few cases has output shown some increase. Behind the poor performance, of course, were many causes: the weather, world commodity prices, poor crop husbandry, etc. Indeed, the vagaries of nature were partly to blame, but they were not the sole reason for the poor performance. As Andrew Coulson indicated, shortages of food, for instance, cannot really be ascribed to drought conditions, as rainfall figures for the decade do not bear this out.<sup>12</sup> In any case, Tanzania by African standards is a vast territory with diverse ecological zones capable of complementing each other in terms of variety of output. Coulson stated that “virtually every crop known to agriculturalists will grow in one or more of these (ecological) areas. Coffee, tea, potatoes, and pyrethrum grow in the highlands, whereas corn, rice, sorghum, tobacco, sisal, etc., grow on the plateaus and low lands. All in all almost each ecological unit produces its own fruits and vegetables.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Hyden, Goran. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. University of California Press: Berkley and Los Angeles, 1982.

<sup>12</sup> Coulson, A. *Tanzania: A Political Economy*. Oxford: Clarion Press, 1982.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p. 10.



By 1974 almost 2.5 million people,<sup>14</sup> approximately 20% of the rural population, resided in the 5,000 registered ujamaa villages.<sup>15</sup> Thus, the 1974 adoption of *kilimo cha kufa na kupona* (agricultural production as a matter of life and death) under the still revered but failing villagization program was marked as a watershed in centering Nyerere's socialism in economic activities. Famine had especially affected food production and threatened lives in rural areas. Food imports had to be resorted to, even at the expense of tastes and values. The introduction of yellow corn flour was an especially painful rub on staple food in a population primarily dependent on white corn. In so many ways, *kilimo cha kufa na kupona* strived to empower rural producers with an admonishment that production has to ensue at all costs.<sup>16</sup>

With the concentration in production units under villagization, it was anticipated that an abundance of agricultural crop output would be registered for the betterment of the economy and rural dwellers. However, that was apparently not the case. Not only did food imports increase, but export production also declined and greatly affected export earnings. The period 1972-1980, in particular, registered an overall growth rate of 5% per annum with respect to food crops and -3% per annum with respect to export crops.<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, insofar as the rural population was concerned, both subsistence food as well as export crop production registered steady decline over the period.<sup>18</sup> The major causes behind dismal economic performance cannot be solely attributed to vagaries of nature but more so to man-made policy choices toward development endeavors. Like the policies of many other independent African countries, Tanzanian policies aimed at bringing about change in the majority-populated rural areas. Nyerere felt even more personally obligated, but the results were discouraging.

It is important to note that Tanzania was exceptional in the sense that the consistency, effort, and commitment toward rural development were unmatched. Scholars from both the West and the East were fascinated by what Nyerere's efforts meant to developing economies, generating hot development debates. Between 1969 and 1975, Tanzania was one of the few developing countries whose development trajectory was discussed in major scholarly work, with varied viewpoints ranging from such ideological expanse as the super left to watered-down liberals.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Scheigman, C. *Ujamaa, a Phantom in Ubuntu and African Renaissance*. Quest Vol. XV No. 1-2, 2001.

<sup>16</sup> Mwapachu, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Maeda, J. & Msambichaka, A. *Agrarian Transformation and Rural Development in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam, 1983.

<sup>18</sup> See Townsend, 1998.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

On the one hand, under ujamaa, the establishment of planned settlements (“ujamaa villages”) was considered a voluntary, positive development endeavor. On the other hand, villagization was seen as mandatory resettlement of rural people into officially designated settlements that often entailed use of force by the state. These can be seen as two sides of Nyerere’s rural development policy coin. Indeed, as it has come to be deduced, the evaluation of the success or failure of ujamaa in rural Tanzania depended heavily on the success of villagization. Townsend alluded to the fact that “although development can be encompassing, socialist and non-socialist commentators critical of Nyerere’s approach have judged both the Ujamaa and Villagization programs as having failed at socialist construction.”<sup>20</sup>

It remains a fact that politics was in command of the villagization decade. Those who control the means of production also call the political shots. Nyerere was not only aware of this fact but also ensured that it influenced all decisions regarding what he sternly believed in: people-centered development.<sup>21</sup> It is obvious that attaining rural development based on Nyerere’s ujamaa has been difficult for Tanzania. The struggle to succeed has been set against a certain background of both external and internal forces. A good example of an external force has been price fluctuations in the world economy for primary agricultural products that rural Tanzania produces for export and the consequent negative impact on export-dependent economy. On the other hand, ongoing internal struggles ensued between the bureaucratic elite who sought to advance their own interests and the peasants who desired and attempted to maintain a traditional lifestyle at a more or less subsistence level.

