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Teaching Notes for CHAPTER 4: Mozambique: A Chance for Peace

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TEACHING NOTES

Mozambique: A Chance for Peace

Ann L. Phillips*

Objective

Since the end of the Cold War, fragile states present the greatest challenges to national, regional, and global security. The number of complex operations, or Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction missions, has grown significantly since the early 1990s. The record of assistance is decidedly mixed. The successes—Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique—are outnumbered by the many efforts that have failed or remain in question. Empirical evidence shows that roughly 40 percent of all countries that experience internal conflict succumb to conflict again within a decade following a peace settlement.

The high rate of failure in complex operations can be traced to a number of factors:

1. Inadequate numbers of personnel who understand the history, culture, tradition, language, key actors, and dynamics of the society the international community is trying to assist.

2. The failure to do a well-informed strategic assessment of the situation prior to developing a strategic plan. The UN peace support mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo; U.S.-led missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; and U.S. missions to Somalia, Lebanon, and Haiti all underscore the heavy cost to host country citizens and to mission personnel when a fairly sophisticated strategic assessment does not inform strategy.

Mozambique is one of the few countries that has made a successful transition from civil war to sustainable peace, stability, reconstruction, and development, despite the presence of many factors found in other cases that have failed.

Target Audience

This case is relevant for: practitioners and academics; policymakers and strategic planning staffs engaged in complex operations; and students of security studies, political economy, political science, international relations, development studies, and peace and conflict resolution studies.

Running the Case

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The primary value of the case study is to educate participants in essential components of draft peace agreements and strategic plans through a comparison of real documents and the official record of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This exercise can be broken out into three parts:

1. Participants should first write a strategic assessment of the situation in 1992 based on “the story” provided in the case. This is a short document that maps out the current situation, including key national, regional, and international stakeholders—their motives and incentives; and identifies the root causes of the conflict, including:
   - structural factors
   - resources to support conflict
   - conflict entrepreneurs
   - triggering events

2. Based on the strategic assessment, participants should draft the key points that a peace agreement should include and be able to explain why. The drafts can then be compared for similarities to and differences with the General Peace Agreement (GPA).

3. Develop a Strategic Plan for the UN mission. Participant strategies should be discussed on their own merits and then compared with ONUMOZ. The strategic plan is based on the strategic assessment and draft peace agreement. It includes the following:

   • Strategic Objectives
     - A statement of the strategic end-state
     - A clear definition of what constitutes success-Specific benchmarks to be achieved to achieve success
     - What are the immediate priorities and what are the subsequent priorities?

   • Key Planning Assumptions
     - e.g., consent of parties
     - role of regional and other actors
     - time
     - resources
     - risk assessment
     - other?
     - of the mission
     - of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners
Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on the strategic assessment and strategic plan.

- **Constraints**
  - time
  - resources
  - risk assessment
  - other?

- **Responsibilities:**
  - of the mission
  - of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners

Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on the strategic assessment and strategic plan.

**Structuring the Exercise**

The structure will depend upon the participants as well as the length of any class period. It is recommended that the exercise be conducted in two parts. The longer version is preferred, because complex operations often suffer from a poor or nonexistent strategic assessment. From this, an equally flawed strategic plan might follow. A shorter option, however, is provided.

For both versions, include this exercise:

**Your Task**

A peace agreement to end civil war is an important first step, but many peace agreements fail. Empirical evidence shows that conflict resumes within a decade in 40 percent of countries emerging from civil war.¹ How do you strengthen and sustain the peace? What must the United Nations do to support the peace?

The Secretary-General of the United Nations understands the importance of supporting peace in Mozambique. He has selected you for a team to develop a strategy for a UN Peacekeeping Mission. Your work is essential in order to win the approval of the UN Security Council for a mission to effectively support peace; to help implement an agreement, once it is reached; and to provide a foundation for sustainable security and reconstruction.

You must first draft a strategic assessment of the situation; second, outline the essential points for a successful peace agreement; and third, draft a strategic design for a UN mission in Mozambique.