Nyerere’s socialist development approach notwithstanding, Tanzania’s development model was unique in that it remained true to traditional African cultural structures, at least in its rhetorical intent at the time. Thus, the two policies (the ujamaa vijijini policy from 1969 to 1973 and the villagization policy from 1973 to 1976) as well as related programs must be viewed from different development perspectives. Despite the fact that the elucidated goals for each policy were different, they nonetheless remained very much complementary.

Was rural Tanzania a social policy experiment laboratory of sorts? Numerous policies have been tried out on the rural peasant population since independence. In some ways, these policies have been, in fact, a mere continuation of colonial policies in that they aimed at integrating the peasant into the world-wide capitalist economic system. Post-independence policy measures have, in certain instances, repeated similar colonial government mistakes, such as the stifling of the development of the productive forces. Tremendous energy and resources have been put into trying to increase agricultural output in rural areas, but it has hardly borne any meaningful results. Over the years, Tanzania has become increasingly dependent on food imports. Consequently, the pressure to deliver by both internal and

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 45.

<sup>21</sup> See Shivji, 2006.



external forces necessitated the adoption and constant reversal of rural development policies, at the expense of the rural population.

The policy of ujamaa villages required substantial amounts of resources for its implementation. The political implications were much more far-reaching to rural areas, especially with the mobilization of the political and state machinery. Indeed, by 1974, more than 5,000 villages were in place. There was great enthusiasm among rural dwellers initially, but it waned upon the realization that no breakthrough had been made to result in the much-anticipated development changes in the rural areas. While some degree of growth was registered in a few instances, mismanagement and misplaced priorities indicated that collapse was imminent.<sup>22</sup>

It is important to note that at this juncture, ujamaa villages constituted only a small proportion of the rural economy, and the mobilization did not totally replace deeply rooted ways of life, some of which still exhibited feudal structures. Subsequently, the villages differed substantially in terms of organization, leadership, and degree of communality, with a certain influence of the predominant traditional culture. It was no surprise that some ujamaa villages were actually fronts for the petty bourgeoisie and wealthier landowning farmers in the rural areas.<sup>23</sup> Cooperatives, which were more marketing than production agencies, could not in themselves guarantee rapid socio-economic development in the rural areas, but they were part of the larger rural transformation and industrialization strategy.<sup>24</sup>

### **Rural Displacement and Unfruitful Development Efforts**

By 1974, almost 2.5 million<sup>25</sup> people, approximately 20% of the rural population at the time, were said to live in 5,000 ujamaa villages. By 1976, all villages were registered, and the entire rural population (about 13 million people) was accounted for in these villages.<sup>26</sup> The creation of these sorts of nucleus villages, therefore, was aimed at facilitating the availability of much-needed services to the peasant population (e.g., agricultural extension services, inputs and produce marketing), an important step in government policy endeavors. It must be borne in mind, however, that villagization was not a product of ujamaa. If anything, the development of ujamaa seems to have been enhanced justifiably through

<sup>22</sup> Mapolu, H. *The Social and Economic Organization of Ujamaa Villages*. Master's Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973.

<sup>23</sup> See Townsend, 1998.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Kitching, G. *Development and Underdevelopment in a Historical Perspective*. Routledge 1982; See Coulson 1982.

<sup>26</sup> See Scheigman, 2001.

villagization. It remains undetermined whether villagization should have taken place prior to instituting ujamaa.

Table 2 summarizes some of Tanzania's key economic indicators during Nyerere's reign, between the adoption of the Arusha Declaration and his retirement. What is revealed by the data speaks volumes insofar as overall economic performance during the period is concerned. The growth rate of per capita GDP fell consistently during the period, possibly indicating a culmination of failed policy measures and programs. Insofar as rural development is concerned, we note remarkable growth during the period following villagization (1974-78) as evidenced by the 4.7% growth in real agricultural output, which was nonetheless followed by subsequent periods of lower growth. The decline in exports over the period for a country that is predominantly agricultural and export-dependent raises questions as to rural performance and the consequent impact on the rural population.

**Table 2: Tanzania: Some Economic Indicators (1967-1984)**

	1967-1973	1974-1978	1979-1981	1982-1984
Growth rate GDP	5.2	2.5	2.1	0.6
Growth rate of per capita GDP	2.5	-0.9	-1.1	-2.9
Ratio of net exports to GDP	-2.6	-9.6	-11.4	-7.1
Growth rate of real output in agriculture	2.3	4.7	-1.0	1.8
Growth rate of exports	3.6	-6.8	7.1	-16.7

*Note.* All values are expressed as percentages.

Source: Extracted from Lele, 1989<sup>27</sup>

In 1977, ten years after the adoption of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere gave a candid assessment of progress made. Ironically, he gave first priority to industry, not agriculture. He indicated that, whereas in 1967 no Tanzanian-produced cotton was turned into clothing, by 1975 eight major textile mills were in place. In the education sector, enrollment in primary schools doubled, and adult literacy grew tremendously, with one third of the population enrolled in adult education. In terms of health, rural health centers tripled. He also alluded to the fact that the income disparity narrowed and the villagization program was almost complete.<sup>28</sup> The completion, nonetheless, does not quantify corresponding effects on rural development overall.

<sup>27</sup> Lele, U. *Sources of Growth in East African Agriculture*. World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 3, #1, 1989.

<sup>28</sup> Calderisi, R. *The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid Isn't Working*. Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006.



It is important to remember that agriculture was at the heart of the Arusha Declaration, and it came last in Nyerere's assessment! Apparently, he wanted to acknowledge inherent failures. He said, "The majority of our traditional crops are still being grown by the same methods as our forefathers used."<sup>29</sup> He continued, "We have continued to shout at the peasants, and exhort them to produce more, without doing much to help them or to work with them in a relationship of mutual respect,"<sup>30</sup> and added, "over the last ten years we have done quite well in spreading basic social services to more and more people in rural areas. More remains to be done; but we shall only be able to do it if we produce more wealth. And we have not been doing very well on that front." World conditions had not been helpful, with high import prices and low export prices, but Nyerere claimed, "We must not use that—or the drought years—as an excuse for our own failures."<sup>31</sup>

### EFFECTS ON RURAL INCOME

Among noted factors has been the drastic fall in rural standards of living, translating to increased rural-urban migration. Bevan et al.,<sup>32</sup> compared results of household budget surveys for 1969, 1976/1977, 1978/1980, and 1982/1983 to demonstrate the drastic decline in rural living standards, which they attributed to a decline in cash income from farm sources. The findings indicated that real per capita rural incomes fell by 50% between 1976/1977 and 1982/1983 and that subsistence production took the place of cash production while non-farm-earned incomes replaced wage earnings. By implication, farmers and wage earners in rural areas found both jobs to be less rewarding.<sup>33</sup>

Table 3 shows the rural income structure from 1976/1977 to 1989/1990 and indicates that the proportion of income derived from subsistence activities consistently fell: from 53.2% in 1976/1977 to 39.7% in 1989/1990. This decline illustrates the change in income structure in rural households. Farm sales increased from below 20% in 1976/1977 to 36.1% in 1989/1990. The proportion of wages in total rural household incomes seems to have been fairly constant during 1976/1977-1989/1990.

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<sup>29</sup> See Nyerere, 1977. pg. 19.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.20.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p.22.

<sup>32</sup> Bevan, D. L., Collier, P., and Gunning, J. W. "Incomes in the United Republic of Tanzania During the Nyerere Experiment," in Ginnen, van W. (eds.) *Trends in Employment and labor Incomes: Case Studies on Developing Countries*, ILO, Geneva, 1988.

<sup>33</sup> Nyoni, T. *Income Distributional Effects of Economic Adjustment in Tanzania*. Research Report Series No. 7, OSSREA, 1996.