1. **Develop a Strategic Assessment** This is a short document that:
   - Maps out the current situation, including key national, regional, and international stakeholders and their motives and incentives
• Identifies the root causes of the conflict including:
  – structural factors
  – resources to support conflict
  – conflict entrepreneurs
  – triggering events
• Considers possible options and scenarios
• Recommends what kind of Peace Support Operation is needed under current circumstances, e.g., Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter (See Appendices)
• Identifies opportunities and risks

2. Outline Key Components Required for a Successful Peace Agreement Based on your strategic assessment, draft the key points that a peace agreement for Mozambique in 1992 should include.

3. Develop a Strategic Plan for the UN Mission This document is based on the strategic assessment and draft peace agreement. It should include:

• Strategic objectives
  – a statement of the strategic end-state
  – a clear definition of what constitutes success
  – specific benchmarks to secure success
  – priorities—What are the immediate priorities? What are the subsequent priorities?

• Key planning assumptions
  – consent of parties
  – role of regional and other actors

• Constraints
  – timing
  – resources
  – risk assessment
  – other?

• Responsibilities
  – of the mission
  – of the international community, regional groups, bilateral partners
Operational planning and a budget plan will be developed later, based on your strategic assessment and strategic plan.

**Long version**
This can be done over two days or on a weekend—however, there is a risk that participants will look up the GPA and UN mission docs and merely replicate them.

1. Participants should divide into groups of four to five to develop a strategic assessment and recommendations for an effective peace agreement—all based on the information provided by the case.
   - The amount of time required will depend upon the reading speed and analytical skills of the participants
   - Recommend 4 hours: one hour to read and discuss the case material, one hour to prepare the brief; one hour for briefs (depending upon size of class), and one hour for discussion as a class. This time can be reduced by having participants read all background materials prior to class.
   - Participants should select a spokesperson to brief the entire class on their strategic assessment and recommendations for a peace agreement.
     - Briefs should be limited to 10–12 minutes for each group to avoid description and retelling the story.
     - Recommend that briefers not be in the room for the other briefs.
     - BREAK after all groups have briefed.
     - The General Peace Agreement text (full) or summary (Appendix II in the teaching notes) should be distributed to participants during break.
     - 45–60 minutes for discussing the briefs and comparing proposals for a peace agreement with the actual document.

2. Participants can stay in the same groups or form new groups to develop a strategic plan
   - The amount of time required will depend upon the analytical skills of the participants
   - Recommend 3 hours—one hour to prepare the strategic plan, one hour to brief, one hour for discussion as a class.
   - BREAK after briefs
   - ONUMOZ mission information should be distributed to participants during break. (Appendix III in teaching notes.)
   - 60 minutes for discussion of briefs and comparison with actual UN mission.

3. An epilogue follows “Specific Issues for Discussion” in the teaching notes. It provides information on the challenges, responsibilities, accomplishments, and less successful aspects of
UNOMOZ as well as lessons learned and how Mozambique has fared following the completion of the UN mission in December 1994. The instructor may distribute it following the briefs and discussion to bring participants up to date.

- Develop a strategic assessment: Since the chronology of events is well developed in the case, start with a “rapid fire” discussion. In quick order, run through the bulleted list. Board work will be essential to get all of the points down. Do not get bogged down in details; however, expect disagreement on key issues such as root causes of the conflict, main actors and incentives, and opportunities and risks. This type of debate is a valuable exercise.

**Short Version** The length of time you commit to this discussion can be customized according to your needs. Participants must read the case materials carefully—background information, the story, and the task description—before class.

**First Session**

1. Develop a strategic assessment: Since the chronology of events is well developed in the case, start with a “rapid fire” discussion. In quick order, run through the bulleted list. Board work will be essential to get all of the points down. Do not get bogged down in details; however, expect disagreement on key issues such as root causes of the conflict, main actors and incentives, and opportunities and risks. This is valuable.