**Table 3: Trends in Rural Income Structure During 1976/1977-1989/1990**

Income Category	1976/1977	1982/1983	1989/1990
Subsistence	53.2	44.9	39.7
Farm Sales	19.4	17.5	36.1
Wages	6.4	6.4	7.1
Own Business	19.0	26.3	11.6
Remittances	2.0	4.8	5.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Note.* All values are expressed as percentages.

Source: Bevan et al. (1989); Nyoni survey, 1990.

Income from individually owned businesses in rural area fluctuated between 11.6% in 1989/1990 and 26.3% in 1982/1983. With monetization of the rural sector and more liberal trade and general macroeconomic policies, a smaller proportion of rural incomes was derived from subsistence activities, and a greater proportion was derived from either farm sales or individually owned businesses. Bevan et al.,<sup>34</sup> indicate a remarkable decline in real incomes in both rural and urban Tanzania from 1969 to 1983. The study compared household surveys for the years 1969, 1976/1977, 1979/1980, and 1982/1983 as well as 1969, 1976/1977, and 1983/1984 for rural and urban income surveys, respectively.

### Rural Development, Demographic Trends and Migration

From an historical perspective, Tanzania's migration experience can be traced through centuries, and it is an important aspect under Nyerere's ujamaa policies through, among others, villagization. The policies greatly affected rural areas, and though aimed at discouraging rural-urban migration, they ended up encouraging such moves, as there were no alternatives to making life better for rural dwellers. That notwithstanding, what did Nyerere's rural development objectives mean in terms of demographic change and migration?

The demographic trends for Tanzania reveal that the population grew almost fivefold between 1948 and 2002. The population almost doubled between 1967 and 1988, a period of 21 years, and almost tripled between 1967 and 2002, a period of 35 years. The data also demonstrate that the population increased by about 17% in the 1948-1957 inter-census period, by 42% in 1957-1967, by 42% in 1967-1978, by 32% in 1978-1988, and by 49% in

<sup>34</sup> Bevan, et al, 1988.



1988-2002. Moreover, the rate of population growth increased from 1.8% in 1948-1957 to 3.0% in 1957-1967 and to 3.2% in 1967-1978; then, it declined to 2.8% in 1978-1988 and slightly increased to 2.9% in 1988-2002.<sup>35</sup>

Between the advent of the Arusha Declaration and Nyerere's departure, Tanzania's rural population continued to decline. On the one hand, this translates into an increase in urbanization (contrary to expectations) or total failure of villagization to facilitate retention of the populace in rural production centers through the provision of crucial social services, as envisaged. However, the fact that Tanzania was still dependent on peasant agriculture, the quality of the land and its accessibility would result in the best agricultural land being favored and, hence, being relatively more populated. Consequently, the magnitude of population increase differs from one region to another, and subsequently, the impact on land resources and the environment may be similar.<sup>36</sup> The steady increase in population in the areas in question has been accompanied by increased pressure on food and cash crop production because population pressure reduces the per capita arable land while increasing the acreage under cultivation. It is typical to find characteristic features such as distance to the farming areas, resource depletion, declining productivity, land use conflicts, and land degradation in all high population density and growth rate regions. Table 4 shows Tanzania's population distribution by type of residence.

**Table 4: Tanzania's Population Distribution by Type of Residence (Rural/Urban)**

Census	Population	% Rural	% Urban
1967	12,313,469	93.8	6.2
1978	17,512,610	86.2	13.8
1988	23,174,336	81.6	18.4
2002	34,443,603	76.9	23.1

Source: URT, 2003

From Table 5, it can be seen that, except for Arusha, Coast, Mtwara, Kigoma, Kagera, Mwanza, and Shinyanga between 1978-1988 and 1988-2002, all other regions registered declining population growth rates. The differences in growth rate are attributed to variations

<sup>35</sup> United Republic of Tanzania (URT), *Age and Sex Distribution, 2002 Population and Housing Census*, Vol. 2, Central Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 2003; Barke, M. and M. Sowden. "Population Change in Tanzania 1978-88: A Preliminary Analysis," *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, Vol.108, No.1, 1992.

<sup>36</sup> Madulu, N. *Assessment of Linkages Between Population Dynamics and Environmental Change in Tanzania*. AJEAM-RAGEE, Volume 9, October 2004.

in the rates of internal migration and marked differences in natural increase, which are influenced by differences in resource endowment, among other factors.<sup>37</sup> It is interesting to note that there was no significant change in the regions considered the country's breadbasket, namely Mbeya, Iringa, and Ruvuma, during the villagization era.

The differences in population density often reflect the aerial variation of people and resources over the land. From Table 5, it is obvious that national population density rose from around 9 persons per square kilometer in 1967 to 20, 26, and 39 persons per square kilometer in 1978, 1988, and 2002, respectively.<sup>38</sup> These density figures give the impression that Tanzania is still sparsely populated. Whereas population *distribution* basically describes the spatial spread of people within an area, population *density* refers to the ratio of a given number of people to a given land area.<sup>39</sup> Noted, however, is the fact that disparate spatial variations exist between locales, including regions, districts, divisions, etc.

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<sup>37</sup> Maro, P. *Population Distribution and Density*, in URT (1983), *Population of Tanzania: 1978 Population Census*, Vol. VIII, Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Dar es Salaam, 1983.

<sup>38</sup> United Republic of Tanzania (URT). *Age and Sex Distribution*, 2002 Population and Housing Census, Vol. 2, Central Census Office, National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, (2003).

<sup>39</sup> See Maro, 1983.


**Table 5: Census Counts and Inter-censal Growth Rates by Region (1967-2002)**

Region	Population				Growth rate		
	1967	1978	1988	2002	1967-78	1978-88	1988-02
Dodoma	709,380	972,005	1,233,835	1,692,025	2.8	2.6	2.2
Arusha	610,474	926,223	1,344,001	1,288,088	3.8	3.5	3.9
Kilimanjaro	652,722	902,437	1,102,934	1,376,702	2.9	2.0	1.6
Tanga	771,060	1,037,767	1,278,995	1,636,280	2.7	2.1	1.8
Morogoro	682,700	939,264	1,212,659	1,753,362	2.9	2.6	2.6
Pwani	428,041	516,586	633,352	885,017	1.7	2.1	2.4
Dar Es	356,286	843,090	1,357,248	2,487,288	7.8	4.7	4.3
Lindi	419,853	527,624	644,851	787,624	2.1	1.8	1.4
Mtwara	621,293	771,818	884,745	1,124,481	2	1.4	1.7
Ruvuma	395,447	561,575	777,486	1,113,715	3.2	3.2	2.5
Iringa	689,905	925,044	1,183,484	1,490,892	2.7	2.6	1.6
Mbeya	753,765	1,079,864	1,471,784	2,063,328	3.3	3.3	2.4
Singida	457,938	613,949	860,141	1,086,748	2.7	2.6	2.3
Tabora	502,068	817,907	1,034,391	1,710,465	4.4	2.3	3.6
Rukwa	276,091	451,897	696,206	1,136,354	4.5	4.4	3.5
Kigoma	473,443	648,941	848,562	1,674,047	2.9	2.8	4.8
Shinyanga	899,468	1,323,535	1,760,869	2,796,630	3.5	2.9	3.3
Kagera	658,712	1,009,767	1,304,459	2,028,157	3.9	2.6	3.1
Mwanza	1,055,883	1,443,379	1,820,728	2,929,644	2.8	2.6	3.2
Mara	544,125	723,827	942,765	1,363,397	2.6	2.7	2.6
Manyara	N/A	N/A	N/A	1,037,605	N/A	N/A	3.9
<b>Mainland</b>	<b>11,958,654</b>	<b>17,036,499</b>	<b>22,393,495</b>	<b>33,461,849</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.8</b>
North Uguja	56,360	77,017	97,047	136,639	2.8	2.3	2.4
South Uguja	39,087	51,749	70,269	94,244	2.6	3.0	2.1
Urban West	95,047	142,041	208,389	391,047	3.7	3.7	4.5
North Pemba	72,015	106,290	137,086	185,326	3.5	2.6	2.1
South Pemba	92,306	99,014	127,185	175,471	0.6	2.5	2.3
<b>Zanzibar</b>	<b>354,815</b>	<b>476,111</b>	<b>639,976</b>	<b>981,754</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>3.0</b>
<b>Tanzania</b>	<b>12,313,469</b>	<b>17,512,610</b>	<b>23,033,471</b>	<b>34,443,603</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>2.9</b>

Source: URT (1991; 2003)

It is indisputable that population growth and the resultant human activities exert pressure on the natural and man-made environment. The resultant effects have been registered in, for example, land degradation, deforestation, and depletion of water sources and seem to be evident during the era of Nyerere's ujamaa and villagization.