2. Next, through questions, have the students outline key components for developing a peace agreement, which is task 2.

3. When these tasks are completed, break the class into three groups, with each group responsible for one of the following subtasks:
   - Strategic objectives and assumptions
   - Constraints
   - Responsibilities

Each group should have a leader. Each group should be given access to a whiteboard or display board for presentation to the class.

**Second Session**

At the end of the first session, hand out the epilogue to the participants to be read before the second session. Also hand out a copy of the actual peace agreement as an assigned reading. In the case debrief, ask them what they learned from the exercise, especially after reading the actual agreement.

The purpose of this shorter exercise is to build the analytical skills of the class, not to recreate the actual agreement. Based on their reading, are the students able to identify the actors, the issues, etc.? Distinct ideas on what is most important may emerge, and should be integrated into the discussion.
Specific Issues for Discussion

- What was the conflict in Mozambique all about? It is often characterized as a proxy war in the East-West conflict. Under the leadership of Samora Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, Frelimo was transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party. In response, Dhlakama’s rallying cry was, “We are against communism, we are against socialism, and we are for capitalism.”

  - But the actual situation was much more complicated as the story shows. In fact, Renamo never really had a compelling vision or political program for the country.

  - Often a change of leadership through death or defeat is pivotal to a shift from war to peace. This was only partially true in Mozambique. The death of Machel allowed Chissano to accelerate a tentative reform program begun by his predecessor.

  - Nonetheless, Chissano and Dhlakama had led the two opposing forces for a long time. It was these two antagonists who ultimately signed a peace agreement.

- Why did the first attempt at peace in 1984 fail?

  - Due to timing, incentives, and bad faith. Other factors?

  - Although the government of Mozambique adhered to the terms of the Nkomati Agreement, South Africa did not. Why not? What role did South Africa’s interest in destabilizing Mozambique exert?

Turning Points

- Offensive and counteroffensive in 1987: Following its expulsion from Malawi, Renamo launched a major offensive along the Zambezi River valley. Success would have divided the country, allowing Renamo to set up its own government in the north. The Mozambique armed forces, supported by Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops, marshaled a successful counteroffensive, pushing back Renamo and its South African allies, widely regarded as a critical turning point in the conflict. The result was a military stalemate.

- Drought: Expanding drought made it much more difficult for Renamo to support itself, since external support had been largely eliminated. Renamo’s brutality toward the local population increased.

- 1987–88—Reforms launched by President Chissano opened up political and economic space and led the way toward a market democracy. The reforms diffused some of the opposition internally as well as regionally
• 1988—President Chissano offered unconditional amnesty to Renamo fighters

–No significant response, because the overture was not trusted. However, a few were drawn away from the insurgency.

Shifting Sides

• Rhodesian shift to majority rule ended that county’s support for Renamo. Renamed Zimbabwe, the country became a strong supporter of the government of Mozambique and played an essential role in helping that government survive militarily. Later, President Mugabe played important role in peace negotiations.

• British company Lonrho (“Tiny Rowland”) payments to Renamo first supported war

–Lonrho later employed its money and connections to support peace, once further conflict in Mozambique became harmful to its interests.

• Many peace agreements fail. Signing a peace agreement is only a first step, albeit an important one. Indeed, approximately 40 percent of countries that have experienced internal conflict return to conflict within a decade. The failure of the Nkomati Agreement (1984) fits this pattern. Why did it fail?

• Why did Chissano and Dhlakama turn to peace? How did they succeed in bringing their two organizations along? Exhaustion, stalemate, and shifting regional and international environments, as well as a handful of critical actors converged to push the participants to produce the General Peace Agreement. No single defining moment or act of heroism stands out. Frelimo had lost popular support because of its economic and social policies as well as its inability to provide public security. Renamo’s public support was always questionable because of its foreign origins and extreme brutality against civilians. Neither side trusted the other. In sum, conditions were not overly auspicious at the time the peace agreement was signed.

• In other countries, such as Northern Ireland, hardliners have broken off from the main organizations to continue the struggle. In Mozambique, although acts of violence continued, there was no organized movement to continue the war.

• Another contributing factor may have been the nature of Renamo. There is no indication that it was animated by any compelling convictions, ideology, or vision for the country. Hence, with sufficient guarantees for safety, the Renamo leadership was willing to be bought. Money paid a significant role in winning Renamo adherence to peace.

• The General Peace Agreement makes no mention of economic reconstruction, considered essential for sustainable peace and stability. Indeed, Paul Collier, a world renowned economist at Oxford University, regards security and reviving the economy as the two most important things to do in order to sustain peace. ONUMOZ did not include economic reconstruction, either. Demobilizing fighters without providing other alternatives is often a recipe for renewed conflict. In this case, donors filled the gap by providing generous development
assistance. Could the omission of the economic component have been a fatal mistake, had the donors not moved quickly?

- The ONUMOZ mandate was quite weak and limited, yet it managed to succeed against significant odds. Why?

- A central discussion in stabilization-reconstruction missions today is the UN and donors’ endurance and commitment to the long-term. The UN and international community participants generally are criticized regularly for leaving too soon. The ONUMOZ mission, however, was in place only for two years. It was not extended. Should the issue of duration be revisited?

Additional Materials/ Resources

Joaquim Alberto Chissano

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7056159.stm

Afonso Dhlakama

Transformation 10, William Minter, “Inside Renamo: As Described by Ex-Participants” (1989)

UN PEACEKEEPING: Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter

UN peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace. The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the armistice agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Since then, there have been a total of sixty-four UN peacekeeping operations around the world, as of the end of 2010.

The term “peacekeeping” is not found in the United Nations Charter and defies simple definition. Dag Hammarskjöld, the second UN Secretary-General, referred to it as belonging to “chapter six and a half” of the charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as
ly, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII.

Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, UN troops may use force only for self-defense. Under Chapter VII, Article 42 permits UN forces to “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Although neither Chapter VI nor Chapter VII explicitly mentions peacekeeping or peace enforcement, this language has been interpreted as permitting the use of force beyond self-defense to achieve the mission’s objectives.


Armon, Jeremy, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines, eds. 1998. The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective.” Accord. This special edition includes the historical context, ideological shifts and economic imperatives among neighboring states. It also examines the quest for reconciliation, the “business” of peace, and financial incentives and the Mozambican settlement.

Hall, Margaret. 1990. The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country. Africa 60(1). This paper argues that Renamo has taken on local roots, despite its external origins and employment as a tool against Mozambique. Renamo has been able to feed on peasant discontent with Frelimo economic policies. Still more important are the structural weaknesses of the Mozambican state and the degree of violent coercion Renamo employs against the civilian population. The article summarizes the origins and spread of the conflict, Renamo’s organization and aims, and the processes at work on the ground.

Junne, Gerd, and Willemijn Verkoren, eds. 2005. Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. This edited volume examines multiple dimensions of post-conflict development and illustrates these with several cases. Of particular interest for this exercise are chapters 1–3 and 14, “Bringing it all together: a case study of Mozambique.”


the contradictions that emerge in international state building efforts in war-torn societies. Since the end of the Cold War, more than twenty major peace operations have been deployed to countries emerging from internal conflicts. This book argues that international efforts to construct effective, legitimate governmental structures in these countries are necessary but fraught with contradictions and vexing dilemmas. Drawing on the latest scholarly research on postwar peace operations, the volume addresses cutting-edge issues of state building, including coordination, local ownership, security, elections, constitution making, and delivery of development aid; features contributions by leading and up-and-coming scholars; provides empirical case studies including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and others; and presents policy-relevant findings of use to students and policymakers alike.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: the Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press. This book presents a theory to account for the different strategies pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts. It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insurgent movements in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels’ strategies depend on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. Weinstein demonstrates how the environment in which rebellion emerges determines the patterns of violence that civilians experience.


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