Land degradation has been and continues to be a major problem in many areas of Tanzania. Its manifestation is evident in the form of severe soil erosion, siltation, and loss of soil fertility. In the Shinyanga region, for instance, measurements of soil loss revealed an increase in the amount of soil loss per hectare between the 1960-1965 and the 1965-1980 periods.<sup>40</sup> Similar experiences of soil loss have been observed in other regions as well. This problem is largely a function of various human activities, including overgrazing, over-cultivation, and deforestation.<sup>41</sup> Poor crop husbandry and farming techniques are the major culprits behind human activity that leads to land degradation and subsequent food insecurity.

Deforestation through expansion of agricultural land (using poor techniques) and fuel wood contribute to and are the most prominent forms of human activity accounting for deforestation. It is estimated that more than 300,000 hectares of forest and bush land are cleared annually for such purposes. With respect to fuel wood, its sustainable supply is estimated to be approximately 19 million cubic meters annually. However, total consumption is projected at 43 million cubic meters per annum: 126% higher.<sup>42</sup>

Through the education system propounded under Nyerere's ujamaa ("Education for self-reliance"), young people were to be prepared to be self-reliant upon graduation. In agricultural communities, this meant being prepared to take up farming, thus minimizing the possibility of migration. Unfortunately, despite concerted efforts and deployment of resources, migration not only took place into villages through villagization during the Nyerere years, but Tanzania also experienced an explosion of rural-urban migration.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> United Republic of Tanzania (URT), *Tanzania: National Environment Action Plan, A First Step*, Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment, Dar es Salaam, 1994.

<sup>41</sup> Madulu, N. "Population, environment and natural resource management in Tanzania: A potential partnership for sustainable development," in UAPS and NPU (eds.), *The African Population in the 21st Century, Proceedings of the 3rd African Population Conference*, Vol. 1, Dakar: Union for African Population Studies, 1999; See URT, 1994.

<sup>42</sup> UN. *Population, Environment and Development in Tanzania*, Demographic Training Unit (University of Dar es Salaam) and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Development, New York (URT-89-PO7). 1993.

<sup>43</sup> Sommers, M. Young, "Male and Pentecostal: Urban Refugees in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 14 (4). pp. 347-370, 2001.



## CONCLUSION

It has been argued in general that under Nyerere's ujamaa, initial attempts to radically change Tanzania's rural scene were, to a large extent, a failure. To his credit, agricultural output did register some growth in the 1960s, but the growth could not be easily ascribed to the specific policies or programs pursued then.

Through ujamaa villages and villagization, one can see Nyerere's genuine concern and concerted efforts toward development aspirations, especially for the rural populace where his heart was. It is evident that despite good intentions, at times supplemented with the use of force, the breakdown of population distribution in rural Tanzania did not provide an easy way out to facilitate what was envisaged. It is apparent that the mobilization of the populace toward that end was no easy task, and failure was imminent.

Debates have persisted regarding long-term effects of villagization, including optimal time use, poor agricultural practices such as over cultivation, and ecological and social effects. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the implications that villagization had for rural development, demography, and internal migration in Tanzania. It highlighted the ways increased resource exploitation has affected rural areas and the consequences that arose as a result. What remains evident, however, is the fact that villagization was introduced and implemented at tremendous speed and scale, catching stakeholders by surprise. Consequently, many of them did not take part as willing participants. Coupled with organizational shortcomings, these circumstances paved the way for its failure, which could not come too soon.

It became evident that ill-preparation, inadequate expertise, too much bureaucracy, and inadequate leadership all predicted a doomsday scenario waiting to happen. In terms of demography, these efforts at rural development actually initiated the first steps toward reverse migration into urban centers, as rural areas could no longer offer the kind of opportunities for better livelihood long sought by rural residents. In many areas, traditional farming and land tenure systems have been unable to adapt to population pressure and, therefore, have been unable to prevent degradation of the environment. Consequently, decline in food production, land degradation, and the resultant climatic change have accompanied the steady population increase.